Iranian Regime tv Channel One hacked while it was airing Khamenie speech

Iranian Regime national tv Channel One hacked about an hour ago. During a broadcast of Khamenie speech, a red crosshair appeared over his face and chanting of Women. Life. Freedom. There was writing to the side saying "Rise up. Join us". Also 4 photos at the bottom of the screen of young people killed and additional writing: "The blood of our youth is dropping from your paws".

Also, there was a huge banner in the middle of Tehran highway today that read: We are no longer afraid of you. We will fight.

Also, attempted attack on IRI ambassador in Denmark. Her bodyguard was stabbed. Diplomatic Security intervened before the attacker could stab the ambassador.

Iran Update, November 11, 2025

Iranian Passive Defense Organization (PDO) head Brigadier General Gholam Reza Jalali sought to shift blame for Iran's defensive failures during the Israel-Iran War onto government institutions in an interview on November 8. Jalali gave an interview to the Iranian podcast “Story of the War,” which features various senior Iranian officials’ reflections on the Israel–Iran War.[24] Jalali noted that Iran is vulnerable to infiltration and that Iran's adversaries can track Iranian officials using traffic cameras and communication networks, among other means. Jalali claimed that government agencies have failed to address these security weaknesses despite years of PDO warnings.[25] Israel killed numerous senior Iranian military commanders and nuclear scientists during the war, highlighting the degree of Israeli infiltration in Iran. Jalali stated that Iran has prioritized rapid development over security considerations in recent years, which has exacerbated security vulnerabilities.[26] The PDO operates under the Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS) and is responsible for developing and coordinating policies to defend Iranian civilian, military, and nuclear infrastructure from attacks.[27] Jalali emphasized that the PDO is not responsible for the implementation of passive defense policies, however.[28]

Jalali also discussed Iran's preparations for a potential attack on its nuclear facilities before the war. Jalali stated that the PDO prepared a plan after Iran's missile strike on Israel in October 2024 to prepare for a potential attack on its nuclear sites and potential radioactive or chemical contamination.[29] Jalali stated that former AFGS Chief Major General Mohammad Bagheri approved the plan, but that President Masoud Pezeshkian’s administration resisted its implementation because it did not believe that war was imminent and did not want to “worry” the Iranian public.[30] Jalali stated that Iran preemptively emptied large ammonia and chlorine tanks in Esfahan Province to prevent chemical leaks and civilian harm if Iran's nuclear facilities were attacked.[31] Jalali added that the nuclear sector significantly reduced its activity and “relocated equipment” before the war. It is unclear what “equipment” Jalali was referring to.

https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-november-11-2025/

Iran Update, November 12, 2025

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors travelled to Iran on November 12 to inspect the Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center (ENTC), according to a confidential IAEA report obtained by the Associated Press.[28] It is unclear the extent of access that the IAEA or Iran has to the facility, given that Israeli airstrikes severely damaged the facility during the Israel-Iran War in June 2025, however.[29] The IAEA has not been able to verify the status of Iran’s weapons-grade uranium stockpile since the war. The IAEA report stated that Iran notified the IAEA of a new enrichment facility at the ENTC on June 12, and the IAEA immediately requested access to the facility. Iran agreed to the IAEA’s request, but the IAEA cancelled the visitation due to the onset of the war.[30] The IAEA does not currently know the precise location of the new facility or the status of its enriched uranium, which the report described as seriously concerning.[31] A previous IAEA report claimed that Iran possessed 440.9 kilograms of 60 percent enriched uranium before the war, which is enough for Iran to produce at least 10 nuclear weapons if enriched to 90 percent.[32] The recent IAEA report, which was shared with all member states of the IAEA Board of Governors, precedes the upcoming IAEA Board of Governors meeting in Vienna from November 19 to 21, during which members will discuss Iran’s nuclear program.[33]

Iran is developing regional trade routes with neighboring countries, likely as part of a broader Iranian effort to mitigate the impact of international sanctions on the Iranian economy. Iran’s Railway Organization’s Deputy Commerce Director stated on November 8 that Iran intends to become a regional trade “hub” after the first Russian freight train arrived at Aprin Dry Cargo Terminal, which is located about 20 kilometers southwest of Tehran City, via Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan.[34] Iran’s Railway Organization opened Aprin Dry Port in June 2025, and 30 trains from unspecified locations have stopped there so far, according to the organization’s Deputy Commerce Director.[35] The train previously transited a border checkpoint at Incheh Borun economic free zone in northeastern Iran on November 8.[36] More than 60 companies have reportedly invested in the 4,000-hectare Incheh Borun economic free zone between Iran and Turkmenistan to cut trade and transportation costs, according to Iran’s Golestan Province Governor in October 2025.[37]

Iran is developing trade routes with all its neighbors. Iran reportedly transported some of the cargo from the Russian freight train, which included paper pulp, onwards to Iraq.[38] Iran and Iraq have been cooperating to revive the Shalamcheh-Basra railway between southwestern Iran and Basra Port, Iraq, since 2023 after years of planning, but have made little progress.[39] Iran has also held several meetings with officials in neighboring countries since August 2025 to propose trade facilitation projects, including two railways with Turkmenistan near the Sarakhs Border Point in Razavi Khorsan Province, a port-sea consortium with Russia in the Caspian Sea, an economic free zone in Chabahar Port, southeastern Iran, with Pakistan, railways with Tajikistan, and the Rasht-Astara Railway project with Azerbaijan.[40] Most of these projects are part of the International North-South Transport Corridor, which Iran, Russia, and India established in 2002.[41] The corridor connects India, Iran, Russia, and Central Asia via road, rail, and sea to reduce transit time and costs between South Asia and Europe.[42]

Iranian officials continue to inspect naval units in the Persian Gulf to secure Iran’s control over the Gulf, likely as part of Iran’s effort to prepare for any potential conflict with the United States or Israel. These inspections suggest that Iranian officials continue to believe renewed war with the United States or Israel is imminent. Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters Commander Major General Ali Abdollahi inspected Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) naval units deployed on the Nazeat Islands on November 11.[43] The Nazeat Islands, including Greater Tunb, Lesser Tunb, Abu Musa, and Siri Island, are key positions for Iran’s ability to control maritime access to the Persian Gulf.[44] Abdollahi stated that the IRGC Navy has recently increased its capabilities.[45] Abdollahi’s inspection comes amid other key Iranian military commanders, including IRGC Commander Major General Mohammad Pakpour, IRGC Navy Commander Brigadier General Alireza Tangsiri, Armed Forces General Staff Chief Major General (AFGS) Abdol Rahim Mousavi, and Artesh Navy Commander Rear Admiral Shahram Irani, inspections of southern Iranian naval units in recent weeks.[46]

Former AFGS Chief Major General Mohammad Bagheri approved the deployment of additional Iranian military forces to the Nazeat Islands near the Strait of Hormuz in May 2025. These deployments could have enabled Iran to harass shipping in the Strait of Hormuz in the event of war. Bagheri said that Iran would retaliate against US military bases, disrupt international commercial shipping, and attack regional states that host US forces “if the US military makes a mistake.”[47] Iran previously responded to the US “maximum pressure” campaign in 2019 by attacking oil tankers near the Strait of Hormuz, seizing a foreign vessel, and harassing US and British naval ships.[48]

