Probably a really bad time to stop doing this. I wonder who made that decision and what in the world were they thinking?
What really bugs me about the situation on December 1941, is that even though the situation with Japan is deteriorating rapidly, most of the senior leadership is acting like they have months to prepare for war. Despite all the evidence that a strike South towards Malaya and the Dutch East Indies is probably coming soon, and that Japan will probably also strike the Philippines to protect their flank.
Much of the US high command is operating on a peacetime footing. The war warnings given have been very non-specific. MacArthur is operating on the assumption that he has until spring before an attack. Re-enforcements are only dribbling in and everyone is operating on a peacetime schedule instead of preparing for war.
It is maddening to watch from 70 years on. Even though there is no evidence directly pointing to an attack on Pearl Harbor it is pointing towards the Phillipines. Nobody in the Philippines or Wake or Guam is operating on a war footing and the forces in Hawaii should have been preparing to respond to action. Marshall and Stark should have been leaning on the field commanders to be ready for action at anytime and to respond to multiple possible contingencies. And frankly they needed to get people out to both Hawaii and the Philippines to brief the field commanders on the latest intelligence.
It is always hard for an army to shift from the peace time army to a wartime one.
It is disappointing that they made this decision to stop monitoring these lines since it is untimely at best with the current situation. The most important note from today is the notification to Washington by Tokyo to destroy their codes. This will be decoded and word sent to the other stations. If there was anything that should have put the guys at Pearl and the Philippines on a complete war footing was that news. It amazes me that they didn’t seem to take much interest in it.