Posted on 04/07/2018 9:25:29 AM PDT by Simon Green
To some minds, bigger is always better—but size can create is many new problems as it solves. Midway through World War II, Nazi Germany decided to take its huge 128-millimeter antiaircraft gun and stick it on its biggest, baddest tank. The result was the monstrous Jagdtiger (“Hunting Tiger”), then heaviest tank to see action in World War II—and still heavier than modern M1 Abrams and Leopard 2 tanks! But the vehicle’s terrifying bulk proved to be its own worst enemy.
During World War II, German factories churned out numerous turretless assault guns (Sturmgeschutz) and tank destroyers (Jagdpanzers) based on each major tank chassis. Though the lack of a turret made them less capable in offensive operations, they were cheaper to build, could carry heavier guns and armor, and remained highly effective at ambushing enemy tanks or providing fire support. Therefore, a turretless version of the huge seventy-ton Tiger II tank was seen as a natural platform for the 128-millimeter gun. A full-scale wooden mockup of the Jagdtiger was presented to Hitler on October 20, 1943, and the führer enthusiastically approved production.
The Jagdtiger was nearly eleven meters long and three meters tall, and tipped the scales at seventy-nine short tons—or eighty-three fully loaded with ammunition and a crew of six. Much of that weight went into 250 millimeters of armor protection in the casemate superstructure housing the main gun; however, the lower hull had only fifteen centimeters, and the sides and rear eight. Thus, while the front armor was practically invulnerable, it remained susceptible to shots to the side, rear and top.
The gargantuan vehicle retained the same 690-horsepower Maybach HL 230 P30 used on the Panther tank—even though the Jagdtiger was 60 percent heavier. Theoretically capable of going twenty-one miles per hour, the “moving bunker” was reduced to nine miles per hour cross-country, and its fuel-gulping characteristics limited range to fifty to seventy-five miles. The motor simply lacked adequate power, and predictably broke down with alarming frequency.
The 128-millimeter Pak 44 gun measured fifty-five calibers and had only ten degrees traverse to either side. Its sixty-pound shells traveled at 950 meters a second, with a range of up to fifteen miles if used for indirect fire. The forty rounds of two-piece ammunition had to be assembled by two loaders before each shot, and the gun had to be leveled to evacuate the breech. The Jagdtiger also mounted a machine gun in the hull, and sometimes a second antiaircraft machine gun on the rear engine deck. Tiger ace Otto Carius was not thrilled with this “secret weapon that could still save Germany,” as described in his autobiography Tigers in the Mud:
“Any large traversing of the cannon had to be effected by movement of the entire vehicle. Because of that, transmissions and steering differentials were soon out of order. . . . A better idea for the travel lock of the eight-meter long cannon of our ‘Hunting Tiger’ was also necessary. It had to be removed from outside during contact with the enemy. Locking down the barrel during a road march was necessary, of course. Otherwise the mountain brackets would have been worn out too quickly and exact aiming would have been impossible. . . . We discovered that the cannon, because of its enormous length, was battered about so much as a result of even a short move off the road that its alignment no longer agreed with that of the optics.”
The Jagdtiger was intended to “snipe” enemy tanks from two or three miles away while remaining immune to return fire. This was a fine concept, but Germany already had the Pak 43, a smaller seventy-one-caliber, eighty-eight-millimeter gun that could still penetrate the heaviest Allied tanks such as the Churchill VII and IS-2. This was already deployed on the Jagdpanther, a fifty-ton tank destroyer with superior mobility and still formidable armor protection.
The Pak 44 had roughly the same maximum penetration as the Pak 43, though admittedly its heavier shells retained greater energy for long-distance shots. However, even standard German seventy-five-millimeter guns were highly effective versus the most numerous Allied tank types, the American M4 Sherman and Russian T-34. Despite its niche advantages, the Pak 44 was a classic case of overkill.
Problem with the assault gun was its lack of a turret.