The United States sanctioned 32 individuals and entities on November 12 for operating multiple weapon procurement networks that support Iran’s ballistic missile and drone production.[49] The sanctioned individuals and entities are based in Iran, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Turkey, the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Hong Kong, India, Germany, and Ukraine. The sanctions targeted a multinational network of individuals and companies that coordinated Iran’s procurement of missile propellant ingredients, including sodium chlorate, sodium perchlorate, and sebacic acid, from the PRC. Sodium perchlorate is a chemical precursor for solid missile propellant.[50] European intelligence sources told CNN on October 29 that Iran received several shipments from the PRC that contained a total of 2,000 tons of sodium perchlorate.[51] Iran previously received about 1,000 tons of sodium perchlorate from China in February and May 2025.[52] Iran‘s recent, larger shipment from the PRC comes amid Iran’s efforts to rebuild its missile program after the Israel-Iran War. Iran sees its ballistic missile program as its main deterrent against future attacks.[53]

https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-november-12-2025/

Iran Update, November 14, 2025

Three small Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) vessels intercepted a Marshall Islands-flagged oil products tanker, Talara, and moved it into Iranian waters in the Strait of Hormuz on November 14.[1] The vessel is operated by Cyprus-based, German- and British-owned Columbia Ship Management. The vessel is owned by Pasha Finance, which allegedly has familial ties to Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev.[2] The vessel was headed to Singapore from the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and was carrying a cargo of high-sulfur gas oil.[3] Iranian naval forces intercepted the vessel on early Friday morning and diverted it into Iranian territorial waters.[4] Columbia Ship Management stated that it lost contact with the vessel around 0822 local time near the coast of Khor Fakkan, United Arab Emirates. The IRGC issued a statement on X on November 14, quoting a Quranic verse: “So whoever has assaulted you, then assault him in the same way that he has assaulted you,” suggesting that Iran is retaliating for a previous incident.[5]

Iran has conducted several inspections of naval units in the Persian Gulf since the June 2025 Israel-Iran War due to concerns that the United States and its allies could seize Iranian vessels. Senior Iranian IRGC and Artesh commanders inspected naval facilities at least seven times between June and November 2025 — most recently on November 11 — to evaluate combat readiness.[6] Iranian officials have warned in October 2025 that Iran will close the Strait of Hormuz if the international community blocks Iranian oil exports, Iran’s most profitable export.[7] Several senior Iranian officials have touted Iranian naval capabilities and their destructive and deterrent effect towards Iran‘s adversaries in recent statements.[8]

ISW-CTP is considering the following three hypotheses about Iran’s objectives in seizing the vessel:

Iran may be seeking retaliation for the potential attack on the LPG tanker MV Falcon, which caught on fire after an unspecified explosion near Aden, Yemen, on October 18.[9] The non-profit United Against Nuclear Iran reported that the Falcon was an Iranian shadow fleet vessel that transports illicit Iranian oil.[10] The IRGC quoted a Quranic verse on X on November 14 that implied that the IRGC was attempting to retaliate for an earlier incident. Iran may have viewed the Falcon incident as an intentional attack and is attempting to deter any actors responsible for it.

Iran may be showing its willingness to close off the Strait of Hormuz as a preemptive measure amid Iranian concerns about future US actions. Iranian officials have warned that Iran is willing to close the Strait of Hormuz if the international community blocks Iranian oil exports and have inspected naval facilities along the coast to confirm force capabilities and readiness.[11]

Iran may be demonstrating its power to actors, such as Azerbaijan and Saudi Arabia. Both countries have recently taken steps to increase cooperation with Iranian adversaries. Israel and Azerbaijan have held several meetings in 2025 to discuss bilateral cooperation and Azerbaijan’s inclusion in the Abraham Accords.[12] Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman reportedly plans to discuss a defense agreement with the United States during his visit to Washington next week.[13] The Saudi-US defense agreement would be similar to the recently signed Qatar-US agreement that pledged the United States to treat any armed attack on Qatari soil as an attack on the United States. Iran may be showing its ability to disrupt movements across the Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz if it perceives any future threats from its adversaries.

https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-november-14-2025/

Iran Update, November 17, 2025

Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-affiliated media claimed on November 15 that the IRGC Navy seized the Marshall Islands-flagged Talara tanker because it was attempting to illegally export Iranian cargo. This claim likely seeks to obfuscate the real reason why the IRGC Navy seized the vessel and may be part of an Iranian effort to prevent any retaliation for the seizure. Three IRGC Navy vessels intercepted the Talara on November 14 and diverted it to Iranian territorial waters.[19] IRGC-affiliated Fars News claimed that the Talara was carrying 30,000 tons of Iranian petrochemical products and that the IRGC Navy seized the vessel to “return [Iran’s] property.”[20] The outlet, citing an unspecified source, stated that an Iranian individual or company intended to illegally export the materials.[21] The IRGC Navy stated on November 15 that it seized the Talara to protect Iran’s “national interests and resources” and claimed that the vessel was carrying “unauthorized cargo.” CTP-ISW has not observed any evidence that the vessel was carrying Iranian cargo or that its owner or operator had any links to Iran. The IRGC suggested following the seizure on November 14 that the IRGC Navy had seized the vessel in retaliation for a previous incident, not because the vessel was illicitly transporting Iranian cargo. The Fars News report suggests that Iran may be trying to avoid any retaliation for seizing the tanker by attributing the seizure to a domestic issue rather than foreign tensions. Iran depends on stability in the Strait of Hormuz to export oil, which is the main source of revenue for the regime. Any naval retaliation could impact the stability of the Strait of Hormuz and Iranian oil exports.

Senior Iranian military officials have continued to emphasize the importance of Iran’s missile program for its national security, which suggests that Iran will continue to invest in the development of its missile program. IRGC Spokesperson Brigadier General Ali Mohammad Naeini stated in an interview on November 16 that Iran’s missile program both deters and defeats Iranian adversaries.[37] Naeini’s statement echoes other Iranian officials’ comments about Iran’s missile program since the Israel-Iran War in June 2025.[38] Former IRGC Commander Major General Mohammad Ali Jafari argued on October 25 that Iran’s missile program is Iran’s main form of deterrence and that Iran deliberately prioritized developing its missile and drone capabilities over its air and ground forces to counter Israel and the United States’ superior capabilities.[39] Iranian Deputy Vice President for Strategic Affairs Ali Abdullah Khani similarly stated on October 20 that Iran must improve its missile capabilities and adopt an approach to confront “hybrid warfare.”[40] Naeini also identified “hybrid warfare” as a strategy used by Israel and the United States in his interview on November 16.[41] The Iranian regime defines “hybrid warfare” as the use of all domains of power, including information, electronic, cultural, social, and military operations, by hostile actors to destabilize Iran.[42]

https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-november-17-2025/

Iran Update, November 18, 2025

Some elements of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) are reportedly pressuring Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei to accelerate the reconstruction of Iran's nuclear program and withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).[18] An unspecified senior “energy source” who works closely with Iran's Oil Ministry told UK-based outlet Oil Price on November 17 that the IRGC is pressuring Khamenei to expedite the reconstruction of nuclear facilities that were damaged during the Israel-Iran War.[19] The source added that some elements of the IRGC are pressuring Khamenei to withdraw from the NPT.[20] Iran must implement a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as an NPT member.[21] Safeguards agreements are “designed to enable the IAEA to detect the diversion of nuclear material from peaceful purposes to nuclear weapons uses, as well as to detect undeclared nuclear activities and material.”[22] CTP-ISW cannot verify the Oil Price report. Unspecified IRGC officials previously urged Khamenei before the Israel-Iran War to approve the development of a nuclear weapon to confront “existential threats” from the West.[23] An unspecified European Union (EU) source also told Oil Price that unanswered questions about recent Iranian activities at the Mount Kolang Gaz La facility in Esfahan Province have set Iran and the West “on a collision course.”[24] Recent Iranian construction at the facility has fueled concerns that the site could serve not only as a centrifuge assembly plant, as Iran announced in 2020, but also as a covert enrichment facility or secure storage facility for highly enriched uranium.[25]

Iran also reportedly intends to allocate a large portion of its military budget to the development of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and multi-warhead delivery systems, according to the EU source.[26] The source stated that Iran will increase its military budget by over 200 percent in the coming year and accelerate the development of ICBMs with multi-warhead delivery systems and ranges of up to 10,000 kilometers. CTP-ISW cannot verify these claims. Multi-warhead delivery systems likely refer to multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs).[27] Iran used ballistic missiles with cluster munition warheads, which disperse unguided submunitions over a wide area, during the Israel-Iran War. Iran does not currently possess MIRV technology, however. Ballistic missiles with MIRVs are more difficult to defend against than regular ballistic missiles, so Iran may seek to develop MIRV technology to bypass enemy air defenses more effectively.[28]

