Soviet Moles in the CIA, Part 1 and 2 (How the Soviets duped US into thinking we won the Cold War)

The Committee for State Security (KGB) has always been the foundation of the Soviet police state. It has kept the borders tightly sealed against escape, maintained thousands of concentration camps, and actively spied on the Soviet population at home while arming terrorists and operating sophisticated spy networks abroad. The Communists have depended on the KGB for their hold on power.

Thus the "death" of Soviet Communism in 1991 should have ended the KGB. Among other consequences, Soviet espionage against the United States should have collapsed with the "end" of the Cold War. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), anticipating this change, has already diverted hundreds of its officers from counterintelligence against Soviet agents into the war on drugs and other campaigns.1

Instead, the opposite has happened. Immediately before resigning, Mikhail Gorbachev increased the KGB's budget by 20%.2 Since Boris Yeltsin came to power, the KGB's foreign section has been renamed the Federal Intelligence Service (SVR in Russian), and its operations have been expanded yet again. One news report admitted that "Russian President Boris Yeltsin has cultivated the former KGB and even strengthened its authority," while according to another source, "Russian spy operations against the US have shown little decline following the collapse of the former USSR. Western intelligence agencies report that Russian spying is on the rise around the world."3 Indeed, the FBI is now reporting a startling rise in the number of Soviet agents operating in the US.4

Given the atmosphere of wishful thinking created by the news media, it is no wonder that Americans were taken by such surprise on February 21, 1994, when Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) officer Aldrich Ames was arrested as a Soviet spy. But the Ames case is only the tip of the iceberg. Western intelligence agencies, including the CIA, are now so heavily infiltrated as to render them virtually useless against Soviet aggression. Our own intelligence agencies, in fact, are lulling the West to sleep by reassuring us that Soviet Communism is probably dead.

The news media has largely downplayed the damage caused by Ames, as well as the growing evidence of a much larger Soviet network inside Western intelligence circles.

Ames was a major figure in the CIA. He joined the agency in 1962 and spent the next two decades gradually working his way up the ranks. By 1985 he became chief of counterintelligence for the Soviet Bloc Division--an incredibly sensitive position, giving him authority over the debriefing of defectors from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

During the next six years, serious problems developed. At least ten, and possibly dozens, of CIA intelligence operations failed; covert foreign contacts "suddenly stopped cooperating"; and at least eight CIA agents were uncovered and assassinated, as were two FBI agents.5 By 1990, the CIA's Counterintelligence Center finally noticed that Ames was paying cash for a home and car too expensive for his salary, and that he had been involved with some of the agency's recent disasters. The Center issued a memo to the Office of Security, requesting an investigation. The memo was ignored.6

The CIA, meanwhile, was recruiting members of the Stasi (the East German secret police) to act as spies for the United States. But in 1991, the CIA and FBI discovered that all of these "spies" had been double agents--in other words, they were secretly working for the Stasi, passing disinformation to the CIA. Someone inside the CIA must have betrayed these operations to the enemy.

The ensuing investigation found about twenty suspects. One was Aldrich Ames, who had worked with some of the Stasi contacts. Ames was given a polygraph lie-detector test, or "fluttered." Yet despite results that FBI officials now admit were suspicious, and despite the 1990 memo, Ames was cleared.7

And promoted. Ames was now transferred to the "Black Sea Counter-drug Offensive," a small but growing CIA operation inside the "former" Soviet Union. Recent evidence shows that this project was, in part, a cover for teams of the CIA and US Special Forces who were training elite military units under Eduard Shevardnadze, the Communist dictator of Soviet Georgia. Merely one month after Ames arrived in Soviet Georgia in 1993, CIA agent Fred Woodruff was mysteriously assassinated--receiving a bullet in the head while being driven on a remote road outside the city of Tbilisi.

British intelligence analyst Christopher Story has revealed that Soviet Georgia is now a major route for shipment of morphine and other drugs into Europe. During his involvement in the "Counter-drug" project, Ames began receiving millions of dollars from the Soviets, leading to speculation that he may have also helped the Communists set up their drug-smuggling operation. Aldrich's wife, Maria del Rosario Ames, was later arrested along with her husband for helping him in his espionage; she was Colombian, a possible link to the drug cartels.8

During 1993, the FBI finally noticed that Aldrich Ames had been making unauthorized trips to Colombia and Venezuela, had maintained contacts with Soviet KGB officers in the United States and other countries without informing the CIA, had illegally collected large numbers of classified CIA documents in his office and home, and was receiving millions of dollars from unknown sources. Finally, the FBI opened an investigation under the code name NIGHTMOVER, leading to Ames' arrest this year.

Ames confessed to being a Soviet spy, and was convicted. But the real story is far more ominous. Ames was only one of dozens of suspected spies in the CIA's Soviet Bloc Division; indeed, he could not have single-handedly betrayed all of the CIA projects that failed. More importantly, the FBI revealed that Ames had been given many CIA documents from operations well outside his authority, meaning that other spies must have worked with him.9

Although the CIA is refusing to look for more spies, several shocking incidents over the past 40 years have proven the agency is heavily infiltrated by Soviet moles.

Pentration of the CIA is certainly not a new Soviet goal. The Communists found their best opportunity at the time the CIA was first created--during World War II, when the new agency was known as the Office of Strategic Services (OSS).

Nathaniel Weyl, who broke with the Communist Party, USA, wrote that "In the Office of Strategic Services... employment of pro-Communists was approved at very high levels provided that they were suited for specific jobs."10 As it turned out, OSS director General William "Wild Bill" Donovan had systematically recruited his OSS personnel directly from Communist Party membership.

Nor was Donovan shy about admitting this. When confronted by the FBI with clear evidence of Communist agents in the OSS, Donovan boasted, "I know they're Communists; that's why I hired them."11

When the OSS became the CIA in 1947, the original personnel were largely retained, Communists and all. By 1952, CIA director Walter Bedell Smith publicly confirmed that hidden Communist agents were working inside his agency.12

Since no one in the Executive branch seemed to be interested in rooting out these spies, Congress began to take an interest. Joseph McCarthy's subcommittee specifically raised the idea of a formal investigation, as later described by legal advisor Roy Cohn:

“One desired investigation that never got started was that of the Central Intelligence Agency, headed by Allen W. Dulles. Our staff had been accumulating extensive data about its operations and McCarthy was convinced that an inquiry was overdue.

Our files contained allegations gathered from various sources indicating that the CIA had unwittingly hired a large number of double agents-individuals who, although working for the CIA, were actually Communist agents whose mission was to plant inaccurate data....

...although we spent far more for intelligence than other countries, the quality of the information we were receiving was so poor that at times the CIA found out what was happening only when it read the newspapers....

When the news broke out that McCarthy was contemplating an inquiry into the CIA, consternation reigned at 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue [the White House]. Vice-President Nixon was assigned to the delicate job of blocking it.”13

Block it Nixon did, and no outside investigation of spies in the CIA has ever been held. The consequences were obvious. Even the Eisenhower administration was forced to admit in 1954 that CIA intelligence measures against the Soviet Bloc had been a dismal failure.14 Since the end of World War II and continuing to this day, the United States has never been able to infiltrate the KGB or recruit double agents of any significance.

But the final proof of massive Soviet penetration emerged during the 1960s, with the spectacular defection of the highest-level KGB officer ever to reach the West.

Anatoliy Golitsyn, a Ukrainian born in 1926, joined the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1945 as he prepared to become a military officer. He began several years of training in intelligence and acquired a position in the KGB by 1948. By the early 1950s, he had risen to an important enough position to co-author a plan for restructuring Soviet intelligence, which brought him into direct contact with Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin and other top officials.

Four years of study at the KGB Institute in Moscow brought Golitsyn closer to the inner circle of Communist power during the late 1950s. He then worked until 1960 as a top analyst for the KGB in its Moscow headquarters, ultimately reaching the rank of major.

Golitsyn was one of the youngest officers ever promoted to such a high position, and the discovery of the KGB's innermost secrets rapidly disillusioned him. He managed to have himself reassigned to Finland with his wife and daughter in 1961. Three days before Christmas, he suddenly presented himself at the US embassy to announce his defection. Within 72 hours, the US Air Force evacuated Golitsyn and his family to Frankfurt, West Germany, just before he had to return to Moscow. After lie-detector tests showed he was telling the truth, he was transferred to the United States for a full debriefing.

