First we have to throw out the "mistake" statement since that did not take place in July, but at the October meeting.
Now since Victor uses the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack (Victor references it as the PHA after initial citation so I'll do the same) as his primary resource for the items on page 158-159 I took the liberty of finding the transcripts to those hearings and read them. I also tracked down and read the transcripts from the Naval Court of Inquiry (I'll call this the NCI from here) that is often referenced in the PHA. Interesting stuff by the way.
Now I don't argue that FDR and Richardson disagreed on the disposition of the fleet and it led to Richardson being relieved. I never have contested that either so it's not much of a point. I do take issue with the "vulnerability" quote by Victor, but in some respects its only semantically so I'll hit that first.
In the PHA which Victor sources, Richardson never makes the claim that the fleet is vulnerable. That distinction goes to Admiral Kimmel who said in his NCI testimony that is often referenced in the PHA. In his testimony, Kimmel says when asked if he also suggested moving the fleet out of Pearl as his predecessor had, "I did not make any protest, any formal protest, against maintaining the fleet at Pearl Harbor at any time. I did, in conversation with the Chief of Naval Operations, in June of 1941, point out to him the vulnerability of Pearl Harbor as a fleet base".
Now the reason I don't discount a concern of vulnerability by Richardson out of hand entirely are two fold. First, as a commander of a fleet I would imagine you worry about the vulnerabilities of your fleet no matter where it is. Second, again in the NCI I found this in which he doesn't claim that the fleet is vulnerable, but does show that he sees the potential for danger.
Q. In other words, you considered that the means of attack would be by submarines rather than by air?A. Yes, although in a statement, in a letter prepared which is before the court, presenting the inadequacies of the defenses of Pearl Harbor, I did point out and particularly stress the inadequacies with respect to anti-aircraft defense, and we did consider at one time the advisability of establishing a balloon barrage, abandoning the idea, so that we were not entirely without concern over the possibilities of a surprise air attack.
So as a reasonable commander he was looking at all angles, but as you can see, his primary concern from a defensive standpoint was with submarine attacks, and not a strike from the air. I guess I should solidify that statement by posting the answer to the previous question that led to this one I just listed above.
Q. At this time and in view of these rumors of a possible war with Japan, what was your estimate as to a surprise attack on Hawaii? Did you believe that the Japanese would make a surprise attack, and if so, how?A. While I was Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet I was primarily concerned with the possibility of an attack by submarines.
So did Richardson claim that the fleet was vulnerable in his July 1940 meeting with FDR? Maybe, but if he did, it wasn't his primary concern. If it was it would have shown up in his testimony, especially when you look at what he did claim his issues were in that July meeting.
According to the PHA, this is the reasons he gives:
"My objections for remaining there were, primarily, that you only had one port, secure port, and very crowded, no recreation facilities for the men, a long distance from Pearl Harbor to the city of Honolulu, inadequate transportation inadequate airfields.""A carrier cannot conduct all training for her planes from the carrier deck. In order to launch her planes she must be underway at substantial speed, using up large amounts of fuel. So that wherever carriers are training their squadrons there must be flying fields available, so that while the ship herself is undergoing overhaul, or repair, or upkeep, the planes may conduct training, flying from the flying fields"
"There were inadequate and restricted areas for anchorages of the fleet; to take them in and out of Pearl Harbor wasted time."
"Another reason, which was a substantial one: Americans are perfectly willing to go anywhere, stay anywhere, do anything when there is a job to be done and they can see the reason for their being there, but to keep the fleet, during what the men considered normal peacetimes, away from the coast and away from their families, away from recreation, rendered it difficult to maintain a high state of morale that is essential to successful training.
"For those reasons, and because I believed that the fleet could be better prepared for war on a normal basis on the west coast, I wanted to return to the west coast."
This mirrors the testimony he gave the NCI:
Q. Admiral, during the time you were in the Hawaiian area, and the Commander-in-Chief of the United States Fleet, did you consider the basing of the United States Fleet in the Pacific, and did you make any specific recommendations to the Navy Department as to the proper base in the Pacific, at which in your opinion the Fleet should be placed?A. I made such representations both unofficially, orally, and in writing, and I happen to have one.
Q. What were they, please? What were the recommendations?
A. Well, I have one in my pocket, if you want it.
Q. Briefly, just generally — just state it, if you please?
A. Well, I stated that the operating areas were not adequate, either for surface ships or air ; there were no airfields adequate to care for the planes that were on carriers, and could not be trained from the carriers because of the shortage of fuel. The only safe anchorage was Pearl Harbor, and it was entirely inadequate to handle the Fleet ; the distance from the West Coast increased the cost and the delay and the difficulty of maintaining and supplying the Fleet; that there were no recreational facilities; that in time of peace the men and officers could not see any reason for remaining for such a long time away from home ; that they were two thousand miles nearer a possible enemy; that we were unprepared to undertake offensive operations from Pearl Harbor, and that if we were involved in war, it would be necessary for us to return to the West Coast for stripping and mobilization and preparation for war; and that our presence in the Hawaiian area, when we were absolutely not trained, couldn't make any military people believe that we were planning offensive operations.
