Posted on 05/05/2011 5:10:17 AM PDT by Homer_J_Simpson
The only person its unclear to is you. Sounds like a personal problem to me.
You didn’t answer my question. How many of the 129 messages does he go over in his book?
What's clear to me is that your attacks on Stinnett amount to nothing more than complaints about his listings of references, and unsubstantial allegations that some of Stinnett's quotes are taken out of context.
These in no way discredit the core of Stinnett's arguments.
If you had actually read the book, as you so often claim, then you'd know perfectly well that Stinnett describes the 129 messages in general terms, classifies them by type, and provides options on how you can see the originals -- their source locations or copies in his files.
So here's the deal: Stinnett's book is now ten years old.
In those ten years, which disinterested scholar has taken the time and effort to thoroughly research Stinnett's sources and objectively report which ones do or do not say what Stinnett claims?
Now, if in ten years no one has objectively debunked him, does that not tell us that at least some of what he wrote must be on target?
I have given you multiple examples. I will continue to do so as we move forward as well. I can’t help you if you lack the capability to understand them.
I have read the book and already knew the answer to the question. I wanted you to say it. 129 claims of breaking radio silence in which he provides "options on how you can see the originals". That park of your statement is a complete joke. He narrows down your "options" by referencing his source as one in over 2 million documents. That's not giving options. A real scholar would pinpoint where to look at the source. Not just flippantly say that its somewhere in this record group of over 1400 boxes.
So lets look at his generality as you put it:
We can jettison 25 of them right off the bat. Tokyo radio transmissions would not violate radio silence. A transmission from Tokyo will not reveal the location of the different fleet locations. This is a common practice that was also used by the U.S. Navy. These are general broadcast messages that do not require a response from the recipient.
We have 60 messages that he claims originated from Nagumo, but he does nothing to back up this claim. He claims that these messages originate from Nagumo's Secret Message Series (SMS) between November 15th and December 7th. They can't possibly all be SMS messages because there are not 60 messages in the SMS over that time span. On November 16th SMS 820 was sent (National Archives II, RG 457 SRN-115397). By the 19th, when the Kido Butai was still in Japanese waters SMS 840 was issued (National Archive II, RG 457 SRN-115491). According to "The Pearl Harbor Papers", SMS 844 is a damage report sent by the Kido Butai to Tokyo on December 8th. How are we stuffing these 60 SMS messages in there? I only have room for 3 at most and that's assuming that these are not really accounted for elsewhere.
The same thing goes for the 40 messages from carrier, Carrier Division Commanders, and other ships. Why does he not make a single example out of these ships in the Kido Butai who he alleges broke radio silence?
This leaves us with four messages from the Midway Neutralization Unit. Even if his claim of the four messages are true, this unit is not part of the Kido Butai.
His claim of 129 instances of breaking radio silence is pretty weak. Perhaps he should list his sources so someone can look at them directly rather than just saying, it's somewhere in RG 38 and RG 457 and expecting us to just take his word for it.
Sure, if your preconceived notion regards Stinnett as a David-Irving class scoundrel, who invents data out of thin air and is lying about the whole thing, then your analysis might make sense.
But suppose we give Stinnett the benefit of the doubt, and take him at his word -- that all of those documents are available in his files.
Why not make a good faith effort to contact him and ask to see them?
Then locating the originals would be no problem at all.
And if it turns out he really is a scoundrel, then that would quickly become apparent.
And surely, in over ten years someone has done this?
And if not, then might we well wonder if Stinnett's sharpest critics aren't afraid of learning the truth?
CougarGA7: "We can jettison 25 of them right off the bat.
Tokyo radio transmissions would not violate radio silence.
A transmission from Tokyo will not reveal the location of the different fleet locations."
If you had read Stinnett's book, as you so often claim, then you'd know that those Tokyo transmissions could reveal a lot.
For one thing, the radio frequency gives an idea of the range being transmitted to -- the higher the frequency, the longer the range.
When they shift from lower frequency to higher frequency, it tells you the receivers are moving further away from Japan.