Golitsyn's shocking information plunged the CIA, and other Western intelligence services, into a state of turmoil for over a decade. He revealed that the KGB placed the bulk of its resources not on stealing secrets, as the West commonly believed, but on deceiving and manipulating Western nations into gradually surrendering to Communism. Every time our intelligence experts would exploit some source of information from the Soviet Union, the KGB would "poison" that source with disinformation. By sending false defectors who were secretly working for the KGB, or by leaking falsified documents, or by organizing phony opposition movements inside the Soviet Bloc, the KGB could influence Western policymaking with seemingly reliable information. Using such techniques, the Communists could make the West believe that the Soviet and Chinese Communists were at war with one another. Or that Communism had "died."

The Golitsyn revelations shook the CIA to the core. Much of the intelligence being gathered could no longer be trusted; apparent successes in stealing Soviet secrets were actually Communist victories in deceiving us. Many CIA officials became furious with Golitsyn, and refused to listen.

To carry out such a huge but delicate operation, the Soviets needed spies in Western intelligence agencies for feedback. These moles would tell the KGB whether the disinformation was being believed, allowing the Soviets to alter the deception to give it more plausibility.15

Because of his former access to KGB intelligence, Golitsyn was able to prove the extent to which Soviet moles had infiltrated sensitive positions. For example, through his ability to recognize a wide array of top-secret NATO documents, he showed that the KGB had agents planted throughout the NATO command structure. His evidence was further confirmed in 1967 by the testimony of Giorgio Rinaldi, an Italian who admitted to being involved with some 300 NATO officers in a massive Soviet spy network--one that was never uncovered or removed.16 Recent years have seen further confirmation of Golitsyn's allegations. On November 17, 1994, former NATO official Rainer Rupp was convicted in a German court for his role as a Soviet spy. Operating under the KGB code name TOPAZ during the 1970s and 1980s, Rupp and his wife (code-named TURQUOISE) had passed "strategies, codes and military preparedness plans" from NATO headquarters to the East German secret police, who transferred the secrets to the KGB.17

Golitsyn also had knowledge of secrets from the highest levels of the French government, and said the information had come from a Soviet spy ring operating under the code name SAPPHIRE. His evidence implicated several members of French Intelligence (SDECE), including the chief of counterintelligence and President Charles de Gaulle's own intelligence advisor. Rather than investigating and stopping the ring, however, the French government and SDECE moved to cover up the evidence. Days after one of the spies was identified, he was murdered-apparently to protect the rest of the spy ring.

According to Golitsyn, Soviet control over the SDECE was so complete that the French agency was already functioning as a virtual arm of the KGB. Based on reports he had seen before defecting, he predicted that the KGB would soon use the SDECE as a front for spying on American nuclear deployment. French officer Philippe de Vosjoli, who was liaison between the SDECE and the CIA, disbelieved Golitsyn-until a few months later, when he received precisely such an order to set up a spy ring to monitor US nuclear facilities. De Vosjoli refused to obey the order and, learning that he was targeted for assassination upon his return to France, defected to the United States.18 The SDECE subsequently carried out the operation against the US under the code name BIG BEN.19

The information supplied by Golitsyn also revealed a powerful spy ring of five Soviet agents operating at the highest levels of the British Ministry of Intelligence. Three had already been exposed, and a fourth-Kim Philby-was uncovered in subsequent years. Based on additional evidence provided by Golitsyn, some members of the British MI5 conducted an investigation which concluded that the "fifth man" of the Soviet ring was none other than Sir Roger Hollis, the director of MI5. An MI6 officer, Stephen de Mowbray, tried to warn the prime minister, but was fired. Hollis himself was never fully investigated. Golitsyn's evidence also pointed to at least two close advisors to Prime Minister Harold Wilson as being Soviet agents, but MI5 blocked an investigation.20

Golitsyn was able to show Soviet infiltration in the intelligence services of West Germany, Austria, Canada, Australia, and others. But his most important spy revelations concerned infiltration of the CIA itself. He knew of one mole code-named SASHA; months of investigation finally uncovered a lower-level Soviet spy. But the stolen secrets Golitsyn had seen while in Moscow came from much higher sources, and could not have come from a single agent. To test Golitsyn's claim that many moles had burrowed into the highest levels of the CIA, the Counterintelligence Division issued "marked cards"-tiny leaks of information that can be traced. Using this method, the Office of Security and the Counterintelligence Division proved the information was being leaked from within the Soviet Bloc Division, and by multiple spies.21

The next logical step was to conduct investigations to identify the spies. But, as we shall review in part II of this analysis, those probes were blocked--with disastrous results.

The CIA, and virtually all of Western intelligence, has been thoroughly compromised by networks of Soviet spies. Nor has the "death" of Soviet Communism changed anything. Aldrich Ames, having worked for years as an agent of the KGB, in 1991 made an effortless transition to the renamed KGB (SVR) without any break in his activities.22 So, too, have hundreds of thousands of other Soviet agents throughout the world, whose activities are now sharply increasing.

In Part II: The secret "inner" KGB, CIA intelligence disasters, suppression of key evidence, and the CIA campaign to discredit Golitsyn.

When KGB Major Anatoliy Golitsyn defected to the United States in 1961, he brought a message that was most unwelcome. Not only did he prove the existence of large networks of Soviet spies operating in all Western intelligence agencies, but he also showed that the Soviets were using our own intelligence apparatus against us. While the CIA and other services were chasing after Soviet state secrets, the KGB was carefully leaking "secrets" that were carefully concocted disinformation. According to Golitsyn, the Communists placed higher priority on deceiving the West into gradual surrender than on protecting their own secrets. In other words, the Soviets were not playing the "Cold War game"; they were fighting to win.

To carry out a successful long-term deception, as Golitsyn explained, the Soviets had to restructure the KGB itself. After all, any disinformation scheme would inevitably be exposed through the very process of delivering the deception. A percentage of those KGB agents in contact with Western agents would defect or otherwise betray the plan. To prevent this from happening, the Soviets had to make sure that only a tiny core of personnel--those not in contact with the West--would actually know the plan. The rest of the KGB would implement the strategy without understanding it.

Golitsyn had not only observed the KGB restructuring first-hand, he had actually participated in it. The process had begun in 1953 upon the death of dictator Joseph Stalin, whose violent purging of fellow Communists had left behind a leadership vacuum. A power struggle ensued, threatening to destabilize the entire Communist system. Stalin's successors quickly decided to reinstitute V. I. Lenin's concept of "democratic centralism," in which no single individual holds the fulcrum of power. If the Communists could be re-united under an all-powerful central committee, the Communist Bloc could launch a long-term offensive against the West.

Party leader Nikita Khrushchev decisively beat all opposing factions in 1957, and immediately began building democratic centralism. Factional infighting was ended, and coordination between Communist governments was re-established. Suddenly the Soviet leadership turned its attentions toward creating a new strategic deception policy. The top intelligence officials began studying the writings of Lenin and ancient Chinese strategist Sun Tzu.

Quickly the entire Communist structure in the Soviet Union was rebuilt, though in secret. From 1958 to 1960, the Communist Party Central Committee created such new agencies as the Department of Foreign Policy and the Department of Active Operations to coordinate international deception. The Committee of Information, which carried out operation to influence Western political leaders, was shifted to the authority of the Central Committee. And the KGB was put under a new chairman, Aleksander Shelepin.

The KGB underwent the largest and most important rearrangement. Not only did its counterintelligence directorate expand, but a special top-secret new "inner level" was created to coordinate strategic deception. Known as Department D, it was immediately staffed with some fifty or sixty intelligence specialists, all highly experienced and trusted officers of the Soviet secret police. These men had special access to the highest state secrets, and were given the authority to coordinate the most powerful agencies of the Soviet government. Department D was designed to be the high command of the Communist disinformation campaign.

