It is very interesting to consider the historical mastery of the operational art of the “Deep Battle” concept of strategic operations epitomized by great Russian captains like Georgy Zhukov, Ivan Konev and Konstantine Rokkosovsky, and the seeming failure to succeed on this occasion with it.
The destruction of German Army Group Center in the summer of 1944 and the Vistula-Oder offensives reflected the Soviet high level grasp of the operational art, to an extent that was probably unequalled by any other major combatant of WW II.
Deep battle encompassed maneuver by multiple Soviet Army front-size formations simultaneously. It not intended to achieve victory immediately, but rather to induce a catastrophic failure in the enemy’s defenses by a series of parallel and multiple operations conducted on many axis’s of advance. It also required far greater amounts of manpower then the Russians have committed here. They seem to have thought they could prevail with a shoe string operation.
I agree with your assessment of the Russian army’s lack of initiative at the tactical and mid level management sphere, PARTICULARLY insofar as they lack a well developed NCO corp. This is something that many authoritarian regimes are loathe to do because they fear people thinking independently. An exception was the German Army of World War II, but it had ALREADY long established and inculcated the concept of Auftragstaktik and personal initiative into the Wehrmacht long before the ascension of the Third Reich.
Last but not least, the corruption that seems to infest the Russian armed forces is also appearing to manifest itself in the form of reduced combat efficiency.
Well said.