The Case Against Medical Marijuana

There are two fairly well-defined positions that have emerged regarding the issue, under consideration by the Supreme Court of the United States of America, of whether the use of marijuana should be legalized for the treatment of certain medical conditions.

The first of these sees marijuana's limited legalization as, in almost all cases, the effort of so-called "stoners" (in contemporary parlance people who pretty much can't live without getting high on marijuana on a daily basis) to find a way to circumvent existing laws that criminalize the use of wacky weed so that they (the stoners), with the consent of their croakers (q.v., below), can stay high all the time with impunity. Those who oppose passing laws which legalize the use of marijuana in "medically" sanctioned cases are seen by those who favor such laws' passage as inflexible obstructionists (scare quotes intended to emphasize the rather cynical view taken by opponents of legalization to the validity of the term "medical").

The term "croaker" is Beat-Generation slang for "doctor." I first encountered it in the writings of William S. Burroughs. Its meaning has since the 1950s been narrowed somewhat to denote a physician who stretches prescription medication guidelines to insure that his or her patients do not have to endure existential pain beyond what contemporary drug mediation can guarantee is acceptable. Under the proposed new laws, I can't imagine marijuana becoming anything — at least in California — but a substance any croaker would readily prescribe for patients with the same sort of substance cravings Burroughs and his cronies flaunted 50 years ago, and for which their croakers provided relief by prescribing opiates when heroin (Burroughs' drug of choice) was in short supply.

On the other side of this issue are those who favor the blanket legalization of medical marijuana. The "medical" umbrella seems to be providing, for people who would ultimately remove any restrictions whatsoever on smoking grass, something of an entry-level platform from which they might leverage across-the-board approval of the use of boo to ameliorate pretty much any condition that might create stress in any human who tends to respond to "stressful" situations by freaking out. All of this is to say that, where the use of marijuana is concerned, the currently-enumerated "medical" conditions are designed to protect a sub-class of American citizens from coping with their lives in traditionally accepted (read "pharmacologically unmediated") ways.

In fact, if such legislation is allowed by the Supreme Court to stand, it will become not much more than an excuse for a bunch of pot-smokers of every ilk to do what abusers of the Americans With Disabilities Act and their attorneys have done: find ways to twist and subvert and otherwise undermine legislation designed to provide succor to a class of American citizens who are legitimately entitled to government-sanctioned relief from their afflictions so that the legislation in question becomes the instrument, in this case, for a bunch of stoners "getting over" at the expense of American taxpayers, who will minimally be presented with the bill for legal fees in the lawsuits that result from potheads' bringing actions against the state if they are denied, for any reason whatsoever, funded access to the drug which has been the foundation of their lifestyles for, in many cases, the past several decades.

But these arguments beg the real question, which has to focus on the consequences for human brain chemistry and, subsequently, human behavior, of the overuse of psychotropic substances. A psychotropic substance is one which, when ingested and absorbed into the bloodstream, interacts directly with brain chemistry to alter moods and behavior. Psychotropic substances can dramatically change the way we feel and the way we respond to our environments. Psychotropic substances are all potentially addictive, and marijuana is most assuredly a psychotropic substance.

Let me backtrack a bit. Hundreds of substances — from the caffeine in coffee to the nicotine in cigarettes to the alcohol in "adult" beverages — that many of us routinely ingest are psychotropic. Add to these innumerable prescription drugs, from antidepressants to allergy medications to painkillers to stimulants, and you'll begin to get an idea of the range of "acceptable" psychotropic substances tens of millions of Americans consume on a daily basis. And I haven't even mentioned so-called "street" drugs, from ecstasy to cocaine to heroin to marijuana, that millions more Americans use on a more-or-less regular basis.