This "inner" KGB has remained so secret that no Soviet defector, other than Golitsyn, has known of its existence. Golitsyn himself was not a member of it, but he was intimately involved in creating it. In 1952 to 1953, he had been appointed to a small team of experts who planned the restructuring of the KGB; Golitsyn's plan was adopted by Shelepin in 1959, by which time the 32-year-old Golitsyn was studying at the KGB Institute in Moscow--and therefore was privy to the details of the KGB reorganization. Later that year, Golitsyn helped implement the deception strategy as a new senior analyst in the KGB's Information Department.

Golitsyn was astonishingly young for his high position, a result of his intellectual acumen. Had the Soviets been more careful, they would not have promoted him so soon, for by 1956 the young Golitsyn had become thoroughly disillusioned with Communism. The launching of the new deception strategy finally convinced him he had to defect to warn the West, and he spent the next few years carefully gathering information that would expose the Communist plans.

Using his position, Golitsyn managed to be assigned with his wife and daughter to the Soviet embassy in Finland. In December 1961, when he received orders to return to Moscow, he realized he had run out of time. He took his family and the few documents he could carry, and defected to the United States embassy. Thus began the controversy that would eventually split the CIA.1

Golitsyn's message was not popular within the CIA. Although he proved himself by helping expose Soviet spy rings in the highest levels of Western intelligence services [see Part I in the Nov. 1994 issue-Eds.], he was telling the CIA that much of its hard-earned intelligence data was merely disinformation concocted by the KGB's Department D. He also shattered all hopes that Communism might disintegrate spontaneously. According to Golitsyn, the Soviet reorganization after Stalin had destroyed all opposition to the regime while permanently healing all factions, splits, and power struggles within the government. Evidence of infighting among the Communists, of popular resistance against Communism, or even of "democratization" in Communist Bloc nations, was an illusion being created by the KGB.

Golitsyn told his CIA debriefers that the Soviets, knowing that Western agencies would not believe propaganda published in the official Soviet news media, used more clever methods to deliver disinformation. The Soviets might allow rumors to "slip" during off-the-record conversations with Western political leaders. Or they might leak special documents or communiques, allowing Western intelligence officers to believe they had stolen it without Soviet knowledge. Or they might pay phony "dissidents" or create illusory "opposition movements" behind the iron curtain, who would pass along "information" that would seem more credible.

But most startlingly of all, Golitsyn revealed that the Soviets understood well the Western dependence on KGB defectors. Department D played on this vulnerability by dispatching phony defectors--double agents who would pretend to expose KGB "secrets" that would now be wholly accepted by gullible Western intelligence services. Meanwhile, KGB spies inside the CIA or other agencies would quietly monitor Western reactions to specific items of disinformation, thus completing the "feedback loop" for the Soviets.

Thus deception could not only be engineered on a grand scale, but could even be fine-tuned for maximum believability.

None of this was idle speculation. In January of 1962, days after escaping to the West, Golitsyn predicted that his own defection would force the Soviets to send false defectors from the KGB and the GRU (military intelligence) to contradict his information.

Within weeks, he was already proved correct. The KGB dispatched a "diplomat" who tried to defect to the CIA in Paris, followed by a similar attempt at the American embassy in Moscow. The Soviets bungled both efforts. Finally two Soviet agents working at the United Nations--one from the GRU, the other from the KGB--almost simultaneously contacted the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and offered to leak Soviet secrets. The FBI assigned them the codenames TOP HAT and FEDORA; the CIA named them SCOTCH and BOURBON. In June yet another such officer, this time from the KGB's Second Chief Directorate, approached the CIA in Switzerland and also began providing secrets. His name was Yuri Nosenko; he was labeled AE/FOXTROT in CIA files (he subsequently defected to the United States in early 1964).2

"Suddenly, in the spring of 1962, the CIA was awash with penetrations of Soviet intelligence--more at one time than during its entire history," wrote journalist David C. Martin years later.3

And, exactly as Golitsyn had predicted, all three "defectors" began providing information that directly contradicted his own. Where Golitsyn had warned of high-level penetrations of the CIA by Soviet spies, Nosenko instead blamed the leaks of information on a low-level code clerk in the US embassy. Golitsyn's charge that Soviet moles had betrayed CIA spy Petr Popov was also contradicted by Nosenko, who claimed that the Soviets had traced Popov's handler merely by spraying an invisible chemical tracer on his shoes. Eerily, TOP HAT and FEDORA were coincidentally able to confirm Nosenko's key allegations. All three confirmed Golitsyn's less important information, but directly contradicted his evidence of top moles in the CIA.4

If Nosenko, TOP HAT, and FEDORA were right, then the Soviets had failed to infiltrate the CIA, and could not pull off sophisticated deception campaigns. If Golitsyn was right, the CIA was already dominated by the KGB, and these other "defectors" were themselves part of the disinformation. CIA officials rapidly polarized into two warring camps on this issue, precipitating a fight that would tear the agency apart for the next decade.

Into the fray stepped James Jesus Angleton, the venerated chief of the CIA's Counterintelligence Division. A brilliant spymaster with a penchant for detecting disinformation, he immediately recognized in Golitsyn a profound source of intelligence. And when Nosenko made his appearance to discredit Golitsyn, Angleton smelled a rat.

Angleton persuaded key members of the Soviet Bloc Division, the branch of the CIA responsible for handling defectors, that Nosenko was a phony defector. By 1963, Angleton had Golitsyn transferred to his authority, and together the two men launched a series of investigations into Nosenko and other suspect defectors, as well as searching for Soviet spies in the CIA.

It was not long before Nosenko's story began falling apart. Although he claimed to be a lieutenant colonel in the KGB with access to high-level secrets, he could not remember important details of his operations. Under interrogation, he admitted the contradiction but then began changing his story repeatedly. When intelligence experts determined that Nosenko could not have held the rank of lieutenant colonel, he admitted having merely been a captain; when confronted with evidence that he had not, as previously claimed, received a particular communication from Moscow, Nosenko again admitted lying. Further interrogation caused him to admit having lied about numerous facts, including his reason for defecting in the first place.

More disturbingly, however, the documents Nosenko had brought from the Soviet Union had themselves been fabricated to back up his false identity. This could mean only one thing: the KGB itself had doctored the items as part of a deception.5

TOP HAT and FEDORA were also caught participating in the game. FBI surveillance convinced Assistant Director William C. Sullivan that both "defectors" were false, although he was unable to persuade his boss, J. Edgar Hoover, who angrily refused to believe that the Soviets had deceived the FBI. Furthermore, FEDORA independently "confirmed" Nosenko's lies about his rank and communications--again proving KGB involvement. The final evidence surfaced in 1978, when the FBI discovered that the KGB had already long known about FEDORA's leaking of information to the West. FEDORA returned to Moscow-and was enthusiastically promoted by the KGB! TOP HAT was exposed in a similar way.

In more recent years, the Soviet embassy itself has recommended Nosenko as a source of accurate information for at least one American journalist.6

The Soviets did not, of course, stop with these double agents. In 1966, the KGB dispatched yet another supposedly important defector, Igor Kochnov. Codenamed KITTY HAWK by the CIA, Kochnov also insisted that the Soviets had no spies in the CIA or FBI, while he again tried to "confirm" the claims of Nosenko. Once Angleton identified KITTY HAWK as a phony defector, the Soviet returned to Moscow and provided no more "information."7

Oleg Gordievsky, an officer in the KGB's First Chief Directorate, joined this growing list of double agents in 1974, when he first began leaking secrets to England's MI6. In 1985, he defected to the West under suspicious circumstances. Although supposedly arrested by the KGB on suspicion of spying for England, he was not executed. "A generation earlier he would simply have been liquidated," writes Gordievsky (with a co-author) of himself. "Nowadays the KGB had to have evidence."8 Starting with this obvious lie, Gordievsky's story becomes even more absurd. Despite his arrest for treason, he claims the KGB nevertheless allowed him enough freedom that he could repeatedly make contact with British agents and even escape the Soviet Union itself--on foot.9 To top it all off, his family was subsequently released from the Soviet Union.10

Unlike Golitsyn, who still remains under deep cover to prevent assassination by the Soviets, Gordievsky maintains a high-profile life in London. Gordievsky insists that the KGB has had no spies in British intelligence since 1961, and ridicules former MI5 officer Peter Wright for fingering over 200 suspects--including former MI5 director Sir Roger Hollis--as a result of investigations under project FLUENCY. Gordievsky also bitterly denies Golitsyn's revelation of the existence of Department D in the KGB, while he staunchly defends Nosenko as a genuine defector. Gordievsky has advised such prominent individuals as Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and Presidents Ronald Reagan and George Bush, and his 1990 book, KGB: The Inside Story, has been published widely.11

Desperate to cover up the Golitsyn revelations at any cost, and unable to assassinate him, the Soviets have adopted a saturation approach to drown out his information with a torrent of disinformation. Since 1962, the Soviets have sent at least 15 "defectors" to contradict Golitsyn and support Nosenko, including those listed above. The staggering quantity of such deception tends to obscure the paradoxes in each defector's story.

