Posted on 08/04/2013 10:54:44 AM PDT by cutty
According to Soviet intelligence reports, we now know that one of FDR’s top officials, the Treasury Department’s Harry Dexter White, was a Soviet agent, who, among many other deceptions, subverted relations between the US and Japan by inserting “ultimatum” language into the cable flow that actually spurred the Japanese attack. This was language written in Moscow, passed to White by a Soviet handler in Washington, D.C., and dropped into a State Department communiqué sent to Japan.
This brilliantly executed influence operation doesn’t live in infamy – at least not yet.
...
“A continuous stream of fighter and pursuit planes is traversing the Pacific,” FDR cabled MacArthur is early 1942, one of the extravagant lies FDR told to the people and forces under Japanese siege. No planes were on their way. Nothing was coming. .. Truth, John Hersey later wrote, would come “in mean little doses.”
...
the US continued to sustain catastrophic losses while shipping Lend Lease supplies to Stalin through the Nazi U-boat-infested North Atlantic.
Could the decision to abandon US forces to death or the horrors of Japanese POW camps by giving uninterrupted priority to the Red Army have had anything to do with the influence of the scores of Soviet agents and assets within reach of the levers of power inside the US government? How about the man driving military supply policy, the man behind Lend Lease?
That man was Harry Hopkins and he was without question FDR’s top wartime advisor. As George Marshall would state in 1957 to his official biographer Forrest Pogue: “Hopkins’s job with the president was to represent the Russian interests. My job was to represent the American interests.”
Was Hopkins representing Russian interests at a time of American need?
Who was Harry Hopkins?
(Excerpt) Read more at breitbart.com ...
Yes, and he got a court martial for his efforts, although it was supposedly for saying some Army and Navy officials were criminally negligent. I think he was right too. It is ironic, that Hap Arnold, Carl Spaatz, and the subject of the thread, none other than General MacArthur were there. I think Ben Foulois was there too, but no he was no fan of Mitchell. One of the prosecutor's grand sons, was Air Force chief of staff in the 1990s. I think in 2005, Mitchell congress authorized the promotion of Mitchell to Major General. Mitchell was vindicated, of course, and ironically, the aircraft named after him, the B-25, was the first to attack Japan. Too bad he did not live to see that. Mark, USAF, retired
Fascinating discussion here. My mother said aboutMacArthur that people either loved him or hated him.I see that still holds.
I believe it was largely a paper force.
If you want a complete, thorough breakdown I recommend Louis Mortons “Fall of the Philippines”, quite old now but its still the primary reference. This is one of the US Army “Green Books”, so its online - http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/5-2/5-2_Contents.htm
Thank. I read that some time ago.
Yes, and he got a court martial for his efforts, although it was supposedly for saying some Army and Navy officials were criminally negligent. I think he was right too. It is ironic, that Hap Arnold, Carl Spaatz, and the subject of the thread, none other than General MacArthur were there. I think Ben Foulois was there too, but no he was no fan of Mitchell. One of the prosecutor's grand sons, was Air Force chief of staff in the 1990s. I think in 2005, Mitchell congress authorized the promotion of Mitchell to Major General. Mitchell was vindicated, of course, and ironically, the aircraft named after him, the B-25, was the first to attack Japan. Too bad he did not live to see that. Mark, USAF, retired
Dang cell phone
From what you described it was as devoid of reality as authors claiming MacArthur left Corregidor on PT boats loaded with household furniture that was then transferred to B-17s on Mindanao.
Granted he was known for his optimism but how did he cut checks he couldn't cover when the leader of a nation promises him the necessary funding but doesn't deliver?
The Filipino troops were not ever up to facing Japanese combat units on even terms, even in Bataan. They managed to hold their positions, usually, only because they much outnumbered the attacking Japanese and because the USAFFE “burned up” the reliable Philippine Scouts and US 31st Regiment as “fire brigades” for counterattacks.
Can you cite one US soldier who served on Bataan that had anything but praise for the fighting qualities of the Filipino troops on Bataan?
I have Bartsch’s book open before me. He has P-40 airframe numbers and materials receipts for every unit unloaded in Manila, with delivery dates.
