Posted on 03/16/2019 11:59:19 AM PDT by Allen In Texas Hill Country
As I tell friends, I worked on computers before the public knew computers existed. Can you say SOAPII? Anyway, I can't begin to imagine what the programmers that coded the MCAS boxes are going thru. I know, Boeing needed to more thoroughly train pilots on using or interacting with the MCAS box. But none the less, "in a manner of speaking", the programming of those boxes has indirectly killed over 300 people. But nobody will ever say that.
Oh I remember. But leave em dead is now the first line pressor in most situations..... I’m getting old
First, when I read the initial reports and saw the First Officer had 200 hours. I assumed it meant 200 hours IN-TYPE. Has it been established that the FO only had 200TT?
If so, and if he was the pilot-in-command, it’s no wonder he wasn’t familiar with a runaway stab condition. In all likelihood, the only in-flight emergency he ever experienced was in a simulator.
Second, the Lion Air aircraft had had issues with the AoA on previous flights prior to the fatal flight. One of the AoA units was supposedly changed, but the problem continued. A maintenance order was written, but the maintenance was never done. The crew may have taken off with a faulty AoA.
Lastly, not knocking foreign-trained crews, but I remember a crash that occurred (I believe) in San Francisco where the ILS was reported to be inoperative. The crew apparently didn’t have the skill necessary to shoot the approach, came in low and struck the approach lights and ended up on a jetty with loss of life. With the technology available in commercial aircraft today, I wonder if we’ve lost the ability to “stick and rudder” an aircraft?
I am not a commercial pilot. I used to fly private but haven’t flown in years. It is amazing to see how advanced and complicated aircraft have become. And...I would bet that now most airlines are run by CEO’s who are more concerned with P&L than with passenger and crew safety.
Your pedigree does not nullify my statement that you are ignorant when you broad brush other pilots.
>> Your pedigree does not nullify my statement that you are ignorant when you broad brush other pilots.
Nice try. Please reread my statement:
“... rather than to train the [third world] aviators.
Been there; done that. Africa (both south and north of the Sahara), Central and South America. China. Examples if you wish.
Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS).
“Southwest Airlines have some 80 737 aircraft with the MAX MCAS. Yet not one of them has crashed; and nor, as far as I am aware, have their pilots reported difficulties with managing the system. Perhaps Southwest takes crew training and aircraft safety more seriously than others.”
My next door neighbor is a captain with SW. I am going to ask him about MCAS and let you all know what he says.
You are writing about something about which you know nothing!
Pilots always have the ability to turn off or shut down a malfunctioning flight control augmentation system. I cannot imagine a US-trained commercial pilot not being able to fly the plane with basic instrumentation. As someone has already pointed out, Southwest is an “all 737 Airline,” and they haven’t crashed anything!
And so my rule is not to fly a foreign flag carrier, because you have no idea the kind of flight training their pilots have received, and that is particularly true with Asian airlines.
>> You are writing about something about which you know nothing!
WTF? Are you addressing that to the retired airline pilot, or the Director of Global Sales & Marketing that travels the world and thinks the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania is the cat’s meow? I shouldn’t get too upset with him - “Road Warriors” like him paid my salary for 3 decades.
Sincerely Yours
The Retired Airline Pilot with over 8700 hours in the -737
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These are the “Stab trim cutout switches” that Media is referring to everywhere.
They form part of the “Runaway stabilizer” memory items that will stop most unwanted movements of the stabilizer, including the mentioned MCAS system.
All of us B737 pilots practice using them. pic.twitter.com/P1mc8KIWog— Mentour Pilot (@MenTourPilot) March 11, 2019
Leeham News & Analysis
Boeing’s automatic trim for the 737 MAX was not disclosed to the Pilots
November 14, 2018
By Bjorn Fehrm
The automatic trim Boeing introduced on the 737 MAX, called MCAS, was news to us last week. Graver, it was news to the Pilots flying the MAX since 18 months as well.
Boeing and its oversight, the FAA, decided the Airlines and their Pilots had no need to know. The Lion Air accident can prove otherwise.