What no legislation, and no public policy that I'm aware of, has ever taken into account is the biochemistry of drug use. While physicians routinely prescribe drugs that have jarring effects on human brain chemistry, they also routinely fail to acknowledge or to advise their patients that such drugs, although often suppressing symptoms of everything from allergies to depression, at the same time alter brain chemistry in such a way that the humans taking the drugs become more and more dependent on them and that their bodies and psyches are consequently less and less able to mount natural responses to their conditions. In other words, the greater the degree to which you rely on any sort of psychotropic drug to mediate between you and the events of your life, the less "human" you become.

THC, the psychotropic ingredient in marijuana, substitutes for the brain chemical anandamide, which plays a role in such important functions as memory, mood, appetite, and pain perception (just in case you were wondering why stoners can't seem to concentrate, can't recall what's happened from one moment to the next, and need to be constantly resupplied with munchies). But while no one is arguing that marijuana might not play some role in mitigating certain types of pain, becoming an habitual marijuana user has other significantly damaging side effects, including lethargy, loss of motivation, inability to focus, the aforementioned memory lapses, and, after prolonged use, difficulty in experiencing pleasure, among numerous others.

Legislation which broadens the scope of acceptability of our use of psychotropic substances — no matter whether the substance be marijuana or Paxil, cocaine or Ritalin (Ritalin, for the record, interacts to disrupt brain chemistry in exactly the same way cocaine does) — is legislation that expands institutional authority over what we accept as "human." This is to say that legislation which expands the acceptability and the legality of using psychotropic substances for the purpose of helping us cope with the physical or psychological pain of existence is legislation which contributes, ultimately, to the disaffirmation of our humanity, of our ability to experience fully what it means to be human.

This is not to say that I don't favor, for instance, the use of painkilling prescription drugs to ease the suffering of those who are in the final stages of a terminal illness. The use of painkillers for the purpose of making bearable another human's last days on earth is to me not only an acceptable but even an honorable application of modern pharmacology. Nor do I object to the short-term use of prescription psychotropic substances in times of crisis, such as enabling someone to bear otherwise debilitating pain while recovering from physical or emotional trauma.

Rather, at issue here is the legitimization of what has been regarded as a "street" drug for the purpose of ameliorating the suffering associated (at least anecdotally) with certain medical conditions. (Indeed, the evidence that marijuana is effective in reducing physical pain among its users is totally anecdotal to my knowledge.) Further, the issue involves adding yet one more psychotropic substance to the list of such substances that can be legally used to reduce our humanness, our ability to build the natural strength to respond to the events and conditions of our lives without biochemical mediation. It is, finally, for this reason that I would argue against the legalization of marijuana use for medical purposes.

Writer Greg Lewis is co-author, with Dr. Charles Gant, of the Warner Books hardcover "End Your Addiction Now." Dr. Lewis is a frequent contributor of political and cultural commentaries to several websites. His next book, "The Politics of Anger: How Marxism's Heirs Are Redefining Liberalism in America Today," is due out in late Spring. Read more of his work at http://www.GregLewis.org

Regarding the power to regulate commerce among the several states, it was the Founder's intent that the states themselves rectify injustices, rather than Congress. This does not preclude Congress from acting, however, and acting in a manner consistent with the wording in the Commerce Clause itself.

That was the intent. I have no problem with that.

You're begging the question, rp. I didn't ask what your interpretation of their intent was. I asked if that interpretation is removed from a pursuit of a particular political agenda. Are you interpreting their words to try and determine what their intent was, or to find a possible interpretation that conforms to your intent, however unlikely that interpretion might be when viewed in the context of the body of evidence?

"And the "and preventative" would encompass positive actions by Congress."

That is not what it means, though you are correct in that Congress may use their power to regulate commerce among the several states to enact legislation which would prevent injustices.

But, like inquest, you are confusing "positive actions" with "positive purposes". They are not the same.

Congress is expected to act for the positive purposes of the General Government -- enacting legislation for the good of the country. Congress could take a "negative action" (prohibiting the interstate transportation of unhealthy beef") for a "positive purpose" (the general health of the nation).