They were meant to accompany infantry assaulting a fixed position, hence the name assault gun.
In a defensive ambush the lack of a turret meant that unless you opponent came within a very narrow field of fire, you’d have to fire up the engine, turn the vehicle and very likely ruin your ambush.
America only built 2 T-28 prototypes. Germans built over 10,000 STuGs but their tankers still much preferred the Panzer III it was based on, smaller gun or not.
The late model Panzer III N had a short barreled 75mm gun but had a shaped charge round that could handle most opponents.
That's the way our air force is going. The best planes one-on-one in the world.
But one-on-five or one-on-ten could be a very different story.
“The also liked their railroad guns. There was an analysis on the resources that went into them”
The V-2 is another example of this. They spent the equivalent of Manhattan project money and delivered a grand total of the power of about two 8th Air Force 1000 plane raids. Raids that they could put together -weekly- by late in the war.
It also bears the distinction of being the only arms program that killed more people making it than in it’s use.
I forgot about that. What was it? 20K workers versus 5K recipients?
Performance at Kursk? The Germans were wiped out at Kursk.
Speed: 8 mph (13 km/h)
The shorter barrel reflected doctrine at the time that in combat when traversing obstacles like ditches, ramming a long barrel into the ground was a bad thing.
Contrary to popular belief, the glaxis of the Sherman was quite effective at defeating German 75mm and 88mm rounds when fired head-on from a distance. At less than head-on angles, the Sherman's glaxis became invulnerable to the 88 at any distance.
Furthermore, when encountering the rare German heavies on the battlfield, Shermans were generally ordered to bypass them and call up tank destroyer units deal with them.
Russians ordered that captured Panthers and Tigers be used until they broke down and then be abandonded. However, captured MK-IVs when broken down were to be repaired and returned to service.
Also, MK-IVs were still showing up on mid-East battlefields as late as 1973. Not the case for Panthers and Tigers.
The French and several Eastern Block nations used captured Panthers through the late 1940s but only until inventory of spares parts had been used up.
The Germans ran out of time to mass produce their ultimate weapons. Hitler acting like a general also led to their uselessness. Tanks at Dunkirk and Normandy would have changed the war.
Check out World of Tanks Blitz for a nice phone/tablet tank game.
What made German tanks superior to American and British tanks was that their long high velocity guns could blow through our armor, and our shorter low velocity guns couldn’t pierce their frontal armor. That was due to the compromise between use demands of the infantry, cavalry and artillery services prior to the war. The artillery people saw tanks as mobile guns, and wanted them to be able to shoot 1,000 rounds without replacing the barrel, which meant low velocity. In reality very few of our tanks ever lasted long enough in battle to ever fire 1,000 rounds. Part of the compromise was a fast tank demanded by the cavalry who saw the tank as the new cavalry, which meant light armor. They envisioned tanks running free behind enemy lines, not slugging it out with other tanks. The Germans had other ideas about that. The result was a lightly armored tank with a low velocity gun. Fortunately we had lots of them, though that didn’t help the crews much.
By popular belief do you mean real life accounts from those who fought in them? I highly recommend "Death Traps: The Survival of an American Armored Division in World War II" by Belton Y. Cooper. Cooper's job was to recover, clean out and cobble together tanks destroyed in combat. Those 3rd Army armored divisions took well over 100% casualties in a matter of less than one year. Shots through the front glaxis were probably the most common.
As I noted above the shorter barrel low velocity guns were to fulfill the requirement that the gun could fire 1,000 rounds without burning out the rifling.
