The 17th

When our founders created the system of government for our constitutional republic, they built in layers of protection from federal control over the lives of people in the states. Over time those protections have been eroded as the federal bureaucracy has seized power. One of the biggest changes that led to the creation of the permanent political class was the 17th amendment.

Our founders created a system where Senators were appointed by the state legislatures. In this original system the senate was bound by obligation to look out for the best interests of their specific states. Under the ‘advise and consent‘ rules of Senate confirmation for executive branch appointments, the intent was to ensure the presidential appointee -who would now carry out regulatory activity- would not undermine the independent position of the states.

The nucleus of corruption amid every element of the federal institutions of government is the United States Senate. The U.S. Senate, also known as the “upper chamber,” is the single most powerful elected element in modern federal government.

The Intelligence Branch is the most powerful branch of government. However, the U.S. Senate is the most powerful assembly of federally elected officials. We pretend the IC branch doesn’t exist; that’s part of our problem. At least we admit the Senate exists.

All other elected federal corruption is dependent on a corrupt and ineffective Senate. If we correct the problems with the Senate and reconnect the representation within the chamber to the state-level legislative bodies, we will then see immediate change. However, there would be ZERO institutional allies in this effort.

When the 17th amendment (direct voting for Senators) took the place of state appointments, the perspective of ‘advise and consent’ changed. The senate was now in the position of ensuring the presidential appointee did not undermine the power of the permanent bureaucracy, which is the root of power for the upper-chamber.

Senate committees, Homeland Security, Judiciary, Intelligence, Armed Services, Foreign Relations, etc. now consists of members who carry an imbalanced level of power within government. The senate now controls who will be in charge of executive branch agencies like the DOJ, DHS, FBI, CIA, ODNI, DoD, State Dept and NSA, from the position of their own power and control in Washington DC.

In essence, the 17th amendment flipped the intent of the constitution from protecting the individual states to protecting the federal government.

Almost every source of federal issue: ex. spending, intervention and foreign assistance, conflict with the states, burdensome regulation, surveillance and spying on American citizens, the two-tiered justice system and the erosion of liberty & individual rights (see COVID examples), can be sourced back to the problem created by the 17th amendment.

Because of the scale of their power, the Senate will not give up control easily; and every institution of society and government will actively work to block/stop We The People from taking back control of the upper chamber. Every entity from Wall Street to multinational corporations, big tech, banks, foreign governments and world organizations would align against us. When you truly understand the epicenter of the corruption, then you are able to see the tentacles extending from it.

It would be easy to say “repeal the 17th amendment;“ it is ‘another kettle of fish’ entirely to walk through the process to make that happen. Yes, ultimately, we do need a full repeal of the 17th amendment and return the selection of the senators from each state with a nomination and appointment process within the state legislature. [Common Explainer Here]

Prior to the 17th amendment, there was significant state level corruption as business interests and senate candidates worked in power groups with party officials to attain the position. Politicians seeking Senate seats began campaigning for state legislative candidates in order to assemble support.

The state legislative races then became a process of influence amid powerful interests seeking to support their Senate candidate. Get the right people in the State legislature and you can get the Senator appointed.

Those state-level entities, bankers, wealthy people of influence, later became the permanent K-Street lobbying groups once the 17th amendment was ratified. In essence, they just shifted the location of their influence operation from the state to an office in Washington DC. [Those same power groups, albeit much larger, now write the physical legislation we see in congress.] Additionally, prior to the 17th amendment, there were issues of vacancies in federal senate seats as state legislatures could not agree on an individual Senator.

The biggest issue following the passage of the 17th amendment became Senators who were no longer representing the interests of their state. Instead, they were representing the interests of the power elite groups who were helping them fund the mechanisms of their re-election efforts.

A Senator only needs to run for re-election every six years. The 17th amendment is the only amendment that changed the structure of the congress as it was written by the founders.

Over time, the Senate chamber itself began using their advice and consent authority to control the executive and judicial branch. The origination of a nomination now holds the question: “Can this person pass the Senate confirmation process?” The Senate now abuses this power to ensure no one challenges them. Additionally, the Senate began using their oversight capacity to control elements within the executive branch and judicial branch. The full scope of that issue in modern form is OUTLINED HERE – which is the cornerstone of the Intelligence Branch of Government.

If we can repeal the 17th amendment and return the selection to the state legislature, you can see where the background work of Tactical Civics and Extreme Federalism begin to take on importance.

