Journal of the Federal Convention July 6th 1787

Wealth v. Population in First Branch. Forty-Thousand Clause Sent to Committee. Money Bills.

Mr. Govr. MORRIS moved to commit so much of the Report as relates to "One member for every 40,000 inhabitants" His view was that they might absolutely fix the number for each State in the first instance; leaving the Legislature at liberty to provide for changes in the relative importance of the States, and for the case of new States.

Mr. WILSON 2ded. the motion; but with a view of leaving the Committee under no implied shackles.

Mr. GHORUM apprehended great inconveniency [FN1] from fixing directly the number of Representatives to be allowed to each State. He thought the number of Inhabitants the true guide; tho' perhaps some departure might be expedient from the full proportion. The States also would vary in their relative extent by separations of parts of the largest States. A part of Virga. is now on the point of a separation. In the province of Mayne a Convention is at this time deliberating on a separation from Masts. In such events the number of representatives ought certainly to be reduced. He hoped to see all the States made small by proper divisions, instead of their becoming formidable as was apprehended, to the Small States. He conceived that let the Genl. [FN2] Government be modified as it might, there would be a constant tendency in the State Governmts. to encroach upon it: it was of importance therefore that the extent of the States shd. be reduced as much & as fast as possible. The stronger the Govt. shall be made in the first instance the more easily will these divisions be effected; as it will be of less consequence in the opinion of the States whether they be of great or small extent.

Mr. GERRY did not think with his Colleague that the large States ought to be cut up. This policy has been inculcated by the middling and smaller States, ungenerously & contrary to the spirit of the Confederation. Ambitious men will be apt to solicit needless divisions, till the States be reduced to the size of Counties. If this policy should still actuate the small States, the large ones cou'd not confederate safely with them; but would be obliged to consult their safety by confederating only with one another. He favored the Commitment and thought that Representation ought to be in the Combined ratio of numbers of Inhabitants and of wealth, and not of either singly.

Mr. KING wished the clause to be committed chiefly in order to detach it from the Report with which it had no connection. He thought also that the Ratio of Representation proposed could not be safely fixed, since in a century & a half our computed increase of population would carry the number of representatives to an enormous excess; that ye. number of inhabitants was not the proper index of ability & wealth; that property was the primary object of Society; and that in fixing a ratio this ought not to [FN3] be excluded from the estimate. With regard to new States, he observed that there was something peculiar in the business which had not been noticed. The U. S. were now admitted to be proprietors of the Country N. West of the Ohio. Congs. by one of their ordinances have impoliticly laid it out into ten States, and have made it a fundamental article of compact with those who may become settlers, that as soon as the number in any one State shall equal that of the smallest of the 13 original States, it may claim admission into the union. Delaware does not contain it is computed more than 35,000 souls, and for obvious reasons will not increase much for a considerable time. It is possible then that if this plan be persisted in by Congs. 10 new votes may be added, without a greater addition of inhabitants than are represented by the single vote of Pena. The plan as it respects one of the new States is already irrevocable, the sale of the lands having commenced, and the purchasers & settlers will immediately become entitled to all the privileges of the compact.

Mr. BUTLER agreed to the Commitment if the Committee were to be left at liberty. He was persuaded that the more the subject was examined, the less it would appear that the number of inhabitants would be a proper rule of proportion. If there were no other objection the changeableness of the standard would be sufficient. He concurred with those who thought some balance was necessary between the old & new States. He contended strenuously that property was the only just measure of representation. This was the great object of Governt: the great cause of war; the great means of carrying it on.

Mr. PINKNEY saw no good reason for committing. The value of land had been found on full investigation to be an impracticable rule. The contributions of revenue including imports & exports, must be too changeable in their amount; too difficult to be adjusted; and too injurious to the non-commercial States. The number of inhabitants appeared to him the only just & practicable rule. He thought the blacks ought to stand on an equality with [FN4] whites: But wd. agree to the ratio settled by Congs. He contended that Congs. had no right under the articles of Confederation to authorize the admission of new States; no such case having been provided for.

Mr. DAVY, was for committing the clause in order to get at the merits of the question arising on the Report. He seemed to think that wealth or property ought to be represented in the 2d. branch; and numbers in the 1st. branch.

Masts. ay. Cont. ay. N. Y. no. N. J. no. Pa. ay. Del. no. Md. divd. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. [FN5]

The members appd. by Ballot were Mr. Govr. Morris, Mr. Gorham, Mr. Randolph, Mr. Rutlidge, Mr. King.