All you hear about Shermans is that they were death traps that could not withstand attacks from German Tigers, as if there were 50,000 Tigers out there behind every tree. The truth is that the Germans could only build a small number of these large, cumbersome tanks and assault guns because of their size and complexity, and when those tanks did make it to the battlefield, they had limited range, mechanical problems, and tracks that wore out too fast. Often, German tank crews were forced to abandon their monsters because they broke down. If Patton hard been equipped with Tigers and Panthers for his breakout after Operation Cobra, he would have had difficulty in even reaching Argentan, much less the German Westwall. Only a tank as reliable and mobile as the Sherman could overrun France so quickly. The only thing that stopped them was that they outran their supplies. It was also easier to escape a Sherman when it was hit, and ammunition storage improved, so the death trap reputation was somewhat exaggerated too. Besides, their were never 50,000 Tigers or any other German tank on the Western Front. There were more Mark IV’s and Stugs than Tigers and Panthers out there. In the Bocage, though, every heavily camouflaged tank that could get off the first shot became a Tiger.
Biggest cause of loss for the Sherman was the Pak gun.
They had over 20,000 of the Pak-40 75mm alone.
And when the Shermans were being shot at, they'd claim it was by tanks...and then that claimed tank turned into a Tiger.
That is cool...
I knew the Arabs were using Mk IVs in the first Arab-Israel war, but 1973?
According to US doctrine, our tanks were not supposed enemy tanks. Enemy tanks were to be engaged by Tank Destroyers and AT guns. Tanks were for breakthroughs and killing infantry.
Needless to say, it was stupid doctrine.
Shermans had great potential though, as shown by their survival in into the 1970s or 80s. The British put a 17 pounder on the Sherman hull and created a terrifying tank killer called a Sherman Firefly. The downside is that Germans tried to shoot Sherman Fireflies first!
Modern warfare no longer means the bigger the better. The bigger and slower something is, the easier to hit. You can always make a bomb or torpedo powerful enough to take out any target.
Yes... fortunately for all of us, Hitler repeatedly snatched defeat from the jaws of victory in almost every decision he made throughout the war. This included his obsession with “super weapons”, which took resources away from tried and true platforms with minimal results.
Thank you.
Our armor strategy was indeed speed, maneuver and swarming. We had 50,000 Shermans and about 10,000 tank destroyers of various types. The Germans had 20,000 Mach IVs, Panthers and Tigers, a great many of which were sent to the eastern front.
You are also exactly correct, we were supposed to use tank destroyers, not our medium tanks, against their heavy tanks. When they attacked, our tank destroyers were supposed to quick get into the action, and take them out. A key aspect of our tank destroyers is that they were relatively light (not much armor) and, so, fast. Speed and maneuver were their strength, not thick armor. So, our approach to tank destroyers was very different from the German approach. Almost the opposite.
As it turned out, we didn’t encounter German tanks in the numbers we had anticipated. So, the tank destroyers were used more as artillery and light tanks, than they were used in their intended role.
Of course, from time to time, Shermans found themselves up against Tigers. In theory, when this happened, some of the Shermans were to maneuver to the side for a flank shot, while other Shermans kept the Tigers engaged and buttoned-up. Infantry could do the same thing. Have part of the force maneuver to the side for a flank shot with a bazooka. Even when successful, these engagements often left some of our force destroyed.
Our strategy of emphasizing speed, maneuver and swarming came at a heavy price to the unfortunate few who had to slug it out against heavier armored vehicles. All I will say about that is that we had to win that war.
Over in the Pacific, a similar thing could be said about the Japanese super battleship the Yamato and her sister ships. The range of their heaviest guns extended beyond the horizon. They were supposed to locate enemy ships from observers in balloons high above the battleship, and destroy those enemy ships before the enemy ships could even come within range of the super battleship. But, because of submarines and aircraft carriers, the super battleships proved to be indecisive, and a tremendous waste of resources.
Our F-35 might be a similar huge waste. The F-35, too, is supposed to destroy the enemy over the horizon, with the assistance of an array of radars including satellite-based radars. But, with a limited cruising range and limited missile bay, it can easily be swarmed. I used to be quite vocal about the F-35, but Trump has talked down the price, and we are working on its successor(s).
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