Yep, just bring back WW2 era deuce and a halfs to move the infantry forward then let them fight with small arms. What we are seeing in the performance or lack of in the Rus army is what happens when soldiers are not trained to think for themselves and to take the initiative, but to wait for orders; are not confident in their leaders; do not maintain their equipment; and there is a complete absence of a core of professional NCOs. Also that tanks and infantry fight as a team, without infantry support tanks are especially vulnerable in towns and wooded areas. However, I do not think the day of the tank is over.
The Rus army wasn’t trained to fight, but merely to go through the steps to perform good enough in a pre-planned exercise to look like they were competent and combat ready.
I recommend reading former USAEUR commander LTG (ret) Mark Hertling’s article comparing the Russian and Ukrainian armies. One thing I got from it, is that the old Soviet army was probably as bad as the current Russian army and that it may have not been the well trained force as we gave them credit to be back during my two tours in Germany with the 3d Armored Division, “Spearhead”.
I assume that the old Soviet army was a little bit more effective because you had the Soviet empire back then plus the corruption was less of an issue back then, if you stole too much, they can either send you to a gulag in Siberia or have you executed. Today, you get away with corruption as long as you prove your loyalty to Putin. It worked for a long time because no one thought that Russia was going to invade Ukraine. Russia is armed with nuclear weapons so the deterrence factor was there even though the military is crap like you've said.
It is very interesting to consider the historical mastery of the operational art of the “Deep Battle” concept of strategic operations epitomized by great Russian captains like Georgy Zhukov, Ivan Konev and Konstantine Rokkosovsky, and the seeming failure to succeed on this occasion with it.
The destruction of German Army Group Center in the summer of 1944 and the Vistula-Oder offensives reflected the Soviet high level grasp of the operational art, to an extent that was probably unequalled by any other major combatant of WW II.
Deep battle encompassed maneuver by multiple Soviet Army front-size formations simultaneously. It not intended to achieve victory immediately, but rather to induce a catastrophic failure in the enemy’s defenses by a series of parallel and multiple operations conducted on many axis’s of advance. It also required far greater amounts of manpower then the Russians have committed here. They seem to have thought they could prevail with a shoe string operation.
I agree with your assessment of the Russian army’s lack of initiative at the tactical and mid level management sphere, PARTICULARLY insofar as they lack a well developed NCO corp. This is something that many authoritarian regimes are loathe to do because they fear people thinking independently. An exception was the German Army of World War II, but it had ALREADY long established and inculcated the concept of Auftragstaktik and personal initiative into the Wehrmacht long before the ascension of the Third Reich.
Last but not least, the corruption that seems to infest the Russian armed forces is also appearing to manifest itself in the form of reduced combat efficiency.
Yabbut, who was that old commie that said
“quantity has a quality all it’s own?”
Or something like that.
Pretty much was the essence of what I always understood about the Red army. Massive numbers.