Posted on 12/10/2003 4:11:16 AM PST by drstevej
Exurge, Calvinisti, et judica causam tuam...
Arise (some mss read Swarm), O Calvinists, and plead your cause. The doctrines of grace are mightily assailed by those who would proclaim with their father, “I will be like the Most High.” Set forth the biblical case for a sovereign God who is jealous for His glory. Disallow through disputation (and lampooning when needed) the damnable errors of those who have refashioned the great sola doctrines into a salvation-helper gospel that exalts the fallen will of man.
From every corner, in every thread exalt the right of God to do whatsoever He pleaseth. Be not dismayed by persistent anthropocentric rantings. Blessed are you when they revile you for the sake of the truth. Happy are ye when the Servetus card is played and the strawmen are paraded before you for He who is enthroned in heaven reigns.
– Pope Piel I, Thread Pope
Incorrect, Xzins. You were freed, only to change masters. Regardless, you are still enslaved. You are not your own.
Romans 6:22 - "But now, having been freed from sin and enslaved to God, you derive your benefit, resulting in sanctification, and the outcome, eternal life."
Cordially,
Arminian and Romish freedom is the power of contrary choice. There is nothing, absolutely nothing in any circumstance in heaven above, or earth beneath, or the waters under the earth—but especially in heaven above—that necessitates a given volition. The opposite choice is always as possible as the one chosen.But what might divine freedom be? One thing is clear. There is no power, circumstance, or principle external to God that necessitates or even induces him to do anything. Of course, before the creation of the world there were no circumstances at all, though some philosopher might say that there were eternal principles external to him. But for the Christian there was nothing before he created something. But does this mean that God could have chosen no[t] to create?
The confusion that permeates discussion on this subject arises from the rather natural impulse to understand the will of God as similar to the will of man, or, more accurately, similar to what many theologians think the will of man is. In particular, they picture God as earlier undecided, and later at a moment in time God makes a choice. The theologian may indeed recognize that there is no external motivation, but he still holds to the possibility that God could have willed otherwise.
This confusion is due to the fact that the authors often forget that God is immutable. Grotius seems to have argued that no one form of atonement is absolutely necessary. The law, he maintains, is a product of the divine will and not something inherent in his nature. Therefore God is free to enforce, to abrogate, or in any way to alter the laws. Grotiusis not the only one who seems to assume that God’s will is free in the sense that he can change his mind at any time. Freedom, however, should be defined, and the implications of the definition should be stated. For example, human freedom may consist in the circumstance that one’s conduct is not determined by physicochemical law. From this definition, if accepted, it follows that the universe is not a mechanism. But, so far as this definition goes, human conduct can be necessitated by a divine teleological law. As for the freedom of God, he is surely free from control by any superior power, for there is no power superior to God. But as immutable by nature—see Grotius’s distinction between will and nature a few lines above—God’s will and action are unalterable.
Hodge—who rejects Grotius’s view of the atonement—is perhaps a little, but not much, better. God, he says, "wills the precept because it is intrinsically right.... There must be an absolute standard of righteousness." Such a statement places a standard of justice outside of God. The standard is intrinsically right, hence independent of God’s sovereignty—indeed, sovereignty has been abandoned. Hodge, however, wants to avoid this implication, for unlike Grotius, Hodge immediately adds, "This absolute standard is the divine nature ... the divine intelligence." This addition gives the impression of maintaining divine sovereignty as against any external power or principle. But it faces an equally difficult objection. It raises the question as to the difference between will and nature. What is nature? Do we not speak of the nature of God, the nature of God’s will, the nature of God’s intelligence? Nature is not a constituent of anything. It is simply the thing’s characteristics. God’s nature, like a dog’s nature, is such and such because such are the characteristics of the dog or of God. The nature is simply the way the dog or God acts. There is no nature that controls God’s will. As Isaac Watts once wrote, "Dogs delight to bark and bite, for ‘tis their nature to."1
In addition to examining the term nature, one must ask what is will? If we speak of the human will, we refer to a somewhat momentary act of choice. After having considered the relative desirability of this versus that line of action—or, what is the same thing, between an action and doing nothing—such as investing in AT&T or just leaving the money in the checking account—and having puzzled over it indecisively for a period of time—we come to a conclusion and make our choice: We decide and do it. Then when we start to study theology and to consider the will of God, we are apt to think, or subconsciously suppose, that God makes decisions. He willed to create, he willed—aftersome deliberation—to save some, and so on. Though we may not say so out loud, we suppose that God was puzzled: He could create or he could refuse to create; he could save or could refuse to save some; and if he decided to save some, he could use any means imaginable.
Now, although these choices are all of one nature, all subject to the same considerations, Hodge and others want to give the last question an answer different from their answer to the prior questions. This seems to me to be logically inconsistent, for if it relieves God of indecision on the last point, it pictures him as indecisive on the prior points and assigns to him a relatively momentary act of choice. This makes God a temporal creature—or if not a creature, at least a temporal being.
Such a view is utterly inconsistent with divine omniscience. The immutable God never learned anything and never changed his mind. He knew everything from eternity. This everything includes both the number of mosquitoes in Jackson Hole and the number of planets in the solar system. Underlying these two examples is the creation of a temporal universe. For time began with the creation of the first nonomniscient angel.
Without claiming infallibility, and certainly no omniscience, I believe the above to be substantially what the Bible implies. -Gordon H. Clark
The complete article can be found here.
I hereby apply for inclusion in the Great Reformed Ping List.
Why, I sent in a quote (mine was from Jesus) as requested and my name. I'm waiting to see if my application is approved.
My quote was: 38 And John answered him, saying, Master, we saw one casting out devils in thy name, and he followeth not us: and we forbad him, because he followeth not us. 39 But Jesus said, Forbid him not: for there is no man which shall do a miracle in my name, that can lightly speak evil of me. 40 For he that is not against us is on our part. 41 For whosoever shall give you a cup of water to drink in my name, because ye belong to Christ, verily I say unto you, he shall not lose his reward.
not yet
pony
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