Posted on 01/26/2026 2:53:43 PM PST by nickcarraway
Last Sunday night, Sean Payton sat in his office at the Denver Broncos facility, watching film of his opponent in the upcoming AFC Championship Game: the New England Patriots. He wanted to have the Los Angeles Rams-Chicago Bears divisional round game on in the background. He turned on one of the flatscreens in his office. He flipped around, somehow ending up on Nickelodeon and "Dora the Explorer." He finally found the right channel, just in time for the Bears to make a critical decision on their first drive. On fourth-and-2 from the Rams 21, they elected to skip a gimme field goal and go for it -- the exact type of call that has dominated playoff professional and college football this season, and can end up winning a tight game or be one of the main reasons for a loss.
Payton saw the Bears line up on offense, and he squinted. "Kick it," he said.
On the play, Caleb Williams was intercepted, costing Chicago three points -- the difference in the final score.
"Why are coaches not kicking field goals?" Payton said, turning back to game preparation.
That decision for coaches -- when to go for it on fourth-and-short and when to kick -- has become one of the most scrutinized and divisive calls in football, an easy sports talk debate. For most of professional football's existence, it wasn't even a decision. Coaches took the points. That started to change in 2002, when a renowned Cal-Berkeley economist named David Romer authored a paper called "It's Fourth Down and What Does the Bellman Equation Say?"
Using the Bellman Equation -- Ei Di(gt) Vi = Pgt + Bgt Ei Di(gt+1) Vi - egt -- Romer's conclusion was clear: the probabilities of what could happen after a successful conversion on fourth-and-4 or less outweighed kicking a field goal or, in some cases, punting and playing field position. Simply put, the math told coaches to be more aggressive.
Romer's findings didn't become conventional wisdom for more than a decade. Now, broadcasts feature in-game analytics, with percentages. Coaches like Detroit's Dan Campbell go for it as an imperative -- as part of their identity.
The Broncos' director of game management/assistant offensive line coach Evan Rothstein is one of Payton's most trusted and valued staffers. He came to Denver from Detroit and New England, where he learned from Bill Belichick, who revolutionized situational football strategy. On Saturday mornings during the football season, Rothstein gives mesmerizing presentations to Payton and the coordinators, breaking down key moments from the previous week's games and ending with data-backed opinions of what to do should the Broncos end up in a similar position.
But in the end, it's Payton's call.
Generally, if the Broncos are driving and faced with fourth-and-short yardage, they will strongly consider going for it. If it's fourth-and-1 after the opponent turns the ball over and gives Denver a short field, Payton will usually take the points.
Sunday's AFC championship was different, of course. It was different because quarterback Jarrett Stidham was making his first start of the season after star Bo Nix fractured his ankle last week. It was different because Denver's defense hadn't played particularly well against top opponents since the bye week. It was different because the Broncos could have easily lost to the Buffalo Bills in the divisional round because their red zone offense was inefficient: one touchdown in four trips. And it was different because a Super Bowl appearance was on the line. All of those facts can be used to argue for or against going for it on fourth-and-short.
In the second quarter Sunday against New England, the Broncos were up 7-0. They drove into the Patriots red zone. On third-and-6, Stidham scrambled right for 5 yards to the New England 14-yard line. That left fourth-and-1 -- and a familiar decision. Denver had gained yardage on every play of that drive, and to that point, its defense had forced three punts.
"I wanted 14-0," Payton later told me.
Going for it is one thing; finding a good play is another. Payton ordered 11 personnel -- one running back, one tight end and three receivers -- and from it called a running play called Nickel Duo. "A sub-run versus a sub-front," he said.
Then, Payton called timeout. He wanted to think.
Duo was Denver's top fourth-and-short run; Slipper Naked, a bootleg to the right, was its top fourth-and-short pass. He went with the pass. But at the snap, the Patriots surprised Denver by playing Red 2, a zone defense, behind a six-man front. The play had no chance. Stidham threw into traffic, incomplete. Denver not only missed out on three points but also missed out on its last, best opportunity for easy points. The Broncos never got so close to the end zone the rest of the game.
"I wish I'd stayed with the initial play call," Payton said softly, leaving the stadium. "The look they showed on film, and the look we saw, wasn't the look we got."
Denver, the AFC's top seed and a home underdog for both playoff games, lost for many reasons. The Broncos failed to run, and catch, well. They missed two field goals. Stidham fumbled in the second quarter, leading to New England's only touchdown, and threw an interception late in the game. Denver's defense played one of its best games of the year but forced zero turnovers. A priority all week -- in coaches' game-planning sessions and in full-team meetings -- was to contain quarterback Drake Maye and keep him from running. Maye ended up with 10 carries for 65 yards and a touchdown, including a run left to ice the game with just under two minutes left.
