Was Nathan Bedford Forrest the Best Confederate Cavalry Leader in the West?

Had the Civil War not occurred when it did allowing Nathan Bedford Forrest to serve as a cavalry officer, we very likely would not be studying or even reading about him today. Of course the same could be said about Ulysses S. Grant and many other notable Civil War commanders. What separates Forrest from other successful general officers are his accomplishments despite his almost total lack of education or military background and his impoverished upbringing. His rise from private to lieutenant general was clearly earned, not gained through political influence or social standing. His military success are due to virtually every element which made up this man, but more importantly, how he conducted his martial career given his physical, mental and spiritual makeup is what arguably made him the best Confederate cavalry general during the war.

Forrest had little formal education, limited to six months, which is reflected many times when reading documents written personally by him and attempts by writers to describe his manner of speaking. Combined with this seeming handicap, he had no military training or experience prior to the Civil War, yet he became one of the best, if not the best, Confederate cavalry commanders. Forrest fought as a cavalry commander as he lived; he did not need Jomini or Clausewitz or years at West Point to show him how to fight or command, he entered the war with all the physical, mental and spiritual tools needed not only to survive but to prosper.

He rose from an impoverished background on a frontier farm where hard physical labor outdoors from sun up to sun down, and then inside by firelight, was the rule. This difficult life served to strengthen his congenitally hearty physique, but also to school him with practical knowledge about such every day things as the weather, domestic and wild animals, firearms, and horsemanship. Making do with what was at hand, inventing, improvising or modifying items to accomplish what must be done was routine; learning from these experiences was the key. But what he could not learn about resourcefulness he inherited; in addition to his strong physiognomy he showed a seeming fearlessness. This, combined with a temper often barely under control endowed the child and young man with an attitude and reputation which followed him throughout his life and marked his wartime career. He was as familiar as any small farmer with bloodshed as butchering farm animals or game was a normal part of his life. Too, he witnessed the death of several members of his family due to illness so he was inured to the transitory nature of life, human and animal. The self-reliant farm life also taught him when cooperation was needed whether it was a simple as getting a family member to help moving a heavy object to seeking neighbors' help raising a barn; he knew his limits. His life experiences and his success at overcoming routine and extraordinary obstacles by his own deeds made him realize that actions usually speak louder than words. But one of the things he did learn was that sometimes bluff, backed up by the threat of force, could succeed. Added to this he established a reputation that he saw could serve to obviate the need for physical force—the threat would suffice. But the many anecdotes about his early life show that he was not averse to use any weapons at hand to help in any affray. His childhood and early years combined with his genetic gifts predicted his wartime successes should he be able to apply them well.

His honesty and charisma undoubtedly also led to his doing well in business as well as war. To do well in business, especially slave trading, one must learn to understand and work well with people since his most lucrative business enterprise was selling humans to humans. Learning how to speak with, understand, and even manipulate and control others while observing their weaknesses and abilities are of great value to a military leader. Too, Forrest's maturity—40 years old in 1861—gave him a better vantage point than younger officers could have; his variegated life experiences for his first four decades offered a longer perspective and a plethora of events from which he could draw. However, Forrest's struggles to control his temper and his very strong sense of personal honor and integrity would hamper him throughout his military life. His strong individualistic trait and self reliance would serve to make him ofttimes a reluctant subordinate and make him shine as an independent commander.

Forrest's involvement with local and county governments enhanced his confidence in his abilities and his knowledge of organizations when, for example, he was a member of the board of Aldermen in Memphis. His successes as a planter and businessman helped his military career, initially by enabling him to pay for arms equipment to help supply his regiment, but also to bring his reputation as a businessman and citizen to allow him to raise a regiment. And he must have had no doubt as to which side he would embrace when the war began; he knew that his plantation required slave labor to be profitable and that his slave trading business would be ended if the North won, thus he and his family would have to start over should the North be victorious.

His first military forays proved that he was not averse to using unconventional and perhaps non regulation tactics such as taking hostages and threatening their lives to accomplish a mission. But his first major mounted action showed that he did have something to learn about tactics as he impetuously charged a Union line before his disorganized troopers were prepared and he was in clear danger of being killed. He was rescued by one of his subordinate officers who kept his head and did not engage in Forrest's initial wild pursuit of the Federal troopers. Forrest did, once those men came up, employ them well dismounting some and having small units go around each flank preparatory to a frontal charge which succeeded well routing the Union troopers. This action at Sacramento, Kentucky, showed Forrest that controlled aggression, using mounted and dismounted troopers, and flanking the enemy worked well. He probably also learned that headlong, wild, uncoordinated pursuits, no matter how brave, might not be the best way to attack an enemy, especially one who is prepared for the onslaught.

