Egged on by Berlin, the Polish government on September 21 demanded of the Czechs a plebiscite in the Teschen district, where there was a large Polish minority, and moved troops to the frontier of the area.
All through . . . September 21, Benes, aching from fatigue, from the lack of sleep and from the contemplation of treachery and disaster, consulted with his cabinet, party leaders and the Army High Command. They had shown courage in the face of enemy threats but they began to crumble at the desertion of their friends and allies. What about Russia? As it happened, the Soviet Foreign Commissar, Litvinov, was making a speech that very day at Geneva reiterating that the Soviet Union would stand by its treaty with Czechoslovakia. Benes called in the Russian minister in Prague, who backed up what his Foreign Commissar had said. Alas for the Czechs, they realized that the pact with Russia called for the Soviets to come to their aid on condition that France did the same. And France had reneged.
Late in the afternoon of September 21, the Czech government capitulated and accepted the Anglo-French plan. “We had no other choice, because we were left alone,” a government communiqué explained bitterly. Privately, Benes put it more succinctly: “We have been basely betrayed.” The next day the cabinet resigned and General Jan Sirovy, the Inspector General of the Army, became the head of a new “government of national concentration.”
William L. Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, Pg. 388, 390-391
Buchanan argues that Hitler was not interested in WESTERN Europe, only in the East, so if Britain & France had let him have Poland too, there would have been no World War Two and millions of lives would be spared.
He also says that a war between Hitler and Stalin would have prevented the triumph of Communism, the 45 year long Cold War, and those tens of millions killed by Communists.
Finally, Buchanan clinches his argument by noting that, compared to Poland, Czechoslovakia came out of the war in pretty good shape -- with less than 10% of the deaths & destruction experienced by the Poles.
So, it seems what Buchanan wants us to learn from this is: when faced with a Hitler-like character, it's better to surrender quickly, and join his side, than it is to fight honorably to the death, to preserve your country.
Of course, I think Pat is nuts, but what I think doesn't matter. Maybe someone should ask the Poles, how many agree with Buchanan?