http://www.kbismarck.com/histoperi.html
23 May 1941 (Friday):
0400. New course 250º. Speed 27 knots.
1200. Position 67º 28’ North, 19º 28’ West. Course 250º. Average speed 24 knots.
1420. Course 270º.
1811-1822. False alarm. Vessels identified as icebergs.
1821. Bismarck and Prinz Eugen reach the ice limit. New course set at 240º.
1922. Sights Suffolk on her port side at 7 miles.
2030. Bismarck sights Norfolk and fires five main battery salvoes. No hits scored. The forward radar set (FuMO 23) is disabled due to the blast shock from the forward turrets. Shortly afterwards the Prinz Eugen passes the Bismarck and takes the lead.
2200. Reverses her course and tries to engage the Suffolk which realizes the Bismarck’s manoeuvre and withdraws.
http://www.kbismarck.com/operheini.html
On 23 May the weather remained the same. At 1811 in the afternoon, the Germans sighted ships to starboard, but soon realised they were actually icebergs which were common in those latitudes. Meanwhile, the battle group reached the ice limit, and set a course of 240º. At 1922, the Bismarck and Prinz Eugen were sighted by the British heavy cruiser Suffolk at a distance of seven miles.4 The Suffolk sent an enemy report: “One battleship, one cruiser in sight at 20º. Distance sevn miles, course 240º.” The Germans had detected the British cruiser as well, but were unable to engage the enemy because the Suffolk took cover in the fog. About an hour later, at 2030, the Germans sighted the British heavy cruiser Norfolk, and this time the Bismarck opened fire immediately. She fired five salvos, three of which straddled the Royal Navy ship throwing some splinters on board. The Norfolk was not hit by any direct impact, but had to launch a smoke screen and retire into the fog. The British cruisers then took up positions astern of the German ships; the Suffolk (equipped with a new Type 284 radar) on the starboard quarter, and the Norfolk (with an old Type 286M radar) on the port quarter. Both ships would keep R. D/F (radio direction-finding) contact and report the Germans’ position until more powerful British ships could engage.
On board the Bismarck the forward radar instrument (FuMO 23) had been disabled by the blast of the forward turrets. Because of this, Admiral Lütjens ordered his ships to exchange positions and the Prinz Eugen with her radar sets (FuMO 27) intact took the lead. Bismarck’s powerful artillery would serve to keep the British cruisers from coming any closer. This change would produce great confusion for the British the next morning.
After being sighted by cruisers Suffolk and Norfolk, Lütjens could have then turned around and head for the Norwegian Sea in order to refuel from tanker Weissenburg. He had already done this earlier that year when in command of Scharnhorst and Gneisenau his force was detected by the British cruiser Naiad in the Faeroes-Iceland gap. An early retreat at this point would have forced the four British capital ships (Hood, Prince of Wales, King George V and Repulse) that had already put to sea, to go back to Scapa Flow with a considerable expenditure of fuel. This time however, Lütjens continued towards the Atlantic with the hope of shaking off the British cruisers at night. The weather conditions in the Denmark Strait were favourable to do so. When Lütjens decided to press on, it is probably because he believed that the heavy units of the Home Fleet were too far away to intercept him, and that they may still be in Scapa Flow. The German reconnaissance reports seemed to confirm this, although the truth is that Vice-Admiral Holland’s force was already approaching the area at high speed. Another thing Lütjens did not count on was the effective use of British radars. At about 2200, the Bismarck reversed her course trying to catch the Suffolk, but the British cruiser withdrew maintaining the distance. Therefore, the Bismarck returned to the formation behind the Prinz Eugen.
http://www.onwar.com/chrono/1941/may41/f23may41.htm
German exploiting gains on Crete
Friday, May 23, 1941 www.onwar.com
In the Mediterranean... On Crete, the Germans continue to exploit their hold on Maleme, sending in artillery units and fighter aircraft. In the naval battles offshore, the destroyers Kelly and Kashmir (part of Lord Mountbatten’s 5th Destroyer Flotilla) are sunk by the Germans while they are withdrawing.
In the North Atlantic... The German battleship Bismark and her consort, Prinz Eugen, are sighted in the Denmark Strait by the patrolling British cruisers Norfolk and Suffolk. British radar equipment plays an important part in the interception.
http://www.hmshood.com/history/timeline4.htm
23 May: Bismarck and Prinz Eugen sighted by H.M.S. Suffolk in Denmark Strait between Greenland and Iceland.
http://www.hmshood.com/history/denmarkstrait/bismarck1.htm
Norfolk and Suffolk’s Patrol in the Denmark Strait
RADM Wake-Walker had arranged for Suffolk to join him at Isafjordur on the north west coast of Iceland after she had completed her refuelling. The two cruisers would then commence their patrol of the Denmark Strait. Their role would, of course, be to locate Bismarck and Prinz Eugen and keep contact with them – there was no question of Wake-Walker’s ships engaging the German squadron as they would be clearly outgunned. The cruisers would patrol down the Strait in a south westerly direction and then reverse course towards the north west. This would continue until the German ships were seen or enough time had elapsed to ensure that they were not heading out into the Atlantic via this route. It was always possible of course that the German ships would be located using another route and that Wake-Walker would be called to assist.