Iran seeks to deepen its economic cooperation with Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) member countries to mitigate the effects of international sanctions. The SCO, which Iran joined in 2023, is a multilateral forum that was established by Eurasian countries, including the People's Republic of China and Russia, to coordinate on political, military, and economic issues.[29] Iran views multilateral institutions such as the SCO as necessary to counter and undermine the US-led international order. SCO officials signed a cooperation document on November 17 at the SCO’s 24th Heads of Government summit in Moscow covering a wide range of economic issues, including the use of national currencies for trade, investments in green energy technology and transportation, and increased economic diplomacy.[30] Iranian First Vice President Mohmmad Reza Aref met with Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin on November 17 on the sidelines of the summit to discuss expanding economic ties, including the development of joint railway projects.[31] Aref separately met with Belarusian Prime Minister Alexander Turchin on November 18 and emphasized the importance of bilateral investment and production initiatives to “meet mutual needs.”[32] Aref and other participating officials signed a joint statement condemning “coercive” economic sanctions, stating that they hinder international cooperation.[33] Iran, Russia, and Belarus, among other SCO member states, are heavily sanctioned by the United States and its allies.[34]

https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-november-18-2025/

Iran Update, November 19, 2025

An Iranian Defense Ministry-affiliated delegation covertly traveled to Russia in November 2024, possibly to seek “laser technology and expertise that could help [Iran] validate a nuclear weapon design without conducting a nuclear explosive test,” according to a former CIA analyst speaking to the Financial Times.[1] This report corroborates CTP-ISW’s assessment from November 2024 that Iran had restarted its nuclear weapons research program. CTP-ISW cannot independently assess the status of this program following the Israel-Iran War. The Financial Times reported on November 19 that the Iranian Organization of Defensive Innovation and Research (SPND) used a front company, DamavandTec, to organize a trip for Iranian laser specialists to go to St. Petersburg, Russia, in November 2024.[2] The SPND played a leading role in Iran's nuclear weapons research program before 2003.[3] The United States sanctioned DamavandTec in October 2025 for procuring “items applicable to the development of nuclear explosive devices from foreign suppliers.”[4] The Iranian laser specialists visited the US-sanctioned Russian military technology company Laser Systems. Iran has previously sought assistance from Russia to develop its nuclear program.[5] The Financial Times previously reported that four Iranian nuclear scientists and an Iranian counterintelligence officer traveled to Moscow in August 2024 to visit Russian research institutes that specialize in dual-use technologies that could be used for nuclear weapons development.[6] Iranian nuclear scientists’ visits to Russia in August and November 2024 came amid other indications, such as reports that Iran had begun running computer models and conducting metallurgical research that could support the development of nuclear weapons, that Iran had resumed its nuclear weapons research program.[7] CTP-ISW cannot independently assess the status of this program following the Israel-Iran War.

Iran is continuing to develop parts of its nuclear program that could potentially support the development of a nuclear weapon. CTP-ISW has not observed any evidence that the Iranian regime seeks to develop a nuclear weapon, however. The Institute for Science and International Security reported on November 18 that Iran is constructing a possible high-explosive containment vessel at the former Taleghan 2 nuclear research site at the Parchin Military Complex in southeastern Tehran Province.[8] The Institute noted that high-explosive containment vessels are necessary for the development of nuclear weapons but that they can also be used for “many other conventional weapons development processes.”[9] The Iranian regime previously used the Taleghan 2 facility to test explosives that are needed to detonate a nuclear device before the regime suspended its nuclear weapons program in 2003.[10] International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director Rafael Grossi stated on November 19 that there is nothing that currently necessitates an IAEA inspection at Taleghan 2 when asked about the construction of a possible high-explosive containment vessel at the site.[11]

Iranian officials continue to express openness to resuming nuclear negotiations with the United States, but the regime has not conceded on its previous stance against zero uranium enrichment. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s Foreign Affairs Adviser, Kamal Kharrazi, stated that Iran would be open to nuclear negotiations based on “mutual respect” with the United States in an interview with CNN on November 19. Kharrazi said that Iran would maintain its right to enrich uranium domestically for peaceful purposes, however.[12] Kharrazi stated that potential negotiations with the United States would focus on the “degree of enrichment” that Iran is allowed. Senior Iranian officials have continuously emphasized both before and after the Israel-Iran War that Iran will not negotiate its right to enrich uranium.[13] Kharrazi said that Iran has experienced difficulty in convincing the United States and the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) that Iran is not pursuing a nuclear weapon.[14] The United States has maintained that Iran must accept zero enrichment.[15] Kharrazi stated that the United States must “make the first move” if Iran is to return to the negotiating table.[16] Kharrazi added that Iran's nuclear program cannot be eliminated with “force.”[17] Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi also told Iranian media on November 19 that Iran will not accept zero enrichment because enrichment has become “a matter of national pride.”[18]

Iran is continuing to prohibit the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) from inspecting damaged and other Iranian nuclear facilities. An unspecified European Union (EU) source told UK-based outlet Oil Price on November 17 that Iran continues to block the IAEA from inspecting nuclear sites, including sites that the United States and Israel struck in June 2025, as well as the Mount Kolang Gaz La facility near Natanz.[19] Kharrazi claimed that Iran cannot yet assess the damage at nuclear facilities such as Natanz and Fordow in his November 19 CNN interview.[20] IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi stressed the urgent need for Iran to allow IAEA inspectors to inspect nuclear facilities on the sidelines of the IAEA Board of Governors meeting on November 19. Grossi stated that Iran has not yet submitted a report on its damaged nuclear sites and highly enriched uranium stockpile to the IAEA.[21] The E3 also submitted a resolution to the IAEA Board of Governors on November 18 that demands that Iran allow IAEA inspectors to access nuclear sites.[22] The IAEA Board of Governors will vote on the resolution in the coming days.[23]

Infighting and paranoia among Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and other Iranian regime officials have reportedly increased since the Israel-Iran War, which could hamper the regime's ability to make cohesive decisions. Unspecified Iranian regime officials told the Telegraph on November 19 that there is “turmoil” within the regime after the Israel-Iran War.[24] Regime officials are reportedly engaged in infighting due to paranoia over widespread Israeli infiltration.[25] The regime has arrested hundreds of individuals on espionage charges since the Israel-Iran War and has executed several Iranians for allegedly spying for Israel.[26] The Iranian officials added that there is growing concern among regime officials and security services that officials who collaborate with Israel may falsely accuse loyal regime officials of treason.[27] These heightened concerns have prompted Iranian officials, particularly within the IRGC, to actively demonstrate their loyalty to the regime, according to an unspecified senior Iranian official.[28] Israeli infiltration enabled the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) to kill numerous senior Iranian military commanders and prominent nuclear scientists during the war.[29] Iranian officials’ concerns about Israeli infiltration are not new, but the Israel-Iran War exacerbated these concerns. The current environment of suspicion within the regime and lack of trust between officials could hinder the regime from being able to make cohesive decisions because trust and cooperation are critical for effective decision-making.[30]

[31] The IDF issued evacuation orders to residents near targets in Deir Kifa, Chohour, and Tayr Falsay in Tyre District and in Ainatha, Bint Jbeil District, in southern Lebanon.[32] The IDF struck the targets shortly thereafter.[33] The IDF targeted five Hezbollah rocket storage facilities.[34] The IDF also killed a Hezbollah fighter who the IDF said was attempting to re-establish Hezbollah's presence in Tiri, Bint Jbeil District.[35] The IDF Military Intelligence Directorate also identified dozens of locations in the neighboring village of Beit Lif where Hezbollah is rebuilding infrastructure, including a headquarters and weapons depots.[36] The IDF said on November 19 that it had referred some of the Hezbollah infrastructure in Beit Lif to the ceasefire monitoring committee but that the LAF had not acted on this information.[37] Israeli media reported on November 8 that Israel warned the LAF through the United States that the LAF is not acting “sufficiently” against Hezbollah because it is not entering rural areas or private property to confiscate Hezbollah weapons.[38] Israel stated in a message that it will continue and increase attacks across Lebanon if the LAF does not make “significant” improvements.[39] The LAF is bound by the November 2024 ceasefire agreement to disarm Hezbollah south of the Litani River.[40]