Second, Stinnett fully describes one of these messages directly identifying Hawaii as the target of attack: Admiral Osami Nagano's December 3 broadcast to the Eleventh Air Fleet on Formosa (Taiwan).
Also, Stinnett p203 summarizes: "Seven Japanese naval broadcasts intercepted between November 28 and December 6 confirmed that Japan intended to start the war and that it would begin at Pearl Harbor.
The evidence that poured into American intelligence stations is overpowering.
All the broadcasts have one common denominator: none ever reached Admiral Kimmel..."...in Station H [Hawaii] records there were plenty of indicators found, in the form of intercepted Japanese broadcasts.
The first of these came on November 28, when Tokyo Naval Radio transmitted a message in the 5-Num code to the First Air Fleet.
It warned that the warships could expect a powerful winter storm in their path..."
CougarGA7: "We have 60 messages that he claims originated from Nagumo, but he does nothing to back up this claim.
He claims that these messages originate from Nagumo's Secret Message Series (SMS) between November 15th and December 7th.
They can't possibly all be SMS messages because there are not 60 messages in the SMS over that time span."
Part of the answer should be obvious -- Stinnett is working off records of intercepts, not of transmissions.
With many US intercept stations around the Pacific, and Japanese messages retransmitted from one Japanese station or ship to another, a small number of Japanese messages could result in a large number of US intercepts.
Another part is that some of these messages were of the short-range ship-to-ship type which required special atmospheric conditions to be picked up by more distant US intercept stations.
Those were just the conditions which existed in the Northwest Pacific, causing the Kido Butai to scatter.
CougarGa7: "Why does he not make a single example out of these ships in the Kido Butai who he alleges broke radio silence?"
Stinnett p208: "During separate interviews with the author, [Captain Homer] Kisner and [Captain Duane] Whitlock identified the 129 intercepts that refute [Commander Edwin] Layton's claim of radio silence.
Whitlock analyzed the radio direction finder reports obtained by Station CAST [Philippines], and Kisner analyzed the intercepts obtained by his operators at Station H [Hawaii]."The 129 reports, dated during the 21-day period, were compiled by the author from three sources found in Archives II: (1) Japanese naval intercepts, (2) Japanese code movement reports filed by warships, and (3) the TESTM radio direction finder reports obtained by Station CAST ..."
CougarGA7: "His claim of 129 instances of breaking radio silence is pretty weak.
Perhaps he should list his sources so someone can look at them directly rather than just saying, it's somewhere in RG 38 and RG 457 and expecting us to just take his word for it."
I'll say again: your complaint is ludicrous!
So far as I know, Stinnett is still alive, and anyone seriously interested can contact him and ask to see his documentation.
So why, so far as we know, has no one done that?
It’s amusing to watch you desperately defend your boy here. I point out that his citation is too vague and your response is, that while it’s true, he shouldn’t have to be specific with his sources and that the reader should hunt down the specific document.
Then you try to defend Stinnett’s statement on the 60 messages from Nagumo by actually contradicting what Stinnett himself said. Interesting tactic.
Stinnett says, “Vice Admiral chuichi Nagumo, commander-in-chief of the First Air Fleet, originated 60 transmissions in his Secret Message Series (SMS) between November 15 and December 7, 1941 (Hawaii Time)” That’s pretty specific in that he is saying the all 60 of these messages are SMS messages which are numbered. Converting to (Japan Time) between November 16 and December 8, 1941 there are only a total of 24 numbers used. Where are the other 36?
So if your assertion is correct, then your author has completely left out almost 2/3rds of his sourcing on what would be a critical piece of information. This would be far worse than the poor citation I’ve demonstrated to you already. If you think it’s hard to track down a source that has only been reduced to a record group, it’s even harder when it is not given at all.
I have not agreed that your complaint about Stinnett's citations being "too vague" is necessarily true, just the opposite.
I've said over and over than anyone seriously interested in the subject should not be deterred by having to read through a lot of data.
I've also pointed out that there's an easy way to avoid duplicate research -- just ask him.
