Iran Update, November 24, 2025
Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei appointed a new commander of the Artesh Ground Forces amid the regime’s broader efforts to reshuffle senior military leadership after the Israel-Iran War. Khamenei appointed Brigadier General Ali Jahanshahi to command the Artesh Ground Forces on November 22.[27] The Artesh Ground Forces operates around 50 infantry, mechanized infantry, and armored brigades.[28] Jahanshahi previously commanded the 77th Samen Ol Aemeh Division of the Artesh Ground Forces in Mashhad, served as Artesh Ground Forces deputy coordinator, and acted as an ”evaluation” deputy for the Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters.[29] Jahanshahi is replacing former Ground Forces Commander Brigadier General Kioumars Heydari, whom Khamenei appointed as Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters deputy commander on November 24.[30] Iranian diaspora media, citing Iranian state media, reported that Jahanshahi’s appointment was part of expected leadership rotations and that the new appointment seeks to strengthen the Artesh Ground Forces operational structure.[31] Khamenei’s appointment of Jahanshahi comes amid regime efforts to reshuffle senior military leadership in the wake of the Israel-Iran War. The regime has made several recent changes as part of this effort, including appointing Brigadier General Hojatollah Ghoreishi as the IRGC Deputy Coordinator on October 27 and Brigadier General Ahmad Vahidi as the new Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS) deputy chief on October 30.[32]
The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Ground Forces Quds Operational Base announced on November 24 that it dismantled an Ansar al Furqan cell during a security operation in Sistan and Baluchistan Province.[33] Ansar al Furqan is a Salafi-Jihadi insurgent group active in southeastern Iran.[34] IRGC forces reportedly detained several members of the cell and seized two suicide vests during the ongoing “Martyrs of Security” operational exercise.[35] The IRGC began this operation in October 2024 after Jaish al Adl—a Baloch Salafi-Jihadi group that operates in southeastern Iran—killed ten Iranian Law Enforcement Command (LEC) officers in the province.[36] Ansar al Furqan claimed responsibility for attacking IRGC personnel near the Iran–Pakistan border in December 2023 and for attacking a LEC station in Zahedan, Sistan and Baluchistan Province in January 2024.[37]
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-november-24-2025/
Iran Update, November 25, 2025
nspecified Iranian officials told The Telegraph on November 25 that the Houthis and some unspecified Iranian-backed Iraqi groups have become less responsive to Tehran.[1] The Iranian officials mischaracterized Iran’s relationship with the Houthis and Iraqi militias by misrepresenting how the Axis of Resistance functions, however. The Telegraph, citing unspecified Iranian officials, reported on November 25 that Iran has lost control over the Houthis and struggles to maintain cohesion among groups within its Axis of Resistance.[2] The officials claimed that the Houthis have rejected Iranian directives and have “gone rogue for a while and are now really rebels.”[3] These officials‘ claims misrepresent the fundamental nature of the Iran-Houthi relationship. The Houthis view themselves as a coequal partner to Iran rather than as an Iranian proxy.[4] Iran and the Houthis share strategic alignment over key objectives, but the Houthis have historically pursued objectives for their own benefit as well as Iran’s.[5] Both Iran and the Houthis aim to decrease US influence in the region to impose their own vision of a regional order.[6] Iran has long viewed the Houthis as a partner that can help implement this vision, even though the Houthis sometimes have divergent aims. This relationship is consistent with Iran’s relationship with many other Axis of Resistance organizations. The Axis of Resistance “makes decisions and coordinates through [informal] channels, making the alliance appear amorphous and opaque to external observers.” The informal and amorphous nature of the alliance is by design, and it enables Iranian officials to disavow its partners when politically convenient to do so.[7]
The Iranian officials also mischaracterized Iran’s relationship with some Iranian-backed Iraqi militias. An unspecified senior Iranian official told the Telegraph on November 25 that “it’s not just the Houthis,” noting that some Iranian-backed groups in Iraq are also behaving as though Iran has “never had any contact with them.”[8] The source added that some Iraqi militias have repeatedly ignored Iranian directives to pause training until “tensions subside.”[9] The source’s statements obscure the reality that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias demonstrate varying degrees of responsiveness to Iran rather than total independence. Iraqi groups operate on a spectrum of alignment with Iranian objectives and directives. Kataib Hezbollah is Iran’s most tightly controlled Iraqi militia and the closest Iraqi group to the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force.[10] The Badr Organization is often described as Iran’s “oldest proxy in Iraq” and is a powerful paramilitary actor.[11] The Badr Organization is also a major Iraqi political party whose leader, Hadi al Ameri, plays a central role in Iraq’s political system, giving the organization more overt Iraqi political interests and constraints than Kataib Hezbollah.[12] Asaib Ahl al Haq identifies as part of Iran’s Axis of Resistance yet “stubbornly maintains a degree of independence” and has openly disobeyed Iranian instructions.[13]
These Iranian officials probably cast the Houthis as an “independent” actor to encourage Saudi-mediated negotiations with the United States to move forward. Iranian officials have repeatedly stated that Iran will only negotiate on the nuclear issue and will not expand the talks to its missile program or Axis of Resistance.[14] Iran, by claiming its relationship with the Houthis no longer exists, would be able to assuage some Saudi concerns about the threat that the Iranian-supported Houthis pose to Saudi Arabia. Unspecified Western sources told Lebanese Hezbollah-affiliated media on November 25 that US President Donald Trump gave Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman a “mandate” to mediate a US-Iran agreement.[15] The sources stated that Saudi Arabia and Iran agreed to convene a high-level meeting in Paris in the coming days.[16] The report stated that bin Salman previously asked Iranian Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Larijani about Iran’s position on Saudi mediation. Larijani reportedly responded positively but emphasized that Iran cannot offer unspecified concessions.[17] Unspecified sources added that Saudi officials also discussed with US officials the need to reach an understanding with Iran to facilitate Yemeni reconciliation.[18] Saudi Arabia seeks an end to the Yemen conflict that would weaken the Houthis, which Riyadh views as a threat. Iranian officials could calculate that by casting the Houthis as unassociated with Iran, they would secure Saudi Arabia as a mediator and the resumption of negotiations without needing to make concessions on the Yemeni civil war.
IRGC Ground Forces interdicted a shipment of explosive devices, weapons, and ammunition reportedly smuggled by Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)-linked fighters into northwestern Iran on November 25.[31] The PKK-linked fighters attempted to smuggle the weapons into Iran via the Kurdish-populated Tergever border near Urmia, West Azerbaijan Province. The PKK is a Kurdish militia group based in the Kurdish-majority areas of Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Turkey. The PKK announced in May 2025 that it would dissolve itself and “end its armed struggle.”[32] The Kurdistan Free Life Party (PJAK), which is the Iranian branch of the PKK, announced in May 2025 that it would not adhere to the PKK’s decision to dissolve, however.[33] Iran and Turkey recently signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) on October 30 to strengthen border security cooperation amid concerns about Kurdish fighters operating along their shared border.[34] Iran has previously accused Kurdish opposition groups of inciting protests in western Iran and cooperating with Israel to facilitate attacks in Iran.[35]
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-november-25-2025/