Hezbollah is likely smuggling weapons from Syria to southern Lebanon that the group could use to defend against a possible Israeli ground operation in Lebanon or to attack Israel. The IDF strikes on Hezbollah rocket storage facilities in southern Lebanon occurred as Hezbollah is attempting to replenish its weapons stockpiles.[41] Syrian and Lebanese authorities have thwarted numerous weapons smuggling attempts along the Lebanon-Syria border since the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024, which indicates that Hezbollah and/or Hezbollah-aligned actors are continuing to smuggle weapons from Syria into Lebanon.[42] Syrian forces seized anti-personnel fragmentation mines, anti-tank guided missiles (ATGM), rocket-propelled grenade warheads, mortar rounds, and Grad rockets in three distinct seizures near al Qusayr, Homs Province, Syria, in September.[43] Hezbollah has historically used these types of munitions to target Israeli ground forces in Lebanon and to fire into Israeli territory. Hezbollah fired thousands of Grad rockets into northern Israel between October 2023 and November 2024, for example.[44] Hezbollah also launched ATGMs and mortars targeting the IDF and Israeli positions in Lebanon in late fall 2024.[45] Recent IDF strikes targeting Hezbollah fighters smuggling munitions into southern Lebanon on November 8 and 10 suggest that at least some smuggling routes between southern Lebanon and other parts of the country and Syria are active.[46]

Iran released the Marshall Islands-flagged Talara tanker on November 19 after confiscating its cargo.[56] Three IRGC Navy vessels intercepted the Talara on November 14 and diverted it to Iranian territorial waters.[57] Iranian Oil Minister Mohsen Paknejad claimed on November 19 that the Talara is not an oil tanker and that the vessel was transporting unspecified cargo from the Persian Gulf.[58] He added that the IRGC Navy seized the vessel because the owner of the cargo failed to pay the Iranian Industry and Mine Bank for the shipment. IRGC-affiliated Fars News claimed on November 15 that the Talara was carrying 30,000 tons of Iranian petrochemical products and that the IRGC Navy had seized the vessel to “return [Iran's] property.”[59] CTP-ISW cannot verify the claims made by Paknejad and Fars News.

https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-november-19-2025/

Iran Update, November 20, 2025

Iran has reportedly signalled its willingness to resume negotiations with the United States if its “rights” — which refers to its right to enrich uranium on Iranian soil — are guaranteed.[1] Iran's demand violates the stated US red line that Iran must halt all domestic uranium enrichment to resume negotiations.[2] Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian asked Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman in a letter to convey Iran's openness to negotiations with the United States, “provided its rights are guaranteed,” on his recent visit to Washington, DC, according to two regional sources with knowledge of the matter who spoke to Reuters on November 20.[3] Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi said on November 20 that Iran will not negotiate its right to enrich uranium in an interview with The Economist.[4]

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors passed a resolution on November 20 that mandates Iran to immediately inform the IAEA about the status of its enriched uranium and damaged nuclear facilities.[5] IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi stated that Iran has not yet submitted a report on its highly enriched uranium stockpile and nuclear sites. Israel and the United States struck nuclear sites that reportedly held the stockpile in June 2025. Iran continues to block IAEA access to these facilities.[6]

Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian continues to emphasize the urgency of Tehran’s water shortage crisis, likely to create broader support for the evacuation of the city. Pezeshkian stated on November 19 that evacuation from Tehran is necessary due to the city's inability to support the population's water consumption.[7] The successful evacuation of a city as large as Tehran would require large-scale public support to ensure an orderly evacuation, reduce friction, and ultimately, prevent widespread protest against the measure. Some Iranian climatologists and a former official have called Pezeshkian‘s calls to ration Tehran‘s water supply and move the capital infeasible.[8] An unconfirmed report from an Iranian water expert stated on November 14 that the areas of Tehran that consume the most dam water would be evacuated first.[9] The first, second, and third districts in northern Tehran, which are generally considered wealthier areas, reportedly account for 50 percent of the city's water consumption, according to Tehran Provincial Water Company data.[10] CTP-ISW has not observed any indications that Iran has begun taking steps for evacuation at the time of writing.

https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-november-20-2025/

Iran Update, November 21, 2025

Iranian defense officials examined aircraft and air defense assets at the 2025 Dubai Airshow from November 17 to 21. Iranian Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Minister Brigadier General Aziz Nasir Zadeh and Intelligence Protection Organization Head Brigadier General Rahim Yaghoubi led an Iranian delegation to the airshow in the United Arab Emirates.[29] The Iranian Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Ministry oversees the Iranian defense-industrial complex and manages Iranian arms sales and purchases.[30] Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS)-affiliated Defa Press reported that the trip is part of Iran’s “defense diplomacy” to strengthen regional engagement and explore new opportunities for cooperation. [31] The airshow featured drones, air defense systems, and aircraft, including Russian Su-57 fighter jets.[32] Iran did not display any military equipment in the airshow, which suggests that Nasir Zadeh was at the airshow to determine possible future Iranian defense purchases.[33]

The United States sanctioned over 50 entities, individuals, and vessels on November 20 for facilitating illicit Iranian oil exports that support Iran’s armed forces and proxies in the region.[34] The US State Department reported that Iran has relied on oil revenue to rebuild its military following the Israel-Iran War.[35] The United States sanctioned several entities linked to the AFGS-affiliated Sepehr Energy Jahan Nama Pars Company (Sepehr Energy Jahan). The US Treasury previously sanctioned Sepehr Energy Jahan in 2023 for generating revenue for the Iranian Defense Ministry.[36] Sepehr Energy Jahan utilizes a network of front companies and shadow fleets to sell billions of dollars’ worth of Iranian oil annually.[37] The United States also sanctioned seven aircraft operated by Mahan Air.[38] The United States originally designated Mahan Air in October 2011 for ”providing financial, material, and technological support” to the IRGC Quds Force and supporting its efforts to supply weapons to members of the Axis of Resistance, including the former Bashar al Assad regime in Syria and Lebanese Hezbollah.[39] The United States also sanctioned seven vessels involved in Iran’s petroleum trade.[40] At least some of the vessels may have been involved in ship-to-ship transfers to obfuscate illicit Iranian oil exports, according to commercially available maritime data.

https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-november-21-2025/

Iran Update, November 24, 2025

Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei appointed a new commander of the Artesh Ground Forces amid the regime’s broader efforts to reshuffle senior military leadership after the Israel-Iran War. Khamenei appointed Brigadier General Ali Jahanshahi to command the Artesh Ground Forces on November 22.[27] The Artesh Ground Forces operates around 50 infantry, mechanized infantry, and armored brigades.[28] Jahanshahi previously commanded the 77th Samen Ol Aemeh Division of the Artesh Ground Forces in Mashhad, served as Artesh Ground Forces deputy coordinator, and acted as an ”evaluation” deputy for the Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters.[29] Jahanshahi is replacing former Ground Forces Commander Brigadier General Kioumars Heydari, whom Khamenei appointed as Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters deputy commander on November 24.[30] Iranian diaspora media, citing Iranian state media, reported that Jahanshahi’s appointment was part of expected leadership rotations and that the new appointment seeks to strengthen the Artesh Ground Forces operational structure.[31] Khamenei’s appointment of Jahanshahi comes amid regime efforts to reshuffle senior military leadership in the wake of the Israel-Iran War. The regime has made several recent changes as part of this effort, including appointing Brigadier General Hojatollah Ghoreishi as the IRGC Deputy Coordinator on October 27 and Brigadier General Ahmad Vahidi as the new Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS) deputy chief on October 30.[32]

