Brig. Gen. Robin Olds: Warrior, Scholar, Total Badass

An old Air Force friend of mine was doing some research and found himself leafing through the papers of retired Brig. Gen. Terryl Schwalier. Those attuned to USAF history will recall that Schwalier was the commander at the center of controversy surrounding the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing, a terrorist attack which killed 19 and injured 498 at a remote airbase in Saudi Arabia.

Schwalier was scapegoated by the Clinton Administration, which triggered the resignation of Gen. Ronald Fogleman, whose integrity prevented him from continuing as the Air Force’s Chief of Staff in the face of what he viewed as an injustice and an intolerable dishonor. This is the popularized version of Fogleman’s resignation, which was actually just as much about bureaucratic headwinds and his lack of fit with the Administration as it was about the transparently unfair treatment of Schwalier.

Interestingly, it turns out that as a Major in 1981, Schwalier had researched and written a paper for Air Command and Staff College. The report, titled “The Tactical Flight Commander — Developing Warriors,” was designed to give guidance to junior commanders, identifying personal qualities and leadership traits essential to theirsuccess. As part of his research, Schwalier reached out to several prominent leaders in the airpower community to ask their insights.

Among the names on that roster was someone whose powerful blend of stalwart leadership and warrior acumen made him a favorite among operators at the time. Someone with whom fighter pilots in particular heavily identified. That someone was none other than retired Brig. Gen. Robin Olds.

For the uninitiated, a bit of Olds lore will be useful. Robin Olds is the undisputed father of modern fighter aviation. More than that, he is the contemporary icon for American military aviation more generally. Olds was a Triple Ace in World War II, scoring 16 kills over the deadly skies of Europe in the pioneering days of dogfighting … where courage and instincts were at a premium.

He commanded a squadron of fighter pilots in his mid-20s and stayed in uniform after the war, rising to the rank of Colonel by the time Vietnam rolled around … this despite having a reputation for serial disobedience bordering on insubordination. He abhorred the post-war bureaucracy the Air Force had become and made no bones about it, especially when he saw institutional idiocy threatening combat effectiveness. Olds got away with pushing back constantly because he was that good. The generals knew they would need him.

And they did. Olds was widely regarded as the best wing commander of the Vietnam War, both because of his individual warfighting skills and for the example he set as a combat leader, which made him legendary. He spent his time after Vietnam toiling begrudgingly in various non-combat posts before retiring in 1973 as a one-star, the service having promoted him in spite of a strong tradition of capping off the careers of renegades short of the upper echelon.

More than any other individual Robin Olds represents the combat version of the United States Air Force: tough, capable, smart, quick, and not to be trifled with. His legend is encased in a work-hard, play-hard patina … a collegiate All-American who married a Hollywood starlet, partied like a rock star, and inspired fear in the hearts of enemies.

The late Olds responded to Schwalier’s request in a way consistent with his reputation. He sent a five-page handwritten letter absolutely dripping with leadership.

Olds not only helped Schwalier with his original question, but gave him some incredible bonus material: singular insight into systemic problems with the institutional Air Force and the timeless struggle of airmen and leaders in finding fulfilling roles in a bureaucratic morass that seems to only grudgingly tolerate its dual status as a combat organization.

Here’s a transcription of his response (I’ve included captures of the actual pages at the end of this article): 30 Nov 1981

Your question, or better request, is provocative, to say the least. I have thought much since receiving your Oct 21 letter, and the more I consider your topic, the more difficult it becomes to frame a reasonable or even useful response. I’ll try to boil down my thoughts, hoping something useful may distill.

First, let me get some negatives in perspective. In my view, current Air Force philosophy and practice have all but eliminated any meaningful role playable by an officer placed in a so-called position of command. Authority has evaporated, sucked up to the rarified heights of “they,” who are somehow felt to exist in the echelons above. For your information, “they” do not exist. Neither is there any “he” fulfilling that role. Authority is expressed through the medium of committee consensus, leadership has become a watered down adherence to the principles of camp counsellorship, with a 90% emphasis on avoiding any action that may in any way be questioned by any one of hundreds of piss ants on the administrative ladder above. In fact, leadership (and I use that term with contempt) has become a process of looking busy as hell while doing nothing, avoiding personal commitment, and above all, making no decision without prior approval.