But Denver also lost because of Payton's decision. Something about fourth down brings out the explicable and inexplicable in coaches, the rational and irrational. You never know what you'll get. To this day, Belichick regrets going for it on fourth down against the New York Giants in Super Bowl XLII. In Sunday's NFC Championship Game against Seattle, Sean McVay of the Rams -- a coach who is often criticized for not going for it on fourth down enough, and who took field goals against Chicago last week and won -- went for it twice on fourth down midway through the fourth quarter down 31-27, getting a first down on one, missing the second time, and coming away with zero points in the loss. Why do some fourth downs convert and some fail?
Payton hates it when people attempt to rationalize a missed opportunity or failed play by shrugging and saying, "That's football." It's an affront to his soul and everything he stands for, when he and his staff work 18-hour days to impose their will on a coin flip of a game.
But the thing is, that is football. And always will be. After Sunday's game, Payton entered his small office down the hall from the locker room. He sat down and stared at the floor. He is 62 years old and has been a head coach for 19 years. He has a Super Bowl win, and many devastating playoff defeats. It was quiet, except for the random sounds of the crash landing of a season ending: the echo of a shouted cussword, the shuffle of coaches and staffers mulling around and whispering.
Moments passed. Payton sat up.
"I can't believe we lost."
A few more seconds passed.
"That fourth down ..."
It would have been nice if ESPN had explained the equation.
It’s the NFL. So what? They should have just kneeled and blew it off c
It seems like the value of 3 points has been underplayed in to days NFL.
This wasn’t a shootout. Going up 2 scores before a snowstorm would have been huge.

One of the gutsiest and greatest 4 down play calls evah.
*sigh*
As a Delco Eagles fan I want to root for them, but the way the NFL is acting is REALLY pissing me off.
Help me, please.
If they get the first down, he’s a genius, if they don’t get it, he’s a bum.
That’s life as a coach.
As a Philadelphia sports fan, you know the deal.
Our teams tease and tease and rip our hearts out.
Then they go and win enough championships to make you say “the wait was worth it.” Then you’re back to going all-in.
Then they hibernate.
As for sports being woke etc., watch it for the fun and strategic value. And don’t buy the advertisers’ products.
Both games Sunday were similar, Peyton went for it and lost, instead of being up 10-0, they ended up 7-0 and the game ended 10-7, at the very least the game would have gone into overtime.
In a low scoring game with a backup QB that hasn’t played meaningful football in well over a year, you take the points.
In the late game the Rams were down 31-27 with 5 minutes to go in the game and 3 time outs, the Rams had the ball in easy FG territory, elected to for it on 4th down, didn’t make it and end up losing 31-27 while being inside the 20 yard line throwing on 4th down to win the game at the end, kick the FG earlier and a FG late instead of throwing into the endzone and you win the game and play in the Super Bowl.
The Jacksonville Jaguars lost earlier in the playoffs to Buffalo when their coach went for it while in easy FG territory, didn’t make it and ultimately cost his team the game.
IMO, coaches are going for it far too often instead of taking the points, especially in the playoffs when the teams are equally matched and every point counts.
I recall Merlin Olsen’s last play of his career. On that play, the opposing ball carrier was stopped behind the line of scrimmage, and Dick Enberg, the Rams’ radio announcer yelled, “Olsen has him!” He later admitted he was mistaken and that another player had made the stop, but noted that “in spirit,” Olsen had made the play.

And then Olsen joined him in the booth.
Go Patriots.... It was an ugly played game but my Patriots won so I’m good.
Well, that was a good play for Philadelphia.
I think I reached the point that I realize all those great plays the team that I followed made, they can’t make all of them. The other team has to make them too to have their own memories.
And wins.
2 rings v 5 rings -- and none of the Rams rings from that era, while the Cowboys were in half of the 70s SBs -- but some very good Rams teams in there ('69 and '74 with Gabriel) that could not close the deal.
And yet that is all you need. One ring and set for life: Rodgers, Brees, Flacco, Wilson, Foles. Rodgers is done, and Foles will never win another, doesn't matter.
It’s is a big thing to achieve. When almost in the Super Bowl (or in it) you never know when you will be back that way again...
I remember the ‘69 Rams. After beating the Colts in September, they went undefeated until December, when they lost narrowly to the Vikings. After that game, they were a completely different team, losing three straight including a 28-0 blowout to Detroit. They closed the season with another narrow loss to the Vikings in the playoff.
After the Super Bowl, the Rams crushed the Dallas Cowboys in the Playoff Bowl, played between the Super Bowl also-rans. At the time, I wondered why they didn’t play like that when it counted.
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