Stinnett claims he has all these documents organized neatly in his files.
No need to reinvent any wheels -- just ask to see them.
Of course, if it turns out that Stinnett is just a pr*ck about it, and won't put up or shut up, or that his files turn out to be other than what he claimed -- well, that changes everything.
Here's my best guess: based on the criticisms I've seen on various sites, including this one by Philip Jacobsen --
A Cryptologic Veteran's Analysis of "Day of Deceit"Note Jacobsen's opening sentence:
"The author, Robert B. Stinnett, made a thorough search of National Archives files other repositories and contacted numerous personnel to justify his long held belief that President Franklin D. Roosevelt not only actively fomented war with Japan..."
Note that nowhere in this article does Jacobsen complain about Stinnett's lack of specificity in his citations.
Indeed, Jacobsen seems quite familiar with many of Stinnett's documents.
Anyway, based on the criticisms by Jacobsen and others, I'm guessing Stinnett made some mistakes, and his book is not 100% perfect.
On the other hand, I've never seen where any of these potential mistakes invalidate Stinnett's basic argument.
Indeed, if we look carefully at the one document which any normal human can readily understand, the document which Stinnett called a "smoking gun" -- Commander Arthur McCollum's October 1940 "Eight Action Memo" -- it's totally clear to me that people like Jacobsen are misrepresenting what McCollum wrote, and that Stinnett got it exactly right.
In fact if anything, Stinnett understated the aggressiveness of McCollum's memo.
CougarGA7: "That’s pretty specific in that he is saying the all 60 of these messages are SMS messages which are numbered.
Converting to (Japan Time) between November 16 and December 8, 1941 there are only a total of 24 numbers used. Where are the other 36?"
To me it's pretty simple: Stinnett either has those messages, or he doesn't.
If he has them, then there must be some logical explanation, such as multiple US intercepts or Japanese retransmissions of the same message, or, indeed, a misinterpretation of some data.
If Stinnett does not have those messages, then we throw that whole argument out, and start over from scratch.
Pardon me, you said, “I take your point” then continued to give a lame excuse for not giving proper citation that. It does not matter if the reader or researcher is deterred by this or not. It should be cited properly if it is to be taken seriously. I should not have to ask him to see his notes. They should be in his references section of his book. This is bad scholarship.
It looks like Jacobsen’s review is focused on the content of his book itself and not the academic quality of it. He makes some good points in this review, but my issue is his scholarship just as much as the content.
"I take your point" means I understand what you said, not that I necessarily think it's totally valid.
Yes, I fully understand that you think Stinnett should have been more precise in identifying his sources.
Fine, that's your opinion, and with some apparent justification.
On the other hand:
"The author will deposit 'Day of Deceit's' entire research collection of cited documents, recorded audio and video tapes, photographs and graphics, including negatives, in his permanent collection housed at the Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford University, Stanford, California.
This collection will be open for public use."
Now I don't know if he did that or not.
But again, I'll say: if Stinnett did what he publicly promised, then he's a good man in my book, and deserves benefits of some doubts.
The data is there for serious scholars to do their work, make their corrections and add new material to the case.
If he didn't do it, especially after more than 10 years, then I'd say something's wrong here, maybe time to reconsider.
Typically a publisher does not worry about citation in a book. They worry about if it will sell copies. They are a business, not a university. Now if it was published by University of North Carolina Press, or Cambridge Press, they would likely be more critical of the sourcing since their reputation as a university would also be tarnished by such sloppy work.