The background to Boeing’s 737 MAX automatic trim
The automatic trim we described last week has a name, MCAS, or Maneuvering Characteristics Automation System.
It’s unique to the MAX because the 737 MAX no longer has the docile pitch characteristics of the 737NG at high Angles Of Attack (AOA). This is caused by the larger engine nacelles covering the higher bypass LEAP-1B engines.
The nacelles for the MAX are larger and placed higher and further forward of the wing, Figure 1.
(Figure 1. Boeing 737NG (left) and MAX (right) nacelles compared. Source: Boeing 737 MAX brochure.)
By placing the nacelle further forward of the wing, it could be placed higher. Combined with a higher nose landing gear, which raises the nacelle further, the same ground clearance could be achieved for the nacelle as for the 737NG.
The drawback of a larger nacelle, placed further forward, is it destabilizes the aircraft in pitch. All objects on an aircraft placed ahead of the Center of Gravity (the line in Figure 2, around which the aircraft moves in pitch) will contribute to destabilize the aircraft in pitch.
(Figure 2. The 737-800 (yellow) overlaid on the 737 MAX 8 (purple), with the line denoting the CG in pitch. Source: Leeham Co. and 737 ACAP.)
The 737 is a classical flight control aircraft. It relies on a naturally stable base aircraft for its flight control design, augmented in selected areas. Once such area is the artificial yaw damping, present on virtually all larger aircraft (to stop passengers getting sick from the aircraft’s natural tendency to Dutch Roll = Wagging its tail).
Until the MAX, there was no need for artificial aids in pitch. Once the aircraft entered a stall, there were several actions described last week which assisted the pilot to exit the stall. But not in normal flight.
The larger nacelles, called for by the higher bypass LEAP-1B engines, changed this. When flying at normal angles of attack (3° at cruise and say 5° in a turn) the destabilizing effect of the larger engines are not felt.
The nacelles are designed to not generate lift in normal flight. It would generate unnecessary drag as the aspect ratio of an engine nacelle is lousy. The aircraft designer focuses the lift to the high aspect ratio wings.
But if the pilot for whatever reason manoeuvres the aircraft hard, generating an angle of attack close to the stall angle of around 14°, the previously neutral engine nacelle generates lift. A lift which is felt by the aircraft as a pitch up moment (as its ahead of the CG line), now stronger than on the 737NG. This destabilizes the MAX in pitch at higher Angles Of Attack (AOA). The most difficult situation is when the manoeuvre has a high pitch ratio. The aircraft’s inertia can then provoke an over-swing into stall AOA.
To counter the MAX’s lower stability margins at high AOA, Boeing introduced MCAS. Dependent on AOA value and rate, altitude (air density) and Mach (changed flow conditions) the MCAS, which is a software loop in the Flight Control computer, initiates a nose down trim above a threshold AOA.
It can be stopped by the Pilot counter-trimming on the Yoke or by him hitting the CUTOUT switches on the center pedestal. It’s not stopped by the Pilot pulling the Yoke, which for normal trim from the autopilot or runaway manual trim triggers trim hold sensors. This would negate why MCAS was implemented, the Pilot pulling so hard on the Yoke that the aircraft is flying close to stall.
It’s probably this counterintuitive characteristic, which goes against what has been trained many times in the simulator for unwanted autopilot trim or manual trim runaway, which has confused the pilots of JT610. They learned that holding against the trim stopped the nose down, and then they could take action, like counter-trimming or outright CUTOUT the trim servo. But it didn’t. After a 10 second trim to a 2.5° nose down stabilizer position, the trimming started again despite the Pilots pulling against it. The faulty high AOA signal was still present.
How should they know that pulling on the Yoke didn’t stop the trim? It was described nowhere; neither in the aircraft’s manual, the AFM, nor in the Pilot’s manual, the FCOM. This has created strong reactions from airlines with the 737 MAX on the flight line and their Pilots. They have learned the NG and the MAX flies the same. They fly them interchangeably during the week.
They do fly the same as long as no fault appears. Then there are differences, and the Pilots should have been informed about the differences.