Historical example: as a 22 year old Major, commanding a squadron in 1945, I was responsible for and empowered to: pay the troops; feed them; house them; train them; clothe them; promote; demote; reward; punish; maintain their personnel files, etc. When I retired as a BG in 1973, I possessed not one of those authorities or responsibilities. Get the drift?

And you ask the importance of a flight commander. I am tempted to say NONE. But that is not true, for in spite of the system, in spite of the executive and administrative castration, a man instinctively looks to a system of military authority in a military situation or system. If that authority is waffled or watered, he still looks to those appointed to the military echelons to do their best under the circumstances. A man (a nation for that matter) wants, demands, leadership. So today’s flight leader/commander leads and commands by example, by appeal to basic instinct, and by light footed avoidance of error, like walking a tightrope. He has responsibility, for sure. But he does not have authority, or freedom of discretion/interpretation. Unfortunately, in some units he really isn’t given much voice. Yet he functions, and if he is successful (perhaps a better word is “effective”) it is greatly to his credit for having done so under the prevailing circumstances. Another thought. All else to the contrary, two basic demands are faced by the Flight Commander. One is PEACE, the other is WAR. It has been my experience, in the fighter business I hasten to add, that the man who may excel under the one is not necessarily worth a damn under the other. Many examples come to mind. I do not (and did not) condemn one man or the other, rather I accepted the challenge of recognizing the difference and choosing accordingly.

P.S. For your information, there is no such thing as HQ, USAF. The highest echelon is a faceless entity, composed of thousands of diverse individuals loosely arranged by a system of interlocking committees and headed by an individual technically labeled the “Chief of Staff.”

Note he is not called the Commander. By law, he cannot be. By nature he is forced to be the consummate bureaucrat, fighting for the all mighty dollar, serving as a buffer between Sec Def / Congress and the people and mission of his service — a demanding, demeaning role playable by very few.

An entire book-length analysis could easily be written about this letter. Seldom can any airman hope to encounter a more furiously burning, dense bundle of essential truths. But two things are especially resonant.

One immediate impression raised from this writing is the recognition of Olds’ considerable intellect. The popular image of the lovable, devil-may-care, warrior firebrand is one Olds earned in spades. But it’s an incomplete portrait. He thought carefully and in great depth about his profession and its place in national affairs, and was extraordinarily literate in expressing himself about it.

This is an important point. Olds stands as the definitive example many young officers strive to embody. The notion of a binary division separating “intellectuals” from “true leaders” remains firmly entrenched in the culture of the modern U.S. Air Force, and it leads to a host of misguided and counterproductive policies, decisions, and characterizations. Olds proves to us that such a false dichotomy is baseless in the first place. It’s not only possible but absolutely essential that an air warrior also be a reflective and even contemplative leader. Olds lived up to that standard, and his words to Schwalier exhort others to do the same.

Another easily grasped takeaway is that most current problems are not new. Olds lamented issues as he retired in 1973 that remained operative as he mentored Terry Schwalier in 1981. Top heaviness, micromanagement, loss of combat focus, misprioritization … all are directly addressed or implied in Olds’ letter. All have continued to visit upon the Air Force.

Lest we find this discouraging, it’s actually good news. Much of what troubles Olds in his letter had been addressed, ameliorated, or even eradicated by the time the Air Force walloped Saddam Hussein a decade later in the First Gulf War. The institution got relatively healthy and remained that way for much of the 1990s, enjoying a Renaissance of sorts before the combined pressures of post-Cold War adaptation and response to the attacks of September 11, 2001 allowed many maladies to creep back in.

Whether these recurring institutional illnesses are tied to protracted wars, keyed to resources, or simply cyclical is a great discussion for another time. In the interim, we could do a lot worse than to consider the learned words of perhaps the ultimate airman.

If you haven’t yet digested “Fighter Pilot: The Memoirs of Legendary Ace Robin Olds,” do yourself a favor and give it a read. We have a lot to learn from Robin Olds. This letter demonstrates how so much of the wisdom he bequeathed to us remains undiscovered.

Robin Olds was Commandant of Cadets when I was at the Air Force Academy.