P-40B - 31 delivered 5/17/1941
P-40E - 50 delivered 9/29/1941
P-40E - 24 delivered 11/25/1941
That’s 105 airframes, plus extra engines etc.
Bartsch effectively tracks every airframe.
Almost all were flyable or were soon made flyable at some point in the campaign; many were destroyed on the ground and in accidents but in few if any cases were delivered aircraft destroyed before they were made operational. So there were 100+ flyable P-40’s available. Not all at once, certainly.
As for the P-35’s, there certainly were many flyable units. It wasn’t a great aircraft but it was competitive with the standard Japanese Army fighter of the campaign, the “Nate”, which were used in larger numbers than Zeros. And like the P-40’s there were also many airframes brought back into service after engine overhauls and cannibalization.
The oxygen problem was again a failure brought about by negligence and inexperience. This was solved, later. It could have been solved before, but wasn’t.
And the pokey assembly/service/gunsight problems/lousy engine service/overhaul performance also were largely personnel and training problems. Also the lack of camouflaged airfields/dispersal, bad operations control, bad tactical/intercept control, lousy communications, etc. All much improved one month in. But by that time there were few airplanes left.
Certainly not a paper force.
At least 50,000 marched out of Bataan to Capas, probably more.
About half died in Capas. My granduncle among them.
Those were the survivors of the campaign, who had not deserted to that point. There must have been at least 70,000 mobilized, that showed up for mobilization, in Luzon alone.
Add in whats known of the various units in Mindanao, Cebu, Panay, and the Philippine Army was indeed a substantial force, in numbers anyway.
Yes they did. Having traveled extensively in the Philippines myself, most recently, to Davao City a few months ago, I asked many Filipinos, who said, people of the Philippines, I shall return. They don't hesitate for a second, and say General MacArthur. That is one more reason I am retiring in Davao City. Americans in the Philippines, for the most part, are still well respected. It is no mystery to me, that in Davao City, and probably many places in the Philippines, their Main road is called MacArthur highway.
What size was it in July 1941? IIRC, the bulk of the force you cite circa 12/41 were fresh conscripts.
Mallonee for one. Fertig for another. And misc others in secondary sources. Otherwise it wasn’t PC to put down the Filipinos. They did try, they were loyal and friendly and brave, most often. But other than the Scouts they just were of low fighting value.
Also, look at who did what in the campaign. Who counterattacked at the Points ? At the Pockets ? At the Abucay line ?
P-40B - 31 delivered 5/17/1941 P-40E - 50 delivered 9/29/1941 P-40E - 24 delivered 11/25/1941
That’s 105 airframes, plus extra engines etc. Bartsch effectively tracks every airframe.
I'm not familiar with the author you cite. Numbers I cited are what was reported by commanders on Luzon Dec 7, 1941 as operational fighter aircraft.
Yea, I shouldn’t have said long before the US became involved in WWII. I was including them with the regular Chinese air force that took part in many operations against the Japanese such as The Battle of Shanghai way back in 1937.
Most weren’t supposed to be “fresh”, tyhey were supposed to have been trained in the previous five years of conscript “classes”, as with any conscription system.
But they were in fact effectively untrained.
Like I said, there probably were at least 70,000 that showed up upon mobilization in Luzon alone.
Morton says 120,000 Philippine Army troops served, altogether, based on mobilization returns and postwar claims.
IIRC, Mallonee praised the Filipino soldiers but was critical of the officers.
Fertig for another.
I haven't read Fertig but I suspect most of his commentary related to his experiences on Mindanao whereas I was referring to the Filipino troops on Luzon that fought on Bataan.
I highly recommend Bartsch.
He does in-depth analysis and cross-check of primary sources.
Its like being a historical detective, of the data driven sort.
He breaks everything down to units, in detail. He even analyzes every combat sortie.
Agreed but they hadn't been trained in the previous 5 years because required resourced were never available.
Mallonee had plenty to say about the Filipino soldiers.
He had a realistic view of them.
Look at the part about where after seeing enemy fire plenty offered to drive trucks instead.
This is understandable. The war was a shock, and these soldiers were untrained and very badly led. Even their US senior officers, as many had, were also “green”.
Filipinos generally didn’t get a true dedication to the war until they had experienced the Japanese occupation for a while.
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