I didn't see anything mentioned on the fuel issue. I do know that American fuel was higher octane which certainly would have made any engine run better and it stands to reason that the Allison engine would be design to use this fuel.
Eaker was all over the place with his opinion on fighters. A colleague of mine is what I would call an expert on the 8th Air Force and he describes Eaker as almost bi-polar. He was a lot like many of the bomber generals of the time, initially feeling that the bombers could protect themselves and that the fighters couldn't go as far as the bombers anyway making them moot, but in the end he saw the light (and the reduction of bomber losses) by using escorts. He will get his first hard lesson in this next month.
He didn't have a problem giving up the P-38s to the Med, but then suddenly wanted something to replace them, ergo the request for P-47s (he got the first ones in April of 43)
You know, I think too much is made of the Me-262 in World War II. No doubt it was a giant leap in aircraft technology with the introduction of a jet propelled fighter but it just never was produced in enough numbers to have a significant impact. In May of 1944 when they were just starting to become operational the III Gruppe of Zerstörergeschwader 26 (ZG 26) had only 7 Me-262s and only 1 of them were operational.
By September of 44 that number had only increased to 91 but 52 of them were assigned to bomber units (Kampfgeschwader 51) and only 37 of those were operational. The rest were assigned to a night fighter unit. (Nachtjagdgeschwader 11)
In the end they still didn't exist in great numbers. From the sources I have this is the disposition of the Me-262 on April 9th, 1945:
Day fighter units:
JG 7 - 76 planes, 53 operational
KG(J)- 54 - 37 planes, 21 operational
JG 400 - 30 planes, 15 operational
Night fighter units:
NJG 11 - 9 planes, 7 operational
Tactical reconnaissance units:
NAGr. 6 - 7 planes, 3 operational
Bomber units:
KG 51 - 21 planes, 13 operational
So there still were less than 100 of them operating as fighters at the end of the war. They were a terror in the sky (if I remember right most of them were shot down while taking off or landing) but it was too little too late to have any real impact against the thousand bomber missions they were up against.
LOL! Glad to have helped out. I would have continued through the section of Africa/Med and the Pacific but was eager to finish the dissertation. I did finish reading it today and really enjoyed it. Thanks again for posting the link.
I didn't see anything mentioned on the fuel issue.
I didn't either.
I do know that American fuel was higher octane which certainly would have made any engine run better and it stands to reason that the Allison engine would be design to use this fuel.
I'll see if I can find anything interesting concerning the fuel issue. Over the years when having these type discussions about the under utilization of p-38s by the 8th Air Force, the topic of aviation fuel in Britain has come up but I've never seen anything conclusive regarding it.
He didn't have a problem giving up the P-38s to the Med, but then suddenly wanted something to replace them, ergo the request for P-47s (he got the first ones in April of 43)
Something I found to be jaw dropping was that had the Luftwaffe challenged the p-51/47/38 along the coast of France and the Low Countries and thereby forced external fuel tanks to be jettisoned, deep strike fighter escorts would not have been possible.
p207
Underlying the problems which beset the Germans in their conduct of air defense was their inability to comprehend implications of the escort fighter. At best, the American escort fighter was a modified interceptor type plane, which even with increased internal fuel capacity could not have accompanied bombers in deep penetrations had the Germans challenged the fighters at the coast of France and forced them to drop the jettisonable tanks. General Anderson stated the point thus:You know, I think too much is made of the Me-262 in World War II. No doubt it was a giant leap in aircraft technology with the introduction of a jet propelled fighter but it just never was produced in enough numbers to have a significant impact.In terms of the reaction to the wing tanks to our P-51's and P-47's here again he (Goering) had the opportunity to apply his forces which were causing the fighter forces so much concern at a time when the fighter forces had tanks on their wing tips.Now when a P-51 had a tank on its wing tip, then if a Luftwaffe Me-109 or Fw-190 didn't have any tactical advantage over it, there was nothing left for them (the Germans) to do but surrender, to give up.
But they did have the tactical advantage there; they could have forced the stripping. It was a tactical mandate that they force the stripping of the wing tanks as near the Channel shores as possible with the forces necessary to achieve that stripping.
Having that (external tanks) stripped, they (Luftwaffe) could move back in and meet the undefended bombers over the target area and have exacted a heavy toll. But they decided it was better to meet the enemy with his wing tanks over a target area and they gave us free access to the deeper targets before we had to strip these tanks.
These were gifts; therse were gratuities from Goering and his staff, and they make major contributions to the seeming success and the tactical soundness of the application, the commitment of the so called daylight strategic Air Forces.
We owe much to Goering for the lessons, the sucessful lessons that we got in the war.
The result of this tactical blunder permitted American bombers and fighters to go as far as Berlin oftentimes before jettisoning fuel tanks.
At that point conflict was in order, but the Germans had denied themselves full employment of their own fighters on the periphery of Germany proper. Had they forced escorts to drop their tanks on the coast, the Germans would have seen bombers flying the same long stretch of deep penetrations alone, with the probable repeat of the reception which had awaited American planes when they struck Schweinfurt and Regensburg in August and October, 1943.
And it's use was only practical because Germany was on defense.
So there still were less than 100 of them operating as fighters at the end of the war. They were a terror in the sky (if I remember right most of them were shot down while taking off or landing) but it was too little too late to have any real impact against the thousand bomber missions they were up against.
Yep. Like the Tiger Tank, the Me-262 was expensive, unreliable and never available in sufficient numbers to materially effect the outcome.