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Iran Update Special Report, July 20, 2026

The Houthis’ announced naval blockade against Saudi Arabia could result in an expansion of the shipping crisis in the Middle East.[1] ISW-CTP has not recorded any Houthi attacks on shipping since July 7, 2025, at the time of this writing, but the Houthis ordered Saudi-bound vessels to turn back from Saudi Arabia over radio on July 20.[2] The announcement of the blockade combined with the Houthi orders will almost certainly increase the cost of shipping through the Red Sea by discouraging ships from transiting through the Red Sea. Insurance industry sources told Western media July 20 that insurance costs to ship goods through the Red Sea rose following the Houthis’ announcement.[3]

Iran is trying to expand the geographical scope of its conflict with the United States to the Red Sea to cause further disruption to international markets and impose additional costs on the United States. Iran asked the Houthis to prepare to attack Red Sea shipping if the United States expands its airstrikes to Iranian energy infrastructure, according to two senior Iranian sources and an informed regional source speaking to Western media on July 16.[4] Iranian officials, including Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani, have threatened that the Houthis could launch another campaign targeting shipping in the Bab al Mandeb Strait.[5] Saudi Arabia has increasingly relied on the Bab al Mandeb Strait to export its oil to Asian markets in recent months, according to Kpler data cited by the New York Times on July 20.[6]

The Houthis may have announced the blockade to deter Saudi Arabia from striking Houthi targets in Yemen to discourage further Saudi attacks, separate from but partially satisfying Iranian efforts to impose costs on the United States. It remains unclear what triggered the Houthi blockade announcement. Houthi Military Spokesperson Yahya Sarea stated on July 20 that they imposed the blockade in response to Saudi Arabia's imposing an “unjust siege” on Yemen for 12 years, but this is likely a false reason.[7] Saudi forces struck Sanaa International Airport on July 13 due to concerns that Iran would use the direct air route to transfer weapons and military advisers to the Houthis, but the Houthis responded by attacking Abha International Airport in Saudi Arabia on July 13.[8] There have been no further attacks since July 13. The UN negotiated a separate and relatively stable ceasefire between the Houthis, the recognized Yemeni government, and Saudi Arabia that has been in effect since 2022.[9] The Houthi blockade announcement, regardless of the proximate cause and how it affects Houthi objectives in Yemen, supports Iranian efforts to impose costs on the United States.

Some senior Iranian officials appear concerned that the renewed conflict will deepen Iran's economic problems and threaten Iran's internal security. Senior Iranian officials have previously appeared concerned that the conflict will deepen Iran's economic problems, but these concerns do not appear to have meaningfully impacted the calculus of the IRGC. Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian warned in a Supreme Judicial Council meeting on July 20 that economic pressure could generate social discontent and damage the public support that the regime has gained during the US-Israel-Iran war.[10] Pezeshkian emphasized that the economy and people's livelihoods are Iran's “main battlefield” now.[11] Pezeshkian previously voiced his concerns about the economic costs of war in March, and he convinced the supreme leader to accept the MoU in June using arguments about the MoU’s economic benefits.[12] Pezeshkian’s concern follows the disintegration of the US-Iran memorandum of understanding (MoU) and the highly anticipated economic relief for Iran, economic relief that Iran expected from, including the lifting of the US naval blockade, sanctions relief, and access to frozen assets.[13] The United States did not unfreeze any Iranian assets and has since restored the blockade and revoked the sanctions waiver.[14] Judiciary Chief Gholam Hossein Mohseni Ejei similarly acknowledged that sustaining the war imposes costs on the population and urged officials to address high prices, protect public resilience, and prevent economic hardship from undermining national unity at the same meeting.[15] Both Pezeshkian and Ejei previously aligned with a faction that favored moderation and diplomacy amid concerns for Iran's economy and internal security after the June 2025 Israel-Iran war, according to four senior Iranian officials cited by the New York Times.[16]

Iran continues to coerce vessels by force to transit through Iranian territorial waters to prevent them from using routes through the strait that Tehran does not approve. Iran has attacked at least two vessels in the strait since ISW-CTP’s last data cutoff.[17] Unidentified projectiles struck a Malta-flagged tanker and a Liberian-flagged tanker that were attempting to use the US-facilitated route through the strait on July 19, according to the United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) center and western media.[18] The projectiles struck the Malta-flagged vessel 8 nautical miles north of Kumzar, Oman, and forced the crew to abandon ship.[19] Iran also almost certainly conducted another attack on a vessel 17 nautical miles east of Dibba, United Arab Emirates, on July 20.[20] The IRGC described the attacks on the Malta- and Liberian-flagged tankers as “explosions,” thus obfuscating its responsibility, and added that the two vessels were attempting to transit through a “dangerous” route.[21] Iran continues to be the only “danger” in the strait for merchant shipping.