"This leaves the phrase "a negative and preventive provision against injustice among the States themselves" as a complete description of the power,"

Nope. Only half the power.

The power to regulate commerce among the several states was to be used two ways: It was to be used among the states themselves as a negative and preventive provision against injustice AND it was to be used by Congress as a power for the positive purposes of the General Government, which includes removing injustices.

When it came to removing injustices, however, it was Madison's intent that the states themselves do it.

I said the injustice may be corrected by the states in federal court or by an act of Congress. It was Madison's intent that the states themselves do this, rather than Congress.

Yes, you've said it. You just haven't been able to produce a lucid, rational argument for why that makes interpeting Madison's comments to exclude the pursuit of the "positive purposes of the General Government" as a valid exercise of the power to RCATSS in error.

Take this post and place it in your "Favorites" folder for future reference if you can't keep things straight in your head.

If you don't have any objections, I'll reserve the right to tell you where to place posts in the future.

No. What is certain, according to his letter, is that when it comes to injustices, he would intend that the states handle that, rather than Congress. He did NOT say Congress wasn't allowed to rectify injustices.

It is certain that he did not explicitly say the the power to RCATSS was intended to be used "for the positive purposes of the General Government". Nowhere in these letters, or in any of the other writings of the Founders do they make any reference to the grant of the power for that purpose, or discuss using it for any purpose other than correcting injustices.

Are you saying that Congress cannot correct injustices under the "positive purposes of the General Government"?

Are you saying that in the context of this sentence "correcting injustices" and the "positive purposes of the General Government" and not considered as separate concepts?

Would preventing the shipment of infected cattle to another state prevent an injustice? Would it be considered "unjust" for someone to ship infected cattle to a stockyard, and thereby infecting healthy cattle that don't belong to them? Would it discourage the interstate commerce in cattle if people were afraid to ship them for fear they might become infected in transit?

The power to regulate commerce among the several states was to be used two ways: It was to be used among the states themselves as a negative and preventive provision against injustice

States cannot use a power reserved to Congress.

AND it was to be used by Congress as a power for the positive purposes of the General Government, which includes removing injustices.

Madison made a distinction between removing injustices and positive purposes. You are corrupting his words.

When it came to removing injustices, however, it was Madison's intent that the states themselves do it.

Then why did he write: "Congress shall have power to RCATSS"?

"I didn't ask what your interpretation of their intent was.

Who's should I use? There are three that are active right now: yours, mine (the same as Madison's), and inquests. There may be four or five, if we had more posters.

If I am to answer your question, which am I to use?

Are you interpreting their words to try and determine what their intent was, or "

The "original intent" means nothing unless it was meant to convey the "sole intent". I see nothing in the Commerce Clause where correcting injustices is the "sole" intent. I see nothing in Madison's letter or anywhere else where he says it is the "sole" intent. Do you?

If a clause may constitutionally be used for 10 different intents, who cares what the original one was?

I don't see you digging into the "original intent" behind the meaning of "arms" in the second amendment. That the "original intent" of the Founding Fathers was to prevent the federal government from infringing on their single-shot muskets and single-shot pistols. So, therefore, those are the only weapons protected from infringement today.

But when it comes to the Commerce Clause though, regulate only means removing injustices, commerce only means goods, among the several states only means interstate commerce -- even though those definitions do not appear in the U.S. Constitution.

"to exclude the pursuit of the "positive purposes of the General Government""

When it came to removing injustices, however, it was Madison's intent that the states themselves do it. This doesn't "exclude" using the power for the positive purposes of the General Government.

"It is certain that he did not explicitly say the the power to RCATSS was intended to be used "for the positive purposes of the General Government"."

Baloney. Then why even mention it? He could have simply said:

"Yet it is very certain that it grew out of the abuse of the power by the importing States in taxing the non-importing, and was intended as a negative and preventive provision against injustice among the States themselves."

