Posted on 02/12/2010 12:35:44 PM PST by syc1959
Being born in the United States does not even make one a 'NATIVE' citizen.
Immigration and Citizenship: Process and Policy fourth edition Under Jus Soli, the following is written "The Supreme Court's first holding on the sublect suggested that the court would give a restrictive reading to the phrase, potentially disqualifing significant number of persons born within the physical boundries of the nation. In Elk v. Wilkins 112 U.S. 94, 5 S.CT. 41, 28 L.ED. 643 (1884), the court ruled that native Indians were not U.S. citizens, even if they later severed their ties with their tribes. The words "subject to the jurisdiction thereof," the court held, mean "not merely subjct in some respect or degree to the jurisdiction of the United States, but completely subject to their political jurisdiction, and owing them direct and immediate allegiange." Most Indians could not meet the test. "Indians born within the territorial limits of the United States, members of, and owing immediate allegiance to, one of the Indian Tribes, (an alien through dependent power,) although in a geographical sense born in the United States, are no more 'born in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof,'*** then the children of subjects of any foreign government born within the domain of that government ***. Id. at 102. It continues that Congress eventually passed legislation with the 'Allotment Act of 1887, that conferred citizenship on many Indians.
The fact remains, the Court held, complete and sole Jurisdiction. As I have held that being born anywhere in the United States, jurisdiction is required, sole and complete, and Barack Hussein Obama was already claimed by British jurisdiction under the British Nationailty Act of 1948, and as such fails the United states Constitutional requirement of a Natural Born Citizen.
When Barack Obama Jr. was born on Aug. 4,1961, in Honolulu, Kenya was a British colony, still part of the United Kingdoms dwindling empire. As a Kenyan native, Barack Obama Sr. was a British subject whose citizenship status was governed by The British Nationality Act of 1948. That same act governed the status of Obama Sr.s children.
Barack Hussein Obama did not have sole jurisdiction under the United States.
Title 8 and the 14th Amendment clearlt state the following;
All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof
Note: 'subject to the jurisdiction thereof'
You’re right, that would be interesting.
Thank you, but that’s the current version.
I was looking specifically for the 1952 McCarren Act version. I’ve found several copies on the world wide web, but section 3 is always missing from the document.
Yep, I am now finding that too. I realized after I posted that, its the current version. Not helpful at all. RAWR.
I am trying to use the University library system.....
I am beginning to think that this has been scrubbed from the internet.
That's what I'm thinking as well. I'm so glad you took the time to search and verify.
Well said, I can think of many posters here on FR that should read that line.
Cobra... the law does not mean what it does not say. And it does not say anything about children born on US soil.
I have access to some pretty heavy duty Search Engines, and I am coming up with NOTHING.
The silence is STAGGERING.
On Vattel
Emmerich de Vattel was the most popular of all writers on the law of nations in America before, but especially after, the American Revolution. Vattel’s {The Law of Nations} arrived, shortly after its publication, in an America, which had already been greatly influenced by Leibniz. No later than 1770, it was used as a textbook in colleges. It was often quoted in speeches before judicial tribunals and legislatures, and used in formulating policy. Following the Revolution, Vattel’s influence grew. Vattel was cited far more often than Grotius and Puffendorf, in court proceedings, from 1789 to 1820.
Among those citing Vattel in legal cases and government documents, were Benjamin Franklin, John Adams, James Wilson, Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, John Jay, and John Marshall. John Adams, the future delegate to the Continental Congress, second President of the U.S., and father of President John Quincy Adams, recorded in his Diary on Feb. 1, 1763, that after spending the day frivolously, instead of reading and thinking, ``The Idea of M. de Vattel indeed, scowling and frowning, haunted me.’’ In 1765, Adams copied into his Diary three statements by Vattel, ``of great use to Judges,’’ that laws should be interpreted according to the intent of the author, and every interpretation which leads to absurdity should be rejected. In a letter to the Foreign Minister of Denmark, in 1779, Benjamin Franklin quoted Vattel, and ``his excellent Treatise entitled {Le Droit des Gens.}’’ James Madison, as a member of the Continental Congress in 1780, drafted the instructions sent to John Jay, for negotiating a treaty with Spain, which quotes at length from {The Law of Nations.} Jay complained that this letter, which was probably read by the Spanish government, was not in code, and ``Vattel’s {Law of Nations,} which I found quoted in a letter from Congress, is prohibited here.’’ Later, John Marshall, during his thirty-four years as Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, quoted Vattel by far the most among all authors on the law of nations.