Forrest also learned much at Fort Donelson in February 1862. In his combined attack with part of the Orphan Brigade, the 2nd Kentucky, he saw that combining his cavalry with aggressive and well-led infantry could be more successful than either alone as these forces successfully sent W.H.L. Wallace's men and much of McClernand's division reeling, capturing cannon and many prisoners. In addition to this valuable tactical lesson, he learned from watching and speaking with the three generals in charge, Gideon J. Pillow, Simon B. Buckner, and John B. Floyd, how high rank does not confer military sagacity or even common sense as all three decided to surrender when escaping was a better option as Forrest quickly demonstrated. This pathetic display certainly enhanced his probably unconscious belief that operating as an independent commander would better suit him. Fort Donelson gave Forrest several valuable military lessons which included reinforcing to him the need to do his own scouting as false or inaccurate reports almost scuttled his escape attempt as it did for the three generals. He also found that surrendering was not part of his repertoire.

At Shiloh, Forrest's abandonment of his assigned position guarding fords at Lick Creek to join in the fighting showed that he still had not matured as a commander. As he covered the Confederate retreat to Corinth, another impetuous but initially successful charge halted the Union chase but almost resulted in his death; he was engulfed by Union infantry when his troopers wisely turned back upon seeing that they were vastly outnumbered. Forrest paid for his boldness by being seriously wounded, emphatically reinforcing this lesson. He continued to learn his trade as he later profited from watching some of his new troopers undergoing mounted drill of which he knew little. He was not afraid to learn from his subordinate officers what he did not know and taught them the hard reality of combat from his recent experiences.

His on-the-job training continued at his Murfreesboro raid which he first used his demand for surrender request and also his deploying his men so they appeared to be in great numbers. These tactics, along with hard fighting and not quitting when the battle was half won resulted in taking the entire garrison. Inflating his numbers and relying on his growing reputation while sowing misinformation served him well in all his later military adventures. Usually outnumbered, he relied on his cunning and knowledge of human nature to be his allies. He learned his earlier lessons of avoiding wild, disorganized frontal charges aptly demonstrated at Trenton, Tennessee, where once he learned that the Union was well fortified in the town, he used his artillery to good effect forcing them to surrender. Supplying his troopers with Union largesse was standard procedure by now as he tried to ensure that this, his third new command, was well-equipped.

All of his newly learned military wisdom combined with his normal aggression and fighting spirit was in evidence at Parker's Crossroads where he was in danger of being surrounded. He fought his way out aided by his desire not to surrender and the aggressive actions of his subordinate officers. That all of his lessons learned might not be sufficient was demonstrated by his actions at Fort Donelson in early 1863 which his part of the battle went poorly despite all his efforts. Forrest, who served under Joseph Wheeler in this battle, was furious perhaps at himself but his anger manifested itself by Forrest telling Wheeler he would never serve under him again. Forrest's human relations abilities failed here. That his temper was also not under constant control was shown when after the successful conclusion of the Streight raiders, he and a lieutenant he had insulted scuffled; Forrest was shot and the lieutenant died as a result of Forrest's stabbing him. Forrest's famous temper was again shown to Braxton Bragg after Bragg took some of his men and put them and Forrest under Wheeler's command. Reportedly, Forrest did everything short of challenging his commanding officer to a duel, disrespect Forrest showed to all of his commanders whom he believed were threatening him by personal attacks or by persecuting him.

Forrest showed that his bluffing ability was raised to a fine art possibly exceeded his renowned fighting ability when, after chasing Abel Streight's mule-mounted infantry, he forced his surrender by multiplying his numbers by crafty marching and deploying and redeploying his artillery. But his most famous victory, Brice's Cross Roads, involved little bluffing; it combined his knowledge of the enemy's movements and composition, how he would react to Forrest's initial actions, and how to best use the terrain and weather to allow his much smaller force to defeat its larger and better equipped foe. He had to use all of his knowledge, skills and personal ability to fight the enemy to a standstill, out flank him on both flanks, while engaging him in frontal assaults during which Forrest battled from the front. Here, in sole command, his abilities shown as he and his men turned a retreat into a wonderful rout. During the rout, he again employed a tactic he often used of chasing the retreating foe by rotating his units so that he could continue the pressure incessantly by always having a rested unit in closely pursuing an exhausted enemy. Brice's Cross Roads showed that Forrest was more than just a raider.