The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Ground Forces Quds Operational Base announced on November 24 that it dismantled an Ansar al Furqan cell during a security operation in Sistan and Baluchistan Province.[33] Ansar al Furqan is a Salafi-Jihadi insurgent group active in southeastern Iran.[34] IRGC forces reportedly detained several members of the cell and seized two suicide vests during the ongoing “Martyrs of Security” operational exercise.[35] The IRGC began this operation in October 2024 after Jaish al Adl—a Baloch Salafi-Jihadi group that operates in southeastern Iran—killed ten Iranian Law Enforcement Command (LEC) officers in the province.[36] Ansar al Furqan claimed responsibility for attacking IRGC personnel near the Iran–Pakistan border in December 2023 and for attacking a LEC station in Zahedan, Sistan and Baluchistan Province in January 2024.[37]

https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-november-24-2025/

Iran Update, November 25, 2025

nspecified Iranian officials told The Telegraph on November 25 that the Houthis and some unspecified Iranian-backed Iraqi groups have become less responsive to Tehran.[1] The Iranian officials mischaracterized Iran’s relationship with the Houthis and Iraqi militias by misrepresenting how the Axis of Resistance functions, however. The Telegraph, citing unspecified Iranian officials, reported on November 25 that Iran has lost control over the Houthis and struggles to maintain cohesion among groups within its Axis of Resistance.[2] The officials claimed that the Houthis have rejected Iranian directives and have “gone rogue for a while and are now really rebels.”[3] These officials‘ claims misrepresent the fundamental nature of the Iran-Houthi relationship. The Houthis view themselves as a coequal partner to Iran rather than as an Iranian proxy.[4] Iran and the Houthis share strategic alignment over key objectives, but the Houthis have historically pursued objectives for their own benefit as well as Iran’s.[5] Both Iran and the Houthis aim to decrease US influence in the region to impose their own vision of a regional order.[6] Iran has long viewed the Houthis as a partner that can help implement this vision, even though the Houthis sometimes have divergent aims. This relationship is consistent with Iran’s relationship with many other Axis of Resistance organizations. The Axis of Resistance “makes decisions and coordinates through [informal] channels, making the alliance appear amorphous and opaque to external observers.” The informal and amorphous nature of the alliance is by design, and it enables Iranian officials to disavow its partners when politically convenient to do so.[7]

The Iranian officials also mischaracterized Iran’s relationship with some Iranian-backed Iraqi militias. An unspecified senior Iranian official told the Telegraph on November 25 that “it’s not just the Houthis,” noting that some Iranian-backed groups in Iraq are also behaving as though Iran has “never had any contact with them.”[8] The source added that some Iraqi militias have repeatedly ignored Iranian directives to pause training until “tensions subside.”[9] The source’s statements obscure the reality that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias demonstrate varying degrees of responsiveness to Iran rather than total independence. Iraqi groups operate on a spectrum of alignment with Iranian objectives and directives. Kataib Hezbollah is Iran’s most tightly controlled Iraqi militia and the closest Iraqi group to the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force.[10] The Badr Organization is often described as Iran’s “oldest proxy in Iraq” and is a powerful paramilitary actor.[11] The Badr Organization is also a major Iraqi political party whose leader, Hadi al Ameri, plays a central role in Iraq’s political system, giving the organization more overt Iraqi political interests and constraints than Kataib Hezbollah.[12] Asaib Ahl al Haq identifies as part of Iran’s Axis of Resistance yet “stubbornly maintains a degree of independence” and has openly disobeyed Iranian instructions.[13]

These Iranian officials probably cast the Houthis as an “independent” actor to encourage Saudi-mediated negotiations with the United States to move forward. Iranian officials have repeatedly stated that Iran will only negotiate on the nuclear issue and will not expand the talks to its missile program or Axis of Resistance.[14] Iran, by claiming its relationship with the Houthis no longer exists, would be able to assuage some Saudi concerns about the threat that the Iranian-supported Houthis pose to Saudi Arabia. Unspecified Western sources told Lebanese Hezbollah-affiliated media on November 25 that US President Donald Trump gave Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman a “mandate” to mediate a US-Iran agreement.[15] The sources stated that Saudi Arabia and Iran agreed to convene a high-level meeting in Paris in the coming days.[16] The report stated that bin Salman previously asked Iranian Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Larijani about Iran’s position on Saudi mediation. Larijani reportedly responded positively but emphasized that Iran cannot offer unspecified concessions.[17] Unspecified sources added that Saudi officials also discussed with US officials the need to reach an understanding with Iran to facilitate Yemeni reconciliation.[18] Saudi Arabia seeks an end to the Yemen conflict that would weaken the Houthis, which Riyadh views as a threat. Iranian officials could calculate that by casting the Houthis as unassociated with Iran, they would secure Saudi Arabia as a mediator and the resumption of negotiations without needing to make concessions on the Yemeni civil war.

IRGC Ground Forces interdicted a shipment of explosive devices, weapons, and ammunition reportedly smuggled by Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)-linked fighters into northwestern Iran on November 25.[31] The PKK-linked fighters attempted to smuggle the weapons into Iran via the Kurdish-populated Tergever border near Urmia, West Azerbaijan Province. The PKK is a Kurdish militia group based in the Kurdish-majority areas of Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Turkey. The PKK announced in May 2025 that it would dissolve itself and “end its armed struggle.”[32] The Kurdistan Free Life Party (PJAK), which is the Iranian branch of the PKK, announced in May 2025 that it would not adhere to the PKK’s decision to dissolve, however.[33] Iran and Turkey recently signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) on October 30 to strengthen border security cooperation amid concerns about Kurdish fighters operating along their shared border.[34] Iran has previously accused Kurdish opposition groups of inciting protests in western Iran and cooperating with Israel to facilitate attacks in Iran.[35]

https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-november-25-2025/

Iran Update, November 26, 2025

A Financial Times investigation unveiled that an Iranian company claimed to possess Western-origin nuclear-related technology, which highlights how Iran continues to adapt its procurement network to advance its nuclear program despite sanctions. The Financial Times reported on November 25 that an Organization of Defensive Innovation and Research (SPND) front company, Imen Gostar Raman Kish, claimed that it uses US and European equipment in some of its products.[1] The SPND played a leading role in Iran's nuclear weapons research program before 2003.[2] Imen Gostar Raman Kish said that it uses radiation-detection tubes from United Kingdom-based company Centronic and components from United States-based company Elijen Technology for its radiation-detection devices.[3] The Financial Times stated that there is no evidence that Elijen or Centronic were aware that they sold technology to Iranian entities.[4] The United States sanctioned Imen Gostar Raman Kish’s chairperson and vice chairperson in October 2025 for contributing to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.[5] Imen Gostar Raman Kish’s chief executive, Javad Ghasemi, was part of an Iranian delegation that secretly traveled to Russia in August 2024 to visit Russian research institutes specializing in dual-use technologies that can be used in nuclear weapons development.[6] A second Iranian delegation traveled to Russia in November 2024, possibly to seek “laser technology and expertise that could help [Iran] validate a nuclear weapon design without conducting a nuclear explosive test,” according to a former CIA analyst speaking to the Financial Times.[7]

Iran has made minimal progress in repairing its three main nuclear sites that were damaged during the Israel-Iran War but has conducted “extensive” clean-up efforts at several nuclear weaponization sites, according to satellite imagery analyzed by the Institute for Science and International Security.The sites where Iran has conducted clean-up activities include:

Organization of Defensive Innovation and Research (SPND) Headquarters, Tehran City: Iran is demolishing the top floors of the SPND headquarters on Fakhrizadeh Street, according to satellite imagery taken on October 23.[10] The Institute added that there are piles of rubble and salvaged equipment around the headquarters. Israel launched several airstrikes targeting the headquarters’ main building in June 2025.[11]

Shahid Meisami Research Center, Alborz Province: The Institute reported that Iran has cleaned up several damaged buildings at the Shahid Meisami Research Center, according to satellite imagery taken on October 21.[12] The Institute assessed that the clean-up efforts may be a “possible prelude to rebuilding” the center.[13] The Shahid Meisami Group is an Iranian chemical engineering and research group that is involved in Iran's chemical weapons program and is a subsidiary of SPND.[14] Israel launched airstrikes during the war that targeted a small building in the southwest of the Shahid Meisami complex that was likely used as a laboratory or administrative center.[15] Israel also struck a nearby hangar-looking building.[16] The hangar-looking building's “high bay metal frame” remains intact, and Iran has collected piles of debris next to it.[17] Israeli intelligence previously assessed that the hangar-looking building housed “plastic explosives and advanced material for nuclear detonation testing.”[18]