ACLS has even backed away from Bicarb. These kids today...
1.)I do not work for Boeing, nor for Southwest Airlines.
2.)Your asinine insults aside, I had the “80” figure incorrect; but otherwise, SW claims that their experience with MAX aircraft has been “phenomenal” ...
3.) Here is the unsolicited letter I received from them in my e-mail, likely because I am a regular customer.
A message from our CEO, Gary Kelly
I want to provide you a quick update on the Boeing MAX airplane. This was the aircraft type that was involved in the Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 accident that occurred on March 10. Any time there is a loss of life it is tragic, and our hearts go out to all those affected. The accident is under investigation, but very little is known days later about the cause, and that is a concern. Whether the cause is linked to the earlier Lion Air accident remains a key, unanswered question.
Since Sunday, we have been continually working with the FAA, Boeing, and others within the U.S. government. I have been in contact daily. Effective March 13th, the FAA issued its order to ground the MAX, with our knowledge and support. Boeing agrees as well. We have removed the 34 MAX aircraft from service; they will remain out of service until the FAA rescinds this order. With more than 750 aircraft in our fleet, more than 95 percent of our aircraft are unaffected by this order.
Safety is our top priority. It always has been. It always must be. Our commitment to the Safety of our Employees and our Customers is unwavering and uncompromising. U.S. airlines operate within the most advanced, regulated aviation system in the world. The FAA provides independent oversight that governs the planes we fly and how we fly them. Every detail about the systems used to operate the aircraft are designed, engineered, manufactured, and operated according to that independent oversight.
Boeing has a rich, storied history of success in aerospace, and they are a talented and major part of this advanced aviation system. Southwest® has a long history with the 737 and a stellar safety record. In 48 years, it’s the only aircraft we’ve flown. We’ve been part of the Boeing 737 story as it’s developed over time. The MAX is the latest version—rather than an all-new aircraft.
Our experience with the MAX, along with the other U.S. operators, has been phenomenal. We’ve operated over 40,000 flights covering almost 90,000 hours. There is a ton of data collected, which we continuously monitor. In all of our analysis since our first flight in 2017, nothing has presented any flight safety concerns. It has been a superb addition to our fleet. It is also important to add that all Pilots at Southwest are deeply experienced and highly trained, as they are at our other U.S. counterparts that fly the MAX. Our Mechanics are also highly experienced and trained to safely maintain every airplane in our fleet.
Based on all the extensive data that we, our U.S. counterparts, and the FAA have access to, there is no reason to question the safety of our MAX airplanes. That makes sense because that’s the way our aerospace and aviation system is designed to work. History proves—air travel is extraordinarily safe.
Which takes us to the question of, what happened with Ethiopian Flight 302? We don’t know. We aren’t learning fast enough. So, we have a temporary grounding.
I realize this disruption will inconvenience our Customers during this busy spring travel season, and we will do everything in our power to mitigate the impact to our operation. For that, I offer my sincere apologies. To support our Customers, we are offering flexible rebooking policies for any Customer booked on a canceled flight.
Nothing is more sacred to all of our Southwest Family Members than the trust our Customers place in our airline every day, on every flight. You have our commitment to minimize the disruptions to our Customers’ travel plans, while adhering to the FAA’s requirements and ensuring the Safety of our fleet.
Thank you for your patience and understanding. We will provide frequent updates to you as this story develops.
I might suggest the problem is even far worse and negligent than first suspected.
Several news outlets are sharing NASA ASRS data, with numerous reports of experiencing similar conditions and eliminating the problem by switching OFF the auto-pilot.
Pilots have reported issues in US with new Boeing jet
Airline pilots on at least two U.S. flights have reported that an automated system seemed to cause their Boeing 737 Max planes to tilt down suddenly.
"The pilots said that soon after engaging the autopilot on Boeing 737 Max 8 planes, the nose tilted down sharply. In both cases, they recovered quickly after disconnecting the autopilot."
The bulletin specifically refers to the condition with autopilot DISENGAGED.
Undoubtedly, more reports have been file with Company. Question then becomes, did their maintenance forward a required report to Boeing. Either way, all hell is going to break loose on this.
