Posted on 03/11/2020 2:39:05 PM PDT by Red Badger
The submarine mysteriously went down in 1963, killing everyone on board. Thanks to a lawsuit, we're about to learn why.
A retired U.S. Navy submarine commander sued the Navy to release an official report on the sinking of the USS Thresher—and won.
Thresher sank in April 1963, lost with all hands, but there has never been an official explanation as to why.
The loss of Thresher lead to an improved culture of safety in the Navy, and since 1968, the service hasn’t lost a single submarine.
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A retired U.S. Navy submarine commander has won a lawsuit forcing the Navy to release its report on what happened to the USS Thresher, a nuclear-powered attack submarine that sank during diving tests in 1963. The loss of the submarine has never been fully explained, and the Navy has never released the report on the sub’s sinking.
Diagram of Thresher showing off its teardrop hull.
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USS Thresher was the first of its class, a new type of fast, deep diving attack submarine. The Thresher-class subs used a streamlined hull designed for fast underwater travel. With a torpedo-like hull design and a S5W nuclear reactor, the Thresher class could make 20 knots on the surface and 30 knots underwater—the reverse of World War II-era submarines designed to spend most of their time on the surface. The submarines were 278 feet long, 31 feet wide, and carried Mk. 37 homing torpedoes for use against surface and subsurface targets, SUBROC anti-submarine torpedoes, and sea mines.
On April 9, 1963, the Thresher was 220 miles east of Cape Cod, conducting diving tests. It was the first submarine to use the new HY-80 steel alloy, and the Navy was eager to determine how deep the new design could safely dive. At 9:13 a.m., while at a depth of 1,300 feet, the submarine radioed the submarine rescue ship USS Skylark, waiting above:
“Experiencing minor difficulties. Have positive up angle. Am attempting to blow (ballast tanks). Will keep you informed.”
But Thresher never surfaced, and the Navy later found the sub in six pieces on the bottom of the Atlantic Ocean. All 129 personnel on board were killed. People have come up with many theories about how the sub sank, including blaming the faulty welds that failed during the tests, shorting out the sub's critical electrical systems and sapping its power.
Capt. Jim Bryant, a retired Navy submarine officer, wanted to see the Navy’s 1,700-page report on the Thresher’s sinking, but the Navy refused to release it. So Bryant, Stars and Stripes reports, sued the Navy, and last month a federal judge ordered the service to release it in 300-page chunks.
The Navy has long been extremely protective of the report. The Navy submarine force is notoriously tight-lipped; submariners say the nickname “the silent service” not only applies to the quiet nature of subs, but the secretive nature of the sub community as a whole.
The service first said it would release the Thresher report in 1998, but released only 19 of 1,700 pages, claiming that keeping it classified was to protect serving submarine crews. The problem with that explanation? The accident happened during normal dive tests. More than 50 years have passed since the sinking, and the submarine’s technology is obsolete.
The loss of the Thresher led to a sea change in the Navy submarine force. After the sinking, the service instituted SUBSAFE, a program that ensures the safe operation of submarines. SUBSAFE monitors the design and construction of new subs to ensure ships can remain watertight and survive accidents at sea. (The Navy lost another submarine, the USS Scorpion, in 1968, but it wasn't built to SUBSAFE standards.)
In 2005, the attack submarine USS San Francisco collided with an underwater seamount at the equivalent of 30 miles an hour—and was still able to sail to Guam for repairs. The culture of safety spawned by SUBSAFE—and indirectly Thresher—is credited for ensuring the San Francisco’s survival.
The Navy will begin releasing the Thresher report in segments on May 15 and will continue until Oct. 15.
I remember the Scorpion too.....just very sad when we lose our guys and gals no matter where or when.....
Changes were made long ago to remedy those defects. Why the enduring Navy coverup? The report likely revealed numerous other defects and to systemic lapses in leadership that should have led to the removal of Rickover and other Navy brass, a restructuring of the Navy's shipbuilding process, and with penalties and reforms for the shipbuilders.
As it was, Rickover skated until his improper and cozy relationship with the Navy's ship contractors forced him into retirement. Since the Navy's shipbuilding process remains troubled today, those now in charge do not want an old sub loss report becoming public and helping to spur reforms.
Writing like someone that once stayed in a Holiday Inn.
*ping*
An insult, not a critique. I come by my knowledge on the matter by following the reporting on the Thresher loss closely due to an interest in it as a boy. My father, a Navy vet, still has a photo of the Thresher above his desk. When it went down, he feared that a friend of his on the crew was lost. Fortunately, he was in training onshore that day.