The Law of Nations} and The Declaration of Independence
Delegates to the First and Second Continental Congress, which produced the Declaration of Independence, often consulted {The Law of Nations,} as a reference for their discussions. One important reason why the delegates chose to meet in Carpenters Hall, was that the building also housed the Library Company of Philadelphia. The librarian reported that Vattel was one of the main sources consulted by the delegates during the First Continental Congress, which met from Sept. 5 to Oct. 26, 1774. Charles W.F. Dumas, an ardent supporter of the American cause, printed an edition of {The Law of Nations} in 1774, with his own notes illustrating how the book applied to the American situation. In 1770, Dumas had met Franklin in Holland, and was one of Franklin’s key collaborators in his European diplomacy. He sent three copies to Franklin, instructing him to send one to Harvard University, and to put one in the Philadelphia library. Franklin sent Dumas a letter, Dec. 9, 1775, thanking him for the gift. Franklin stated, ``I am much obliged by the kind present you have made us of
your edition of Vattel. It came to us in good season, when the circumstances of a rising state make it necessary frequently to consult the law of nations. Accordingly, that copy which I kept, has been continually in the hands of the members of our congress, now sitting ...|.’’
The study of {The Law of Nations} by the delegates to the Continental Congress, to answer questions ``of the circumstances of a rising state,’’ is reflected in the Declaration of Independence of July 4, 1776. The central ideas of that document are coherent with Vattel’s arguments on the criteria of a people to overthrow a tyrannical sovereign. The Declaration of Independence states that governments are instituted to fulfill the ``inalienable rights’’ of ``life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness,’’ and can be changed if they fail to meet these obligations to the people. Governments should not be changed for light and transient causes, but only after a long chain of abuses to the fundamental rights of the people, with repeated requests for redress of grievances, which were refused. Repeated appeals were made to our ``British Brethren,’’ but since they ``have been deaf to the voice of justice and of consanguinity,’’ we are prepared to face them either in war or in peace. Therefore, we declare ourselves independent of the British Crown, with the full powers of a sovereign government, ``to levy war, conclude peace, contract alliances, establish commerce, and to do all other acts and things which Independent States may of right do.’’
The inclusion of the central conception of {The Law of Nations,} Vattel’s Leibnizian concept of happiness, as one of the three inalienable rights, is a crucial statement of the Declaration’s Leibnizian character. The Declaration of Independence was prepared by a committee consisting of Benjamin Franklin, Thomas Jefferson, John Adams, Robert Livingston, and Roger Sherman. Jefferson was assigned by this committee to write the draft of the Declaration, after John Adams turned down the task, because of his numerous other responsibilities. The fact, that Jefferson was a strong proponent of the philosophy of John Locke by as early as 1771, is often used as evidence that the Declaration was based on Locke’s philosophy. However, Locke had argued, in his {Two Treatises of Government,} that the fundamental right of men is to ``Life, Liberty, and Property.’’ The inclusion of ``the pursuit of happiness,’’ rather than ``property,’’ as an inalienable right, was a crucial statement, that the American Revolution would be a battle for the establishment of a true Republic, rather than merely a dispute between two groups of aristocrats over the division of property.
Dumas’ Cipher — Benjamin Franklin's Favorite Cipher
Franklin's letter to Dumas dated April 30, 1776
This passage is taken from the introduction Dumas wrote of a book he sent to Franklin: Emerich de Vattel’s Le droit des gens (Law of Nations). Dumas had reprinted this work with his introduction and notes that applied its principles to the situation in America and had sent three copies to Franklin in 1775 (Franklin acknowledges it in his letter of December 19, 1775).
Since Dumas’ cipher is based on a passage in French, each letter has as many homophones as proportional to its frequency in French and K and W, not used in French, are not assigned a number. While the table illustrated above shows numbers 684-694 for W, these are struck out with a note “make use of two vs”. As for K, there is an instruction “use C”.