Yet despite all the clear evidence of a vast Soviet deception program using false defectors, and despite growing evidence of Soviet spies in the highest ranks of the CIA, Angleton and Golitsyn ultimately lost the struggle to save the agency.

Virtually every investigation Angleton initiated was either blocked, terminated, or undermined. He was never allowed to uncover a single major spy or false defector. Angry CIA officers in every department frantically derailed his probes, and howled protests every time he questioned the reliability of a defector. Gradually Angleton's enemies closed ranks to destroy him.

The purge began in 1969, on orders from above, by phasing out Golitsyn's advisory relationship with the CIA. President Richard Nixon, who in the early 1950s had blocked an investigation by Senator Joseph McCarthy of Communist spies in the CIA [See Part I-Eds.], wanted nothing to interfere with his program of detente.12

Then came William E. Colby, who in 1973 was promoted to Executive Comptroller, the number three position in the CIA. His career had certainly raised eyebrows. He had come from the CIA's covert action wing in Vietnam, rather than involvement in true intelligence work. As chief of the CIA's Rome station in the 1950s, Colby had fought hard to provide covert CIA support to Communist front organizations in Italy--over Angleton's vigorous opposition. During the Vietnam War, Colby vetoed Angleton's plan to use counterintelligence to weed out Communist infiltrators in the South Vietnamese government, thus ensuring that hundreds of Communists would continue to paralyze the war effort from within. Most suspiciously of all, Colby met several times with a Soviet GRU agent in Vietnam--without notifying the CIA. Colby even managed to shut down a CIA program to investigate Communists in American labor unions. Although CIA officials constantly overlooked Colby's actions and promoted him, the Counterintelligence Division had long suspected Colby of being a Soviet mole.13

In January of 1973, Colby issued a new directive to all CIA stations worldwide. These orders permanently changed the operational methods of the CIA, effectively overturning every warning Golitsyn and Angleton had ever given. Any information provided by defectors was henceforth automatically to be accepted, so long as it was basically consistent with the majority of other defectors' stories. Thus Nosenko, FEDORA, TOP HAT, and many other phony defectors were legitimized. The new policy assumed that the Soviets do not send false defectors, and that the Soviets are only interested in stealing secrets, not in carrying out strategic deception. Even the word "disinformation" was redefined as Soviet attempts to place propaganda in the Western news media, not as attempts to deceive intelligence agencies. And all searches for Soviet moles were ended.

In the wake of the 1974 Watergate scandal, Colby became Director of the CIA. Within months, he had carefully severed Angleton's connections in the intelligence world, mobilized most of the agency's personnel in a united front against Angleton, and then fired him. All of Angleton's top staffers departed with him. To make matters worse, Nosenko himself was officially rehabilitated--and brought in as a consultant to help train the new counterintelligence staff. The new CIA policy remains in effect today.14

In the years since the purge of Angleton and Golitsyn, the CIA has been wracked with scandals of Soviet spies and false defectors. The recent case of Soviet mole Aldrich Ames was preceded in the 1970s by William P. Campiles, who gave the Soviets an extremely sensitive spy satellite manual, and in the 1980s by Edward Lee Howard. Presumably these represent merely the tiny tip of the iceberg.

The CIA still refuses to admit that any Soviet "defectors" may be phony, but one case in particular turned into a public relations disaster for the agency. Vitaliy Yurchenko, who had held such top positions as chief of the KGB's counterintelligence department, suddenly defected to the United States in July of 1985. Among other operations against the US, he had been in charge of sending "dangles"--Soviet double agents who would approach the FBI and offer "secrets" so as to mislead American intelligence gathering. One of Yurchenko's CIA debriefers was none other than Aldrich Ames, who would not be discovered as a Soviet spy for another nine years.

Like Nosenko two decades earlier, Yurchenko insisted that the Soviets had no spies inside the CIA. Indeed, he specifically backed up Nosenko as being a genuine defector, and he told the CIA that the Soviets had blown Western spy operations using invisible chemical tracers and ex-agents of the CIA. Officials at the agency, including Director William Casey, enthusiastically promoted Yurchenko to the news media and Congress.

But three months after Yurchenko's defection, he surprised his handlers by redefecting to the Soviets, who welcomed and promoted him. To embarrass the CIA, Yurchenko held a press conference for American reporters, at which he alleged that the CIA had kidnapped and drugged him. In other words, the Soviets were openly laughing at the CIA's gullibility.

Unwilling to admit that Golitsyn and Angleton might have been right in the first place, the CIA planted a phony story in the news media that Yurchenko had been captured and shot by the Soviets; shortly thereafter, Yurchenko appeared live on Soviet television to refute the charge. Nevertheless, to this day the CIA blindly insists that, somehow, Yurchenko really had been a genuine defector. After all, CIA policy dictates that the Soviets do not send false defectors.15

So desperate has the CIA been to cover up Soviet deception operations from the public that the agency has resorted to a full smear campaign against Golitsyn and the now-deceased Angleton. In his 1984 book, New Lies For Old, Golitsyn drew on his personal knowledge from within the KGB to predict that Department D would orchestrate the "death" of Communism, starting no later than 1989. The Berlin Wall would be torn down, Solidarity would be allowed to achieve power in Polish elections, the Soviet Union would break up, and a crisis would be manufactured in Yugoslavia. Point for point, Golitsyn predicted the events of Europe since 1989 with chilling accuracy, and warned that the Soviets would be using the deception to prepare for a takeover of Western Europe.

As if to neutralize Golitsyn's warnings, the CIA has recently planted numerous stories in the media to discredit him. Articles in major national news magazines and a special documentary on PBS in 1990 have been followed by such books as Tom Mangold's Cold Warrior and David Wise's Molehunt, both books savagely attacking Angleton and Golitsyn as "paranoid cold warriors." Both Mangold and Wise masquerade as independent journalists, but both acknowledge that the information for their books came directly from large numbers of helpful CIA officials. As author Edward Jay Epstein has pointed out, the CIA frequently plants its own books in the public domain under false cover. This is done by cultivating certain authors, providing them complete manuscripts (or at least sufficient material to write books), and using connections in the publishing industry to arrange for the books' distribution and promotion by major companies. This method allows the CIA to publish viewpoints that appear to come from independent sources.16

Both the Mangold and Wise books present the Golitsyn/Nosenko debate in a severely lopsided way. Mangold's book even goes so far as to ignore completely Golitsyn's accurate predictions of "change" in Eastern Europe, declaring brazenly that "History has dealt harshly with Anatoliy Golitsyn the prophet.... As a crystal-ball gazer, Golitsyn has been unimpressive." Mangold continues by carefully skipping over Golitsyn's already-fulfilled predictions, quoting a few sentences out of context so as to change their meaning altogether.17

But in light of the evidence that the CIA is riddled with Communist spies, it is little wonder the agency strains so hard to convince Americans that Communism is truly "dead."