I lived aboard the USS Patrick Henry SSBN 599, originally a Thresher class boat later that class name was changed.
There is no mystery as to what happened to the Thresher, we all knew exactly what happened.
During sea trials they did a normal surface procedure. A problem developed with the aft ballast tanks, actually the high pressure air valve that allowed air into the tanks to blow out the water to give the boat positive buoyancy. The forward group operated normally and the boat developed a hard up angle which allowed the air to spill out of the tanks. The boat then lost buoyancy provided by forward motion and began to go backwards quickly gathering speed in reverse. The ship then cycled all main ballast vents allowing the air in the forward tanks out in an attempt to level the boat and added full planes angles to level the ship to some success. After the ship was leveled they again tried to blow ballast but the aft blow valves again failed. They were already deep on this last attempt when again the forward group filled enough to develop a severe up angle.
Again the forward motion was stopped and the ship started losing depth in reverse. Again the Main vents were cycled but it was too late, another attempt to blow was made but at the depth they were there was not enough high pressure air left in the air banks and the boat went below crush depth in reverse.
The Surface craft above heard and recorded all the sounds that pretty much tell the story. Later testing showed that the high pressure air valves developed ice as the HP air expanded and clogged up the valve keeping the aft group from being able to fully blow.
One of the most important features of the SubSafe program was to include emergency blow valves that were huge ball valves that could not clog with ice. Another feature was to provide more drying of compressed air to reduce the amount of moisture that could cause problems. The program caused there to be high pressure air actuated from mechanical “T” handled valves at the diving/ballast control panel to make it easily accessible to the diving officer, BCP operator or even the Conning officer and planesmen.
After most every upkeep these boats would go to test depth and do an emergency blow to test the system and train on it’s use.
SubSafe was an excellent program. Many of us owe our lives to those who went down on the Thresher by opening the eyes of the submarine service to a very dangerous situation.
The Scorpion is an entirely different situation of which I suspect will be kept under wraps for a long time because of several unanswered questions.
If she steps foot on any boat, that is a distinct possibility.
Rickover had many traits, some of them not very pleasant, but he would have been the first to say that being pleasant wasn't his job. Rickover was only responsible for the nuclear power plant, the rest of the submarine's design and construction was the responsibility of other navy groups and the shipyard. In fact, after the Thresher was lost, elements of Rickover's QA program were incorporated into the SUBSAFE program.
Have you ever read the novel ‘Crush Depth’ by Joe Buff?
It is very interesting. A sci-fi novel of the near future, subs are made of ceramic hulls, the German Nazis are back in secret bases and intend to start WWIII by sinking all ships of countries that get in their way...............
https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/378930.Crush_Depth
Who told you that? Brian Williams?...........................
It was below ‘crush depth’ and imploded.........................
We may never know. At least not within our lifetimes..................
Probably. They were known to be around that area constantly.................
So, if that deep U-Boat dive actually happened, then it did survive such a depth. Only one was reputed to have done that. The depth indicators pegged at 200 meters. They did, however, go deeper than their design depth routinely. It didn't help them once the allies deployed B24/25/17 bombers against them.
The news media speculated a torpedo loop-back, but I don’t think they were testing torpedo launches at that depth.
“The news media speculated a torpedo loop-back, but I don’t think they were testing torpedo launches at that depth.”
Scorpion, not Thresher.
I’m partial to the theory put forth by Dr. John Craven, the guy who found the USS Scorpion: Hot running Mk37 electric torpedo exploded in the torpedo room.
I read about that in a book called Blind Man’s Bluff. If I remember correctly, the torpedo room did not implode and the Scorpion was found facing the opposite direction of her point of intended movement.
I forget if he purposely ran a hot running torpedo drill or just happened upon one, but what struck him was that the captain immediately turned the ship to deactivate the torpedo with its internal mechanism to prevent a circular run. I think he ran other simulations and the results were very similar to what actually happened. Torpedo room equalized with seawater pressure and did not implode, the rest of the ship did, and the timing of hull breaking up matched what was recorded. (Not sure how he simulated any of that, but the guy’s pretty damn smart.)
It all sounds plausible to me, but I might be a wee bit biased. Dr Craven signed my copy of Blind Man’s Bluff in a book store in Kailua in 1998 or 99.
Thanks for that. It seems I practice combinatorial history.
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