Finally, it is understood that the envoy in Moscow was instructed to ask Mr. Molotoff if Russia really meant business, and apparently he go a satisfactory answer.
"It has been repeatedly made clear that His Majesty's Government stand for the settlement of international differences by friendly negotiation, arbitration or other peaceful means and they are at all times ready to lend their good offices at the request of any of the interested parties."
The more important question is, does Great Britain really mean business?
Today's update:
On May 8 the British Government at last replied to the Soviet Note of April 16. While the text of the British document was not published, the Tass Agency on May 9 issued a statement giving the main points of the British proposals. On May 10 the official organ Isvestia printed a communiqué to the effect that Reuter's statement of the British counter-proposals, namely, that "the Soviet Union must separately guarantee every neighbouring State, and that Great Britain must pledge herself to assist the U.S.S.R. if the latter becomes involved in war as a result of its guarantees", did not correspond to fact. The Soviet Government, said the communiqué, had received the British counter-proposals on May 8, but these did not mention the Soviet Union's obligation to give a separate guarantee to each of its neighbouring States, whereas they did state that the U.S.S.R. was obliged to render immediate assistance to Great Britain and France in the event of their being involved in war under their guarantees to Poland and Roumania. No mention however was made of any assistance on their part to the Soviet Union in the event of its being involved in war in consequence of its obligations towards any Eastern European State.
Later on the same day Mr. Chamberlain said that the Government had undertaken their new obligations in Eastern Europe without inviting the direct participation of the Soviet Government on account of various difficulties. His Majesty's Government had suggested that the Soviet Government should make, on their own behalf, a similar declaration, and express their readiness to lend assistance, if desired, to countries which might victims of aggression and were prepared to defend their independence.
Almost simultaneously the Soviet Government presented a scheme at once more comprehensive and more rigid, which, whatever other advantages it might present, must in the view of His Majesty's Government inevitably raise the very difficulties which their own proposals had been designed to avoid. They accordingly pointed out to the Soviet Government the existence of these difficulties. At the same time they made certain modifications in their original proposals. In particular, they [H.M.G.] made it plain that if the Soviet Government wished to make their owm intervention contingent on that of Great Britain and France, His Majesty's Government for their part would have no objection.
It was a pity that this had not been explicitly stated a fortnight earlier.
Winston S. Churchill, The Gathering Storm
5/10/39 update at #3.
The British government could not quite get its mind around the idea that in order to stop Hitler, it would have to get in bed with Stalin.
They couldn't imagine it and couldn't bring themselves to do it. Even more important, they had nothing of value to offer Stalin. Hitler had much to offer...