OK, this is really starting to creep me out. I can’t even find the BILL on THOMAS and The Library of Congress....
wiggieFool
Here comes another tingle;
The following is a clear definition of a Natural Born Citizen as one born to two parents (plural) in the House of Representitives
Journal of the House of Representatives of the United States, 1838-1839 MONDAY, January 28, 1839. Mr. Heman Allen submitted the following resolution; which was read, and debate arising, it was laid over, under the rule, viz: Resolved, That the Committee on the Judiciary be instructed to inquire into the expediency of so amending the law on the subject of naturalization, as to exclude those from the privileges of natural-born citizens who are or shall be born of parents
Conress defined a ‘Natural Born citizen’ as “”””natural-born citizens who are or shall be born of parents””””
Congress has spoken.
Crazy, isn’t it?
Chapter 19: Of our Native Country, and several Things that relate to it.
§211. What is our country.The whole of the countries possessed by a nation and subject to its laws, forms, as we have already said, its territory, and is the common country of all the individuals of the nation. We have been obliged to anticipate the definition of the term, native country
(§122), because our subject led us to treat of the love of our country,a virtue so excellent and so necessary in a state. Supposing then this definition already known, it remains that we should explain several things that have a relation to this subject, and answer the questions that naturally arise from it.
§212. Citizens and natives.The citizens are the members of the civil society: bound to this society by certain duties, and subject to its authority, they equally participate in its advantages. The natives, or natural-born citizens, are those born in the country, of parents who are citizens. As the society cannot exist and perpetuate itself otherwise than by the children of the citizens, those children naturally follow the condition of their fathers, and succeed to all their rights. The society is supposed to desire this, in consequence of what it owes to its own preservation; and it is presumed, as matter of course, that each citizen, on entering into society, reserves to his children the right of becoming members of it. The country of the fathers is therefore that of the children; and these become true citizens merely by their tacit consent. We shall soon see, whether, on their coming to the years of discretion, they may renounce their right, and what they owe to the society in which they were born. I say, that, in order to be of the country, it is necessary that a person be born of a father who is a citizen; for if he is born there of a foreigner, it will be only the place of his birth, and not his country.
§213. Inhabitants.The inhabitants, as distinguished from citizens, are foreigners, who are permitted to settle and stay in the country. Bound to the society by their residence, they are subject to the laws of the state, while they reside in it; and they are obliged to defend it, because it grants them protection, though they do not participate in all the rights of citizens. They enjoy only the advantages which the law or custom gives them. The perpetual inhabitants are those who have received the right of perpetual residence. These are a kind of citizens of an inferior order, and are united to the society, without participating in all its advantages. Their children follow the condition of their fathers; and as the state has given to these the right of perpetual residence, their right passes to their posterity.
§214. Naturalisation.A nation, or the sovereign who represents it, may grant to a foreigner the quality of citizen, by admitting him into the body of the political society. This is called naturalisation. There are some states in which the sovereign cannot grant to a foreigner all the rights of citizens,for example, that of holding public offices,and where, consequently, he has the power of granting only an imperfect naturalisation. It is here a regulation of the fundamental law, which limits the power of the prince. In other states, as in England and Poland, the prince cannot naturalise a single person, without the concurrence of the nation represented by its deputies. Finally, there are states, as, for instance, England, where the single circumstance of being born in the country naturalises the children of a foreigner.
§215. Children of citizens, born in a foreign country.It is asked, whether the children born of citizens in a foreign country are citizens? The laws have decided this question in several countries, and their regulations must be followed. By the law of nature alone, children follow the condition of their fathers, and enter into all their rights (§212); the place of birth produces no change in this particular, and cannot of itself furnish any reason for taking from a child what nature has given him; I say of itself, for civil or political laws may, for particular reasons, ordain otherwise. But I suppose that the father has not entirely quitted his country in order to settle elsewhere. If he has fixed his abode in a foreign country, he is become a member of another society, at least as a perpetual inhabitant; and his children will be members of it also.