[NOTE: Within the repeal effort we would need to include a recall process for states to reach out and yank back their Senator if they go astray; the ability to recall was missing in the original construct of the framers; it would need to be added.]

◊ PATH ONE is the primary platform of the presidential candidate…. a visible and emphasized mandate that includes:

This specific election issue would need to be the #1 priority of the candidate and spoken at every event.

This approach gives presidential candidate Donald Trump the mandate to demand congress to act if he won the 2024 election. We need a warrior of epic strength, resolve and fortitude. We need Donald Trump.

◊ PATH TWO is the parallel path built along with the 2024 election platform path and put into place in the event that Congress refused to accept the mandate.

Obviously, this would be an ugly battle. The second path is a convention of states in the first year of President Trump’s second term in office.

The ‘convention of states‘ would be detailed, strategically planned, and the future schedule determined during the 2024 GOP convention preceding the November election (assuming the right candidate wins). That way, if congress refuses to act on their own, within say the first 100 days of the new administration, the state legislatures will then assemble a convention for the singular and limited purpose of one action item:

There is a lot more to this, and a lot more to cover in discussion of this. However, this is the path that can resolve most of the issues we face with an out-of-control federal government. The shift in power would kneecap the Intelligence Branch of Government by re-instituting genuine oversight and control. A repeal of the 17th amendment stops Senators from campaigning, needing to raise money and puts them directly into the accountability position as a steward for the interests of their state.

The people within each state would then have a mechanism to address any negative federal action by contacting their state legislative representative. In a worst-case scenario, a rogue Senator could be removed within days if they support any federal legislative activity that is not in alignment with the state interest. This approach also wipes out most of the power amid the Senate Majority Leader, as he/she could also be recalled by the state and would be less likely to work against the interests of the majority in the chamber.

The House of Representatives was created to be the voice of the people, ie, “The Peoples’ House.” However, the U.S. Senate was structurally created to be the place where state government had representation in the federal government decision-making. The 17th amendment completely removed state representation, and we have been in an escalating battle over state’s rights ever since.

Overlay that DC structural issue with the fact that almost all of the bureaucracy created by this skewed DC system is now in place to defend itself from any outside effort to change it, and you get this UniParty problem that Donald Trump fully exposed.

Repeal the 17th amendment and we would see the most significant restoration of freedom, liberty and social balance in our lifetime.

I'm not a fan of term limits; I believe the People should have the right to choose their representatives for as long as they want.

That said, the Senate was never intended to be elected by the people. It was designed to be a meeting place where "ambassadors" from the several states, selected by their respective legislatures, would gather to discuss interstate issues for the common good of the United States. Senators who fail to respect the wishes of their legislature would not be selected to return after their six-year term was over.

There are many places in the Constitution where state control of the federal government via the Senate was expected. The obvious ones are:

Confirmation of the President's nominees to the Cabinet and Supreme Court to ensure that the President is selecting trustworthy people to these positions.
Ratification of treaties to ensure that the states endorse the treaties negotiated by the President. In fact, the President shouldn't be negotiating on behalf of the nation on his own initiative; he should first consult with the Senate to find out what the states want and then be the emissary to foreign leaders on their behalf.
Conviction and removal of impeached Presidents or confirmed office-holders of the United States.
Appointing the officers of the state Militias when called into national service to ensure that the President doesn't abuse the military power entrusted to him.

The less obvious, but arguably more important, functions of a Senate of ambassadors from the States are:

Article I Section 10: "No State shall, without the Consent of Congress... enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a foreign Power..."
Given the limitations on travel and communication in the 1790s, it was unlikely that states would negotiate deals between themselves; their Senators would represent the states' interests in the Senate and compacts would be formed there. Then the House would essentially "confirm" what the Senators agreed to on behalf of their respective states.
Article IV Section 4: "The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of them against Invasion; and on Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened) against domestic Violence." This was the most consequential role of the Senate in the Constitutional framework, but mostly overlooked.
As James Madison wrote in Federalist #43, the states were expected to police themselves against invasion and insurrection:
A republican form of government and protection from invasion was for the fear of larger states invading smaller states and expecting neighboring states to band together to repel the invasion. It had nothing to do with the federal government protecting the border; the states were expected to protect each other's borders.
From Federalist #43 (James Madison):
6. "To guarantee to every State in the Union a republican form of government; to protect each of them against invasion; and on application of the legislature, or of the executive (when the legislature cannot be convened), against domestic violence.
In a confederacy founded on republican principles, and composed of republican members, the superintending government ought clearly to possess authority to defend the system against aristocratic or monarchial innovations. The more intimate the nature of such a union may be, the greater interest have the members in the political institutions of each other; and the greater right to insist that the forms of government under which the compact was entered into should be SUBSTANTIALLY maintained. But a right implies a remedy; and where else could the remedy be deposited, than where it is deposited by the Constitution?
Madison sets up the argument by pointing out that the several states are of like disposition. A "superintending government" (the federal government, in this case) is the natural home for the authority to defend the system (republicanism). The more alike the states are, the more interested the states will become in each other's affairs, and the more desirable it will be for each state to maintain its form of government in harmony with the others.
Madison then gives a brief history lesson of past confederacies of dissimilar city-states.
Governments of dissimilar principles and forms have been found less adapted to a federal coalition of any sort, than those of a kindred nature. "As the confederate republic of Germany,'' says Montesquieu, "consists of free cities and petty states, subject to different princes, experience shows us that it is more imperfect than that of Holland and Switzerland. '' "Greece was undone,'' he adds, "as soon as the king of Macedon obtained a seat among the Amphictyons.'' In the latter case, no doubt, the disproportionate force, as well as the monarchical form, of the new confederate, had its share of influence on the events. It may possibly be asked, what need there could be of such a precaution, and whether it may not become a pretext for alterations in the State governments, without the concurrence of the States themselves.
Madison goes on to say that the federal government is not expected to enforce republicanism onto the states, it is enough to simply "guaranty" to the states a republican form of government, and the states will take care of enforcing it on each other.
These questions admit of ready answers. If the interposition of the general government should not be needed, the provision for such an event will be a harmless superfluity only in the Constitution. But who can say what experiments may be produced by the caprice of particular States, by the ambition of enterprising leaders, or by the intrigues and influence of foreign powers? To the second question it may be answered, that if the general government should interpose by virtue of this constitutional authority, it will be, of course, bound to pursue the authority.
But the authority extends no further than to a GUARANTY of a republican form of government, which supposes a pre-existing government of the form which is to be guaranteed. As long, therefore, as the existing republican forms are continued by the States, they are guaranteed by the federal Constitution. Whenever the States may choose to substitute other republican forms, they have a right to do so, and to claim the federal guaranty for the latter. The only restriction imposed on them is, that they shall not exchange republican for antirepublican Constitutions; a restriction which, it is presumed, will hardly be considered as a grievance.
This is how Madison disposes of the word "guarantee" in Article IV -- it is limited to the federal government issuing the guaranty to the states, but not enforcing it onto the states from above. The states were expected to police themselves based on their mutual common alignments, unlike how the "free cities and petty states, subject to different princes" of Europe behaved.
Regarding invasion, Madison expresses the fear that larger states will invade smaller states, but the other states will intervene to keep the peace.
A protection against invasion is due from every society to the parts composing it. The latitude of the expression here used seems to secure each State, not only against foreign hostility, but against ambitious or vindictive enterprises of its more powerful neighbors. The history, both of ancient and modern confederacies, proves that the weaker members of the union ought not to be insensible to the policy of this article. Protection against domestic violence is added with equal propriety. It has been remarked, that even among the Swiss cantons, which, properly speaking, are not under one government, provision is made for this object; and the history of that league informs us that mutual aid is frequently claimed and afforded;
Regarding insurrection, Madison writes that the federal government must support the state governments to quell insurrections because the federal and state constitutions are too interwoven to let domestic violence go unchecked. Madison thinks that the threat of federal involvement is sufficient to prevent an insurrection from starting.:
Why may not illicit combinations, for purposes of violence, be formed as well by a majority of a State, especially a small State as by a majority of a county, or a district of the same State; and if the authority of the State ought, in the latter case, to protect the local magistracy, ought not the federal authority, in the former, to support the State authority? Besides, there are certain parts of the State constitutions which are so interwoven with the federal Constitution, that a violent blow cannot be given to the one without communicating the wound to the other. Insurrections in a State will rarely induce a federal interposition, unless the number concerned in them bear some proportion to the friends of government. It will be much better that the violence in such cases should be repressed by the superintending power, than that the majority should be left to maintain their cause by a bloody and obstinate contest. The existence of a right to interpose, will generally prevent the necessity of exerting it.
Madison writes about the fear of foreign influence in a state (an invasion of aliens) fomenting violence amongst the citizens, but that the remedy is the federal government organizing the neutral states to intervene on behalf of the rest of the nation.
...May not the minor party possess such a superiority of pecuniary resources, of military talents and experience, or of secret succors from foreign powers, as will render it superior also in an appeal to the sword? May not a more compact and advantageous position turn the scale on the same side, against a superior number so situated as to be less capable of a prompt and collected exertion of its strength? Nothing can be more chimerical than to imagine that in a trial of actual force, victory may be calculated by the rules which prevail in a census of the inhabitants, or which determine the event of an election! May it not happen, in fine, that the minority of CITIZENS may become a majority of PERSONS, by the accession of alien residents, of a casual concourse of adventurers, or of those whom the constitution of the State has not admitted to the rights of suffrage? I take no notice of an unhappy species of population abounding in some of the States, who, during the calm of regular government, are sunk below the level of men; but who, in the tempestuous scenes of civil violence, may emerge into the human character, and give a superiority of strength to any party with which they may associate themselves. In cases where it may be doubtful on which side justice lies, what better umpires could be desired by two violent factions, flying to arms, and tearing a State to pieces, than the representatives of confederate States, not heated by the local flame? To the impartiality of judges, they would unite the affection of friends...
and that it is a sufficient recommendation of the federal Constitution, that it diminishes the risk of a calamity for which no possible constitution can provide a cure. Among the advantages of a confederate republic enumerated by Montesquieu, an important one is, "that should a popular insurrection happen in one of the States, the others are able to quell it. Should abuses creep into one part, they are reformed by those that remain sound."
We have to understand that the Framers were less concerned about foreign invasion than they were about one state invading another state. Madison discusses protection from invasion and protection from domestic violence as the same issue from a federal perspective.
...the history of [the Swiss cantons] informs us that mutual aid is frequently claimed and afforded...
Why may not illicit combinations, for purposes of violence, be formed as well by a majority of a State, especially a small State as by a majority of a county, or a district of the same State...
there are certain parts of the State constitutions which are so interwoven with the federal Constitution, that a violent blow cannot be given to the one without communicating the wound to the other.
Insurrections in a State will rarely induce a federal interposition, unless the number concerned in them bear some proportion to the friends of government.
It will be much better that the violence in such cases should be repressed by the superintending power, than that the majority should be left to maintain their cause by a bloody and obstinate contest.
Madison then suggests that it is the neighboring states that should be the active bodies that quell domestic violence, not the federal government.
In cases where it may be doubtful on which side justice lies, what better umpires could be desired by two violent factions, flying to arms, and tearing a State to pieces, than the representatives of confederate States, not heated by the local flame? To the impartiality of judges, they would unite the affection of friends.
Finally, Madison summarizes the entirety of Federalist #43 with this plea to the states: that the obligations between states is more than just legislative ratification of a compact between states (like the Articles of Confederation). The several states can no longer take a breach of the Articles as an excuse to break the compact. the time has come to put effort into keeping the compact intact by mutually working to protect it.
PERHAPS, also, an answer may be found without searching beyond the principles of the compact itself. It has been heretofore noted among the defects of the Confederation, that in many of the States it had received no higher sanction than a mere legislative ratification. The principle of reciprocality seems to require that its obligation on the other States should be reduced to the same standard. A compact between independent sovereigns, founded on ordinary acts of legislative authority, can pretend to no higher validity than a league or treaty between the parties. It is an established doctrine on the subject of treaties, that all the articles are mutually conditions of each other; that a breach of any one article is a breach of the whole treaty; and that a breach, committed by either of the parties, absolves the others, and authorizes them, if they please, to pronounce the compact violated and void. Should it unhappily be necessary to appeal to these delicate truths for a justification for dispensing with the consent of particular States to a dissolution of the federal pact, will not the complaining parties find it a difficult task to answer the MULTIPLIED and IMPORTANT infractions with which they may be confronted? The time has been when it was incumbent on us all to veil the ideas which this paragraph exhibits. The scene is now changed, and with it the part which the same motives dictate.
Madison's point to Article IV Section 4 is this: The federal government wasn't expected to act directly, the states were empowered to mutually act on its behalf to protect against invasion. This was the expected intent of the federal government.

