I'm sure that really soured the British attitudes towards the p-38 and caused them to regard it in the same obsolete class as the German Me-110. I wonder if the British were aware that what they received was a stripped down "export" version of the p-38?
This British sentiment was bolstered by Major General James E Chaney who was commander on U. S. Army forces on the British Isles before the establishment of ETOUSA. He didn't like the thought of using the P-38 as a fighter either. When he found out that many of the fighter groups being assigned to England were to be fitted with the 38 and the P-39 he wrote Air Marshal Portal with his doubts of the use of the P-38 in England. He claimed that it was better suited as an interceptor to shoot down enemy bombers rather than an air superiority fighter.
Chaney may too have been prejudiced by those stripped down p-38s delivered to the British in 1941.
There is still the matter of aviation gas blend used in England that I have read about over the years contributing to performance issues with the p-38s Allison engines.
Finally, there is a timing issue here as well. As Eaker was trying to equip his pursuit units he knew that the bulk of the P-38s being sent to Europe would end up going to the African/Med theater.
I guess the question here is did Eaker even try to keep his fighters? I ask this because by late 1942 he was on record (per the document you provided) pounding the table saying no fighters were needed to escort his heavy bombers.
He therefore requested that the P-47 be designated as his long range escort fighter (with drop tanks they could go a fair way but not quite as far as the P-38). So in a way, the P-38 was muscled out in England by a another very good aircraft.
The p-47 was a very good airplane. However, if I remember correctly, the p-47 had less than half the combat radius of the p-38 and didn't begin arriving in England until 1943 which was after Eaker had given up all his p-38s to Africa/Mediterranean.
That the p-47 had greater range than the Spitfire was probably a plus in Eaker's mind but even with drop tanks the p-47 couldn't go to Berlin and back but Eaker didn't believe such escort capability necessary.
When the P-51 started showing up with the Merlin/RR engine, then there was even less room for the Lightning.
The p-51 did have a little more range than the p-38 but when going up against the Me-262, the p-38 was slightly faster than the p-51 and the p-38 could outclimb the Me-262 whereas the p-51 couldn't touch the Me-262 in a climb.
I also think in these latter years of the war, logistics played an important role in the p-51 surpassing the p-38. For the material that went into a p-38, you could almost produce two p-51s.
In doing a little bit of poking around concerning this question I ran across this dissertation by Bernard Boylan on the Air Force Historical Research Agency's website. I only skimmed it of course, but it looks like it is worth revisiting and reading in full.
Thanks. That is a great read. I haven't finished it but will do so shortly. Interesting little nuggets I've already come across are:
p14 An account written by Gen "Hap" Arnold and Gen. Eaker is an example of the pre-war Air Corps outlook regarding heavy bombers:
"The bombing formations will come persistently onward as relentless as the waves of the sea. The fighting and pursuit planes will soon exhaust their fuel supply, cease their attacks, and land for servicing, but the bombers will complete their missions and return to their bases to take more bombs for other operations. Once more the pursuit planes will rise to the attack and endeavor to halt the seemingly endless stream of hostile bombers until the defending airmen are exhausted and the losses of planes become so great that the few effectives remaining can be brushed aside with little or no effort. The bombers keep coming."p46
"in May (1939) the Chief of the Air Corps directed that no tactical plane be equipped with a droppable tank."p58
"Early in May (1942) when Chaney learned that American fighter groups were to be equipped with P-38's and -39's, he wrote Air Marshal Portal that he gravely doubted if they were suitable for escort missions. He suggested that the American units, instead, be assigned Spitfires, and that a like number of Kittyhawks (P-40) be sent to the British in the Middle East."p60 in July 1942
"Elements of the 1st Fighter Group crossed the Atlantic Ocean in two B-17's and eight P-38's, the longest flight of fighter planes up to that time. Brig. Gen Frank O'D. Hunter, Commanding General of VIII Fighter Command, and his staff landed at Prestwick, Scotland on July 27 (1942) after having made the trip via Goose Bay, Labrador, Greenland, Iceland, and Stornoway, Scotland."p61
in December (1942) the 78th Group, equipped with p-38's arrived in the United Kingdom, but early in 1943 all of its planes and 60 of its pilots were transferred to North Africa."p67
in Oct 1942 Gen Eaker, Commander of the 8th Air Force wrote "there was then no evidence to suggest that bomber losses would be so high as to make daylight bombing uneconomical"p68
"He (Gen. Eaker) felt that the bomber force in England could now enter the second phase of its program -- the plan for bombing submarine pens -- which called for deeper penetrations -snip- with bombers proceeding to the targets beyond fighter range. Eaker was anxious to initiate this program, notwithstanding the loss of three p-38 units to North Africa and the Eight's dependence on the short range Spitfires."p68
"Later in October (1942) Eaker reiterated his earlier conviction that daylight bombing was feasible without fighter escort. "You have probably been asked", he wrote to Arnold, "whether it is feasible to bomb objectives in Germany by daylight without fighter cover. I am absolutely convinced that the following measures are sound.... Three hundred heavy bombers can attack any target in Germany by daylight with less than four percent losses."p69
"In the fall of 1942 VIII Bomber Command reviewed its activities and optimistically reported that the B-17 could defend itself against the German fighters, Me-108 and Fw-190. The summary stated that the two German planes are no match for close formations of the B-17 and B-24's in units of 12 or more."p70
"The (autumn 1942) report concluded: One salient fact emerges from any study of German fighter tactics against missions flown to date: no tactics have been evolved capable of inflicting uneconomical losses on units of 12 or more B-17's or B-24's when flown in close formation."p72
"As 1942 drew to a close, VIII Bomber Command could take stock of its small but promising operations. Though only 27 missions had been flown, and none exceeded 79 planes, the B-17 had shown itself the best day bomber to fly in the theater and the P-38 had appeared as the best fighter plane for escorting bombers."And those same p-38 the Eaker said were his best escorts would soon be sent to Africa.