The patrol began mid-morning of 23 May. Both cruisers were fitted with radar equipment (R D/F) but that on Suffolk was far superior to that on Norfolk. Suffolk’s radar was multi-directional with a range of 13 miles which enabling her to sweep in all directions except a blind spot at her stern. In contrast Norfolk was fitted with fixed R D/F allowing her to see ahead only. For this reason Suffolk was chosen to patrol on the Greenland side of the Strait. She would keep the ice at the limit of her radar, which would allow her room for manoeuvre should the German ships be sighted. This protection was further enhanced by the fog conditions that day – it was clear over Greenland and the ice pack, but a bank of fog was clinging to the Icelandic coast. This fog would provide a blanket of protection into which the British ships could slip once contact with the enemy was established. Norfolk, with her fixed equipment, patrolled from the Iceland side of the Strait only.
The patrol continued throughout the day and into the early evening. At roughly 1915 hours, whilst Suffolk was on her south-westerly run, the uncertainty was suddenly ended: Able Seaman Newell was on duty as the starboard after look out. He was there to cover the ‘blind’ zone in Suffolk’s radar coverage astern. As he scanned the horizon he saw Bismarck, and then Prinz Eugen roughly 7 miles away. He immediately called out ‘Ship bearing green one four oh’, followed seconds later by ‘two ships bearing green one four oh’. The reaction was swift as Suffolk heeled over to port to seek the cover of the fog bank. Further encouragement was found by the fact that Bismarck did not open fire on Suffolk. Signals were sent out to say that contact with the enemy had at last been made.
Norfolk, hiding within the safety of the fog, picked up Suffolk’s report. She steered to take up position at the edge to the fog to assist in keeping contact. She strayed too close to the edge of the fog bank however, and cover was briefly lost. Bismarck spotted her and immediately opened fire. Norfolk was straddled, but was able to safely regain the cover of the fog bank. It was the first time the new German battleship had fired salvoes in anger and it served as a warning to the British of the deadly accuracy of Bismarck’s guns.
Luck seemed to be running with the British: Contact with the enemy squadron had been achieved. Although the Germans knew that they been found, neither British ship had been damaged in making contact. Furthermore, contact could be safely maintained by means of Suffolk’s radar from the cover of the fog bank. It was now just a question of ensuring that British heavy ships could be guided towards the enemy.
Hood Leads the Chase
By 2000 hours, Hood’s force was at 63º20N’ 27º00’W. Shortly before this, at 1939 hours, Vice-Admiral Holland ordered his vessels to raise steam for full speed and to change course to 295º. Shortly thereafter, at 2004 hours, he had the news he had been waiting for: Suffolk had positively sighted Bismarck and its consort in the Denmark Strait. This was followed-up by a report from Norfolk at 2040 hours. Plots put the Germans approximately 300 miles to the north of Holland’s force.
Holland’s battle plan at this point appears to have been for Hood and Prince of Wales to engage Bismarck in one of two fashions:
a. The first option was to cross the Germans’ “T” - i.e., cut across their bows on a westward course whilst they headed south. This would allow all the British guns to bear on the German ships whilst the enemy would only be able to fire at the British squadron with their forward guns. Of course, such a move could be easily countered.
b. The second choice was for Holland’s ships to cross the German squadron’s path well ahead, then swing around and approach from the west. This would would silhouette the Germans against the morning sky and considerably ease range finding for the British. It is evident that VADM Holland was hoping that Norfolk and Suffolk would engage Prinz Eugen whilst the two British capital ships fired on Bismarck, though this was evidently never communicated to them.
By 2054 hours, Hood’s force was proceeding at 27 knots on a heading of 295º. As the speed increased, the destroyers struggled to maintain station in the heavy seas. VADM Holland signalled to the destroyers “If you are unable to maintain this speed, I will have to go on without you. You should follow at your best speed”. The four tiny destroyers did their best to keep up with the old battle cruiser fairly but took a horrendous buffeting in doing so.
At 2200 hours, the crews of Hood, Prince of Wales and their accompanying destroyers were officially notified of the Germans presence in the Denmark Strait. Interception and action was expected to take place between 0140 and 0200 hours that morning. All hands were ordered to be prepared to change into clean undergarments (to help prevent infection should they be wounded) and to don battle gear (life vests, flash gear, gas masks, helmets and, where necessary, cold weather gear). At 2230 hours, ‘darken ship’ was ordered. By 0015 hours, 24 May, crews aboard both ships had been called to action stations and battle ensigns raised (note- Hood raised one battle ensign only). They were then an estimated 120 miles / 222 km south of the German ships.