Q. Where did you recommend that the Fleet be based ?
A. Normal West Coast bases, except a detachment to remain in Pearl Harbor that could be adequately cared for by the facilities there.
So his main concern was that Pearl Harbor didn't have the facilities to support the fleet and the remote station would be more expensive and harder on the men. All reasonable concerns honestly, especially when you consider that if you cannot train adequately, and don't have the material resources to ramp up from peace to war status without cycling the ships back to the mainland, then you wont be in a position to take advantage of that forward position for offensive operations if war does break out.
Admiral Stark's testimony backs up Richardson's as far as his concerns when it comes to the fleet's stationing at Pearl Harbor (again from the NCI):
Q. At some time during the late summer or fall of 1940, did Admiral Richardson make either one or two official visits to Washington?A. He did.
Q. And during one or both of those visits, did you have conversations with him relative to continuing the Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor?
A. That question was undoubtedly one which we talked about.
Q. And do you recall that Admiral Richardson protested with strength and vigor the continued maintenance of the Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor under the then existing conditions ?
A. I recall his desire to bring the Fleet back to the Coast.
Q. Did he advance any reasons to you for that desire?
A. Yes, he supported them with reasons.
Q. Do you recall what the reasons were, as stated to you?
The witness requested permission to refresh his memory from documents he had in his possession.
The court granted the permission.
A. I can give you some of the reasons.
Q. Can you state generally your present recollection?
A. I recall one reason which Admiral Richardson gave which was in connection with morale, namely, that the fleet on the Pacific Coast would have better opportunity for recreation, visits with their families. I am not sure, but as I recall the question of re-enlistments was brought up in that same connection, but as to any material reason which he might have given, I do not recall specifically at the moment.
Q. Do you recall whether Admiral Richardson based his protest on the fact that he considered the Fleet was not secure at Pearl Harbor ?
A. I do not recall that, no, nor any official communication to that effect.
Q. Do you recall whether one of the factors behind Admiral Richardson's protest was that strategically and logistically, war operations could not be conducted, either actually or in training, from Pearl Harbor because of inadequate train then attached to the Fleet?
A. I remember a discussion of inadequate training came up and we were endeavoring to meet the needs of the Fleet to make Pearl Harbor suitable for some of these purposes, if not all of them.
So once again, we have Richardson's concerns with moral, facilities, and training, but noting on the fleet being vulnerable. In fact, Stark states that there were no mention of the fleet not being secure made to him by Richardson either officially or unofficially. So Richardson does not convey a concern about the security of the fleet at Pearl Harbor to his superior, or in official communiques at the time, or unofficially, or in his testimony in 1944 (NCI) and 1945 (PHA). But Victor's interpretation of the PHA testimony is that Richardson did make the argument with FDR that the fleet was vulnerable at Pearl Harbor, and apparently all the other reasons that are in the PHA were not an issue that came up in these meetings of July or October. Interesting assessment.
So at this point in time, I would be willing to say that Richardson and FDR are on the outs because Richardson wants to move the fleet back to the coast where it can better train and prepare for war while FDR wants to leave it at Pearl to exert political pressure on Japan.
Another great post -- lots of meat and potatoes in it, thanks!
And yes, for purposes of this discussion I've conflated the July and October meetings -- because they seem directly connected and demonstrate that Richardson's concerns about Pearl Harbor, far from being alleviated by Roosevelt's actions, only grew more intense over time.
And what were those concerns?
Oh, says his boss, Admiral Stark, Richardson was worried about the lack of training and maintenance facilities at Pearl Harbor.
Anything else?
Naw, that was about it, says Stark.
Of course, anyone of the "Roosevelt knew" school has to believe Stark was a major figure in the Pearl Harbor cover-up, so any such testimony must be viewed with suspicion.
So, what did Richardson himself say?
Yes, he was concerned about the lack of facilities at Pearl Harbor, but he also had higher strategic concerns, including, in effect, its "vulnerability" to attack.
What kind of attack?
Well mainly he was concerned about submarines, but also air attack.
And there are documents to support his concern, says Richardson.
And not only Richardson was concerned, but his successor, Admiral Kimmel was also concerned about Pearl Harbor's "vulnerability."
So, why is this word "vulnerability" or the phrase "inadequacies of defense" important strategically?
Because, militarily speaking, "vulnerability" is what turns a "deterrence" into a provocation.
Militarily, a deterrence is a force so powerful it says to any potential enemy: "don't mess with me, or you will be so, soooo sorry."
By contrast, a provocation is a force so weak it says to a potential enemy: "here I am, attack me to gain victory and glory."
In their October meeting, Roosevelt claims the fleet at Pearl Harbor is a deterrent to the Japanese.
Richardson answers -- no, it's too weak to deter, and the Japanese know that.
What is a force too weak to deter?
It's a provocation.
Roosevelt knows that, and considers the possibility of a Japanese attack as the great "mistake" which will bring American into the war.