His final success as a commander was ironically during his service as rear guard for Hood's defeated army retreating from Nashville. He performed excellent rear guard actions saving as much as possible of the remnants of the Army of Tennessee but this and subsequent actions depressed Forrest as he saw that the Union juggernaut was impossible to stop. During Wilson's Selma Campaign, Forrest performed as well as he could being heavily outnumbered suffering another wound. He knew his war was over. Though Forrest best operated independently and arguably best as a raider, he was usually always aware of general strategy. The best example of this was his desire to strike Sherman's long supply line as Sherman was chasing Joseph E. Johnston. By this stage of the war, Forrest knew that the North's manpower and supply advantages meant that direct confrontation was impossible so cutting the monster's long tail and gobbling up small outposts was the best approach. One of his last and most notable successes was his remarkable destruction of Union supplies, facilities and even boats during his late 1864 raid along the Tennessee River. Mounting his artillery on captured boats highlighted his ingenuity. The weak southern rail network which worked fairly well during the first two years of the war was failing as facilities wore out or were destroyed by Union advances and raiders. This also meant that more and more Forrest had to live off the land and supply himself from captured Union armaments and supplies. The South's ability to concentrate large armies quickly to confront Union armies was curtailed making Forrest even more necessary for any hope remaining for the South.

Unfortunately, for Southern hopes, Confederate leadership in the west and in Richmond recognized too late that Forrest and his tactics were the only hope left to salvage anything in the western theater. Undoubtedly his prickly attitude and open disparagement of commanders who he believed were either incompetent or actively seeking to thwart his personal or military endeavors did not help him. All of the lessons Forrest learned in the first years of the war could have been put to good use but for the short sightedness and less-than-aggressive attitude of many of his commanders, most notably Braxton Bragg. Forrest never had a Robert E. Lee to appreciate and exploit his talents as Lee did with Jeb Stuart. The Civil War gave Forrest the stage to fully display the life and personality which contributed so much to the Southern cause.

I read that book. I will wait on the edge of my seat for your return. LOL!

From High Tide at Gettysburg by Glenn Tucker, Chapter 20, The Council and The Captain, Section 2, Lee's Letters Are Found in the Mailbag:

"Captain Ulric Dahlgren had a roving Federal calvary squadron, which on July 2 he took across South Mountain at the Monterey Pass, led through Waynesboro, and halted at Greencastle, where he was greeted much as if he were a conqueror, to the gratification of his pride and vanity.

He had just reached the age of 20. His father, Admiral John Adolf Dahlgren, after whom the big, bottle shaped, smooth bore naval guns were named, was one of Lincoln's close confidants, whom the President, with his tinkering and inventive instincts, delighted to visit. Ulric was well acquainted with all the great figures of Washington whom the President brought to Admiral Dahlgren's house, stopping on visits to the Navy Yard, and probably could have had any type of military career he desired. But he had entered the dashing cavalry arm and was serving as a foot-loose patrol of Kilpatrick's division around Gettysburg.

Young Dahlgren was about to engage in as exploit that would fascinate the army and the capital, enliven the newspaper columns, win him a jump promotion over two grades, from captain to colonel, and ultimately lead to his death in circumstances that left him one of the figures in the Federal Army most odious to the South.

The sight of Dahlgre's blue column, in the rear of Lee's army, aroused the citizens who had watched so long the passing of the Southern host. The entire Greencastle population was brought to the streets. Dahlgren, accepting their cheers for a time, ordered them back into their houses and restored the town to a normal appearance. Then he hid his troopers around the corners of the public square, making ready to intercept and communications on that afternoon between Lee's army and the Confederate capital, for he was on the main route. With the trap set, he climbed to the belfry of the Dutch Reformed Church and surveyed the surrounding country with his glasses.

Sure enough, a Confederate cavalry company was approaching from the south. It was not well led and came into town blindly, without even outriders or an advance party. Jeb Stuart had contributed so much already to Lee's discomfiture that it seems superfluous to mention other instances. But if Stuart had been on hand properly discharging his duties, one of which was to protect the army's communications, Lee's rear would not have been exposed to the molestation of such small Federal bodies as Dahlgren's. Robertson, Jones, and Imboden were supposed to be watching, but their forces were limited and Stuart's vigorous leadership was lacking.