Considering that you cite complaints filed by pilots, then perhaps you would offer an explanation as to why the Pilots Union would hold a viewpoint contrary to your own?
From the CNN story you linked:
“Southwest Airlines’ pilots union is standing by the airline’s decision to continue to fly the Max. Southwest has 34 737 Max 8s — the largest fleet in the US. American operates 24 Max 8s and United flies 14 Max 9s.”
I note also that story cited “pilots” but provided no number as to how many complaints were actually lodged. I also note it strange that you source CNN, an outlet not recognized for its “factual” content, and usually quite handy with exaggeration and outright lies.
As to your story sourced from the Star Telegram, the link does not work.
Thanks for the replies.
“It seems as if the pilots didn’t even know this automatic system existed prior to the crashes. Good videos:”
Well, FWIW, this is what I was responding to. The very idea that an ATR pilot did not/would not “know” about “this automatic system” is unthinkable to me. I too am a pilot, but not as my life’s work. I was in the right seat of our family’s Cessna X not long ago as a “guest.” I was told that the Honeywell displays replicate those in a lot of late model 737’s. When everything works as it’s supposed to, the damned thing very nearly gets you from here to there with out any real intervention of the pilot as regards manipulating the flight controls. That said it is comforting to see the array of basic flight instruments surrounding the glass cockpit so a well-trained pilot can still get you there absent all the “help.”
The Asiana crash at SFO a few years ago is the case in point for truly untrained pilots being allowed to fly passengers. The CAT 3 ILS was out there on that day, and those pilots could not establish a reliable glide slope. Go hunt up the data. So these guys get thousands of hours going back and forth across the Pacific while 99% of the time the plane flies itself. But at SFO that day, where normally they have a lot of electronic help, suddenly, they didn’t, and they could not actually FLY the plane. Sorry if I offended, I respect those who fly professionally, and I too was an “international road warrior” for decades myself, so I always appreciated a safe trip.
Truth of the matter is I don’t like using up my handful of free looks at the Dallas News, but since you apparently don’t know how to use Google:
“The News found five complaints about the Boeing model in a federal database” https://www.dallasnews.com/business/airlines/2019/03/12/boeing-737-max-8-pilots-complained-feds-months-suspected-safety-flaw
Fox via Youtube “NASA had a list of complaints from Boeing 737 Max 8 pilots”
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u5Zy56I4WZQ
You also might try Russia Today via Youtube
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vqjyNbQgYNg
The girl on RT will read some of the database posts to you if that would help your comprehension and seems to have the more comprehensive report.
And, by the way, the Startle-gram link works for me. Problem must be at your end. Here it is again.
Pilots warned of ‘nose down’ Boeing 737 Max 8 problems before Ethiopia crash
https://www.star-telegram.com/news/business/aviation/article227481979.html
You did not answer my question about the Pilots Union support.
RE; Google use: Since you provided links as confirmation for your statement, why would I search elsewhere? Again, you prefer to be an insolent prick, rather than answer a sincere question.
The Asiana crash in KSFO highlighted the lack of CRM (Crew Resource Management) skills* that are all too common with foreign air carriers. Compounded with training that overly relies on automation and a lack of in-depth systems understanding leads to sad consequences.
BTW, the crew had adequate vertical path guidance - the PAPI light system.
*like having the copilot speak up when you’re low and slow with the engines at idle power...
It’s not a matter of if pilots can override the stab trim or not, they can. It’s an issue of can they catch it in a timely manner before it creates a situation that’s hard to recover from. Something like this is more likely to cause a problem at 200’ on takeoff than if it happens at 30000’ in cruise flight.
I’m an airline pilot and it bristles me a bit with everyone saying “just train the pilots better”. The pilots are already trained to handle things like this, but just like playing football even if you’re properly trained sometimes you don’t do everything exactly right and you drop the pass. This is a situation where the pilots handling it right 99% of the time isn’t good enough, it’s got to be 100% and as humans we never get things 100%. How about instead of just screaming for better pilot training we fix the airplane so it doesn’t do this?
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