This is all pre-17th amendment thinking. When the Framers referred to the federal government, they were envisioning a federal government that was being managed by a Senate of the states.

It was the role of the governors of the several states to lead the people of their states.

It was the role of the federal Executive to manage the relationships between the states, to be the voice of the nation in foreign relations with other countries, and to be the commander-in-chief of the military during armed conflicts.

The President's constituents were the governors, not the people. The states were the sovereign governments closest to the people. That's why the Senate was designed to be appointed by their respective state legislatures: 1) to confirm the President's nominations for executive branch offices and judicial picks, and 2) to ratify treaties that the President negotiated with foreign governments.

It was the several states, through the Senate, that were supposed to "lead" the President, not the other way around. This is why Article IV Section 4 says "and on Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened)..." The states were expected to communicate to their Senators to convey to the President what the states were going to do. They were not asking the President for permission, they were informing the President of their intended actions.

That's why I say that term limits for Senators is a non sequitur; the states we should instead return to the pre-17th amendment Senate where the states appointed their own Senators and would then non re-appoint them if they failed to follow the desires of their legislatures. Effective Senators would continue to serve at the pleasure of the legislature until such time as the People choose to replace their own legislatures.

-PJ

Thank you for posting Loud Mime.

"Repealing the 17th won’t deliver a cure for our runaway government because its effects are too deep."

All that needs to be done to effectively repeal 17A is to repeal 16A. Then the crook politicians who are following the tsunami of unconstitutional federal taxes to DC as a consequence of Congress's abuse of its 16A powers (citizens' wallets) will lose interest in DC.

"16th Amendment : The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived [emphasis added], without apportionment among the several States, and without regard to any census or enumeration."
"Congress is not empowered to tax for those purposes which are within the exclusive province of the States." —Justice John Marshall, Gibbons v. Ogden, 1824.
“If the tax be not proposed for the common defence, or general welfare, but for other objects, wholly extraneous, (as for instance, for propagating Mahometanism among the Turks, or giving aids and subsidies to a foreign nation, to build palaces for its kings, or erect monuments to its heroes,) it would be wholly indefensible upon constitutional principles [emphases added].” — Justice Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution 2 (1833).
The congressional record shows that Rep. John Bingham, a constitutional lawmaker, had clarified the federal government's constitutionally limited powers as follows.
”Simply this, that the care of the property, the liberty, and the life of the citizen, under the solemn sanction of an oath imposed by your Constitution, is in the States and not in the federal government [emphases added]. I have sought to effect no change in that respect in the Constitution of the country.” —John Bingham, Congressional. Globe. 1866, page 1292 (see top half of third column)
“Cherish, therefore, the spirit of our people, and keep alive their attention. If once they become inattentive to the public affairs, you and I, and Congress and Assemblies, judges and governors, shall all become wolves [emphasis added]. It seems to be the law of our general nature.” - Thomas Jefferson (Letter to Edward Carrington January 16, 1787)
Pelosi: "We have to pass the bill so that you can find out what is in it." (non-FR; 6 sec.)
Illegals are indeed getting immediate Social Security, contrary to Democrat claims (7.11.24)
Arizona Sheriff: Illegal Immigrants Being Handed $5,000 Visa Gift Cards, Cell Phones, And Plane Tickets (12.7.23)
Democrats [and RINOs] Are Terrified Of An Educated And Informed Public (3.12.23)

The constitutionally reality now is that, since worthless career federal lawmakers and renegade states have repeatedly proven that they are enemies of the people imo, it is now up to Democratic and Republican Trump supporters to effectively "impeach and remove" ALL (exceptions?) state and federal lawmakers and executives in November.

In other words, it's now up to Democratic and Republican Trump supporters to support hopeful Trump 47 with a new, Constitution-respecting Congress, new state lawmakers too, not only so that he will not be a lame duck president from the first day of his second term, but will support him to quickly finish draining the swamp.

Finally, let's not allow the anti-Trump media try to fade our memories of what we witnessed on July 13.

Disclaimer: Opinions posted on Free Republic are those of the individual posters and do not necessarily represent the opinion of Free Republic or its management. All materials posted herein are protected by copyright law and the exemption for fair use of copyrighted works.

The 17th

August 9, 2024 | Sundance

**“repeal the 17th amendment “.**