My son is now a USAF 2nd Lt. I am a retired Master Sgt. You can best believe, I gave him an earful, before he was sworn in. I told him not to forget who was repairing the aircraft he would fly, or who would put him in a holding pattern, and clear him for the approach, when they were ready. He understands where I am coming from. 👍

Thank you for posting this Jet, and to extexasredhead for the ping. If I may, please allow me to add a few personal anecdotes to this fine thread.

I had the distinct honor of meeting General Olds when he came to my base when I was in pilot training. He had long since retired, however, our Wing Commander knew him in Vietnam and invited him to fly with us and talk with us. He was everything people imagine he was. And here’s something else: while I was still trying to learn the ropes of the T-38, we watched Gen Olds climb in one, gaze around the cockpit, start engines, and take off. Afterwards, we learned he had not flown a T-38 for 15 years. But that was his piloting skill.

He spoke about combat, leadership, and patriotism. He walked around the flight rooms like a god, and we were amazed by him. That day, a student failed his T-38 formation check ride. We saw Gen Olds, meeting with him and encouraging him. The student passed the check ride 2 days later.

Years later, a General who I will not name here told a gathering of officers and enlisted that the Clinton administration was scape goating the Khobar Towers affair, and Gen Fogelman was probably going to resign because of that and the way Congress and the Clintons had politicized the Kelly Flynn case. General Fogelman did resign, and his resignation was completely lost on Congress and the American people. They seemed to not even care.

I saw General Fogelman and his wife about a year and a half ago. He became a millionaire in retirement through various business ventures. One was a porta-potty business that he launched that was wildly successful. I related to him that he encouraged and spoke to our squadron when we were flying missions into Bosnia, and he said he was grateful to have had those opportunities. He is a man of principle and integrity - just like Gen Olds.

Two years ago, Air Force members (on their own accord) launched “Mustache March.” Many officers and enlisted grew out of regulation mustaches as a tribute to General Olds.

General James selected and presented me with one of the most prestigious honors I ever received, Outstanding Airman of the Year" (1976). My Father was a SM/Sgt, two uncles were SM/Sgts, one uncle I never met was a member of the 325th Glider and was killed in Algeria during WWII, and a cousin I never met was a B-29 pilot in the USAAF and was killed over Tokyo in May of 1945 in the famous raid that lost 500 airmen. I was reared in the USAF and my Father was the super at Takli while Jack Broughton was the head F-105 pilot and personally destroyed his nose film upon return after he strafed the Russians at Haiphong Harbor. My Father knew Curtis LeMay, General James, Gen Olds, as he was an advanced aircraft mechanic for the F-4, F-105, C-130, RB-66 and B-57. At Bien Hoa he was almost killed when the VC mortared several F-105's that he'd just re certified fit to fly. The USAF was my home before I went back to college and left during the malaise of the late 1970's but reentered the ANG until 1983. I'm proud of my USAF heritage and watch the changes being made to the service, both good and bad.

I was at Bien Hoa, 70-71. At that time, we had USAF A-37s and Vietnamese F-5s. Before that, F-100s. I didn’t know any Thuds were there. I thought they were flying out of Takhli and Korat. At one time, I think I knew people at ever base in Vietnam and Thailand, plus Clark and Anderson. I knew the NCO who was working approach at Clark, when commercial and back up power failed. It was a miracle, that no one augered in. I can’t say I miss all that drama. 😁😊

My Father was there in 68’ and was TDY there from Takhli to recertify an F-105 that was there. It was blown up in the enclosure along with firemen that tried to put the fire out. 30 years later in a hayfield in Mississippi my Father and an ex Marine discovered that they had been in the same engagement, the Marine chasing the VC that sent the mortars and my Father curled up in a bunker next to the exploding F-105. The Marine recounted the attack in eerie detail. In 1965 my Father lost several of his friends during the disaster in May that killed several airmen when B-57’s loaded for takeoff began to explode. All had been at Yokota from 1959-63 with the B-57s in the WRS (56 or 53, I can't remember).

“small tasks became more important than war readiness exercises”

Back in the mid-1980s our ship was in the Persian Gulf suppressing air attacks on neutral shipping, when we got a missive from some shiny-loafered, chair-warming, paper-pushing POS in D.C. ordering us to compile a complete educational resume for every man on board.

The XO actually started running around with his hair on fire preparing to do it, until the CO got wind of it. They disappeared into the CO’s sea cabin, and nothing more was ever heard of it.

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