p74
"The Eighth Air Force was responsible for the transportation of the units destined for North Africa. This movement encompassed the dispatch of 1,072 aircraft, including 412 P-38's".
"the p-38, once in Africa became the outstanding fighter in the theater. Its performance in ground strafing, fighter sweeps and reconnisance proved it to be the most versatile plane in the campaign. But it was in the role of an escort plane that the p-38 was regarded as unique. The p-38 quickly became the plane almost exclusively used to escort both heavy and medium bombers because of its superior range."p76 In the spring of 1943 Gen Doolittle in North Africa wrote the following to Gen. Hap Arnold
"Our only problem in connection with the use of the p-38 is that there are not enough of them and it does not appear that there ever will be."
Thanks again for the link. This is a great read.
Book after book and documentary after documentary always point to the lack of long range fighter as if the p-38 never existed. They portray the p-51 as the great savior of the Eighth Air Force and responsible for turning the tide in the skies over Europe.
Based on what I've already read in the document you linked to, I'm leaning towards Air Corps brass going into the war with a mindset of heavy bombers not needing fighter escort. The relatively light bomber losses in small 1942 coastal "milk runs" (non-German targets) made by the 8th confirmed in many minds that fighters were not needed to escort formations of heavy bombers.
So, 8th Air Force brass agreed to permanently let go of their p-38s.
Later, in 1943 as the 8th began striking into Germany proper with larger formations of bombers, the Germans countered by sending up larger numbers of fighters than had been the case in 1942 during the small flights of bombers raiding coastal (non-German) targets.
The problem for the 8th in 1943 was it had already given up its p-38s and made no demands for their return. So, it had to make do with the modest combat radius of the p-47.
I didn't see anything mentioned on the fuel issue. I do know that American fuel was higher octane which certainly would have made any engine run better and it stands to reason that the Allison engine would be design to use this fuel.
Eaker was all over the place with his opinion on fighters. A colleague of mine is what I would call an expert on the 8th Air Force and he describes Eaker as almost bi-polar. He was a lot like many of the bomber generals of the time, initially feeling that the bombers could protect themselves and that the fighters couldn't go as far as the bombers anyway making them moot, but in the end he saw the light (and the reduction of bomber losses) by using escorts. He will get his first hard lesson in this next month.
He didn't have a problem giving up the P-38s to the Med, but then suddenly wanted something to replace them, ergo the request for P-47s (he got the first ones in April of 43)
You know, I think too much is made of the Me-262 in World War II. No doubt it was a giant leap in aircraft technology with the introduction of a jet propelled fighter but it just never was produced in enough numbers to have a significant impact. In May of 1944 when they were just starting to become operational the III Gruppe of Zerstörergeschwader 26 (ZG 26) had only 7 Me-262s and only 1 of them were operational.
By September of 44 that number had only increased to 91 but 52 of them were assigned to bomber units (Kampfgeschwader 51) and only 37 of those were operational. The rest were assigned to a night fighter unit. (Nachtjagdgeschwader 11)
In the end they still didn't exist in great numbers. From the sources I have this is the disposition of the Me-262 on April 9th, 1945:
Day fighter units:
JG 7 - 76 planes, 53 operational
KG(J)- 54 - 37 planes, 21 operational
JG 400 - 30 planes, 15 operational
Night fighter units:
NJG 11 - 9 planes, 7 operational
Tactical reconnaissance units:
NAGr. 6 - 7 planes, 3 operational
Bomber units:
KG 51 - 21 planes, 13 operational
So there still were less than 100 of them operating as fighters at the end of the war. They were a terror in the sky (if I remember right most of them were shot down while taking off or landing) but it was too little too late to have any real impact against the thousand bomber missions they were up against.