CTP-ISW previously reported that Iran has conducted limited clean-up and rebuilding activities at other nuclear sites, including Lavisan 2 (Mojdeh) and Taleghan 2.[19] Iran has also continued construction at the Mount Kolang Gaz La Facility near Natanz following the war.[20] The Institute assessed that Iran has conducted “little activity” at Iran's main nuclear sites — Natanz, Fordow, and the Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center — since the war.[21]

Iranian media outlets affiliated with hardliners and pragmatic hardliners are spreading rumors about fissures within President Masoud Pezeshkian’s administration amid ongoing efforts by these political factions to increase their influence in the regime. Some hardline outlets have recently circulated reports claiming that First Vice President Mohammad Reza Aref resigned due to disagreements with Pezeshkian. Media outlets affiliated with pragmatic hardliner Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, including Sobh-e No and Khorasan, are amplifying rumors about Aref’s reported resignation.[22] Sobh-e No claimed on November 19 that Aref resigned because the Pezeshkian administration was making major decisions without coordinating with him.[23] Khorasan claimed that Aref resigned due to “structural incoherence” between Aref, Pezeshkian’s Chief of Staff, Ali Haji Mirzaei, and Vice President for Executive Affairs Jafar Ghaem Panah.[24] These reports come as different factions within the Iranian regime, including a faction centered around Ghalibaf, are fighting for influence in Iran to determine Iranian policy after the Israel-Iran War.

https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-november-26-2025/

Iran Update, November 28, 2025

Iranian officials have dismissed reports that Iran seeks Saudi Arabia to mediate between Iran and the United States on the Iranian nuclear issue. Reuters reported on November 20 that Iran asked Saudi Arabia to persuade the United States to “revive stalled nuclear talks,” according to two unspecified regional sources.[31] Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei delivered a speech on November 27 in which he dismissed “rumors” that the Iranian government had sent a message to the United States through an intermediary country as a “pure lie.”[32] Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi also denied reports during an interview with French media on November 26 that Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian’s recent letter to Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman “had anything to do with” the nuclear issue or US-Iran talks.[33] Araghchi expressed “full confidence” in Saudi Arabia as a partner for regional stability but claimed that “US behavior” is the sole obstacle for nuclear talks rather than a lack of mediators.[34] The Iranian judiciary filed a case against a former Iranian parliamentarian on November 25 for alleging that President Pezeshkian, with Khamenei’s approval, had sent a message to US President Donald Trump through Salman to restart nuclear negotiations.[35] Unspecified Western sources also told Hezbollah-affiliated media on November 25 that Trump gave Salman a “mandate” to mediate a US-Iran agreement.[36] Unspecified sources told anti-regime media on November 28 that the United States recently reiterated its three conditions to restart negotiations in response to Pezeshkian’s letter to Salman.[37] These conditions include zero enrichment, limitations on Iran's missile program, and a halt to Iranian support for the Axis of Resistance.[38] US-Iran nuclear negotiations previously stalled, mainly because Iran consistently rejected the US demand for zero Iranian uranium enrichment.[39] Iranian officials have repeatedly stated that Iran will only negotiate on the nuclear issue and will not expand negotiations to include Iran's missile program or the Axis of Resistance.[40]

Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei reportedly ordered the Iranian Intelligence Ministry to crack down on individuals who violate Iran's mandatory hijab law, according to an Iranian religious propaganda official on November 25.[41] Khamenei reportedly issued this directive after being “shocked” by an Intelligence Ministry report on women's use of the hijab in Iranian society. The report presumably highlighted that Iranian women are increasingly flouting the mandatory hijab law, a trend that has become more prevalent since the Mahsa Amini movement in late 2022 and early 2023.[42] Iranian hardliners, including Judiciary Chief Gholam Hossein Mohseni Ejei, support stricter enforcement of the mandatory hijab law.[43] A large group of individuals, most of whom were women, attended a demonstration organized by the Islamic Propaganda Organization in support of hijab enforcement at Tehran University on November 28.[44] The Islamic Propaganda Council is responsible for spreading and implementing the Iranian regime's religious propaganda.[45] Moderates, including current President Masoud Pezeshkian, have been reluctant to enforce the mandatory hijab law out of concern that it may spark social unrest similar to the Mahsa Amini protests in 2022 and 2023.[46]

https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-november-28-2025/

🌐🇮🇷Iran: Persia and its mineral wealth in history.

As early as the 3rd millennium BC, the Elamites mined tin and copper in what is now southwestern Iran for the production of bronze. In ancient Persia (Achaemenid Empire 550–330 BC), the mines belonged to the king of kings – the Royal Road led past the mines of lapis lazuli in Badakhshan (imported via Bactra) and turquoise near Neyshabur, which the Persians called “pırouz” (victorious) and exported as far as Egypt and Rome.

The most famous was the silver mine at Laureion in Asia Minor (after the conquest in 546 BC), but at home they mined iron, copper and lead in the Zagros Mountains; they imported gold and silver from Armenia and the Caucasus. Darius I minted gold dareiki from the electro mines of Lydia and Sardis, which allowed him to create the world's first stable currency.
According to Herodotus, the Persians paid tribute in talents of silver from mines in Armenia and Bactria.

The Parthians and especially the Sasanians (224–651 AD) expanded mining: the silver mines of Nayin and Anarak, the gold mines of Armenia, and the turquoise mines of Neyshabur reached their peak. The Sasanian king Khosrau I (531–579) had new copper and silver mines dug in Tabaristan and paid Roman engineers to build him sophisticated drainage systems (qanat systems).

After the Arab conquest (651), the caliphs took over the Persian mines; the Abbasids exported turquoise, saffron, and silk to China and Byzantium in the 9th–10th centuries.

In the Middle Ages, the Safavids (1501–1736) restored the great mines of copper in Kerman and turquoise near Mashhad; Shah Abbas the Great paid European minemasters to modernize the shafts.

The first concessions to Europeans were granted only in 1872 (Baron Julius de Reuter – cancelled) and 1901 (William Knox D’Arcy – oil in Masjid-e Suleiman 1908). Until then, Persia had been extracting minerals for thousands of years using traditional methods – hand picks, fire and vinegar to crack the rock, and qanats to drain it.

Thus, for 4,000 years, ancient Persia transformed its underground into gold, silver, turquoise and power – and laid the foundation for why today's Iran is still one of the richest countries in the world underground...

https://x.com/geogeolite/status/1995176838264451093

...and now, thanks to Khomeini's seizure of power in 1979, the entire country is sinking into the underworld.

Iran Update, December 1, 2025

Israeli and Arab media have reported that Iran is prepared to expand an Israel-Hezbollah conflict regionally if Israel launches operations against Hezbollah. Iran and its partners may be preparing a contingency plan for this scenario. An Israeli security source told Israeli media on November 30 that Iran is attempting to rearm its regional partners, including the Houthis, Hezbollah, and unspecified groups in the West Bank and Syria, for potential action against Israel.[1] The source added that Iran is in “an arms race” because Iran understands that Israel will launch an operation in Lebanon if the Lebanese government fails to meet the United States’ December 31 deadline to disarm Hezbollah.[2] A political council member of Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba told Iranian media on December 1 that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have worked to develop an “advanced security plan” to improve organizational structure, enhance drone and missile capabilities, and fortify militia headquarters in preparation for “any upcoming military operation“ against Israel.[3] Israeli and Arab media reported on December 1 that US Special Envoy Thomas Barrack told Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed al Sudani that Israel intends to carry out an operation against Hezbollah soon, ”that will continue until [the group] is disarmed.”[4] Barrack reportedly warned Sudani that Israel would strike Iraq if any Iranian-backed Iraqi militias intervene in a potential Israeli operation against Hezbollah and urged Sudani to stop any militia activities to ”support Hezbollah… financially or militarily.”[5] US officials have previously warned Iraqi officials that they must deter Iranian-backed Iraqi militia from targeting Israel or the United States. US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth warned Iraqi Defense Minister Thabet al Abbasi on November 4 that the United States would act against any Iranian-backed Iraqi militias that interfered with US operations in the region, particularly in Syria.[6]