§216. Children born at sea.As to children born at sea, if they are born in those parts of it that are possessed by their nation, they are born in the country: if it is on the open sea, there is no reason to make a distinction between them and those who are born in the country; for, naturally, it is our extraction, not the place of our birth, that gives us rights: and if the children are born in a vessel belonging to the nation, they may be reputed born in its territories; for it is natural to consider the vessels of a nation as parts of its territory, especially when they sail upon a free sea, since the state retains its jurisdiction over those vessels. And as, according to the commonly received custom, this jurisdiction is preserved over the vessels, even in parts of the sea subject to a foreign dominion, all the children born in the vessels of a nation are considered as born in its territory. For the same reason, those born in a foreign vessel are reputed born in a foreign country, unless their birth took place in a port belonging to their own nation: for the port is more particularly a part of the territory; and the mother, though at that moment on board a foreign vessel, is not on that account out of the country. I suppose that she and her husband have not quitted their native country to settle elsewhere.
§217. Children born in the armies of the state, or in the house of its minister at a foreign court.For the same reasons also, children born out of the country in the armies of the state, or in the house of its minister at a foreign court, are reputed born in the country; for a citizen, who is absent with his family on the service of the state, but still dependent on it, and subject to its jurisdiction, cannot be considered as having quitted its territory.
§218. Settlement.Settlement is a fixed residence in any place with an intention of always staying there. A man does not then establish his settlement in any place, unless he makes sufficiently known his intention of fixing there, either tacitly, or by an express declaration. However, this declaration is no reason why, if he afterwards changes his mind, he may not transfer his settlement elsewhere. In this sense, a person who stops at a place upon business, even though he stay a long time, has only a simple habitation there, but has no settlement. Thus the envoy of a foreign prince has not his settlement at the court where he resides.
The natural or original settlement is that which we acquire by birth, in the place where our father has his; and we are considered as retaining it, till we have abandoned it, in order to chuse another. The acquired settlement (adscititium) is that where we settle by our own choice.
§219. Vagrants.Vagrants are people who have no settlement. Consequently those born of vagrant parents have no country, since a mans country is the place where, at the time of his birth, his parents had their settlement (§122), or it is the state of which his father was then a member;which comes to the same point: for to settle for ever in a nation, is to become a member of it, at least as a perpetual inhabitant, if not with all the privileges of a citizen. We may, however, consider the country of a vagrant to be that of his child, while that vagrant is considered as not having absolutely renounced his natural or original settlement.
§220. Whether a person may quit his country.Many distinctions will be necessary in order to give a complete solution to the celebrated question, whether a man may quit his country or the society of which he is a member. 1. The children are bound by natural ties to the society in which they were born: they are under an obligation to shew themselves grateful for the protection it has afforded to their fathers, and are in a great measure indebted to it for their birth and education. They ought therefore to love it, as we have already shewn (§122),to express a just gratitude to it, and requite its services as far as possible by serving it in turn. We have observed above (§212), that they have a right to enter into the society of which their fathers were members. But every man is born free; and the son of a citizen, when come to the years of discretion, may examine whether it be convenient for him to join the society for which he was destined by his birth. If he does not find it advantageous to remain in it, he is at liberty to quit it on making it a compensation for what it has done in his favour,* and preserving, as far as his new engagements will allow him, the sentiments of love and gratitude he owes it. A mans obligations to his natural country may, however, change, lessen, or entirely vanish, according as he shall have quitted it lawfully, and with good reason, in order to choose another, or has been banished from it deservedly or unjustly, in due form of law, or by violence.
2. As soon as the son of a citizen attains the age of manhood, and acts as a citizen, he tacitly assumes that character; his obligations, like those of others who expressly and formally enter into engagements with society, become stronger and more extensive: but the case is very different with respect to him of whom we have been speaking. When a society has not been formed for a determinate time, it is allowable to quit it, when that separation can take place without detriment to the society. A citizen may therefore quit the state of which he is a member, provided it be not in such a conjuncture when he cannot abandon it without doing it a visible injury. But we must here draw a distinction between what may in strict justice be done, and what is honourable and conformable to every duty,in a word, between the internal and the external obligation. Every man has a right to quit his country, in order to settle in any other, when by that step he does not endanger the welfare of his country. But a good citizen will never determine on such a step without necessity, or without very strong reasons. It is taking a dishonourable advantage of our liberty, to quit our associates upon slight pretences, after having derived considerable advantages from them: and this is the case of every citizen with respect to his country.