Mr. WILSON signified that his view in agreeing to the commitmt. was that the Come. might consider the propriety of adopting a scale similar to that established by the Constitution of Masts. which wd. give an advantage to ye. small States without substantially departing from a [FN6] rule of proportion.

Mr. WILSON & Mr. MASON moved to postpone the clause relating to money bills in order to take up the clause relating to an equality of votes in the second branch.

On the question [FN7] Masts. no. Cont. no. N. Y. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. ay. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

Docr. FRANKLIN observed that this question could not be properly put by itself, the Committee having reported several propositions as mutual conditions of each other. He could not vote for it if separately taken, but should vote for the whole together.

Col. MASON perceived the difficulty & suggested a reference of the rest of the Report to ye Committee just appointed, that the whole might be brought into one view.

Mr. RANDOLPH disliked ye. reference to that Committee, as it consisted of members from States opposed to the wishes of the smaller States, and could not therefore be acceptable to the latter.

Mr. MARTIN & Mr. JENIFER moved to postpone the clause till the Come. last appointed should report.

Mr. MADISON observed that if the uncommitted part of the Report was connected with the part just committed, it ought also to be committed; if not connected, it need not be postponed till report should be made.

Mr. GOVERNr. MORRIS was opposed to a restriction of this right in either branch, considered merely in itself and as unconnected with the point of representation in the 2d. branch. It will disable the 2d. branch from proposing its own money plans, and giving the people an opportunity of judging by comparison of the merits of those proposed by the 1st. branch.

Mr. WILSON could see nothing like a concession here on the part of the smaller States. If both branches were to say yes [FN10] or no, [FN10] it was of little consequence which should say yes [FN10] or no [FN10] first, which last. If either was indiscriminately to have the right of originating, the reverse of the Report, would he thought be most proper; since it was a maxim that the least numerous body was the fittest for deliberation; the most numerous for decision. He observed that this discrimination had been transcribed from the British into several American constitutions. But he was persuaded that on examination of the American experiments it would be found to be a trifle light as air. Nor could he ever discover the advantage of it in the Parliamentary history of G. Britain. He hoped if there was any advantage in the privilege, that it would be pointed out.

Mr. WILLIAMSON thought that if the privilege were not common to both branches it ought rather to be confined to the 2d. as the bills in that case would be more narrowly watched, than if they originated with the branch having most of the popular confidence.

Mr. MASON. The consideration which weighed with the Committee was that the 1st. branch would be the immediate representatives of the people, the 2d. would not. Should the latter have the power of giving away the people's money, they might soon forget the source from whence they received it. We might soon have an aristocracy. He had been much concerned at the principles which had been advanced by some gentlemen, but had the satisfaction to find they did not generally prevail. He was a friend to proportional representation in both branches; but supposed that some points must be yielded for the sake of accomodation.

Mr. WILSON. If he had proposed that the 2d. branch should have an independent disposal of public money, the observations of [Col Mason] would have been a satisfactory answer. But nothing could be farther from what he had said. His question was how is the power of the 1st. branch increased or that of the 2d. diminished by giving the proposed privilege to the former? Where is the difference, in which branch it begins if both must concur, in the end?

Mr. GERRY would not say that the concession was a sufficient one on the part of the small States. But he could not but regard it in the light of a concession. It wd. make it a constitutional principle that the 2d. branch were not possessed of the Confidence of the people in money matters, which wd. lessen their weight & influence. In the next place if the 2d. branch were dispossessed of the privilege, they wd. be deprived of the opportunity which their continuance in office 3 times as long as the 1st. branch would give them of makig three successive essays in favor of a particular point.

Mr. PINKNEY thought it evident that the Concession was wholly on one side, that of the large States, the privilege of originating money bills being of no account.

Mr. Govr. MORRIS had waited to hear the good effects of the restriction. As to the alarm sounded, of an aristocracy, his creed was that there never was, nor ever will be a civilized Society without an aristocracy. His endeavor was to keep it as much as possible from doing mischief. The restriction if it has any real operation will deprive us of the services of the 2d. branch in digesting & proposing money bills of which it will be more capable than the 1st. branch. It will take away the responsibility of the 2d. branch, the great security for good behavior. It will always leave a plea, as to an obnoxious money bill that it was disliked, but could not be constitutionally amended; nor safely rejected. It will be a dangerous source of disputes between the two Houses. We should either take the British Constitution altogether or make one for ourselves. The Executive there has dissolved two Houses as the only cure for such disputes. Will our Executive be able to apply such a remedy? Every law directly or indirectly takes money out of the pockets of the people. Again What use may be made of such a privilege in case of great emergency? Suppose an Enemy at the door, and money instantly & absolutely necessary for repelling him, may not the popular branch avail itself of this duress, to extort concessions from the Senate destructive of the Constitution itself. He illustrated this danger by the example of the Long Parliament's expedts. for subverting the H. of Lords; concluding on the whole that the restriction would be either useless or pernicious.