Iran’s reported preparations for a potential Israel-Hezbollah conflict suggest that Iran could push its Axis of Resistance partners to proactively fight Israel, despite the major defeats that multiple Axis partners and Iran have sustained in the past two years. Iran largely restrained itself and the rest of the Axis from fully engaging Israel and the United States at various points throughout the Israel-Hamas War. Iran only partially activated its Axis partners following the Hamas October 7 attack. Iran did not activate pre-existing plans for Hezbollah to launch ground attacks into northern Israel after the October 7 attacks, for example. Some Iranian officials have recently called for Iranian partners to remove this ”restraint,” which may suggest that Iran views its previous approach against Israel as a mistake. Former Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Commander Mohsen Rezaei, for example, urged Hezbollah on November 25 to abandon its ”restraint” and strike Israel for its killing of Hezbollah’s ”de facto chief of staff” and senior commander Haitham Ali Tabatabai on November 23.[7]

Iran is facing several internal issues and is in the process of rebuilding its diminished military capabilities, which may make the regime hesitant to become directly involved in a renewed Israel-Hezbollah conflict, however. Iran is reportedly facing increased “turmoil” and infighting within the regime due to paranoia over widespread Israeli infiltration.[8] Iran has also undertaken efforts to rebuild its ballistic missile program and its weapons stockpiles and reshuffle senior military leadership after Israel destroyed key weaponry and killed a significant number of senior Iranian military officials during the Israel-Iran War.[9] Iran’s need to rebuild and re-focus domestically will limit Iran’s ability to meaningfully rebuild some of its partner forces on a short timeline, however.

Some of Iran’s other partners, including Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, may also be hesitant to conduct kinetic operations against Israel in a renewed Israel-Lebanon conflict. Iranian-backed Iraqi militias may hesitate to get involved in a renewed Israel-Lebanon conflict because the militias’ participation could have repercussions for their domestic political efforts. The ongoing Iraqi government formation process is significant for the Iraqi militias because it determines the ability of Iranian-backed actors to dominate Iraq and support Iranian interests within the country.[10] Iraqi militias could face political repercussions for engaging in a conflict. Some Iraqi parties could decide against aligning with Iranian-backed parties if the parties’ affiliated militias dragged Iraq into a war with Israel, for example. Iran’s partners in Iraq conducted attacks targeting Israel and US military positions in Iraq during the Israel-Iran War, but did not claim the attacks to avoid dragging Iraq into the war and causing negative political repercussions ahead of the November 2025 parliamentary elections.[11] The militias’ inaction during the war highlights that the Iranian-backed Iraqi militias may not be willing to engage in activities that could disrupt their political efforts. External militia operations that trigger US or Israeli action in Iraq are generally unpopular in Iraq.

Hezbollah is also likely hesitant to pursue any direct action against Israel that could trigger a full-scale conflict and disrupt the group’s reconstitution efforts. An Israeli media outlet reported on December 1 that Hezbollah is pursuing the “dual objective” of indirectly retaliating for Tabatabai’s death while ensuring that its retaliation will not warrant an Israeli response that could lead to a “full-scale war” in Lebanon.[12] The Israeli outlet added that Hezbollah may request that the Houthis launch a retaliatory strike targeting Israel on Hezbollah’s behalf.[13] The Houthis may be willing to act on Hezbollah’s behalf in this specific situation due to Tabatabai’s role in training Houthi fighters.[14] The Houthis may not be willing to engage in a broader escalation, however. The Houthis did not support Hezbollah kinetically during or after the Israel-Hezbollah conflict in late 2024, despite Houthi Supreme Leader Abdulmalik al Houthi stating that there is “complete solidarity” between the Houthis and Hezbollah.[15] The Houthis instead have linked their campaign against Israel to Israeli operations in the Gaza Strip.[16] Hezbollah’s continued hesitancy to act directly against Israel, nonetheless, suggests that the group fears escalation because of its weaker position and the inherent unpredictability of military escalation, which could rapidly spiral out of Hezbollah’s control. Any Hezbollah retaliatory attack directly targeting Israel or Israeli forces would presumably prompt a large Israeli response, because Israel has promised to respond to any direct threats or plans to attack Israel with force.[17] Such an Israeli response would possibly disrupt Hezbollah’s current efforts to regenerate its forces and replenish its weapons stocks by targeting Hezbollah fighters, military infrastructure, and supply lines.[18]

The Iranian Artesh Navy unveiled new naval vessels on November 29 as part of a broader naval modernization effort.[25] The Artesh Navy unveiled the Kurdistan “floating base” vessel and showcased the renovated Sahand destroyer in Bandar Abbas, Hormozgan Province.[26] The Sahand capsized in Bandar Abbas Port on the Persian Gulf in July 2024.[27] The Kurdistan reportedly carries eight Ghadr and Ghadir anti-ship missiles with a 200-kilometer to 300-kilometer range, vertical-launch Navab air-defense missiles with a 25-kilometer range for low-altitude threats, and Kian one-way attack drones with a roughly 2,000-kilometer range.[28] Iran has constructed several forward base ships and other offensive vessels since 2021 to execute expeditionary and out-of-area operations.[29] Iran has sometimes built these vessels by converting old commercial tankers. The Iranian Artesh has also developed a variety of forward-base and long-range surface ships, including the Makran, which was the first Artesh Navy’s forward base ship.[30] The Makran carries drones, helicopters, and anti-ship missiles, which enable months-long deployments for out-of-area missions.[31]

These Iranian ships are not likely to survive conventional naval engagements with the United States, but they can support attacks on international commercial traffic. Iranian officials have repeatedly threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz.[32] Iran would have to deploy naval mines and fast attack crafts to close the Strait. Iran also sees its naval capabilities as another form of deterrence. Senior Iranian military commanders claim that Iran did not use its naval capabilities during the Israel-Iran War because Iran deliberately held those capabilities in reserve and saw no reason to expand the conflict.[33] Iranian Artesh Navy Commander Rear Admiral Shahram Irani also announced on November 29 that the Artesh Navy will name its next “floating base” Khuzestan, which indicates that the Iranian Artesh is institutionalizing this class of long-endurance support ships as a core element of its future naval force.[34]

Iran is expanding trade with Turkey as part of Iran’s broader strategy of prioritizing regional trade to mitigate the impact of sanctions on the Iranian economy. Araghchi announced that Iran and Turkey have agreed to build the 200-kilometer Marand–Cheshmeh Soraya railway between Iran’s East Azerbaijan Province and Turkey’s eastern Aralik border area in the next three to four years.[46] Iran has announced several new trade ventures with neighboring states in recent months.[47] Iran has repeatedly failed to meet its transportation infrastructure completion forecasts, however.[48] Araghchi announced that Iran will open a consulate in Turkey’s eastern city of Van in the ”near future” to facilitate bilateral trade and border cooperation.[49] Araghchi also stated that Iran and Turkey are prepared to extend their existing agreement on Iranian gas exports to Turkey and that the two states are pursuing unspecified cooperation in electricity production.[50] Iranian media highlighted that Iran should capitalize on its engagements with Turkey and Saudi Arabia to form trade mechanisms that circumvent the use of the US dollar and, therefore, international sanctions on Iran.[51]

Iran’s water crisis is affecting the Iranian regime’s ability to provide electricity to its citizens, which could eventually lead to domestic unrest. Iranian authorities stopped electricity production at Karkheh Dam in southwestern Iran on November 29 because of a decrease in the reservoir’s water levels.[52] The dam’s director stated that the reservoir’s water level was too low for electricity production.[53] The Karkheh Dam’s shutdown comes amid Iran’s ongoing energy crisis due to overconsumption, Israeli strikes on energy infrastructure during the Israel-Iran War, and government mismanagement.[54] Energy shortages have triggered repeated unrest in 2025, including a strike by iron market traders in Tehran in May and a large July demonstration in Gilan Province over water and electricity outages.[55]

https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-december-1-2025/

Iran Update, December 2, 2025

Iran and key US adversaries likely shared tactical and technological lessons on December 2 as part of a five-day military exercise in Iran. Iran is holding the “Sahand 2025” counterterrorism exercise at the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Ground Forces’ Imam Zaman Mechanized Brigade in East Azerbaijan Province from December 1 to 5.[1] Iran faces security threats along its northwestern border near East Azerbaijan Province from Kurdish groups, including the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI), Komala, the Free Life Party of Kurdistan (PJAK), and the Kurdistan Freedom Party (PAK).[2] All ten members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which includes Russia, Belarus, and China, sent military delegations to participate in the exercise.[3] The SCO has historically emphasized counterterrorism as a key goal of the institution.[4] Saudi Arabia, Azerbaijan, Oman, and Iraq also attended as observers.[5] IRGC-affiliated media published photos of Iranian forces using first person view (FPV) drones during the exercise, which are widely used by both Russia and Ukraine and have changed the character of the modern battlefield.[6] These drones, when employed at scale, can “perform a wide array of functions but have been particularly transformative in creating a nearly-transparent battlefield.”[7] This transparency has applications outside of conventional warfare, as seen in Ukraine. Drones could be employed in Iran to assist counterinsurgency operations in border regions or to help suppress protests, for example.