US forces expanded strikes to possible missile launch sites in northwestern and central Iran. Iranian regime media reported on July 19 that US forces struck an unspecified site in Urmia, West Azerbaijan Province.[22] Anti-regime media, citing unspecified local reports, claimed on July 20 that Iran had been using the site to launch missiles in recent days.[23] US forces also struck an unspecified military area in Tabriz, East Azerbaijan Province, on July 19, which marks the first US strikes on Tabriz in the latest phase of the war.[24] The US struck multiple missile bases in Tabriz in March and April 2026, including the IRGC Amand Missile Base and Southwest Tabriz Missile Base.[25] An open-source intelligence account on X reported on July 19 that US forces struck the IRGC Ghazi Tabatabaei Training Base in Khosrow Shah, East Azerbaijan Province, and that Iran used the military school to launch missiles.[26] US forces struck the Khojir Military Complex in Khojir, Tehran Province, on July 19, which marks the first time US strikes have targeted Tehran Province in the latest phase of the war.[27] The Khojir complex is one of Iran's key research, development, and manufacturing facilities for solid- and liquid-fuel missiles.[28]

Iran continues to conduct drone and missile strikes on US regional bases in response to US airstrikes on Iran. The Kuwaiti Armed Forces and Bahrain Defense Force General Command both announced that they intercepted Iranian drone and missile attacks since ISW-CTP’s last data cutoff at 2:00 PM on July 19.[29] Bahrain's Civil Defense reported on July 20 that Iran conducted a drone attack targeting Bahrain's civil navigation systems but that the attacks did not impact flight operations in Bahrain.[30]

The IRGC released a statement on July 19 thanking the Jordanian people for providing Iran with information that has aided Iran's recent attacks on Jordan.[31] The IRGC said that the Jordanian people provided information on US military equipment at Aqaba airport. Iran launched four missiles at the airport on July 19, but Jordanian air defense systems intercepted three and let the fourth strike an open area.[32] An Israeli analyst posted footage on July 20 of Jordanian air defenses engaging an additional Iranian attack on Aqaba.[33] The IRGC also claimed that information provided by Jordanian people led to the “precise” targeting of 20 US shelters in Jordan's al Azraq region, which likely refers to personnel shelters at Muwaffaq al Salti Air Base in the al Azraq region.[34] Iran struck a group of buildings at Muwaffaq al Salti Air Base and killed at least two US service members and seriously injured four others.[35]

The IRGC may have released this statement to counter continuing reports that Russia and the People's Republic of China have helped Iran target US assets in the region during the US-Israel-Iran War.[36] The statement could also be part of recent broader Iranian efforts to mobilize the local populations in Arab countries against US forces. Iranian officials have increasingly called on individuals in the region in recent weeks to stand up to their leadership and counter the US presence in their countries.[37]

Unspecified armed individuals killed a Sunni cleric and Friday Prayer Leader Molavi Mohammad Anvar Rigi in Mirjaveh, in Sistan and Baluchistan Province on July 20.[38] No actor has claimed responsibility for the attack at the time of this writing. Anti-regime media citing local Baloch media reported on July 20 that the Supreme Leader representative to Sistan and Baluchistan Province previously intervened to appoint Anvar Rigi as Mirjaveh Friday prayer leader in 2024 after authorities removed and arrested the city's previous Friday Prayer Leader.[39] Anvar Rigi previously escaped an assassination attempt in December 2024.[40] Sistan and Baluchistan Province is a hotspot for anti-regime activity, including by anti-regime Baloch separatist groups that frequently attack Iranian security forces in southeastern Iran.[41]

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) are preparing for Israeli forces to begin withdrawing from the “pilot zones.” An unspecified Israeli official told Axios on July 20 that Israeli forces will begin withdrawing from one of the “pilot zones” on July 21.[42] This would mark the first Israeli withdrawal in southern Lebanon in accordance with the June 26 Trilateral Framework Agreement. The Agreement stipulates that Israeli forces will eventually withdraw from ”pilot zones” in southern Lebanon, after which the LAF would secure the areas and disarm and dismantle local armed groups.[43] Israeli and Lebanese media clarified that Israeli forces are expected to withdraw from Zawtar el Gharbiyeh in Nabatieh District on July 21.[44] The LAF instructed civilians to not enter Zawtar el Gharbiyeh on July 20, likely in preparation for an IDF withdrawal.[45] The State Department announced on July 20 that Israel and Lebanon are cooperating to implement the ”pilot zones“ plan in Zawtar el Gharbiyeh as well as Froun in Bint Jbeil District and Srifa in Tyre District.[46] The LAF began deploying forces to and around the “pilot zones” in Froun, Srifa, and additional areas without an IDF presence on July 16 and 17.[47]

Israeli and Lebanese efforts to implement the “pilot zones” come during Lebanese President Joseph Aoun’s visit to Washington, DC between July 18 and 21.[48] Aoun met with US Secretary of State Marco Rubio to discuss further implementation of the Agreement and an Israeli withdrawal from the “pilot zones” on July 19.[49] Aoun is expected to meet with US President Donald Trump on July 21, according to Reuters.[50]