As the Confederate troop came into the square, Dahlgren's men dashed out suddenly with a shrill yell, fired their pistols, and, more by the impetuosity of their assault than by their numbers, threw the Southern column into disorder and flight. The prisoners included 3 officers and 14 men.

Then Dahlgren discovered what a treasure of intelligence he had captured. The detachment was bringing up the official Richmond mail addressed to General Lee, and even cursory examination disclosed to the Federal cavalry captain its significance. Dahlgren set out at once for Meade's headquarters, about thirty-five miles away. So concerned was he lest he encounter another body of Confederates and have his packet wrested from him, on leaving Waynesboro, he split his command and had part of the men form a barricade on the eastern hill by piling wagons and farm equipment across the roadway. He crossed again over Monterey Pass, moved by Emmitsburg, and finally handed the Confederate mailbag to Meade's chief of staff, General Butterfield. Butterfield read the letters and went at once to Meade. The hour is uncertain, but it must have been near midnight.

The correspondence showed that Lee's force on Seminary Hill was the full load of the invasion.

Lee would not receive the reinforcements of Corse's, Jenkins', or Cooke's brigades. He would have to detach men from his own army to keep his communications open. Beauregard would not establish a second front in Virginia threatening Washington. This highly important phase of Lee's planning - the assembly of an actual army, or "an army in effigy," at Culpeper, to menace the Federal capital from the south while Lee was on its flank in Pennsylvania - had collapsed.

All this was clear from the correspondence. Meade need not worry about any sudden foray on Washington, or the arrival of reinforcements for Lee, or operations against his own rear, or anything except the embattled Confederate army in his immediate front. The reading of these dispatches bolstered Meade's confidence; if, as some have felt, it had been as limp as a wisp of smoke, it quickly came as stiff as a gun barrel."

Its meaningless to this conversation. As the quotes from the book note, Dahlgren intercepted the mail bag around midnight July 2nd.

By that time, Meade already KNEW he was facing the entire Army of Northern Virginia. He knew which corps were where to the northeast, north, northwest, west, southwest of his position atop Cemetary Ridge. The decision to stay and ‘fight it out’ was being made AT the time of Dahlgren’s ‘discovery’. This is heavily noted in every CW history worth opening, due to the ‘council of war’ Meade called on the evening of July 2nd.

Every Union Corps commander was present.

btw, there is a helluva big difference between intercepting a mail bag that had some correspondence from Lee, and intercepting Lee’s plan of battle, as was alleged up above.

As for Stuart.....(chuckle)

The man screwed up, big time. I don’t think it would have changed the end result, but I’ve looked high and low throughout my own library on the subject, and the internet and its thousands of forums on the topic.

I keep coming back to Stuart’s own men noting he ‘worried them out with concerns about pomp and foppery he was so fond of’ the three days before Brandy Station took place, and his actions immediately afterward influenced his decision making during the Gettysburg campaign, with disasterous results.

No need, I saw them the last time you posted them.

Stuart failed to keep Lee informed of any Union movements in reaction to taking Winchester, and then moving north into first Maryland, then Pennsylvania.

He failed in that task. There is no mitigating it.

Since you first put forth that theory, with fine documentation I might add, I’ve given your view serious consideration. I”ve always found the ‘Boy Cavalier’ facinating.

But in the summer of 1863, he was thrown ‘off his game’ as a result of his ego, and his love of the ladies. The whole ‘grand review’ which given the circumstances was in fact a gross waste of resources, time, and horseflesh, kept him from aggressively challenging any Union attempt at a raid, which Pleasanton (of all people to be taken surprise by, outside of Kilpatrick/Kill cavalry, this was the worst) took full advantage of at Brandy Station.

Its my belief the Army of Northern Virginia, from Robert E Lee on down the line to the lowest private, became unbelievably ARROGANT after Chancellorsville, which we both know had thundered to its conclusion six weeks before Lee began the ‘second invasion of the North’. It also explains Lees insane suicidal charge on July 3rd....

You can see this arrogance throughout all the coorespondence of that time frame (June 1863 to July 4th, 1863) in how the invasion was laid out, how lax the orders given were throughout the entire matter, excepting the withdrawal, which Lee himself issued detailed instructions both in writing and verbally to Imboden for example.