3. As to those who have the cowardice to abandon their country in a time of danger, and seek to secure themselves instead of defending it, they manifestly violate the social compact, by which all the contracting parties engaged to defend themselves in an united body, and in concert: they are infamous deserters whom the state has a right to punish severely.*
§221. How a person may absent himself for a time.In a time of peace and tranquillity, when the country has no actual need of all her children, the very welfare of the state, and that of the citizens, requires that every individual be at liberty to travel on business, provided that he be always ready to return, whenever the public interest recalls him. It is not presumed that any man has bound himself to the society of which he is a member, by an engagement never to leave the country when the interest of his affairs requires it, and when he can absent himself without injury to his country.
§222. Variation of the political laws in this respect.The political laws of nations vary greatly in this respect. In some nations, it is at all times, except in case of actual war, allowed to every citizen to absent himself, and even to quit the country altogether, whenever he thinks proper, without alleging any reason for it.
These must be obeyed.This liberty, contrary in its own nature to the welfare and safety of society, can no where be tolerated but in a country destitute of resources and incapable of supplying the wants of its inhabitants. In such a country there can only be an imperfect society; for civil society ought to be capable of enabling all its members to procure by their labour and industry all the necessaries of life:unless it effects this, it has no right to require them to devote themselves entirely to it. In some other states, every citizen is left at liberty to travel abroad on business, but not to quit his country altogether, without the express permission of the sovereign. Finally, there are states where the rigour of the government will not permit any one whatsoever to go out of the country, without passports in form, which are even not granted without great difficulty. In all these cases it is necessary to conform to the laws, when they are made by a lawful authority. But in the last-mentioned case, the sovereign abuses his power, and reduces his subjects to an insupportable slavery, if he refuses them permission to travel for their own advantage, when he might grant it to them without inconvenience, and without danger to the state. Nay it will presently appear, that, on certain occasions, he cannot, under any pretext, detain persons who wish to quit the country with the intention of abandoning it for ever.
§223. Cases in which a citizen has a right to quit his country.There are cases in which a citizen has an absolute right to renounce his country, and abandon it entirely,a right, founded on reasons derived from the very nature of the social compact.1. If the citizen cannot procure subsistence in his own country, it is undoubtedly lawful for him to seek it elsewhere. For political or civil society being entered into only with a view of facilitating to each of its members the means of supporting himself, and of living in happiness and safety, it would be absurd to pretend that a member, whom it cannot furnish with such things as are most necessary, has not a right to leave it.
2. If the body of the society, or he who represents it, absolutely fail to discharge their obligations towards a citizen, the latter may withdraw himself. For if one of the contracting parties does not observe his engagements, the other is no longer bound to fulfil his; for the contract is reciprocal between the society and its members. It is on the same principle also that the society may expel a member who violates its laws.
3. If the major part of the nation, or the sovereign who represents it, attempt to enact laws relative to matters in which the social compact cannot oblige every citizen to submission, those who are averse to these laws have a right to quit the society, and go settle elsewhere. For instance, if the sovereign, or the greater part of the nation, will allow but one religion in the state, those who believe and profess another religion have a right to withdraw, and to take with them their families and effects. For they cannot be supposed to have subjected themselves to the authority of men, in affairs of conscience;* and if the society suffers and is weakened by their departure, the blame must be imputed to the intolerant party: for it is they who fail in their observance of the social compact, it is they who violate it, and force the others to a separation. We have elsewhere touched upon some other instances of this third case,that of a popular state wishing to have a sovereign (§33),and that of an independent nation taking the resolution to submit to a foreign power (§195).
§224. Emigrants.Those who quit their country for any lawful reason, with a design to settle elsewhere, are called emigrants, and take their families and property with them.
§225. Sources of their right.Their right to emigrate may arise from several sources. 1. In the cases we have just mentioned (§223), it is a natural right, which is certainly reserved to each individual in the very compact itself by which civil society was formed.