The Iranian Armed Forces announced new Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and Artesh appointments on December 2 amid Iran’s broader efforts to reshuffle senior military leadership after the Israel-Iran War.

· Artesh Ground Forces Commander Brigadier General Ali Jahanshahi appointed Brigadier General Bahador Khajehvand as the new commander of the Artesh Ground Forces Northeastern Regional Headquarters.[31] The Northeastern Regional Headquarters is one of the Artesh Ground Forces’ five regional headquarters.[32] Khajehvand replaced Brigadier General Sirous Amanollahi.[33] Khajehvand most recently served as the 58th Zolfaghar Division commander in Shahrud, Semnan Province.[34]

· Jahanshahi appointed Amanollahi as the new Artesh Ground Forces Operations deputy.[35] Amanollahi most recently served as the Artesh Ground Forces Northeastern Regional Headquarters commander. He also served as the commander of the Artesh Ground Forces Northwestern Regional Headquarters from 2023 to 2024. Amanollahi notably commanded the 65th Airborne Special Forces Brigade from approximately 2016 to 2019, when Jahanshahi was the Coordination Deputy of the Artesh Ground Forces.[36] He was also the deputy commander of the 65th Airborne Special Forces Brigade from early 2011 to 2016. The 65th Brigade is one of the most specialized forces within the Artesh Ground Forces and was deployed to Syria during the Syrian Civil War.[37] The Iranian Armed Forces have historically promoted commanders from the 65th Brigade. The regime promoted Brigadier General Nozar Nemati, who oversaw this brigade’s deployment to Syria, to Artesh Ground Forces coordination deputy and deputy commander in October 2016 and January 2017, respectively.[38]

· IRGC Commander Brigadier General Mohammad Karami appointed Brigadier General Esmali Khalilzadeh as the new deputy commander of the Hamzeh Sayyid ol Shohada Operational Base, which oversees Kurdistan and West Azerbaijan provinces.[39] Karami also appointed Brigadier General Yadollah Abroshan as the new commander of the Shahid Boroujerdi headquarters and Colonel Mansour Abdollahzadeh as the new commander of the Northwest Combat Medical Center.[40]

https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-december-2-2025/

Iran Update, December 3, 2025

Iran may have sought to develop laser-based anti-drone systems in response to Israeli drone attacks on Iran in recent years. Israel has conducted a series of drone attacks on Iran in recent years, including a drone strike on a centrifuge manufacturing facility in Karaj, Alborz Province, in 2021, a strike that destroyed a drone manufacturing facility in Kermanshah Province in 2022, and a drone attack on a munitions factory in Esfahan in 2023.[25] These attacks may have driven Iran to seek to develop laser-based anti-drone systems, which cost significantly less than traditional air defense systems.[26] Israel also used small drones in June 2025 to kill Iranian nuclear scientists and destroy Iranian ballistic missile launchers, which may further drive Iran to develop its anti-drone capabilities.[27] US Central Command (CENTCOM) announced on December 3 that it has launched a one-way attack drone force in the Middle East, which highlights how drones will continue to play a large role in future conflicts in the region.[28] Russia may be able to share knowledge about laser based anti-drone systems with Iran, given that Russia has developed such systems to counter Ukrainian drone strikes.[29] Russia unveiled a truck-mounted anti-drone laser system in October 2025, for example, that can detect, track, and destroy small drones by damaging onboard sensors, wiring, and batteries and causing the drone to crash.[30] Iran would likely prioritize laser-based anti-drone systems over laser based anti-ballistic missile systems in the near future, given that the latter requires much more energy than the former.[31] Most existing laser-based air defense systems, such as the Israeli Iron Beam, can shoot down small drones, rockets, and other systems, but currently do not have the capability to shoot down ballistic missiles.[32]

Iranian officials have met with several African counterparts over the last week to discuss greater defense and economic ties. Iranian Director General for African Affairs Akbar Khosravinejad met with the three foreign ministers of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) — Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger — in Burkina Faso on November 28.[48] The officials discussed ways to expand cooperation broadly. Iran has increased cooperation with the AES since the anti-Western bloc formed in 2023, and Iranian officials have met with their Sahelian counterparts on numerous occasions.[49] Iran has signed various agreements with Burkina Faso and Niger on energy, finance, health, industry, mining, and engineering, although CTP has observed little implementation.[50]

The Iranian deputy foreign minister for economic diplomacy led an Iranian delegation to Uganda on December 2, marking at least the second Iranian delegation to Uganda in 2025.[51] Iranian media emphasized that the trip aimed to strengthen economic ties and specifically noted that the two sides discussed bilateral relations, preparations for the upcoming joint economic and technical commission, and sectoral meetings with Ugandan business leaders to expand trade and investment ties.[52] Iran and Uganda have a decades long partnership rooted in anti-colonial political allyship and agricultural ties.[53] The previous three Iranian presidents visited Uganda during their terms, and Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni has visited Iran several times.[54]

Iran seeks to bolster partnerships with African countries as part of its continued effort to break its international isolation, including through growing its geopolitical influence and increasing trade, hard currency acquisition, and access to natural resources, such as uranium, to mitigate sanctions. Iran has used defense ties as a foundation to strengthen partnerships, including its pursuit of Red Sea and uranium access. Iran has sent Ababil-3 and Mohajer-6 multi-role drones to Ethiopia, Sudan, and Western Sahara since 2021.[55] The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) rejected an Iranian request for a naval base or dual-use port on Sudan’s Red Sea coast in exchange for continued aid and a helicopter-carrying ship.[56] The Nigerien junta similarly turned down an Iranian offer of drones and surface-to-air missiles in exchange for uranium yellowcake in 2024.[57] CTP also assessed that Iran likely aimed to secure access to Zimbabwe’s rich uranium deposits through increased defense engagement with Zimbabwe in 2024.[58]

Iran has used internal oppression and regime security assistance to bolster its partnerships with some African states, including Burkina Faso. The Iranian Law Enforcement commander visited Burkina Faso and Ethiopia in May.[59] CTP previously assessed that this visit was likely part of a broader Iranian effort to build partnerships and simultaneously open new avenues for economic partnerships and revenue streams.[60] Uganda’s authoritarian regime could be open to similar support, especially as aging President Yoweri Museveni considers passing power to his son.[61]

Iran has separately sought to expand trade, investment, and infrastructure initiatives in Africa, in line with its latest moves in Uganda. Iran held the Third Iran-Africa Economic Cooperation Summit in April 2025, where it signed multiple commercial and investment deals with African partners and emphasized expanding joint chambers of commerce, trade centers, and financing mechanisms.[62] Iran has previously struggled to follow through on aspirational cooperation goals with African countries, but Iranian officials explicitly reorganized the 2025 summit to focus on four priority sectors — mining, agriculture, petrochemicals, and medical equipment — to ensure the summit remained “outcome-driven.”[63] Greater bilateral trade with Africa helps Iran increase its capital inflows to prevent economic collapse under Western sanctions and normalizes economic cooperation with non-Western countries despite sanctions. Iran-Africa trade remains a tiny portion of its overall gross domestic product, however, and CTP has previously assessed that increased trade with Africa will not solve the problems that underlie Iran’s economic instability.[64]

https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-december-3-2025/

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