Stueart? He took the least inhibiting viewpoint of the orders you are basing your theory on, and simply ignored them once he crossed the River. The clear fact remains after advancing only 20 some miles in 24 hours, having found his planned line of advance blocked by the UNION ARMY, he should have turned around and REPORTED THE MOVEMENT.

He did not do so, for one reason, and one reason only. He was exceedingly aware of the Richmond papers for the first time, castigating him publicly for getting caught by surprise at Brandy Station. So he was determined to exceed his first two famous ‘rides around the Union army’ and retrieve his faltering personal reputation.

JEB Stuart was a magnficent cavalry officer throughtout the Civil War....with the exception of his performance from June 22nd to July 3rd of 1863. IN those two weeks, he failed miserably, by his own hand, not by anything inflicted upon him by the opposing force.

Excluding his surprise by Pleasanton, that is.

Some of the blame can and should be laid at Robert E Lee’s feet, no disputing it. He could have recalled Jenkins days earlier, but he refused to do so. He could have sent the cavalry that was with his army forward, but he refused to do that as well, seeing it as a rebuke of Stuart primarily from what I can tell, and you know as well if not better than I his fondness for his ‘cadet Cavalier’.

That said, Stuart failed in his primary job of being the ‘eyes and ears of Lee’s army’ a job he had performed prior to this incident, and after this incident, as well as any Cavalry Officer ever has in my view.

I read something long ago that seems pertinent here. Orders are a guide for a good officer. Thats all. Nothing has come down from the Mount written in stone...well, since the tablets of lore.

Stuart should have known better, in fact he did know better. He simply couldn’t let go of the sting of criticism from the Richmond papers which up to that point had showered him with acolades pretty much from day one of the conflict, and it adversely affected his judgement as a commander.

The ‘arrogance’ of which I speak of above can also be seen in how the Army of Northern Virginia approached Gettysburg in the first place. Besides placing his least experienced corps commanders ‘first in line’ ahead of his only remaining, tried and tested corps commander (Longstreet) he let the new corps commanders Ewell and Hill ‘lead’.

Ewell, as history notes, was at best mediocre in the job. Hill was simply careless as he was at Mechanicsville, and then again late in the war where he got 2,000 troops killed in an ambush near a dam (sometime in 1864).

Even though Hill was informed ‘Union Cavalry is in Gettysburg’ he still allowed Heth to go ‘looking for shoes’ which in itself is one of the most oft repeated LIES of the entire war (there was no shoe manufacturing facility in Gettysburg EVER in its history).

Its my belief, and the belief of many of the parks resident experts Heth and others concocted the fable about ‘looking for shoes’ to hide the fact Heth too failed to obey his instructions. Henry Heth had a thirst for glory just like every other Virginian in command that summer of 1863, and it caused him to disregard all established protocal and orders, forcing a fight when Lee specifically said not to bring on a ‘general engagement til the army is up’.

The arrogance brought about by Chancellorsville was worth two large corps to the Army of the Potomac over the next three days, as history shows us.

Its meaningless to this conversation. As the quotes from the book note, Dahlgren intercepted the mail bag around midnight July 2nd.

No it's not. I'm not going to type in the whole chapter but the pages prior to the section I submitted details how little confidence Meade had. My point was that if 'intel' about the Southern Army had not been intercepted, Meade's cautious nature may have put him in reverse.

Meade already KNEW he was facing the entire Army of Northern Virginia.

Not according to Tucker's account, which is a highly credible book on Gettysburg.

The decision to stay and ‘fight it out’ was being made AT the time of Dahlgren’s ‘discovery’.

It was a vote by the other corp commanders. The northern army held 'war councils'. The war council made recommendations to remain in the field, which Meade accepted. There's a monster difference between 'accepting a recommendation' and 'making a decision'.

At the time Dahlgren intercepted the mail bag, Meade was drawing up plans for a retreat.

btw, there is a helluva big difference between intercepting a mail bag that had some correspondence from Lee, and intercepting Lee’s plan of battle, as was alleged up above.

A memory discrepancy on my part. However, mailbag or battle plan, it was interception of 'intel' that supports my point.

As for Stuart.....(chuckle)

As you probably know, the leadership styles between Lee and his northern counterparts was quite different. Lee's orders were often left open to interpretation, which is what made Jackson so successful because he understood Lee so well. If my memory serves, as it sometimes does, Stuart simply misinterpreted Lee's orders.

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