http://www.hmshood.com/history/timeline4.htm
23 May: Bismarck and Prinz Eugen sighted by H.M.S. Suffolk in Denmark Strait between Greenland and Iceland.
http://www.hmshood.com/history/denmarkstrait/bismarck1.htm
Norfolk and Suffolk’s Patrol in the Denmark Strait
RADM Wake-Walker had arranged for Suffolk to join him at Isafjordur on the north west coast of Iceland after she had completed her refuelling. The two cruisers would then commence their patrol of the Denmark Strait. Their role would, of course, be to locate Bismarck and Prinz Eugen and keep contact with them – there was no question of Wake-Walker’s ships engaging the German squadron as they would be clearly outgunned. The cruisers would patrol down the Strait in a south westerly direction and then reverse course towards the north west. This would continue until the German ships were seen or enough time had elapsed to ensure that they were not heading out into the Atlantic via this route. It was always possible of course that the German ships would be located using another route and that Wake-Walker would be called to assist.
The patrol began mid-morning of 23 May. Both cruisers were fitted with radar equipment (R D/F) but that on Suffolk was far superior to that on Norfolk. Suffolk’s radar was multi-directional with a range of 13 miles which enabling her to sweep in all directions except a blind spot at her stern. In contrast Norfolk was fitted with fixed R D/F allowing her to see ahead only. For this reason Suffolk was chosen to patrol on the Greenland side of the Strait. She would keep the ice at the limit of her radar, which would allow her room for manoeuvre should the German ships be sighted. This protection was further enhanced by the fog conditions that day – it was clear over Greenland and the ice pack, but a bank of fog was clinging to the Icelandic coast. This fog would provide a blanket of protection into which the British ships could slip once contact with the enemy was established. Norfolk, with her fixed equipment, patrolled from the Iceland side of the Strait only.
The patrol continued throughout the day and into the early evening. At roughly 1915 hours, whilst Suffolk was on her south-westerly run, the uncertainty was suddenly ended: Able Seaman Newell was on duty as the starboard after look out. He was there to cover the ‘blind’ zone in Suffolk’s radar coverage astern. As he scanned the horizon he saw Bismarck, and then Prinz Eugen roughly 7 miles away. He immediately called out ‘Ship bearing green one four oh’, followed seconds later by ‘two ships bearing green one four oh’. The reaction was swift as Suffolk heeled over to port to seek the cover of the fog bank. Further encouragement was found by the fact that Bismarck did not open fire on Suffolk. Signals were sent out to say that contact with the enemy had at last been made.
Norfolk, hiding within the safety of the fog, picked up Suffolk’s report. She steered to take up position at the edge to the fog to assist in keeping contact. She strayed too close to the edge of the fog bank however, and cover was briefly lost. Bismarck spotted her and immediately opened fire. Norfolk was straddled, but was able to safely regain the cover of the fog bank. It was the first time the new German battleship had fired salvoes in anger and it served as a warning to the British of the deadly accuracy of Bismarck’s guns.
Luck seemed to be running with the British: Contact with the enemy squadron had been achieved. Although the Germans knew that they been found, neither British ship had been damaged in making contact. Furthermore, contact could be safely maintained by means of Suffolk’s radar from the cover of the fog bank. It was now just a question of ensuring that British heavy ships could be guided towards the enemy.
Hood Leads the Chase
By 2000 hours, Hood’s force was at 63º20N’ 27º00’W. Shortly before this, at 1939 hours, Vice-Admiral Holland ordered his vessels to raise steam for full speed and to change course to 295º. Shortly thereafter, at 2004 hours, he had the news he had been waiting for: Suffolk had positively sighted Bismarck and its consort in the Denmark Strait. This was followed-up by a report from Norfolk at 2040 hours. Plots put the Germans approximately 300 miles to the north of Holland’s force.
Holland’s battle plan at this point appears to have been for Hood and Prince of Wales to engage Bismarck in one of two fashions:
a. The first option was to cross the Germans’ “T” - i.e., cut across their bows on a westward course whilst they headed south. This would allow all the British guns to bear on the German ships whilst the enemy would only be able to fire at the British squadron with their forward guns. Of course, such a move could be easily countered.
b. The second choice was for Holland’s ships to cross the German squadron’s path well ahead, then swing around and approach from the west. This would would silhouette the Germans against the morning sky and considerably ease range finding for the British. It is evident that VADM Holland was hoping that Norfolk and Suffolk would engage Prinz Eugen whilst the two British capital ships fired on Bismarck, though this was evidently never communicated to them.
By 2054 hours, Hood’s force was proceeding at 27 knots on a heading of 295º. As the speed increased, the destroyers struggled to maintain station in the heavy seas. VADM Holland signalled to the destroyers “If you are unable to maintain this speed, I will have to go on without you. You should follow at your best speed”. The four tiny destroyers did their best to keep up with the old battle cruiser fairly but took a horrendous buffeting in doing so.
At 2200 hours, the crews of Hood, Prince of Wales and their accompanying destroyers were officially notified of the Germans presence in the Denmark Strait. Interception and action was expected to take place between 0140 and 0200 hours that morning. All hands were ordered to be prepared to change into clean undergarments (to help prevent infection should they be wounded) and to don battle gear (life vests, flash gear, gas masks, helmets and, where necessary, cold weather gear). At 2230 hours, ‘darken ship’ was ordered. By 0015 hours, 24 May, crews aboard both ships had been called to action stations and battle ensigns raised (note- Hood raised one battle ensign only). They were then an estimated 120 miles / 222 km south of the German ships.
About the same time, the radar operators on Suffolk saw that the German ships had changed course. The Bismarck had reversed course in an attempt to attack or drive off the two shadowing cruisers. The radar gave the British ships warning, and they simply slipped away under cover of the fog. Unable to spot them, the Bismarck resumed her original course, with Prinz Eugen still leading. The British cruisers resumed their position astern of her, but two hours later, just after midnight, a snowstorm temporarily blinded Suffolk's radar. All the operator saw was a blur. By coincidence Admiral Lutjens chose roughly rhe same moment to increase speed. As a result the German slipped ahead under cover of the snowstorm, and the British cruisers lost contact. It was a full three hour before radar contact was regained.
In the meantime Holland altered course to 240 degrees - the south-west - in case the Germans changed course as well as speed. That way he was surer of an interception, only that it would take place a little after dawn. As Holland's force steamed west to intercept his crews went to action stations, where his men grabbed what seep they could. On the Prince of Wales, the few civilian contractors who were still on board worked through the night to sort out the mechanical problems that still plagued the main guns. As dawn approached, the lookouts peered through the darkness to starboard, waiting for the first sign of the enemy warships they knew were out there.
At 5.37am a lookout on board the Hood spotted smoke on the horizon.