[Homer_J_Simpson]

GSD at #14.

22 Towns Retaken – 2-3
Nazis Concede Pause in Drives – 3
Premier Emphatic – 4-5
The International Situation – 4
213 Vessels Added This Year – 5-6
A United States Navy Battleship Tries Her Guns (photos) – 5-6
Army Will Test Air Raid Defense – 6
President Names Moscow Mission – 6-7
The Day in Washington – 7
British Offensive in Libya Expected – 8-9
When the Alarm Sounds in Besieged Tobruk (photo) – 8
Axis Shows Anxiety in Lies, Wavell Says – 9
Russians Praised by British Envoy – 9
Early Denies Parley in Pacific is Planned – 9
French Volunteers Depart for Poland – 9
Allies Continuing Parley with Iran – 10
Judge Rebels at Oath to Petain and is Ousted – 10
Assures Yugoslavs Big Help is Coming – 10
Australian Envoy Confers with Hull – 10
Chinese Regain Port (map) – 10
Italy to Restrict Restaurant Meals – 10
Smuts Says United States is Preparing to Enter War – 10
Two Years of War-III – 12
Nazis Facing Soviet Drive ‘Hope for Help Soon’ – 12
The Texts of the Day’s War Communiques – 13-14
British Supply Cost £90,622,237 in Week – 14
A Canine Trooper on Duty (photo) – 14
More Troops Land at Singapore Base - 14

[Homer_J_Simpson]

http://www.onwar.com/chrono/1941/sep41/f04sep41.htm

German sub sink [sic] American destroyer

Thursday, September 4, 1941 www.onwar.com

In the North Atlantic... the US destroyer Greer, escorting a convoy, is attacked by a German U-boat. It engages and attempts to sink the U-boat with depth charges. US President Roosevelt cites the incident as an example of German aggression against the US.

[BroJoeK]

There is enough material on Pearl Harbor -- not even counting Prange, which Homer has covered -- from Stinnett, Victor, Claussen, Minority Staff Chief Percy Greaves and others, to post something nearly every day.

So why not start with some of the more controversial stuff, and charge deep, deep into the weeds... ;-)

The following is from Stinnett:

"Admiral Yamamoto’s war plans called for seizure of the American, British, and Dutch possessions in Southeast Asia.

"Japan wanted access to the vast natural resources of this huge area.
Her planned conquest extended along 100° east longitude from Siam (Thailand), south along the Malay Peninsula to the Netherlands East Indies, then branched eastward to the mid-Pacific Ocean near longitude 180°, the international date line.
To implement this immense campaign, Yamamoto organized his Combined Fleet into eight separate commands.

"American radio intelligence obtained the details and Rochefort at Station HYPO informed Admiral Kimmel of the reorganization on September 4.

"Four of the fleet commands were assigned to support the southern offensive—the invasion of Southeast Asia by Japan’s army.
These fleets were the major firepower of Japan’s 1941 navy, but did not include the six major aircraft carriers of the First Air Fleet.

"Cryptographers at Station CAST on Corregidor were able to break down the composition and targets of the main forces.
Traffic analyst Duane Whitlock of CAST prepared a Japanese Order of Battle, which apparently was later forwarded to Kimmel and to Washington at the end of October:

• the Southern Expeditionary Fleet consisted of troop transports, torpedo boats, mine layers, submarines, and other small craft;
• the Second Fleet served as main support for the other fleets and included battleships, cruisers, and destroyers.
  
• The Third Fleet was the invasion fleet of amphibious forces trained for beachhead landings; its supporting vessels included light cruisers and destroyers; finally,
• Air Fleet-Eleven was made up of land-based air support which combined the major bomber and fighter squadrons of Japan’s navy with seaplane tenders and four light aircraft carriers.

"With these fleets, Admiral Yamamoto planned to block American interference with Japan’s Southeast Asia conquest.
He was sure that the United States would react to the invasion of the Philippines by dispatching warships, air units, and military reinforcement to the British and Dutch governments.
Part of his plan included invading and seizing Guam and Wake islands, two minor and lightly defended American bases in the Central Pacific.

"He organized four fleets to counter the American threat and formed a screening force to immobilize the Pacific Fleet through a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor.

"This screening force consisted of:

• the First Air Fleet with six fast aircraft carriers, protected by a screen of destroyers, cruisers, and battleships and a supply train of seven fuel tankers;
• the Fourth Fleet based at Truk in the Central Pacific, including cruisers, coastal submarines, air units, destroyers, landing craft, troop transports, and Air Flotilla 24 with its land-based bombers, fighters, and seaplanes;
• the Fifth Fleet, a patrol force built around trawlers, gunboats, and other small craft capable of making ocean patrols of Japan’s northern and eastern coasts to send out early warnings of countermoves by the United States or the USSR; and
• the Sixth Fleet, a powerful force of 45 oceangoing fleet submarines, some of which carried float planes and midget subs.

"Japan’s Fast Carrier Force was concentrated in the First Air Fleet, which had been formed on April 1.
This force and 30 submarines of the Sixth Fleet would be aimed at Pearl Harbor on December 7.
Japan’s Fourth Fleet, based at Truk, was assigned to capture Guam and Wake and prevent an American military advance through the Central Pacific.
By organizing these fleets into combat-ready forces using the radio waves, Japanese officials unwittingly disclosed their intentions to Americans, Dutch, and British.
These disclosures occurred throughout 1941.
Most Japanese and American historians assert that Japan’s naval vessels ceased radio broadcasts after November 25 pursuant to an order issued by Admiral Yamamoto.

"These assertions have been accepted as fact for fifty years.
But Yamamoto’s order of the twenty-fifth was not all-inclusive—it contained a proviso that permitted radio transmissions.

"The order was intercepted at Station H by Radioman Second Class Jack Kaye at 8:48 P.M., on November 24.
It read, according to a USN translation dated March 18, 1946:

'FROM 26 NOVEMBER, SHIPS OF COMBINED FLEET WILL OBSERVE RADIOCOMMUNICATION PROCEDURES AS FOLLOWS.

• (1) EXCEPT IN EXTREME EMERGENCY, THE MAIN FORCE AND ITS ATTACHED FORCES WILL CEASE COMMUNICATING.
• (2) OTHER FORCES ARE AT DISCRETION OF THEIR RESPECTIVE COMMANDERS.
• (3) SUPPLY SHIPS, REPAIR SHIPS, HOSPITALSHIPS, ETC., WILL REPORT DIRECTLY TO PARTIES CONCERNED.'

"Radio intercepts obtained by US Navy monitoring stations disclosed that the broadcasts continued after the order was issued.
Instead of radio silence there was substantial, continuous radio traffic from the Japanese naval ministry, foreign ministry, and warships, most of which American communications communications intelligence personnel intercepted and understood.
It was a major departure from normal Japanese naval communications. "

Stinnett, Robert (1999). Day of Deceit, Free Press.