1 Story, C., Soviet Analyst 22:7-8, March 1994, p. 20. 2 McAlvany, D., McAlvany Intelligence Advisor, Sept./Oct. 1991, p. 22. 3 US News & World Report, Feb. 8, 1993, and Washington Times, Nov. 15, 1992, as quoted in McAlvany Intelligence Advisor, Jan. 1994, pp. 20-22. 4 Ibid., p. 22; Sinai, R., Associated Press, "Cold War over? Not for spies," Contra Costa Times, 3-5-92, p. B1. 5 Story, C., March 1994, Op cit., p. 3. 6 Pincus, W., Washington Post, "CIA memo warned about Ames 3 years before arrest," SF Chronicle, 8-2-94, p. A6. 7 Pincus, W., Smith, J.R., & Thomas, P., Washington Post, "East German Stasi files pointed to Ames as long-sought mole," SF Chronicle, 3-7-94, p. A9. 8 Story, C., March 1994, Op cit., p. 18; Story, C., Soviet Analyst 22:4, Sept. 1993, pp. 15-16; Story, C., Soviet Analyst 22:3, July 1993, pp. 7-8. 9 Pincus, W., Smith, R.J., & Thomas, P., Op cit. 10 Weyl, N., The Battle Against Disloyalty, Cromwell, New York, 1951, p. 180, as quoted in Smith, R.H., OSS, Univ. of California Press, Berkeley, CA, 1972, p. 10. 11 Smith, R. H., Op cit., p. 11. 12 Burnham, J., The Web of Subversion, Western Islands, Belmont, MA, 1965, p. 182. 13 Cohn, R., McCarthy: The Answer to "Tail Gunner Joe", Manor Books, New York, 1977, pp. 63-64. 14 Martin, D.C., Wilderness of Mirrors, Harper & Row, New York, 1980, p. 62. 15 Epstein, E.J., Deception, Simon & Schuster, New York, 1989, chapter 5. 16 "300 officers bared as red NATO spies," Los Angeles Herald-Examiner, 3-22-67, pp. 1, 10. 17 "Ex-spy jailed for selling NATO secrets to East Bloc," SF Chronicle, 11-18-94, p. A12. 18 Epstein, E.J., Op cit., pp. 65-66, 68-70. 19 Mangold, T., Cold Warrior, Simon & Schuster, New York, 1991, p. 131. 20 Epstein, E.J., Op cit., pp. 71-73, 80-82; Wright, P. with Greengrass, P., Spycatcher, Viking, New York, 1987, passim. 21 Epstein, E.J., Op cit., pp. 75-78. 22 Story, C., March 1994, Op cit., p. 5.

1 The story of Department D is told in Golitsyn, A., New Lies for Old, Dodd, Mead & Co., New York, 1984, esp. chapter 6; see also Epstein, E.J., Deception, Simon & Schuster, New York, 1989, esp. chapter 5. 2 Martin, D.C., Wilderness of Mirrors, Harper & Row, New York, 1980, pp. 110-114; Mangold, T., Cold Warrior, Simon & Schuster, New York, 1991, pp. 410-411; Epstein, Op cit., pp. 74-75. 3 Martin, Op cit., p. 114. 4 Ibid., pp. 112-114; Epstein, Op cit., pp. 47-49, 74-75. 5 Martin, Op cit., pp. 161-162, 164, 172-174; Epstein, Op cit., p. 60; Mangold, Op cit., pp. 163, 397. 6 Epstein, Op cit., pp. 13, 48-49, 60, 96; Martin, Op cit., pp. 161-162; Mangold, Op cit., p. 411. 7 Martin, Op cit., pp. 191-192; Mangold, Op cit., pp. 409-410. 8 Andrew, C. & Gordievsky, O., KGB: The Inside Story, Harper Collins, New York, 1990, p. 13. 9 Ibid., pp. 8-16. 10 Story, C., Soviet Analyst, vol. 22:7-8, March 1994, p. 15. 11 Andrew & Gordievsky, Op cit., pp. 7-8; Mangold, Op cit., pp. 111, 204; Story, Op cit., p. 12. 12 Epstein, Op cit., p. 98. 13 Ibid., pp. 98, 100; Martin, Op cit., pp. 183-184, 217; Mangold, Op cit., pp. 309-315; Epstein, E.J., Legend, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1978, pp. 272, 329. 14 Epstein, Deception, Op cit., pp. 90-91, 100-101, 196-199; Epstein, Legend, Op cit., p. 273; Mangold, Op cit., pp. 205-206, 313-317. 15 Epstein, Deception, Op cit., pp. 199-214; Story, Op cit., p. 24; Mangold, Op cit., p. 402. 16 Mangold, Op cit.; Wise, D., Molehunt, Random House, New York, 1992; Epstein, Deception, Op cit., pp. 12-20. 17 Mangold, Op cit., pp. 355-356.

Poohbah, you crack me up. You haven't added one bit of new information to this thread.

Pot, kettle, black. This stuff is almost a decade old!

You have never proved a single one of your so-called "counterarguments."

You haven't proven a single one of your arguments to begin with. Arm-waving with self-referential documents is not proof.

Everything I have posted is thoroghly footnoted so anyone can check the validity of ISWR's sources and come to their own conclusions.

Footnoting does not prove validity. Many of the footnotes are references to other documents produced by ISWR, and those documents in turn refer to other documents prepared by ISWR. In short, these articles are self-referential.

If, as the articles I posted clearly demonstrate, the Soviet Union really did fake its own collapse, it wouldn't matter if the article was published in 1994 or 2004.

That is the problem: the articles do not clearly demonstrate that.

You haven't clearly demonstrated a damn thing. Please do so before doing anything else.

Are you maintaining that the Soviets originally faked their own demise and then somehow lost control and collapsed for real after 1994?

I am asking you to prove your arguments. You have refused to do so. When pressed for additional information, you have provided one non-ISWR article...from a source of legendary non-credibility.

Moreover, Anatoly Golisyn predicted almost all of the changes in the "former" Soviet Union nearly 10 years before the events themselves (94% percent of them according to author Mark Riebling)

When a man like Golitsyn makes Kerryesque predictions (first one thing, then the opposite), he's going to be right a fair amount; all you have to do is ignore where he was wrong.

And perceptive observers of the USSR were few and far-between in the 1980s, being mostly recruited from an academia that regarded the USSR as a great, noble, and successful experiment.

I am unsurprised that Golitsyn got the events somewhat correct, although he got the underlying causes absolutely wrong. I knew people who'd been assigned to the embassy in Moscow in the 1970s and early 1980s (I was in the Marine Corps during the 1980s), and they openly wondered how in the hell the USSR kept itself from imploding. Answer: it didn't, in the long run.

Every other Soviet analyst was completely taken by surprise by the events leading to the USSR's "collapse."

Because they never understood the nature of the Communist system. The factory floor manager lied to the factory manager, who lied to the ministry representative. That much we understood. But we never understood until after things collapsed that the ministry representative lied to everyone above him, and so it went, right up to the Politburo.

So it is you who are coming across devoid of any substance.

You haven't provided anything except a bunch of self-referential articles with theses that are downright silly; the "proof" of the theses is in footnote references to other articles by the same entity.

You asserted; you must prove. You have failed to do so.

Why don't you put forward your version of what happened during the lead up to and after the "collapse" of Soviet Communism, and I promise you I will take your argument apart bit by bit, using open sources, until you realize that your argument has been reduced to the residual puddle it always was. Indeed, if I only proved you wrong on a single point, it would be an infinitely greater accomplishment than anything you have accomplished here. But don't worry, I will destroy your entire argument. There will be nothing left of it when I am finished with you. What do you say, Poohbah, ready to accept the challenge. Put up or shut up.

After you put up or shut up, good sir. Prove your arguments. Extraordinary claims require extraordinary proof. Provide said extraordinary proof, or go elsewhere.

Footnotes from "We Are The Next Target." What is the ratio of self-referential versus no self-referential footnotes? Like I said, you just invent "facts" to deride and mislead.

Footnotes

1 Fritz, S. and Jackson, R.C., "Federal authorities expect additional arrests in trade center bombing." Los Angeles Times, Sat., 3-13-93, p. A16.

2 Goldman, J.J. and Jackson, R.L., "Eight suspects seized in plot to bomb U.N., other N.Y. targets." Los Angeles Times, Fri., 6-25-93, p. A1; Neumeister, L., Associated Press, "U.S. charges sheik with terrorist plots." Orange County Register, Thur., 8-26-93, p. 1.

3 Newsday, "Palestinian reportedly questioned in N.Y. blast." San Francisco Chronicle, Thur., 5-6-93, p. A11.

4 "N.Y. bombing tied to international plot." San Francisco Chronicle, Fri., 7-16-93, p. A12.

