I have never said that actions taken by FDR did not provoke an attack by Japan. What I have said (even in the last post) is that there is no evidence that FDR knew that Pearl Harbor was going to get hit by the Japanese and intentionally allowed his fleet to get surprised and sunk. I have also said that there were failures all the way up the chain of command.
I know how military bureaucracies work too, and there is still no evidence that FDR ever saw this memo and there is less proof that he or any of his inner circle contracted its authorship. To make such a suggestion is just making wild suppositions. It’s really the core problem with this memo, the suppositions are so far out there that they are not even believable.
Considering the numerous problems with Stinnett’s book, I’m not very surprised that he claims all 8 were done. And, like I said, 2 of them were just a restatement of policies that were already decided before the memo was even written (not very telling). 3 of them never happened.
Overall though, its just not that incredible. Of the 5 of 8 actions that did take place, none of them are outside the realm of what would make sense considering the situation.
The full embargo, which really was a primary motivator for Japan, was just an extension of the embargos that were levied after July of 1940 when Japan occupied northern Indochina. This is why I put the question out there when it happened, what would you (general you, not specific to you) have done. If you decide to go with the full embargo, of course you are going to ask your allies to do it as well and I bet it wouldn’t take much convincing either.
Keeping the fleet in Hawaii? That was a done deal long before this memo was written. So was the commitment to help China. T.V. Soong had already brokered loans disguised as trade agreements before this memo was written and with the long standing American commitment to the Open Door policy in China, their support is really a no brainer.
Stinnett makes a reference to a obscure statement in a letter to Richardson about sending submarines to Manila dated November 1940, but in reality two divisions of submarines were not sent to Manila at that time (at most there were three individual submarines, but the Seawolf and Searaven may have already been transferred the Asiatic Fleet by October). It was not until October of 1941 as plans were changing on how much effort was going to be put into defending the Philippines (championed by MacArthur of course) that two divisions were sent, almost doubling the number of submarines assigned to the Asiatic Fleet and more than doubling their effectiveness since 6 of the subs that were already there were old S-class subs that had been there since 1924. I don’t see how this memo could have anything to do with it.
Then you are already at least 50% of a "conspiracy nut," because that is at least half of the alleged "conspiracy."
Now, if I could just get you to pay attention to the evidence about Pearl Harbor itself, then you'd be home with us, defending the truth instead of a pack of political lies. ;-)
CougarGA7: "What I have said (even in the last post) is that there is no evidence that FDR knew that Pearl Harbor was going to get hit by the Japanese and intentionally allowed his fleet to get surprised and sunk.
I have also said that there were failures all the way up the chain of command."
I too have never said, "FDR knew that Pearl Harbor was going to get hit by the Japanese and intentionally allowed his fleet to get surprised and sunk."
What I do say, and evidence fully supports, is that top leaders in Washington, including FDR, knew or suspected the coming Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, but failed to adequately warn the Hawaii commanders, because among other screw-ups, they were ordered to insure that Japan would commit the first overt act of war.
CougarGA7: "I know how military bureaucracies work too, and there is still no evidence that FDR ever saw this memo and there is less proof that he or any of his inner circle contracted its authorship."
Then you know full well, that a memo like McCollum's never just appears out of nowhere.
There had to be many discussions, it had to be a consensus document, and the proof of that is: the endorsement by McCollum's boss, and the high officials to whom it was addressed.
These high officials met frequently with FDR, so McCollum's Eight Actions (and, no doubt, others) would have been reviewed, discussed, debated, modified and executed according to Roosevelt's intentions.
And they were all eventually executed, despite your repeated claims to the contrary.
CougarGA7: "It’s really the core problem with this memo, the suppositions are so far out there that they are not even believable."
The only "far out" suppositions I've ever seen are those by the Pearl Harbor deniers claiming that McCollum's memo does not really say exactly what it clearly does say.
CougarGA7: "Considering the numerous problems with Stinnett’s book, I’m not very surprised that he claims all 8 were done.
And, like I said, 2 of them were just a restatement of policies that were already decided before the memo was even written (not very telling).
3 of them never happened."
OK, pal, the time has come for you to put up or shut up.
Name the eight actions, one by one, and explain how each action either did not happen, or was not part of a plan to provoke the Japanese into war.
Once you have spelled out your argument in specificity, I will show you where you're wrong.
CougarGA7: "Of the 5 of 8 actions that did take place, none of them are outside the realm of what would make sense considering the situation."
Not a single one of those actions was intended to avoid war, or help negotiate peace with Japan -- just the opposite.
They were intended to cause a crisis with Japan, and they succeeded.
CougarGA7: "I put the question out there when it happened, what would you (general you, not specific to you) have done."
As I've said here frequently, I approve of everything President Roosevelt did about Japan, except his failure to more effectively warn the commanders in Hawaii.
CougarGA7: "The full embargo, which really was a primary motivator for Japan, was just an extension of the embargos that were levied after July of 1940 when Japan occupied northern Indochina."
Here is one brief description of those events:
"After Japan occupied northern French Indochina in late 1940, FDR authorized increased aid to the China, a policy that won widespread popular support.
In July 1941, after Japan occupied the remainder of Indo-China, he cut off the sale of oil to Japan.
Japan thus lost more than 95 percent of its oil supply.
Roosevelt continued negotiations with the Japanese government, primarily through Secretary Hull.
Japan Premier Konoye desired a Pacific conference with FDR which U.S. Ambassador Joseph Grew favored but which Hull opposed.
When Kenoye failed to produce diplomatic results, Emperor Hirohito replaced him with Minister of War Tojo.
Meanwhile Roosevelt started shifting the long-range B-17 bomber force to the Philippines."
The important point here is that McCollum's Eight Action Plan, dated October 7, 1940, was contemporary with Japan's move into Indo-China, and President Roosevelt's authorization of increased aid to China.
CougarGA7: "Keeping the fleet in Hawaii? That was a done deal long before this memo was written."
In fact, the President's decision to fire Admiral Richardson for Richardson's opposition to keeping the US fleet in Hawaii was made after McCollum's memo was typed up.
So, McCollum's plan helped support FDR's policy, and suggested other ways to accomplish their goal.
CougarGA7: "So was the commitment to help China. T.V. Soong had already brokered loans disguised as trade agreements..."
Which goes to prove, yet again, that McCollum's memo only reflected the thinking already in place, and was not proposing radically new ideas.
CougarGA7: "It was not until October of 1941 as plans were changing on how much effort was going to be put into defending the Philippines (championed by MacArthur of course) that two divisions were sent, almost doubling the number of submarines assigned to the Asiatic Fleet..."
Remember, McCollum was a lowly Commander in Naval Intelligence -- he in no way could tell his bosses, much less the Commander in Chief, FDR, what to do.
So all his memo does is provide suggestions for how to accomplish the goals his CinC has laid out -- to provoke the Japanese into a first overt act of war.
Roosevelt alone made decisions on if or when to implement McCollum's action items.
But the bottom line is, FDR did eventually implement all eight actions, and they did accomplish the goals McCollum and Roosevelt intended.
CougarGA7: "I don’t see how this memo could have anything to do with it."
McCollum's memo simply reflected the thinking of FDR's inner circle at the time it was written -- in late September and early October, 1940.
And there is no evidence -- zero, zip, nada -- that this thinking ever significantly changed before December 7, 1941, exactly 14 months later.