First of all, I agree on President Roosevelt -- among his many socialistic flaws was at least one shining virtue: FDR had learned from Woodrow Wilson's First World War example that incomplete victory just doesn't work.
So an enemy dangerous enough for war must be thoroughly defeated.
Otherwise, you'll just have have "round two" as soon as they feel ready again.
Now, on Stinnett's book -- remember, the subject here is Admiral Richardson, not code-breaking.
So, where ever your Lt. Cmdr Jacobson may or may-not have been at the time, he was certainly not in on discussions between Richardson and Roosevelt.
To find data on that, we must look elsewhere.
Stinnett's book spends two pages discussing Richardson's conflict with FDR.
Victor's book devotes more than ten pages to it.
Here is an example from Victor (page 158):
"At [Navy Secretary Frank] Knox's request he [Richardson] visited Washington again in October [1940] and took the occasion to confront Roosevelt.
"His recollection of their long, tense discussion was largely supported by Roosevelt's friend, Adm. William Leahy, who was also present.
"Richardson and Roosevelt restated positions they had taken during the July visit. Richardson urged returning the fleet to the West Coast because of its vulnerability at Pearl Harbor. Roosevelt said the fleet was needed in Hawaii to deter Japan. Richardson said it was too weak to be an effective deterrent, and the Japanese knew that.
"Roosevelt replied:
'Despite what you believe, I know that the presence of the fleet in the Hawaiian area has had, and is now having a restraining influence on the actions of Japan.'"(The basis of this statement is unknown. It was not supported by intercepted Japanese diplomatic messages or other intelligence that has come to light.)
"Both Roosevelt and Richardson made the same arguments over and over, becoming angry and challenging each other.
"Suspecting the fleet's transfer might be part of a hidden plan, Richardson finally broke the stalemate by asking if Roosevelt meant to go to war with Japan.
"That, the president answered, depended on where Japan attacked. If she attacked Thailand or the Dutch East Indies, the United States would not go to war. If she attacked the Philippines, the United States probably would go to war, but (in Richardson's words),
'[the Japanese] could not always avoid making mistakes and as the war continued and the area of operations expanded sooner or later they would make a mistake and we would enter the war.'"The only U.S. territory in the Pacific more important than the Philippines was Hawaii. By inference a Japanese "mistake" meant an attack on Hawaii or on the fleet, either one would enable Roosevelt to enter the war.
"On October 7, the day before his argument with Richardson, Roosevelt had received an ONI memo, written by [Naval Intelligence Commander Arthur] McCullum containing proposed measures to help save Great Britain and ultimately to defeat Germany:
- 'Make an arrangement with Holland for the use of base facilities...in the Dutch East Indies.
- 'Send a division of heavy cruisers to the Orient.
- 'Send two divisions of submarines to the Orient.
- 'Keep the main strength of the US Fleet...in the vacinity of the Hawaiian Islands.
- 'Insist that the Dutch refuse to grant Japanese demands for...oil...
- 'Completely embargo all U.S. trade with Japan, in collaboration with the British Empire.'
"It is worth emphasizing that measures to defeat Germany were directed against Japan.
And the memo ended with,"If by these measures the Japanese could be led to commit an overt act of war, so much the better."
I don’t think anyone would dispute that FDR and Richardson didn’t see eye to eye. And I agree that it eventually led to Richardson’s dismissal.
I don’t think that would make the point that FDR felt the attack was going to come at Pearl Harbor though. Victor makes an interesting analysis in his writing when he assumes that the “mistake” could only mean Pearl Harbor.
FDR himself shows where his mind is when you look at the places named when he responds to Richardson’s question on if FDR meant to go to war with Japan. No, if they attacked the Dutch East Indies or Thailand. Yes, if they attacked the Philippines. FDR clearly shows that he is thinking much like the rest of the Navy that if the Japanese attacked that they would do so closer to their own home waters and strike south towards the resources of the South Pacific. The Philippines would happen to be in the way and it would be the potential American target along with Guam.
FDR is also clearly thinking about public reaction too. And attack on Guam for instance probably would not provoke the necessary outrage to declare war and as a result doesn’t appear to even be crossing his mind. The Philippines on the other hand would, especially with “America’s General” in the country.
I would think that if Pearl would have been on his radar that it would have likely had been included in answering this question, especially since the entire argument surrounded basing the fleet on the islands.
Victor says the “mistake” could only mean Pearl, but it also could mean the Philippines since it would also be a catalyst to get the U.S. into the war. It’s a bit of a leap by the author in my opinion.
I don’t doubt that FDR wanted a provocation to get us in the war. Had he not, he would have taken his own navy’s advice and eased up to give the the extra time they asked for to prepare forward bases. I just don’t see any evidence that he thought it would be Pearl Harbor as the target of Japanese aggression.