A Cold Peace: Trump, Putin, and the Birth of a New U.S.

History rarely repeats itself, but it often rhymes. The Alaska summit between Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin was not a Munich 1938 moment of appeasement, as some critics argue, but rather a Yalta-style recognition of spheres of influence. Two Cold War titans, both seasoned in brinkmanship, showed they had no interest in burning the world to the ground for the sake of Ukraine’s Donbas. The real obstacle is not Moscow or Washington—it is younger European politicians, NATO bureaucrats, and President Volodymyr Zelensky himself, who have mistaken perpetual escalation for strategy.

Comparisons to Neville Chamberlain’s Munich accord miss the mark. Chamberlain handed Hitler control over the Sudetenland—territory Britain did not own and could not defend—while pretending it secured “peace in our time.” In Alaska, Trump and Putin acknowledged what is already reality: Russia controls much of the Donbas, and the local population identifies more with Moscow than Kyiv. Trump did not “give away” Ukraine; he began the process of drawing a boundary both sides can live with. This is not appeasement, but realignment.

The summit floated the prospect of a U.S.–Russia non-aggression pact, paired with guarantees that NATO will not expand further eastward. In return, Moscow would halt its offensive beyond the Donbas. That is not surrender; it is classic cold-blooded bargaining. Each side locks in what matters most: Russia gets recognition of its sphere of influence in eastern Ukraine, while the West gains certainty that Russian armor will not roll toward Warsaw, Riga, or Berlin. The trade stabilizes the frontline and buys space for economic recovery.

The loudest cries of betrayal come not from ordinary Europeans or Americans but from Zelensky himself. His approval rating at home has collapsed to 21%. Western aid has dried up, and his much-vaunted counteroffensives never materialized. For him, Trump’s peace push is a lifeline, not a humiliation. It gives him a chance to claim he delivered an end to the war, rather than presiding over Ukraine’s collapse. In truth, he has little choice. Without Washington’s backing, he cannot fight on, and Trump has made it clear: the U.S. will not fund forever wars.

The deeper play here is not about Donbas, but about Europe’s security architecture. Since 1949, NATO has been the anchor. Yet NATO has drifted, expanding into missions and regions far beyond its original charter, while leaving European nations dependent on Washington’s defense umbrella. Trump has never hidden his disdain for NATO’s freeloaders. What emerged in Alaska was the sketch of an alternative: direct U.S.–EU security guarantees, independent of NATO’s bureaucracy.

The outlines of such an agreement are already implied in Trump’s language and the quiet phone calls racing across Europe. Here’s what it might entail:

Bilateral Guarantees with Brussels: Washington would sign a treaty directly with the European Union (or its largest members), pledging mutual defense against major external aggression. Unlike NATO, this deal would exclude smaller Balkan or Baltic flashpoints that drag the alliance into perpetual crisis.

Limited Defense Triggers: Instead of NATO’s Article 5 “an attack on one is an attack on all,” the agreement could specify narrow scenarios—nuclear threats, cyberattacks on infrastructure, or incursions into EU core territory—that trigger U.S. support. This trims the risk of entanglement in local quarrels.

Shared Burden by Design: The U.S. would insist that Europe match American commitments dollar-for-dollar. For every U.S. carrier group deployed to the Mediterranean, Europe would fund equivalent rapid-reaction brigades or missile defense. This forces Europe to put skin in the game.

Parallel Economic Integration: Security would be tied to trade and energy deals. Europe could gradually unwind its sanctions on Russia in exchange for Moscow’s guarantees, while securing discounted energy flows that stabilize EU economies. The U.S. would benefit by refocusing its exports and rebuilding its industrial base without footing Europe’s defense bill alone.

For all the fiery rhetoric from NATO headquarters and hawkish European capitals, the Alaska summit revealed the true state of play. The United States and Russia, the only two nuclear superpowers capable of annihilating the planet, have no desire to march into Armageddon over Donbas. They have looked each other in the eye and signaled: enough.

The younger generation of European politicians, reared on idealism and digital activism rather than Cold War pragmatism, will fume. They wanted “total victory” and dreamed of NATO’s blue flags flying in Sevastopol. Instead, they face a future where Europe’s security is guaranteed not by NATO’s endless expansion, but by direct deals that bypass it.

This is not weakness. It is recognition of limits. A cold peace beats a hot war. And if Trump, Putin, and even a reluctant Zelensky can hammer out a deal that ends the bloodshed, the critics may scream “traitor” all they like. History, however, will likely record August 2025 as the moment when the world stepped back from the brink—and when two aging Cold War titans reminded everyone that survival, not ideology, is the first duty of statesmen.

Once Europe is stabilized under a U.S.–EU framework

More globalist deepstate subordination of our sovereignty to an unelected corrupt self-selling out bureaucracy that's even worse that NATO, which is mostly just a worthless parasite. They won't even defend their own boarders. It's a coalition of the unwilling and I want no part of it. If the graduates of Georgetown in foreign policy and public policy can't get a job that sounds like Nirvana to me.

I began reading that and was about to barf all over you until I got the end where it was Wilson’s 14 points. Well done, but be very careful!

Needless to say that that plan has produced nothing but war ever since.

I see a lot of things to be worked out. But the two men are comfortable with each other. I think there will be progress because Putin is not dealing with a typical neocon. Putin is dealing with Trump, and they have the same enemies: the Democratic and Republican neocons. Trump got revenge on them with his DOGE and executive order signings. Now he is getting revenge with charges against the top echelon of Democrats who spied on him, dragged him through Russiagate & J9, orchestrated two impeachments, ransacked his home in Mar-a-Lago, had him up on criminal and sexual charges, and probably had something to do with two assassination attempts to take his life. This is not a question of foreign policy with Trump, but a question of revenge against the same people who also conducted the coup in Ukraine and are against Putin. That is why Trump is giving Putin the most valuable thing: time. Time to be in position to grab most of Ukraine. So foreign policy is a mute question. Trump is going to continue yik-at-Te yak and kill time as Putin grabs Ukraine, the crown jewel in the neocon’s cap, for Russia. Revenge served cold if all this goes down by next February.

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