almost.
The extra redundant sensor was an option that the airlines in this case declined.
Any single point of failure that can take down an aircraft is not engineering, it is beyond stupid Bean Counting, but that was the profit driven culture at the time.
When I was building large Datacenters, I spent lots of time looking for these potential single points of failure.
one of my friends used to have nightmares about a bad actor inserting something into “windows update” another was the single security guy for .Net his hair turned grey prematurely.
Would that be because they failed to inform them about the MCAS system and how the pilots would have ten seconds to turn it off before the plane was in an unrecoverable dive?
That does not jive with what I recall of the problem. My recollection is that Boeing simply did not build it into the system. You couldn't get one with a redundant sensor in it. They were all built with one sensor.