2. The liberty of emigration may, in certain cases, be secured to the citizens by a fundamental law of the state. The citizens of Neufchatel and Valangin in Switzerland may quit the country and carry off their effects at their own pleasure, without even paying any duties.
3. It may be voluntarily granted them by the sovereign.
4. Finally, this right may be derived from some treaty made with a foreign power, by which a sovereign has promised to leave full liberty to those of his subjects, who, for a certain reason, on account of religion for instance, desire to transplant themselves into the territories of that power. There are such treaties between the German princes, particularly for cases in which religion is concerned. In Switzerland likewise, a citizen of Bern who wishes to emigrate to Fribourg and there profess the religion of the place, and reciprocally a citizen of Fribourg who, for a similar reason, is desirous of removing to Bern, has a right to quit his native country, and carry off with him all his property.
It appears from several passages in history, particularly the history of Switzerland and the neighbouring countries, that the law of nations, established there by custom some ages back, did not permit a state to receive the subjects of another state into the number of its citizens. This vicious custom had no other foundation than the slavery to which the people were then reduced. A prince, a lord, ranked his subjects under the head of his private property: he calculated their number, as he did that of his flocks; and, to the disgrace of human nature, this strange abuse is not yet every where eradicated.
§226. If the sovereign infringes their right, he injures them.If the sovereign attempts to molest those who have a right to emigrate, he does them an injury; and the injured individuals may lawfully implore the protection of the power who is willing to receive them. Thus we have seen Frederic William,75 king of Prussia, grant his protection to the emigrant protestants of Saltzburgh.
§227. Supplicants.The name of supplicants is given to all fugitives who implore the protection of a sovereign against the nation or prince they have quitted. We cannot solidly establish what the law of nations determines with respect to them, until we have treated of the duties of one nation towards others.
§228. Exile and banishment.Finally, exile is another manner of leaving our country. An exile is a man driven from the place of his settlement, or constrained to quit it, but without a mark of infamy. Banishment is a similar expulsion, with a mark of infamy annexed.* Both may be for a limited time, or for ever. If an exile or banished man had his settlement in his own country, he is exiled or banished from his country. It is however proper to observe that common usage applies also the terms, exile and banishment, to the expulsion of a foreigner who is driven from a country where he had no settlement, and to which he is, either for a limited time or for ever, prohibited to return.
As a man may be deprived of any right whatsoever by way of punishment,exile, which deprives him of the right of dwelling in a certain place, may be inflicted as a punishment: banishment is always one; for a mark of infamy cannot be set on any one, but with the view of punishing him for a fault, either real or pretended.
When the society has excluded one of its members by a perpetual banishment, he is only banished from the lands of that society, and it cannot hinder him from living wherever else he pleases; for, after having driven him out, it can no longer claim any authority over him. The contrary, however, may take place by particular conventions between two or more states. Thus every member of the Helvetic confederacy may banish its own subjects out of the territories of Switzerland in general; and in this case the banished person will not be allowed to live in any of the cantons, or in the territories of their allies.
Exile is divided into voluntary and involuntary. It is voluntary, when a man quits his settlement, to escape some punish-ment, or to avoid some calamity,and involuntary, when it is the effect of a superior order.
Sometimes a particular place is appointed, where the exiled person is to remain during his exile; or a certain space is particularised, which he is forbid to enter. These various circumstances and modifications depend on him who has the power of sending into exile.
§229. The exile and banished man have a right to live somewhere.A man, by being exiled or banished, does not forfeit the human character, nor consequently his right to dwell somewhere on earth. He derives this right from nature, or rather from its author, who has destined the earth for the habitation of mankind; and the introduction of property cannot have impaired the right which every man has to the use of such things as are absolutely necessary,a right which he brings with him into the world at the moment of his birth.
§230. Nature of this right.But though this right is necessary and perfect in the general view of it, we must not forget that it is but imperfect with respect to each particular country. For, on the other hand, every nation has a right to refuse admitting a foreigner into her territory, when he cannot enter it without exposing the nation to evident danger, or doing her a manifest injury. What she owes to herself, the care of her own safety, gives her this right; and in virtue of her natural liberty, it belongs to the nation to judge, whether her circumstances will or will not justify the admission of that foreigner (Prelim. §16). He cannot then settle by a full right, and as he pleases, in the place he has chosen, but must ask permission of the chief of the place; and if it is refused, it is his duty to submit.
