[CougarGA7]

• JAPAN GIVES TWO WEEKS MORE TO NEGOTIATIONS - PREPARES FOR ACTION IN EVENT OF FAILURE - Hawaiian newspaper headline

• "1. Among the telegraphic codes with which your office is equipped burn all but those now used with the machine and one copy each of 'O' code (Otie) and abbreviating code (L). (Burn also the various other codes which you have in your custody.) 2. Stop at once using one code machine unit and destroy it completely. 3. When you have finished this, wire me back the one work 'haruna.' 4. At the time and in the manner you deem most proper dispose of all files of messages coming and going and all other secret documents. 5. Burn all the codes which Telegraphic official KOSAKA brought you. (Hence, the necessity of getting in contact with Mexico mentioned in my #890 is no longer recognized" - Message from Togo in Tokyo to Washington sent in Purple code. Translated on December 3rd with a correction submitted December 4th.

• "In view of present situation, the presence in port of warships, airplane carriers, and cruisers is of utmost importance. Hereafter, to the utmost of your ability, let me know day by day. Wire me in each case whether or not there are any observation balloons above Pearl Harbor or if there are any indications that they will be set up. Also advise me whether or not the warships are provided with anti-mine (anti-torpedo) nets." This message, Army intercept 8007, was not translated until December 30th 1941. A primary reason for this is that it was transmitted in the J-19 code which was considered to be for lower priority messages and therefore got overlooked.

• Captain Layton reports to Kimmel that he does not know where Japanese Carrier Division 1 or Carrier Division 2 are, but thinks that they are in home waters.

• The Navy stops monitoring the phone lines they have tapped at the Japanese Council General's office.

• Kluge's Fourth Army begins its assault on Naro-Fominsk causing the Stavka to assign additional reinforcements to Artem'ev's Moscow Military District.

[GreenLanternCorps]

The Navy stops monitoring the phone lines they have tapped at the Japanese Council General's office.

Probably a really bad time to stop doing this. I wonder who made that decision and what in the world were they thinking?

What really bugs me about the situation on December 1941, is that even though the situation with Japan is deteriorating rapidly, most of the senior leadership is acting like they have months to prepare for war. Despite all the evidence that a strike South towards Malaya and the Dutch East Indies is probably coming soon, and that Japan will probably also strike the Philippines to protect their flank.

Much of the US high command is operating on a peacetime footing. The war warnings given have been very non-specific. MacArthur is operating on the assumption that he has until spring before an attack. Re-enforcements are only dribbling in and everyone is operating on a peacetime schedule instead of preparing for war.

It is maddening to watch from 70 years on. Even though there is no evidence directly pointing to an attack on Pearl Harbor it is pointing towards the Phillipines. Nobody in the Philippines or Wake or Guam is operating on a war footing and the forces in Hawaii should have been preparing to respond to action. Marshall and Stark should have been leaning on the field commanders to be ready for action at anytime and to respond to multiple possible contingencies. And frankly they needed to get people out to both Hawaii and the Philippines to brief the field commanders on the latest intelligence.