Posted on 10/21/2009 4:53:08 AM PDT by Homer_J_Simpson
“If the US/UK knew in 1939 what they knew in 1943, they would have concentrated more on aircraft carriers than on battleships and other gun-type ships.”
In 1939 nobody, not even the Japanese, knew just how much air power would change naval warfare. At this time, all navies are building surface warships built around gunnery. Japan, the US and UK are building aircraft carriers, but only as an adjunct to capital ship construction.
There were also lots of variation in aircraft carrier design. Japanese and American carriers had huge fundamental design differences; closed v. open hangers, armored v. wooden flight decks, small v. large islands for conducting flight ops, etc....
21.10.1939
U-47 enters the Friedrich Krupp Germaniawerft A.G. shipyard in Kiel for repairs.
Said shipyard.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Friedrich_Krupp_Germaniawerft
Friedrich Krupp Germaniawerft (often just mentioned Germaniawerft) was a German shipbuilding company, located in the harbour at Kiel, and one of the largest and most important builders of U-boats for the Kaiserliche Marine in World War I and the Kriegsmarine in World War II.
Required reading for anyone interested in German military history.
http://books.google.com/books?id=TIsvPMXQEBcC&dq=the+arms+of+krupp&source=gbs_navlinks_s
The Arms of Krupp: The Rise and Fall of the Industrial Dynasty that Armed Germany at War
By William Manchester
The Weekly Spectator denounced the lack of air attacks against Germany. That is interesting to note.
One of the main reason the armored deck carriers did not do so well was that they limited aircraft carrying capacity. One feature of the “armored carrier,” in addition to the flight deck, was the concept of the enclosed hangar deck. Look at photos of an Essex class carrier and compare to RN Ark Royal, or with IJN Soryu or Akagi, which went even farther. You don’t see the side elevators and the open hangars. In the British and Japanese carriers, the hangars were enclosed. By having a more open and lightly armored design, American carriers could carry more aircraft. American carrier doctrine very early on decided that carrier combat would be decided by who put more planes in the sky, rather than whose ship could best deflect a bomb. You don’t have to worry about a bomb hitting your carrier when the plane carrying it never gets there. That turned out to be a much better concept, and one borne out by combat experience.
And while having the armored flight deck and enclosed hangar deck were meant as protection, in practice they didn’t accomplish what they intended. Any bomb that penetrated the flight deck would explode in the contained hangar deck, where the compression effect would make the damage more severe. American carriers, on the other hand, had the more open hangar decks which allowed bomb blasts to be “vented” and reduced damage. In addition, damage control/firefighting was much more effective with an open hangar. In an open hangar, the fire could be “pushed” out the door, and also attacked from more angles. Not so in the enclosed hangar.
Repair of battle damage is also an issue. Damage to a steel armored flight deck required a trip to the yard and a long stay there. American carriers could take a hit, and patch the wooden deck, sometimes in hours, sometimes while still at sea.
There is a very good discussion of these design differences in “Shattered Sword, The Untold Story of the Battle of Midway.” This book makes it very clear why the Japanese lost four carriers at Midway, when Yorktown went through two attacks and almost survived. The damage inflicted on Yorktown would have destroyed an IJN carrier, while the hits on IJN ships might have been survived by Yorktown, although she certainly would have been out of action for a long time.
Despite not having armored decks, American fleet carriers were really hard to kill.
Interesting points.
It occurs to me that the world was just not prepared for this war. If the Germans had waited another year to start their territorial acquisitions they might have had such a huge advantage they could have rolled all the way to Moscow and the Ukraine.
Assuming the world didn’t catch on.
just saying.
They also thought French and UK forces were going to be able to keep the Germans out of France.
or Spain... Spain is good.
We lost a couple of carriers under the same conditions as the japanese at Midway.
But the primary difference is that many Japanese captains did not feel Damage Control Training was “Bushido”. that would be akin to admitting defeat, before a battle ever happened.
This would haunt the Japanese throughout the war. Some commanders would get it, most would not.
Kind of; American crews usually fought the damage control hard before the ship was lost. Like Lexington. Or if it were a CL like Princeton or a CLE like Sangammon, there just wasn’t enough ship to survive the damage. On many Japanese carriers, like Akagi and Hiryu, they fought the fires just as hard but they way the ships were built, and the way the damage was inflicted, the outcome was never really in doubt.
But you are right; damage control was pretty inconsistent in the IJN. They built some tough ships but didn’t save them when they could have. While we learned a lot from the loss of Lexington, the Japanese never really had a learning curve. As for bad Japanese damage control, though, no one could hold a candle to the idiot damage control officer on Taiho.
Actually the window was closing on Germany. The French and Brits finally woke up and were rearming. Their combined industrial might was greater than Germany. And Stalin wasn’t going to sit on his hands forever; the Red Army was in disarray in 1939 due to purges, rapid expansion, and obsolete equipment. However, had Hitler waited until 1942 to invade the USSR, most of the Soviet forces would have been up to strength, equipped with modern tanks like the T-34 and modern aircraft. The officer corps would have had a year to settle into their billets, and the frontier fortifications would have been built.
While you are correct that generally, the world was unready for war in 1939, Germany was “less unready” than everyone else.
Your right, I forgot they were aiming at Russia more than anything.
US Crews also TRAINED HARD in Damage control, long before battle. Japanese crews rarely did.
(Yamato being the huge exception. Her previous damages wisened the crew fast about the value of Damage Control)
Hitler knew that Germany had no choice but to strike quickly, that was the crux of what he told his generals early in 1939. Hitler wanted war in 1938, and was actually angry that Britain and France gave in so easily at Munich.
Not so much.
Where do you find this material? Thanks for your great posts.
You are quite welcome. I'm glad you enjoy them.
The source for the material is detailed at the top of every thread, right under the thread title. Maybe I should add some explanation about my microfiche foraging on my profile.
If I had opened my eyes I would have seen that. :D
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