5 Turque, B., Waller, D., Cohn, B., and Beachy, L., "An Iranian connection?" Newsweek, 3-22-93, p. 33; Neumeister, Op cit.

6 "N.Y. bombing tied to international plot," Op cit.

7 Reuters, "IRA blast injures 27." San Francisco Chronicle, Wed., 12-2-92, p. A10.

8 "Bomb injures 17 in Northern Ireland." San Francisco Chronicle, Tues., 7-6-93, p. A8.

9 Schmidt, W.E., "Bomb tied to I.R.A., the 8th in 6 days, injures 5 Londoners." New York Times, Tues., 10-13-92, pp. A5-6.

10 "8 people wounded by two bomb blasts in Northern London." New York Times, Fri., 12-11-92, pp. A3, A9.

11 New York Times, "Anti-terrorist roadblocks set up in Central London." San Francisco Chronicle, Tues., 7-6-93, p. A8.

12 Protzman, F., "Head of top West German bank is killed in bombing by terrorists." New York Times, Fri., 12-1-89, p. A1.

13 "German official is fatally shot in Dusseldorf." Wall Street Journal, Tues., 4-2-91, pp. A17, A21; "Berlin city official is killed by letter bomb at his home." New York Times, Fri., 6-14-91, p. A9.

14 "Turkey says Kurd rebels killed 35." San Francisco Chronicle, Wed., 5-26-93, p. A14.

15 Hoffman, D., Washington Post, "Gunmen attack Israeli bus--4 die." San Francisco Chronicle, Fri., 7-2-93, p. A16.

16 Kelly, D., "Egypt tries to suppress fundamentalists." San Francisco Chronicle, Tues., 2-16-93, p. A7.

17 New York Times, "South African group vows more attacks." San Francisco Chronicle, Wed., 12-2-92, p. A12.

18 Shenon, P., New York Times, "Another ambush by Khmer Rouge--13 die on train." San Francisco Chronicle, Fri., 5-7-93, p. A10.

19 de Villamarest, P.F., Histoire secrete des organisations terroristes. Famot-Beauval, 1976; Sterling, C., The Terror Network. Holt, Rinehart and Winston, New York, 1981.

20 Farah, D., Washington Post, "'Terrorist' arsenal uncovered." San Francisco Chronicle, 7-14-93, pp. A1, A15.

21 U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, "Nicaragua Today." Republican Staff Report, August, 1992, 138 pp.

22 Associated Press, "Czech revolution: A secret police plot?" Los Angeles Times, Fri., 6-1-90, p. A10 (about "Czech-Mate: Inside the Revolution," aired on BBC-TV 5-30-90).

23 Ellison, B.J., "Behind the facade." The New American, 5-21-91, pp. 21-30.

24 Micheletti, E. (translated by McColl, A.), "Puppet Revolution," Soldier of Fortune, July, 1990, pp. 48-55.

25 Golitsyn, A., New Lies for Old. Dodd, Mead & Co., New York, 1984, p. 331.

26 McAlvany, D.S., "Russian strategic deception: The 'new' Communist threat." The McAlvany Intelligence Advisor, Jan., 1994, p. 9.

27 See, for example, Ellison, B.J., "Behind the facade," Op cit.; Epstein, E., "Spies who still haven't come in from the cold," (World Insider), San Francisco Chronicle, 3-30-90, p. A25; Epstein, E., "Some spies won't quite their old ways," (World Insider), San Francisco Chronicle, 6-15-90, p. A19; Emerson, S., New York Times Magazine, "Keeping watch on the Stasi machine," San Francisco Chronicle, Wed., 8-15-90, pp. Briefing 1,4,5; Fisher, M., Washington Post, "Spies keep popping up in Germany," San Francisco Chronicle, 10-11-90, pp. A1, A22; Tagliabue, J., "Secret-police scandals outlive East Germany," New York Times, Sun., 10-28-90, International; New York Times, "New links to East German secret police," San Francisco Chronicle, 3-28-91, p. A19; and others.

28 McAlvany, D.S., "Russian strategic deception: The 'new' Communist threat," Op cit., pp. 7-9.

29 Ibid., p. 12.

30 Ibid., p. 14; Klebkinov, P., "Prizewinner's ways," Forbes, 1-7-91.

31 Personal communication with Avraham Shifrin, director of The Research Center for Prisons, Psych-prisons, and Forced-Labor Concentration Camps of the USSR, based in Jerusalem, Israel; Zalman Shoval, former Israeli ambassador to the U.S., confirmed that most Jews still cannot leave the Soviet Union (speech at the University of California, Berkeley, 12-8-92).

32 Sinai, R., Associated Press, "Cold war over? Not for spies," Contra Costa Times, 3-5-92, p. B1; McAlvany, "Russian strategic deception: The 'new' Communist threat," Op cit., pp. 20-22.

33 McAlvany, D.S., "The rebirth of an empire: What is really happening in the Soviet Union," The McAlvany Intelligence Advisor, Sep./Oct. 1991, pp. 18-22; McAlvany, "Russian strategic deception: The 'new' Communist threat," Op cit., pp. 15-18.

34 Cheung, T.M., "China's buying spree: Russia gears up to upgrade Peking's weaponry," Far Eastern Economic Review, 7-8-93, pp. 24-26; Washington Post, "Soviets offer to keep sending Nicaragua aid," San Francisco Chronicle, 2-28-90, p. A13; Collier, R., "Chamorro tries to hold onto Communist aid," San Francisco Chronicle, Wed., 3-7-90, pp. A13, A15; "Czechs rebuff U.S. on Syria arms sale," San Francisco Chronicle, 5-9-91, P. A20; Gordon, M.R., New York Times, "Russians flew N. Korea arms parts to Syria," San Francisco Chronicle, Sun., 12-12-93, p. A15; McAlvany, "The rebirth of an empire: What is really happening in the Soviet Union," Op cit., pp. 21-22; "Islamic fundamentalism: The threat to peace," American Jewish News, Thurs., May 6, 1993, p. 7.

35 "Poland won't allow Red Army through," San Francisco Chronicle, 1-11-91, p. A21; "Soviet army starts on the long way home," San Francisco Chronicle, 3-13-91, p. A11; McAlvany, "The rebirth of an empire: What is really happening in the Soviet Union," Op cit., p. 21; Kinzer, S., New York Times, "A bitter good-by to Germany," San Francisco Chronicle, 3-4-94, p. A14.

36 Associated Press, "Russia preparing to join new NATO partnership," San Francisco Chronicle, 3-18-94, p. A16; McAlvany, "Russian strategic deception: The 'new' Communist threat," Op cit., p. 10.

37 "NATO opposes repositioning of Russian troops," San Francisco Chronicle, 4-4-94, p. A10; Cooperman, A., Associated Press, "Yeltsin OKs bases in ex-Soviet Union," San Francisco Chronicle, 4-7-94, p. A12.

38 McAlvany, "Russian strategic deception: The 'new' Communist threat," Op cit., p. 10.

39 Golitsyn, Op cit., Chapter 25.

40 Lenin, V.I., "What is to be done?", 1902, in Connor, J.E., Ed., Lenin on Politics and Revolution, Pegasus, Indianapolis, 1968, pp. 61-72.

41 Ibid., p. 73.

42 Lenin, V.I., "Left-Wing" Communism, an Infantile Disorder, International Publishers, New York, 1940, p. 9.

43 Ibid., pp. 31-32.

44 Ibid., p. 82.

45 Goodman, E.R., The Soviet Design for a World State, Columbia University Press, New York, 1960.

46 Lenin, "Left-Wing Communism, an Infantile Disorder, Op cit., pp. 12, 18-19.

47 Ibid., pp. 14, 20-21, 34, 37-39, 42-48, 62, 65, 76-77, 80, etc.

48 Stalin, J., Marxism and the National Question, International Publishers, New York, 1942, p. 38, passim.

49 Foster, W.Z., Toward Soviet America, Elgin Publications, Balboa Island, CA, 1961 (originally published 1932), pp. 39-40.

50 Petrenko, F., and Popov, V., Soviet Foreign Policy: Objectives and Principles, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1985, pp. 285-287.