§231. Duty of nations towards them.However, as property could not be introduced to the prejudice of the right acquired by every human creature, of not being absolutely deprived of such things as are necessary,no nation can, without good reasons, refuse even a perpetual residence to a man driven from his country. But if particular and substantial reasons prevent her from affording him an asylum, this man has no longer any right to demand it,because, in such a case, the country inhabited by the nation cannot, at the same time, serve for her own use, and that of this foreigner. Now, supposing even that things are still in common, nobody can arrogate to himself the use of a thing which actually serves to supply the wants of another. Thus a nation, whose lands are scarcely sufficient to supply the wants of the citizens, is not obliged to receive into its territories a company of fugitives or exiles. Thus it ought even absolutely to reject them, if they are infected with a contagious disease. Thus also it has a right to send them elsewhere, if it has just cause to fear that they will corrupt the manners of the citizens, that they will create religious disturbances, or occasion any other disorder, contrary to the public safety. In a word, it has a right, and is even obliged, to follow, in this respect, the suggestions of prudence. But this prudence should be free from unnecessary suspicion and jealousy;it should not be carried so far as to refuse a retreat to the unfortunate, for slight reasons, and on groundless and frivolous fears. The means of tempering it will be never to lose sight of that charity and commiseration which are due to the unhappy. We must not suppress those feelings even for those who have fallen into misfortune through their own fault. For we ought to hate the crime, but love the man, since all mankind ought to love each other.
§232. A nation cannot punish them for faults committed out of its territories,If an exile or banished man has been driven from his country for any crime, it does not belong to the nation in which he has taken refuge, to punish him for that fault committed in a foreign country. For nature does not give to men or to nations any right to inflict punishment, except for their own defence and safety (§169); whence it follows, that we cannot punish any but those by whom we have been injured.
§233. except such as affect the common safety of mankind.But this very reason shews, that, although the justice of each nation ought in general to be confined to the punishment of crimes committed in its own territories, we ought to except from this rule those villains, who, by the nature and habitual frequency of their crimes, violate all public security, and declare themselves the enemies of the human race. Poisoners, assassins, and incendiaries by profession, may be exterminated wherever they are seized; for they attack and injure all nations, by trampling under foot the foundations of their common safety. Thus pirates are sent to the gibbet by the first into whose hands they fall. If the sovereign of the country where crimes of that nature have been committed, reclaims the perpetrators of them in order to bring them to punishment, they ought to be surrendered to him, as being the person who is principally interested in punishing them in an exemplary manner. And as it is proper to have criminals regularly convicted by a trial in due form of law, this is a second reason for delivering up malefactors of that class to the states where their crimes have been committed.
> Blackstone rejects the very existence of dual citizenship Bullsh!t. Blackstone is not some Chinese buffet where EnderWiggins gets to pick the broccoli beef while ignoring the General Tso's chicken. It's all or nothing. Just like post-1990 US State Dept directives regarding "dual citizenship", Blackstone acknowledged hundreds of years ago that as the British empire is strewn across all four corners of the globe, the concept of "dual nationality" is relevant and applicable to the Crown's Natural Born Subjects. Take those dimestore glasses off and read again:
Indeed the natural-born subject of one prince, to whom he owes allegiance, may be entangled by subjecting himself absolutely to another; but it is his own act that brings him into these straits and difficulties, of owing service to two masters; and it is unreasonable that, by such voluntary act of his own, he should be able at pleasure to unloose those bands, by which he is connected to his natural prince.You after-birthers keep trying to shift the focus onto Obama's mama and her US citizenry, when Blackstone, despite changes in current citizenship laws, would be VERY clear that Obama Jr is BOTH a US Citizen and a British Natural Born Subject:
But by several more modern statutes these restrictions are still farther taken off: so that all children, born out of the king's ligeance, whose fathers were natural-born subjects, are now natural-born subjects themselves, to all intents and purposes, without any exception (Source: http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/a1_8_4_citizenships1.html).
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