"Good heavens!" ("Ich bin vom Himmel gefallen!") Hitler exclaimed when he read Chamberlain's message. He was astounded but highly pleased that the man who presided over the destinies of the mighty British Empire should come pleading to him, and flattered that a man who was sixty-nine years old and had never traveled in an airplane before should make the long seven hours' flight to Berchtesgaden at the farthest extremity of Germany. Hitler had not had even the grace to suggest a meeting place on the Rhine, which would have shortened the trip by half.
Whatever the enthusiasm of the English, who seemed to believe that the Prime Minister was making the long journey to do what Mr. Asquith and Sir Edward Grey had failed to do in 1914—warn Germany that any aggression against a small power would bring not only France but Britain into war against it—Hitler realized, as the confidential German papers and subsequent events make clear, that Chamberlain's action was a godsend to him. Already apprised by the German Embassy in London that the British leader was prepared to advocate "far-reaching German proposals," the Fuehrer felt fairly certain that Chamberlain's visit was a further assurance that, as he had believed all along, Britain and France would not intervene on behalf of Czechoslovakia. The Prime Minister had not been with him more than an hour or so before this estimate of the situation became a certainty.
In the beginning there was a diplomatic skirmish, though Hitler, as was his custom, did most of the talking. Chamberlain had landed at the Munich airport at noon on September 15, driven in an open car to the railroad station and there boarded a special train for the three-hour rail journey to Berchtesgaden. He did not fail to notice train after train of German troops and artillery passing on the opposite track. Hitler did not meet his train at Berchtesgaden, but waited on the top steps of the Berghof to greet his distinguished visitor. It had begun to rain, Dr. Schmidt, the German interpreter, later remembered, the sky darkened and clouds hid the mountains. It was now 4 P.M. and Chamberlain had been on his way since dawn.
After tea Hitler and Chamberlain mounted the steps to Hitler's study on the second floor, the very room where the dictator had received Schuschnigg seven months before. At the urging of Ambassador Henderson, Ribbentrop was left out of the conversation, an exclusion which so irritated the vain Foreign Minister that the next day he refused to give Schmidt's notes on the conference to the Prime Minister—a singular but typical discourtesy—and Chamberlain thereafter was forced to rely on his memory of what he and Hitler had said. Hitler began the conversation, as he did his speeches, with a long harangue about all that he had done for the German people, for peace, and for an Anglo-German rapprochement. There was now one problem he was determined to solve "one way or another." The three million Germans in Czechoslovakia must "return" to the Reich.
He did not wish [as Schmidt's official account puts it] that any doubts should arise as to his absolute determination not to tolerate any longer that a small, second-rate country should treat the mighty thousand-year-old German Reich as something inferior . . . He was forty-nine years old, and if Germany were to become involved in a world war over the Czechoslovak question, he wished to lead his country through the crisis in the full strength of manhood . . . He would, of course, be sorry if a world war should result from this problem. This danger, however, was incapable of making him falter in his determination . . . He would face any war, even a world war, for this. The rest of the world might do what it liked. He would not yield one single step.
Chamberlain, who had scarcely been able to get a word in, was a man of immense patience, but there were limits to it. At this juncture he interrupted to say, "If the Fuehrer is determined to settle this matter by force without waiting even for a discussion between ourselves, why did he let me come? I have wasted my time." The German dictator was not accustomed to such an interruption— no German at this date would dare to make one—and Chamberlain's retort appears to have had its effect. Hitler calmed down. He thought they could go "into the question whether perhaps a peaceful settlement was still possible after all" And then he sprang his proposal.
Would Britain agree to a secession of the Sudeten region, or would she not? ... A secession on the basis of the right of self-determination?
The proposal did not shock Chamberlain. Indeed, he expressed satisfaction that they "had now got down to the crux of the matter." According to Chamberlain's own account, from memory, he replied that he could not commit himself until he had consulted his cabinet and the French. According to Schmidt's version, taken from his own shorthand notes made while he was interpreting, Chamberlain did say that, but added that "he could state personally that he recognized the principle of the detachment of the Sudeten areas . . . He wished to return to England to report to the Government and secure their approval of his personal attitude."
From this surrender at Berchtesgaden, all else ensued.
That it came as no surprise to the Germans is obvious. At the very moment of the Berchtesgaden meeting Henlein was penning a secret letter to Hitler from Eger, dated September 15, just before he fled across the border to Germany:
MY FUEHRER: I informed the British [Runciman] delegation yesterday that the basis for further negotiations could . . . only be the achievement of a union with the Reich.
It is probable that Chamberlain will propose such a union.
William L. Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, Pg. 384-386
"Hitler had for some time been convinced that neither France nor Britain would fight for Czechoslovakia. On May 28 he called a meeting of his principal advisers and gave instructions for the preparations to attack Czechoslovakia.
"His service advisers, however did not share unanimously his overwhelming confidence. The German generals could not be persuaded, considering the still enormous preponderance of Allied strength except in the air, that France and Britain would submit to the Fuehrer's challenge.
"To break the Czech Army and pierce or turn the Bohemian fortress line would require practically the whole of thirty-five divisions. The German Chiefs of Staff informed Hitler that the Czech Army must be considered efficient and up to date in arms and equipment.
"The fortifications of the West Wall or Siegfried Line, though already in existence as field works, were far from completed: and at the moment of attacking the Czechs only five effective and eight Reserve divisions would be available to protect the whole of Germany's western frontier against the French Army, which could mobilize a hundred divisions.
"The generals were aghast at running such risks, when by waiting a few years the German Army would again be master."
On September 10, the French foreign minister, M. Bonnet, asks the British ambassador in Paris: what if Hitler invades Czechoslovakia? The formal British government response of September 12 is noncommittal:
"...So far therefore as I am in a position to give any answer at this stage to M. Bonnet's question, it would have to be that while His majesty's Government would never allow the security of France to be threatened, they are unable to make precise statements..." etc., etc.
Writes Churchill:
"Upon the statement that "His Majesty's Government would never allow the security of France to be threatened" the French asked what aid they could expect if it were. The reply from London was, according to Bonnet, two divisions, not motorized, and one hundred and fifty aeroplanes during the first six months of the war.
"If M. Bonnet was seeking for an excuse for leaving the Czechs to their fate, it must be admitted that his search had met with some success."