Update from Ukraine | Ruzzian fake Victory in Stepove. Actually they failed
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BrD4Inv8W8Q
Militaryland news: The summary of the situation of Russian re-invasion to Ukraine covering the recent developments on the battlefield, as of 20th December 2023 – 22:00 (Kyiv time) https://militaryland.net/news/invasion-day-665-summary/
[NOTE: two summaries per week, released on Wednesday and Sunday]
Recap Deployment Map changes – Week 50 December 18, 2023 https://militaryland.net/news/recap-deployment-map-changes-week-50/
*** Great interactive maps with viewer controlled Map magnification tool to use for each Front!
https://militaryland.net/maps/
Mornin’ Miss Rose
Hah hah. Your nonsense never ends. All the hogwash you concoct won’t make people more inclined to throw more taxpayer money at a failure.
Why Ukraine Won’t Be Able to “Dig In”
- After the defeated 5 month Ukrainian offensive and with admissions in the Western media that Ukraine’s cross-river offensive in Kherson is a failure, a growing number Ukrainian and Western military and political leaders are talking about Ukraine going on the defensive;
- Ukraine seeks to build Russian-style defensives along the line of contact and use 2024 to build up combat power;
- The main problem facing this strategy is that Ukraine has already in many places dug in since as early as 2014 and yet Russia has been able to overpower and displace Ukrainian forces regardless;
- ussia’s successful defeat of the 2023 Ukrainian offensive was owed as much to its superior firepower as it was to the construction of defensive positions;
- While Russia will not be able to conduct “big arrow” offensives without suffering heavy losses for the same reason Ukraine cannot, the existence of mines covered by artillery, FPV drones and other systems that can target Russian forces as they attempt to breach minefields;
- Russia can continue its war of attrition while placing growing pressure all along the line of contact and exploiting anywhere opportunities begin to form;
- Western commentators continue to interpret the conflict in mere 2 dimensions rather than the 4 dimensions actually required to understand Russia’s long-term strategy and why it has worked;
- The 4th dimension being time, it is important to understand what Ukraine’s combat power will look like a year from now following concerted Russian efforts to target and irreversibly diminish specific capabilities (like air defense, artillery, counter battery fire, and military aviation);
Why Ukraine Won’t Be Able to “Dig In”
- After the defeated 5 month Ukrainian offensive and with admissions in the Western media that Ukraine’s cross-river offensive in Kherson is a failure, a growing number Ukrainian and Western military and political leaders are talking about Ukraine going on the defensive;
- Ukraine seeks to build Russian-style defensives along the line of contact and use 2024 to build up combat power;
- The main problem facing this strategy is that Ukraine has already in many places dug in since as early as 2014 and yet Russia has been able to overpower and displace Ukrainian forces regardless;
- ussia’s successful defeat of the 2023 Ukrainian offensive was owed as much to its superior firepower as it was to the construction of defensive positions;
- While Russia will not be able to conduct “big arrow” offensives without suffering heavy losses for the same reason Ukraine cannot, the existence of mines covered by artillery, FPV drones and other systems that can target Russian forces as they attempt to breach minefields;
- Russia can continue its war of attrition while placing growing pressure all along the line of contact and exploiting anywhere opportunities begin to form;
- Western commentators continue to interpret the conflict in mere 2 dimensions rather than the 4 dimensions actually required to understand Russia’s long-term strategy and why it has worked;
- The 4th dimension being time, it is important to understand what Ukraine’s combat power will look like a year from now following concerted Russian efforts to target and irreversibly diminish specific capabilities (like air defense, artillery, counter battery fire, and military aviation);