Docr. FRANKLIN did not mean to go into a justification of the Report; but as it had been asked what would be the use of restraining the 2d. branch from medling with money bills, he could not but remark that it was always of importance that the people should know who had disposed of their money, & how it had been disposed of. It was a maxim that those who feel, can best judge. This end would, he thought, be best attained, if money affairs were to be confined to the immediate representatives of the people. This was his inducement to concur in the report. As to the danger or difficulty that might arise from a negative in the 2d. [FN11] where the people wd. not be proportionally represented, it might easily be got over by declaring that there should be no such Negative: or if that will not do, by declaring that there shall be no such branch at all.

Mr. MARTIN said that it was understood in the Committee that the difficulties and disputes which had been apprehended, should be guarded agst. in the detailing of the plan.

Mr. WILSON. The difficulties & disputes will increase with the attempts to define & obviate them. Queen Anne was obliged to dissolve her Parliamt. in order to terminate one of these obstinate disputes between the two Houses. Had it not been for the mediation of the Crown, no one can say what the result would have been. The point is still sub judice in England. He approved of the principles laid down by the Hon'ble President [FN12] [Doctr. Franklin] his Colleague, as to the expediency of keeping the people informed of their money affairs. But thought they would know as much, and be as well satisfied, in one way as in the other.

Genl. PINKNEY was astonished that this point should have been considered as a concession. He remarked that the restriction [FN13] to money bills had been rejected on the merits singly considered, by 8 States agst. 3. and that the very States which now called it a concession, were then agst. it as nugatory or improper in itself.

On the Question whether the clause relating to money bills in the Report of the Come. consisting of a member from each State, shd. stand as part of the Report-

Massts. dividd. Cont. ay. N. Y. divd. N. J. ay. Pa. no. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. no. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. divd. [FN14]

A Question was then raised whether the question was carried in the affirmative: there being but 5 ays out of 11 States present. The words of the rule are [FN15] (see May 28). [FN16]

[In several preceding instances like votes had sub silentio been entered as decided in the affirmative.]

FN5 In the transcript the vote reads:"Massachusetts, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye-7; New York, Jersey, Delaware, no-3; Maryland, divided."

FN7 the words 'of postponement" are here inserted in the transcript and the vote reads: "New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, South Carolina, Georgia, aye-8; Massachusetts, Connecticut, North Carolina, no-3."

FN12 In the transcript after the word "President" reference is made to a footnote which reads: "He was at that time President of the State of Pennsylvania."

FN14 In the transcript the vote reads: "Connecticut, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, North Carolina, aye-5; Pennsylvania, Virginia, South Carolina, no- 3; Massachusetts, New York, Georgia, divided."

FN15 The phrase "For the words of the Rule" is substituted in the transcript for "The words of the rule are."

FN16 A House to do business shall consist of the Deputies of not less than seven States; and all questions shall be decided by the greater number of these which shall be fully represented: but a less number than seven may adjourn from day to day.

Under consideration was the report of the committee from 5 July:

1. That in the 1st. branch of the Legislature each of the States now in the Union shall be allowed 1 member for every 40,000 inhabitants of the description reported in the 7th. Resolution of the Come. of the whole House: that each State not containing that number shall be allowed 1 member: that all bills for raising or appropriating money, and for fixing the Salaries of the officers of the Governt. of the U. States shall originate in the 1st. branch of the Legislature, and shall not be altered or amended by the 2d. branch: and that no money shall be drawn from the public Treasury. but in pursuance of appropriations to be originated in the 1st. branch"

2. That in the 2d. branch each State shall have an equal vote.

Governeur Morris (PA) motioned and James Wilson (PA) seconded to commit to committee the first clause regarding “1 member for each 40,000 inhabitants,” with a view to make the ratio flexible according to the wealth of the various states. He implied a lower ratio for new states.

Nathaniel Gorham (MA) insisted the number of reps per state not be permanent, for the populations of the states were changing. (Western counties of VA to become KY, and likewise eventually with NC/TN) He wandered off into musing over wishing to keep the States from growing so large as to threaten each other and the general government.

Elbridge Gerry (MA) found division of states to be dangerous and if taken to the logical extreme, they would be the size of counties. (I think he is concerned about tiny states getting at least one rep and probably one Senator regardless of population. Too many States concentrated, for instance in the northeast would upset the balance of powers always in the forefront of the delegate’s minds.)