51 Golitsyn, A., New Lies for Old, Op cit., pp. 341-342.

52 Foster, W.Z., Toward Soviet America, Op cit., pp. 272-273.

53 Gromyko, A., Africa: Progress, Problems, Prospects, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1983, pp. 41-51.

54 Agwani, M.S., Communism in the Arab East, Asia Publishing House, New York, 1969, pp. 9-20.

55 As quoted in Sterling, Op cit., pp. 21-22.

56 Sterling, Op cit., pp. 151, 171.

57 Reed, D., "South Africa: Glimmers of hope?", Reader's Digest, Aug., 1987; McAlvany, D.S., "Revolution and betrayal: The accelerating onslaught against South Africa," The McAlvany Intelligence Advisor, July, 1986, pp. 10-11; Bureau for Information, Talking with the ANC..., Government Printer, Pretoria, South Africa, 1986, p. 24.

58 For example, see Sterling, Op cit.; Batista, F., Cuba Betrayed, Vantage Press, New York, 1962; Weyl, N., Red Star Over Cuba, Hillman Books, New York, 1961; Smith, E.E.T., The Fourth Floor, Random House, New York, 1962; Clark, M.K., Algeria in Turmoil, Grosset & Dunlap, New York, 1959; True Aspects of the Algerian Revolution, French Interior Ministry, Paris; Kai-shek, C., Soviet Russia in China, Farrar, Straus and Cudahy, New York, 1957; Welch, R., Again, May G-d Forgive Us, Belmont Publishing Company, Belmont, MA, 1952; Somoza, A. and Cox, J., Nicaragua Betrayed, Western Islands, Boston, 1980; Pahlavi, M.R., Shah, Answer to History, Stein & Day, New York, 1980; Pike, H.R., A History of Communism in South Africa, Christian Mission International of South Africa, Germiston, South Africa, 1985; de Villamarest, P.F., The Strategists of Fear, Geneva, Switzerland, 1981; and many others.

59 Marx, K., "On the Jewish Question," in Tucker, R.C., ed., The Marx-Engels Reader, second edition, W.W. Norton & Company, New York, 1978, p. 49.

60 Lumer, H., ed., Lenin on the Jewish Question, International Publishers, New York, 1974, p. 47.

61 Agwani, Op cit., pp. 9-13; Webster, N.H., The Surrender of an Empire, London, 3rd ed., 1931, pp. 360-365.

62 Sterling, Op cit., pp. 14-15.

63 Livingstone, N.C. and Halevy, D., Inside the PLO, William Morrow & Co., New York, 1990, pp. 68-70.

64 Sterling, Op cit., pp. 272-276.

65 Livingstone and Halevy, Op cit., pp. 201-211.

66 Ibid., pp. 67, 73.

67 Livingstone and Halevy, Op cit., pp. 64-65; Rees, J., "Why Americans must oppose the P.L.O.," The Review of the News, Oct. 17, 1979, pp. 31-44 (p. 41); Parry, A., Terrorism, From Robespierre to Arafat, Vanguard Press, New York, 1976, p. 131.

68 Livingstone and Halevy, Op cit., p. 67; Sterling, Op cit., p. 277; Israeli, R., ed., PLO in Lebanon: Selected Documents, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1983, pp. 34-73.

69 Livingstone and Halevy, Op cit., pp. 77-78.

70 Sterling, Op cit., pp. 272-285; Israeli, Op cit., p. 7; Alexander, Y. and Sinai, J., Terrorism: The PLO Connection, Crane Russak, New York, 1989, pp. 126-127.

71 Sterling, Op cit., pp. 272-285; Israeli, Op cit., pp. 74-157; Rees, J., "Why Americans must oppose the P.L.O.," Op cit., pp. 42-43; Alexander and Sinai, Op cit., pp. 121-136.

72 Rees, J., "Why Americans must oppose the P.L.O.," Op cit., p. 33.

73 Ibid., pp. 31-44; Livingstone and Halevy, Op cit., passim; Israeli, Op cit., passim; Sterling, Op cit., pp. 113-130, 272-285; Laffin, J., The P.L.O. Connections, Corgi Books, London, 1982, passim; Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Threat of PLO Terrorism, Jerusalem, 1985, pp. 17-22; Merari, A., PLO: Core of World Terror, Jaffee Centre for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University, Carta, Jerusalem, 1983, pp. 10-21; Alexander and Sinai, Op cit., passim.

74 Livingstone and Halevy, Op cit., pp. 158-160.

75 Ibid., p. 159.

76 Sterling, Op cit., p. 121.

77 Ibid., p. 122.

78 On Algeria, see Clark, M.K., Algeria in Turmoil, Op cit.; editorial staff, "If you want it straight," "Testimony of Raoul Salan," and du Berrier, H., "The opposition," American Opinion, Sept. 1962, pp. 1-45, 49-58, 59-62; on Libya, see Sterling, Op cit., chapter 14, especially pp. 268-269, and ElWarfally, M.G., Imagery and Ideology in U.S. Policy Toward Libya, 1969-1982, University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh, PA, 1988, chapter 3; on Syria, see Hopwood, D., Syria 1945-1986: Politics and Society, Unwin Hyman, London, 1988, especially chapter 4 and p. 56; Syria completed its invasion and annexation of Lebanon in October, 1990, as recounted in Bard, M.G. and Himelfarb, J., Myths and Facts, Near East Report, Washington, D.C., 1992, p. 106; the takeover of South Yemen by Habash's Arab Nationalist Movement is mentioned in Livingstone and Halevy, Op cit., p. 202, and its final conversion to full Communism in Sterling, Op cit., pp. 89-90, 253-254; Communist influence over, and attempts to conquer, North Yemen are referred to in Davis, L.J., Myths and Facts 1989, Near East Report, Washington, DC, 1988, p. 36, in Bard and Himelfarb, Op cit., pp. 238-239, in Sterling, Op cit., p. 257, and in Alexander and Sinai, Op cit., p. 116, and the final merger with South Yemen is mentioned by Carapico, S., in Middle East Report, Nov./Dec. 1992, pp. 43-44; on Iraq, see Darwish, A. and Alexander, G., Unholy Babylon, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1991, especially pp. 20-24, and al-Khalil, S., Republic of Fear, University of California Press, Berkeley, CA, 1990, especially pp. 12-13, 66, 183-184ff, 226-227, and chapter 7 passim.

79 Rees, J., "How Jimmy Carter betrayed the Shah," The Review of the News, Feb. 21, 1979, pp. 31-48.

80 Taheri, A., Holy Terror: Inside the World of Islamic Terrorism, Adler & Adler, Bethesda, MD, 1987, p. 79; Alexander and Sinai, Op cit., pp. 72-73; Livingstone and Halevy, Op cit., pp. 150-154.

81 "Islamic fundamentalism: The threat to peace," American Jewish News, Op cit.; McAlvany, "Russian strategic deception: The 'new' Communist threat," Op cit., pp. 11, 20; "Gorbachev's gulf, too," The Economist, Oct. 24, 1987, pp. 13-14.

82 Sterling, Op cit., chapter 12.

83 Davis, Myths and Facts 1989, Op cit., pp. 134-135; Alexander and Sinai, Op cit., pp. 11-14, chapters 6-7.

84 For examples of Shi'ite opposition to the Ayatollah Khomeini, see Taheri, Op cit., p. 163, and Pahlavi, Shah Mohammed Reza, Answer to History, Op cit., chapter 11.

85 Taheri, Op cit., p. 217.

86 Rees, J., "How Jimmy Carter betrayed the Shah," Op cit., pp. 39-47; Taheri, Op cit., p. 175.

87 Taheri, Op cit., pp. 95-99.

88 Ibid., pp. 100-102.

89 Ibid., 177; Laffin, J., Holy War: Islam Fights, Grafton Books, London, 1988, p. 79.

90 Livingstone and Halevy, Op cit., pp. 212-216, 267-275; Alexander and Sinai, Op cit., p. 186.

91 Taheri, Op cit., pp. 76-84.

92 Schiff, Z. and Ya'ari, E., Intifada, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1990, pp. 56-57; Black, I. and Morris, B., Israel's Secret Wars, Grove Weidenfeld, New York, 1991, p. 468.