Now Jacobsen is critical of the books contents. That’s his point and that’s fine. I can make many similar arguments, but currently I’m just looking at the citation itself. Even Tim Wilford, who supports some aspects of Stinnett’s position criticized him on his poor scholarship stating among other issues that “Stinnett sometimes fails to develop coherent arguments and supportable conclusions. Moreover, his endnotes do not always support his claims.” (Intelligence and National Security, August 2006)
By the way, according to the Hoover Insitute Archives there are no records in their archive for the Day of Deceit. What he gave the Hoover Institute was papers surrounding his own personal service in the Second World War. The only entry in their archive is titled. “Stinnett (Robert B.) miscellaneous papers 1943-1945”. The years listed alone should tip you off, but the description makes it concrete that these are his own personal experiences. “Memoranda and photographs depicting the aircraft carrier San Jacinto, naval personnel, prisoner of war camps, life at sea, scenes of battle, naval artillery, Tokyo, and the Pacific Islands during World War II.” In fact, they do not even carry “Day of Deceit” in their library. The only book by Stinnett in their holdings is “George Bush: His World War II Years”.
So he did not do what he publicly promised. This only makes me more suspicious of the quality of his work. Like I’ve said, I’m just looking at his referencing right now. That is not the only problem I have with his work here.
The reason I keep mentioning David Irving is because he is the most glaring example I know of -- plenty of others only slightly less glaring -- of a previously recognized historian who went off the deep end and then was discovered to have been faking it from the beginning.
So the question is, does Stinnett approach that level of dishonesty, or is he just an honest man who is fairly or unfairly alleged to have made some mistakes?
Well, a published promise to deposit his research materials for public inspection is a strong test of personal honesty, a test which it appears Stinnett may be failing.
One wonders if Stinnett intends to fulfill his promise in his will, for legal reasons, and if so, couldn't a good lawyer show him a better way?
CougarGA7: "Even Tim Wilford, who supports some aspects of Stinnett’s position criticized him on his poor scholarship stating among other issues that
'Stinnett sometimes fails to develop coherent arguments and supportable conclusions.
Moreover, his end-notes do not always support his claims.' (Intelligence and National Security, August 2006)"
Note here the key words in Wilford's statement: "sometimes fails" and "do not always support".
I think Wilford is not saying that Stinnett's work is complete garbage, only that we should be careful with "some" of it.
So the bottom line question is, do "some" disputed passages make Stinnett's entire argument invalid?
By the way, I totally agree with the statement about "coherent arguments" and would suggest that Victor's book has the same problem in spades.
The subject is naturally complex in the extreme, and these authors don't make it any easier to understand.
Also by the way, I did order Clausens's book, but it will now be next week before I can get into it.
And figured out how to do Kindle on my PC, and that's pretty neat.
Stinnett is on Kindle, but very poorly done.
And none of the other more controversial authors are on Kindle.
But there is a brand new book by Alan Zimm, which looks at Pearl Harbor force ratios, strategies & weapons, but doesn't get into any "conspiracy" material.
It's pretty neat to click on an end-note number and see the reference instantly, or do a search on a word (i.e., someone's name) and see immediately where else that word is used and what it means.
Kindle is good.
I’m not going to compare him to other authors. I will only measure him based on the merit of his own work. That fact that his notes are not where he says, and that his referencing has a tendency to only narrow things down to groups of thousands (or more) documents doesn’t speak well for him. Nor does the fact that even supporters of his thesis have problems with his academic method. I don’t think anyone will say that he is “always” wrong nor could you say that about almost any book. Even I’m not saying that. There is however, significant errors that completely undermine his own thesis. As I’ve said before, if given the choice between Victor and Stinnett, I’d take Stinnet every time.
Clearly, imho, there's a crying need for someone to write a book which makes the case, well organized and simple enough that people can understand it, but also with thorough and detailed documentation.
By the way, I've finally been able to start into Clausen's book, and note right away where he agrees with me. ;-)
Will soon see where he disagrees...
Well, who knows, perhaps down the road I might write something on it. Right now it is not much a priority for me though.
I think you will like Clausen’s book. It is an interesting perspective on one investigators work on the events. I don’t agree with all of his conclusions, but he makes some very good arguments and does share my view that there were systemic failures in the system itself that played a large roll in the failure to defend ourselves.
My collection of Pearl Harbor related books has now reached ten -- five of them on Kindle:
Some of these I've read thoroughly, others just starting into.
My main interest is to learn how different one is from the other -- on what matters do they all say the same things, and where, exactly, do they diverge?
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