The power to RCATSS includes its use for the positive purposes of the General Government".

I see nothing in Madison's letter or anywhere else where he says it is the "sole" intent. Do you?

Right here:

"... and was intended as a negative and preventive provision against injustice among the States themselves, rather than as a power to be used for the positive purposes of the General Government,

Now, you can ignore the definition of "rather than" and substitute your own, but we will continue to point out that you are corrupting the English language in doing so.

"Are you saying that in the context of this sentence "correcting injustices" and the "positive purposes of the General Government" and not considered as separate concepts?"

They are not separate concepts. If Congress were to enact a law correcting an injustice, they would get the power to do this from the Commerce Clause. This is referred to by Madison in his letter as a power used for the "positive purposes of the General Government".

Where do you think Congress gets the power to correct injustices? Do they even have that power? In your opinion, how does Madison refer to that power in his letter -- as a "preventative provision? C'mon.

"If that is the case, then the use of the term "rather than" in the sentence renders it nonsensical."

Not at all. As a matter of fact, the use of "rather than" proves that there areat least two uses. If there was only one use, why compare it to something else?

The power to regulate commerce among the several states was to be used two ways: 1) It was to be used among the states themselves as a negative and preventive provision against injustice AND 2) it was to be used by Congress as a power for the positive purposes of the General Government, which includes removing injustices.

When it came to removing injustices, however, it was Madison's intent that the states themselves do it rather than Congress.

Once again, you are corrupting the meaning of "rather than". When Madison says, "rather than for the positive purposes...", it means the power to RCATSS was not to be used for the "positive purposes..."

Where do you think Congress gets the power to correct injustices? Do they even have that power? In your opinion, how does Madison refer to that power in his letter -- as a "preventative provision?

Exactly. The power to RCATSS "was intended as a negative and preventive provision...":

Class V. Words Releasing to the Voluntary Powers

637. Provision.

--Roget's International Thesaurus. 1922.

As a matter of fact, the use of "rather than" proves that there areat least two uses. If there was only one use, why compare it to something else?

Job 32: "against Job was his wrath kindled, because he justified himself rather than God."

Did Job justify both himself AND God, or did he justify himself AND NOT God?

§ 6. rather than

The phrase rather than consists of an adverb and a conjunction and often means "and not," as in I decided to skip lunch rather than eat in the cafeteria again.

Rather than can also be used with nouns as a compound preposition meaning "instead of": I bought a mountain bike rather than a ten-speed

--The American Heritage® Book of English Usage.

When it came to removing injustices, however, it was Madison's intent that the states themselves do it rather than Congress.

Using the proper definition of "rather than", your sentence means that the man who wrote "Congress shall have power to RCATSS", is saying "States, not Congress, shall have power to RCATTS".

Not at all. As a matter of fact, the use of "rather than" proves that there areat least two uses. If there was only one use, why compare it to something else?

To exclude that use as a valid exercise of the power. The expression of that intent is accompished by separating them with the term "rather than". If the intent was to include either possible use expressing that intent would be accomplished by using the term "and", or some other term of inclusion.

When it came to removing injustices, however, it was Madison's intent that the states themselves do it rather than Congress.

And after repeated requests, you can produce no evidence to support such a grammatically convoluted interpretatation of this letter. What evidence do you have in the other writings of the Founders that it is necessary to attribute such a strained construction in order to make it consistent with the intent of the clause expressed in those other writings? If no such evidence exists, why even engage in the exercis, and on what basis do you deem this the "correct" interpretation over the grammatically apparent one?

"then it is nonsensical to talk about one, "rather than" the other."

There is Concept A: Correcting injustices in the courts by the states themselves, and Concept B: Congress correcting injustices under the "positive purposes of the General Government"?

I'll ask you again. Are you saying that Congress cannot correct injustices under the "positive purposes of the General Government"?

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