Grassley Report Concludes Secret Service Failure to Share Threat Information Allowed for Preventable Tragedy in Butler, Identifies Path Forward for Agency Improvements
Secret Service received threat intel 10 days before Butler rally; Major gaps in internal policies and procedures contributed to massive security breakdown
BUTLER COUNTY, IOWA – U.S. Sen. Chuck Grassley (R-Iowa), Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, today released a Government Accountability Office (GAO) report compiled at his request in the wake of the attempted assassination of President Donald Trump in Butler, Pennsylvania on July 13, 2024.
The Grassley-requested report states senior-level U.S. Secret Service (USSS) officials received classified intelligence regarding a threat to President Trump’s life ten days before the rally in Butler, but failed to relay the information to federal and local law enforcement personnel responsible for securing and staffing the event.
Per the GAO, “the Secret Service had no process to share classified threat information with partners when the information was not considered an imminent threat to life.” GAO offered eight recommendations to improve USSS functionality; chief among them is a recommendation for USSS to proactively share threat information among USSS personnel and its law enforcement partners.
The report further exposes a litany of USSS procedural and planning errors, including misallocation of resources, lack of training and pervasive communication failures, all of which contributed to an unsecure environment and ultimately allowed for Thomas Matthew Crooks to fire a near-fatal shot at President Trump and take the life of a spectator.
The GAO is the U.S. government’s primary auditor and is a nonpartisan, wholly independent legislative branch agency. GAO’s audit, conducted over the course of nearly a year – from August 2024 to July 2025 – is the longest review of the attempted assassination in Butler that has been completed to date.
Grassley said the following regarding the report’s release:
“One year ago, a series of bad decisions and bureaucratic handicaps led to one of the most shocking moments in political history. The Secret Service’s failure on July 13th was the culmination of years of mismanagement and came after the Biden administration denied requests for enhanced security to protect President Trump. Americans should be grateful that President Trump survived that day and was ultimately reelected to restore common sense to our country.
“Naturally, the American people wanted answers and accountability in the aftermath of this tragedy, and so I worked hard to provide that. The information I’m releasing today is a comprehensive overview of the failures that occurred prior to and on July 13th. More importantly, this report offers a clear path forward for the Secret Service to improve, so it can prevent another Butler from ever happening again. This information would not have been possible without congressional oversight, and my work will continue.
“As Chairman of the Judiciary Committee, which has jurisdictional oversight over the Secret Service, I’m committed to working closely with the agency to ensure they’re properly equipped to repair what’s broken. As an important step, I allocated $1.17 billion in the One Big Beautiful Bill to provide the Secret Service with additional funding. I’m hopeful this significant injection of resources will go a long way in bringing the agency up to speed.”
Grassley is additionally making public a letter from Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Inspector General (IG) Joseph Cuffari to then-DHS Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas discussing credible whistleblower accounts that USSS personnel frequently rely on their personal cell phones for official communication, which creates serious security and legal risks. According to these allegations, USSS in 2021 instituted “functional limitations on government phones” that prevent USSS personnel from participating in groups texts or sending or receiving photos via text.
Read the DHS IG letter HERE.
Read the GAO report HERE.
KEY FINDINGS OF THE GAO REPORT
Threat Information Sharing
On July 3, 2024, one day after the USSS Pittsburgh field office was notified of the scheduled Butler rally, high-level USSS officials were briefed on a classified threat to President Trump. Per GAO, “once those officials reviewed the intelligence, they could have then requested that personnel within their chain of command be briefed on the specific information.” USSS had multiple opportunities to share this information over the course of the following ten days, but repeatedly failed to do so.
As a result of USSS’s siloed information-sharing, federal and local law enforcement entities planning and staffing the event were unaware of the active threat, including members of the Donald Trump Protective Division. Local law enforcement interviewed by GAO attested that, if they had received threat information, they “would have requested additional assets” for the Butler rally.
Timeline of when Secret Service Personnel Obtained but did not Appropriately Share Threat Information
Roles and Responsibilities
The USSS’s Office of Protective Operations (OPO), which is responsible for issuing documents outlining USSS personnel’s respective roles, prescribed overly-broad policies that failed to clearly communicate USSS personnel’s responsibilities. As a result, five of the 14 USSS agents GAO interviewed, who “performed key roles on July 13th,” stated they relied on their own varying-levels of protective experience in executing this event.
At the time of the Butler rally, OPO did not require the USSS advance team to review local law enforcement partners’ operational plans or participate in USSS’s central command center at the event.
Further, the assigned site agent on July 13th, who was responsible for “identif[ying] site vulnerabilities,” was new to her role. The Butler event was “her first time planning and securing a large outdoor event as the site agent.”
On-Site Decision-Making
At the time of the Butler event, USSS also lacked a formal policy for communicating protectee staff’s requested changes to on-site security plans.
Ahead of July 13th, a Trump campaign staffer asked the USSS advance team, who was unaware of the active threat to Trump, “not to use large farm equipment to address line-of-sight concerns near one of the buildings – the AGR building” so as not to interfere with campaign press photos. In response to the request and without consulting senior-level USSS officials who could have changed the decision, the USSS advance team independently made the decision to use a “jumbotron and a large flag to address the line-of-sight vulnerability,” rather than the large farm equipment.
Per the GAO, “not using the farm equipment possibly created an opportunity for the gunman to use the AGR’s elevated rooftop to fire several shots at then former President Trump and kill and injure other rally participants.”
Assets
The USSS’s “War Room” is responsible for allocating resources for protectees and protectees’ events. The War Room makes these decisions “primarily based on availability and efficiency assessments” without knowledge or input of current risk assessments.
Due to limited resources, the War Room denied the Donald Trump Protective Division’s request for enhanced counter Unmanned Aerial Surveillance (cUAS) equipment at the Butler event, as “these resources had already been allocated for the Republican and Democratic National Conventions.”
However, senior OPO officials with knowledge of the threat against Trump stepped in to approve counter sniper assets for the Butler rally, a decision which was described as “inconsistent with and separate from War Room practices for making resource decisions.” Per GAO, “[a]bsent OPO senior executives’” action, President Trump “would likely not have received the counter sniper assets that ultimately took out [Crooks].”
Technology
The USSS’s limited cUAS technology used on July 13th malfunctioned, and while repairs were being made, Crooks flew a drone – undetected – over over the event site hours before the rally. The USSS agent assigned to operate the cUAS was severely inexperienced; this agent reported receiving just one hour of training on cUAS capabilities and noted, “in retrospect, [he] did not have enough training to confidently operate the equipment.”
Additionally, many USSS agents and local law enforcement who relied on cell phones to communicate the day of the event encountered limited service, hampering their ability to share information in real-time. Despite knowing the event would garner significant attendance, the USSS had no policy in place to proactively troubleshoot “potential audio and data communication challenges.” The agency has yet to require agents to perform such an assessment.
Background:
Grassley’s oversight provided the “most detailed picture” of USSS security failures in the immediate aftermath of the Butler assassination attempt. Grassley contacted the USSS, DHS, DHS IG, Department of Justice and Federal Bureau of Investigation within days of the rally to begin investigating. He was the first to release bodycam footage and text messages from local law enforcement who responded to Crooks at the event.
As Chairman of the Judiciary Committee this Congress, Grassley allocated $1.17 billion in funding for USSS as part of the One Big Beautiful Bill Act (Sec. 100057).