93 Abu-Amr, Z., "Hamas: A historical and political background," Journal of Palestine Studies, XXII (4), Summer, 1993, pp. 5-19 (pp. 16-17).

94 Netanyahu, B., A Place Among the Nations, Bantam Books, New York, 1993, pp. 220-221.

95 Livingstone and Halevy, Op cit., p. 84.

96 Davis, L.J., Op cit., pp. 90-93.

97 Israeli, Op cit., pp. 281-288.

98 Davis, L.J., Op cit., p. 92.

99 Emerson, S., The American House of Saud, Franklin Watts, New York, 1985, chapter 14.

100 Rees, J., "Why Americans must oppose the P.L.O.," Op cit., pp. 43-44; National Lawyers Guild, 1977 Middle East Delegation, Treatment of Palestinians in Israeli-Occupied West Bank and Gaza, National Lawyers Guild, New York, 1978.

101 Bard and Himelfarb, Op cit., pp. 117-118; "U.N. Council condemns Hebron killings," San Francisco Chronicle, 3-19-94, pp. A1, A15.

102 Journal of Palestine Studies, XXII (3), Spring 1993, pp. 157-159.

103 Davydkov, R., The Palestine Question, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1984, pp. 23-24.

104 Ibid., pp. 233-248.

105 Arafat, Y., "We are optimistic," World Marxist Review, Sept. 1987, pp. 47-50; "Stronger solidarity with the Palestinian people's struggle in the occupied territories: Statement by the Communist and Workers' Parties of the Arab East," Information Bulletin, Feb. 1988, p. 37; "Israeli actions are state terrorism: Statement by the Central Secretariat, Communist Party of India," Information Bulletin, March 1988, p. 25; "For speeding up a Middle East international conference: Joint statement by the Communist Parties of Jordan, Palestine and Israel," Information Bulletin, March 1988, pp. 25-26; "Gus Hall: The Middle East--the moment of truth," Information Bulletin, March 1988, p. 26.

106 Tamari, S., "Left in limbo: Leninist heritage and Islamist challenge," Middle East Report, Nov.-Dec. 1992, pp. 16-21; Cobban, H., "Palestinian relationships inside and outside the occupied territories," American-Arab Affairs, Winter 1989-90, pp. 38-42; Sosebee, S.J., "The palestinian women's movement and the intifada: A historical and current analysis," American-Arab Affairs, Spring 1990, pp. 81-91; Lockard, J., "U.S. aid: Subsidizing collective punishment of palestinians," American-Arab Affairs, Summer 1989, p. 68; Schiff and Ya'ari, Op cit., passim.

107 Schiff and Ya'ari, Op cit., chapter 2 and pp. 101-105, 198-202.

108 Ibid., chapter 7; Cobban, Op cit., p. 40; Livingstone and Halevy, Op cit., pp. 44-45.

109 Abu-Amr, Z., Op cit., pp. 14-15; Bard and Himelfarb, Op cit., p. 171.

110 See, for example, the number of PLO-affiliated professors in the delegation to the peace talks, "The Madrid peace conference," Journal of Palestine Studies, XXI (2), Winter 1992, pp. 122-123.

111 Bard and Himelfarb, Op cit., pp. 170-172; "Israel reopens West Bank university," San Francisco Chronicle, 8-22-91, p. A21.

112 "Israelis blow up homes," Orange County Register, 10-13-88, p. A22; "Arabs demand U.N. protection," San Francisco Chronicle, 3-27-92, p. A19.

113 Rosenthal, D., "The geography of fear," San Francisco Examiner Image, 10-6-91, pp. 8-15, 32; Schiff and Ya'ari, Op cit., passim.

114 Tamari, S., Op cit., p. 18.

115 Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Threat of PLO Terrorism, Op cit., p. 21; Rees, J., "Why Americans must oppose the P.L.O.," Op cit., pp. 35-37.

116 Emerson, S., "Meltdown," The New Republic, Nov. 23, 1992, pp. 26-29; Bard and Himelfarb, Op cit., pp. 168-170.

117 Emerson, "Meltdown," Op cit., p. 26.

118 J.H., "Intrafada violence continues," Near East Report, Dec. 14, 1992, p. 229.

119 Rosenthal, D., "The geography of fear," Op cit., p. 14; Los Angeles Times, 1-20-88, pp. 1, 8.

120 "The war of stones," Simon Wiesenthal Center Response, May 1988, pp. 5-7.

121 New York Times, "Rights group lays blame on PLO for Arab deaths," San Francisco Chronicle, 1-10-94, p. A9.

122 Netanyahu, Op cit., p. 224.

123 Abu-Amr, Z., Op cit., p. 17.

124 Emerson, S., "Meltdown," Op cit., p. 26; Bar-Illan, D., "Israel's new pollyannas," Commentary, Sept., 1993, pp. 27-32 (p. 30).

125 Rubin, B., "How low will we stoop for Arafat?", Los Angeles Times, 3-22-90; Emerson, S., "The Bush administration's PLO cover-up," The Wall Street Journal, 3-22-90.

126 Williams, D., "Likud blames U.S. for Shamir's downfall," Los Angeles Times, 3-22-90, p. A6.

127 "Christopher leans on Israeli, Arab negotiators," San Francisco Chronicle, 4-28-93, p. A11; Washington Post, "U.S. makes proposal on palestinian self-rule," San Francisco Chronicle, 5-13-93, p. A12.

128 Ibrahim, Y.M., New York Times, "Israel-PLO deal for mutual recognition," San Francisco Chronicle, 9-9-93, pp. A1, A13; Broder, J.M. and Kempster, N., Los Angeles Times, "Israel, PLO give peace a chance," San Francisco Chronicle, 9-14-93, pp. A1, A13.

129 Kempster, N. and Parks, M., "Israel, Syria near accord, negotiators say," Los Angeles Times, 9-3-93, pp. A1, A15; "Rabin reaffirms Israel's offer to withdraw from Lebanon," San Francisco Chronicle, 9-17-93, pp. A1, A18.

130 "U.N. Council condemns Hebron killings," Op cit.

131 Lockard, J., Op cit., pp. 65+.

132 Goshko, J.M., Washington Post, "U.S. issues global call to help palestinians," San Francisco Chronicle, 9-21-93, pp. A1, A13.

133 Bard and Himelfarb, Op cit., p. 241.

134 Livingstone and Halevy, Op cit., pp. 167-169.

135 New York Times, "Saudis asked to aid palestinians again," San Francisco Chronicle, 4-29-93, p. A14.

136 Sutton, A.C., The Best Enemy Money Can Buy, Liberty House Press, Billings, MT, 1986.

137 Bard and Himelfarb, Op cit., pp. 120-121.

138 Alexander and Sinai, Op cit., pp. 182-183; Viorst, M., Reaching for the Olive Branch: UNRWA and Peace in the Middle East, Middle East Institute, Washington, DC, 1989.

139 Alexander and Sinai, Op cit., pp. 182-183; Schoenberg, H.O., A Mandate for Terror: The United Nations and the PLO, Shapolsky Publishers, New York, 1989, chapter 9; Laffin, The PLO Connections, Op cit., pp. 57-58; Israeli, Op cit., pp. 294, 296.

140 Schiff, M., "How U.S. tax dollars pay for PLO terrorism," Soldier of Fortune, Winter 1977, as quoted in The Review of the News, 6-16-82, pp. 37-38.

141 Compare the current budget, nearly $250 million (Viorst, Op cit., p. 60), with one estimate of PLO annual spending, at about $400 million (Livingstone and Halevy, Op cit., p. 171).

142 Schoenberg, Op cit., chapters 7, 9; Alexander and Sinai, Op cit., pp. 183-186; Lockard, J., Op cit.

143 Schoenberg, Op cit., chapter 8; Laffin, The PLO Connections, Op cit., pp. 58-59

144 "Arafat urges U.N. to prevent 'extermination'," San Francisco Chronicle, 5-26-90, pp. A1, A20; "Arabs demand U.N. protection," San Francisco Chronicle, 3-27-92, p. A19.

145 "New plan to put foreign force in Israel territories," San Francisco Chronicle, 3-23-94, pp. A1, A13.

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