Rufus King (MA) argued against a fixed proportion and supported representation based on wealth. What about the NW Territory? It was to become ten states. Areas could request statehood when population reached the smallest of the original thirteen, which was DE at barely 35,000 souls. Why should poor states be granted so much power as to quickly overwhelm, say PA?

Pierce Butler (SC) agreed to commit as long as it had free reign. While the best basis was wealth, he would agree to a changeable ratio of inhabitants. Property was the object of government, “the great cause of war; the great means of carrying it on.”

Charles Pinckney (SC) would not commit. Representation by population was the only practical method. Slaves should be counted equally, but he would agree on a fraction of them.

William Davy supported commitment in order to more closely examine its merits. Numbers should be the basis in the first branch, and wealth or property in the second.

The motion to commit the first clause of the first proposition (1 member for each 40,000 inhabitants) passed 7-3. The members were Mr. Govr. Morris, Mr. Gorham, Mr. Randolph, Mr. Rutlidge, Mr. King.

James Wilson (PA) hoped the committee would consider (a sliding rule?) a representative scale that would give some advantage to the small states.

James Wilson (PA) and George Mason (VA) moved to postpone the remainder of the first proposition in order to consider the second. The motion passed 8-3.

The second proposition: “That in the 2d. branch each State shall have an equal vote," was up for consideration.

Dr. Benjamin Franklin (PA) did not wish to vote separately on each proposition because they were interconnected.

Luther Martin (MD) and Daniel of St. Thomas Jenifer (MD) moved to postpone consideration of the second proposition until the committee reported. The motion passed to postpone, 6-3.

The second portion of the 1st proposition was up next: “that all bills for raising or appropriating money, and for fixing the Salaries of the officers of the Governt. of the U. States shall originate in the 1st. branch of the Legislature, and shall not be altered or amended by the 2d. branch: and that no money shall be drawn from the public Treasury. but in pursuance of appropriations to be originated in the 1st. branch.”

Governeur Morris (PA) would not restrict money bills to either house, and wished to delay consideration of this clause until the question of suffrage in the second branch was decided.

James Wilson (PA) saw no advantage one way or the other. It was certainly no concession to the small states. (Okay, if the second proposition passed as written, the five southern states of GA, SC, NC, VA and MD would be at a disadvantage in the Senate to the eight remaining states, which included all of the small states. Agriculture v. Commerce. It was in the House that the large states would carry the power and perhaps dominate for some time as the southwest territories to the Mississippi River were expected to rapidly fill with planters and farmers.)

Mr. Wilson backed up his argument with the experience of the states since independence.

Hugh Williamson (NC) would trust money bills to the smaller, deliberative branch.

George Mason (VA) thought a branch disconnected from the people, the Senate, would have little regard for the people’s money. He supported proportional representation in both branches but appeared ready to make an accommodation.

James Wilson (PA) repeated that it made no difference where money bills originated.

Elbridge Gerry (MA) did not regard it much of a concession by the small states, but it was a concession. It would lessen the weight and influence of the Senate.

Charles Pinckney (SC) viewed, in the big picture that of the large states conceding all without accommodation.

Governeur Morris (PA) once again maintained the necessity of an aristocracy in any civilized society. The inability of the Senate to amend money bills, either take them or leave them, would be a source of trouble between the branches. The British Constitution should be ours. He referred to British history, the 17th century Long Parliament. (Mr. Morris had obviously had it with popular government in the states. He feared a wild national House would extort Constitutional concessions from the Senate.)

Dr. Benjamin Franklin (PA) thought the people could better keep track of, and better deal with electorally, a single House, the one that represented them, when it came to money matters. The fault or credit in handling the people’s money would be known to all. (The successful businessman Franklin always “followed the money.”) Perhaps the Senate should not be able to veto money bills; perhaps there should be no Senate at all. (PA had a single house legislature.)

James Wilson (PA) referred to Parliamentary difficulty under Queen Anne. (Which I am not familiar with)

General Pinckney (SC) was amazed that delegates so easily changed their minds regarding money bills, which had already been dealt with. (Illustrative of why it was a good thing to keep the proceedings secret)

On the question shall the following clause stand as part of the report, namely:

“That all Bills for raising or appropriating money, and for fixing the salaries of the Officers of the Government of the United States, shall originate in the first branch of the Legislature, and shall not be altered or amended by the second Branch — and that no money shall be drawn from the Public Treasury but in pursuance of appropriations to be originated by the first Branch.”

It passed 5-3, with three states divided.

(I found the Avalon source confusing and referred to Max Farrand’s Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, vol. I, 1911 for a record of this vote.)

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