Informed sources told Iraqi media on July 20 that Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al Zaydi will ask the Iranian government to pressure Iranian-backed Iraqi militias to surrender Iranian-provided missiles to the Iraqi federal government during his upcoming visit to Tehran on July 23.[51] The Iranian government is unlikely to agree to Zaydi’s request, however. Zaydi’s trip comes as Iran has warned its Iraqi militia partners to resist disarmament.[52] The IRGC reportedly told Iraqi militia leaders that their weapons belong to Iran, and that the militias do not have the right to surrender these weapons to the Iraqi federal government, according to unspecified sources speaking to US-funded, Arabic-language media on June 10.[53] Iran supplied its Iraqi militia partners with weapons, including missiles and drones, before and during the Iran war.[54] Zaydi’s trip to Iran also follows his visit to Washington, DC, on July 14, during which he signed several investment agreements with the United States.[55] One of these agreements could be what Iraqi and regional media have described as the “June agreement,” in which the United States will support investment in Iraq in exchange for the Iraqi federal government reducing Iranian influence in Iraq, including disarming Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.[56]

The Iranian-backed Islamic Resistance in Iraq on July 19 threatened to target US bases and interests in the region if the United States expands its strike campaign against Iran.[57] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq is a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, including Kataib Hezbollah, Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba, Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada, and Harakat Ansar Allah al Awfiya.[58] The statement denied that the Islamic Resistance in Iraq recently attacked US bases in the region, however.[59] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq frequently claimed attacks against US bases in Iraq and the region during the war in March and April.[60]

https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-july-20-2026/

Iran Update Special Report, July 21, 2026

The Houthis likely decided to impose their blockade on Saudi Arabia to advance their own interests, though Iran probably encouraged them to impose the blockade for Tehran’s own purposes. The Houthis have repeatedly warned Saudi-owned ships against transiting the Red Sea via radio on July 20 and July 21.[1] The Houthis also emailed shipping companies on July 20 and warned them against loading or discharging cargo in Saudi ports on the Red Sea.[2] These threats and warnings have resulted in at least two vessels turning around in the Red Sea to avoid crossing the Bab al Mandeb and a third turning around rather than continuing its transit to a Saudi port.[3] The Houthis have not yet attacked shipping, however. These efforts will almost certainly increase the cost of shipping goods through the Red Sea while also imposing high economic costs on Saudi Arabia specifically. The increase in costs globally and the economic impact on Saudi Arabia specifically supports both Iranian and Houthi objectives. The Houthis seek to discourage Saudi action against them, while the Iranians seek to extend the maritime shipping crisis and increase oil prices caused by Tehran’s efforts to close the Strait of Hormuz.

The Houthis only threatened shipping in the Red Sea once it benefited Houthi objectives. The Houthis did not adhere to earlier Iranian calls in July to close the Bab al Mandeb Strait during the recent conflict and only decided to impose a blockade on Saudi Arabia on July 20 following Saudi strikes on Sanaa International Airport on July 13.[4] This suggests the Houthis expanded the shipping crisis only when doing so served their interests, such as deterring future Saudi strikes on Houthi targets in Yemen.[5] Iranian and Houthi interests align in this case, but the Houthis are not enforcing the blockade for Iran. Their actions benefit Iran while directly serving Houthi objectives against Saudi Arabia. The Houthis’ enforcement of the blockade, regardless of how it affects Houthi objectives in Yemen, supports Iranian efforts to degrade US willingness to continue the war and force the United States to accept Iran's demand to retain control over the Strait of Hormuz.[6] Disruption in both the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab al Mandeb increases pressure on the United States and global markets more than disruption in either waterway alone.[7] This pressure could help Iran force the United States to accept Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz, assuming Iran is able to secure Saudi assurances that Riyadh will not strike Houthi assets and end the Houthi blockade on Saudi Arabia.

Iran continues to use force to impose its control over the Strait of Hormuz and compel vessels to follow Iranian transit restrictions. Iran rejects any alternative to its designated traffic separation scheme, particularly the southern Omani route, because it allows vessels to bypass Iranian authorization and directly undermines Iran's claim to control maritime traffic through the strait.[8] Iran sees this control as its primary means of imposing costs on the United States and compelling Washington to accept Iranian demands. Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Deputy Secretary for International Affairs Ali Bagheri Kani described the strait on July 21 as Iran's “decisive leverage,” and argued that Iran must translate its military strength into political gains.[9] Iran has repeatedly threatened and attacked vessels using the southern route to enforce this objective.[10] The United Kingdom Maritime Trade Organization (UKMTO) reported on July 20 that unknown projectiles struck two vessels near Oman and the United Arab Emirates, which damaged one vessel's steering gear and forced the crew of the second vessel to abandon ship.[11] Kuwait identified the second vessel as the Kuwaiti tanker Kaifan and reported that the likely Iranian attack injured several crew members.[12] The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) separately claimed on July 20 that it attacked two tankers on July 20 because they attempted to use the southern Omani route.[13]

Iran is repeatedly attacking US bases and personnel across the region in order to erode US willingness to challenge Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz. Iran likely calculates that sustained attacks and rising US casualties will generate domestic pressure on the United States to end the conflict, force the United States to surrender, and accept Iranian control over the strait. The Wall Street Journal reported on July 20 that Iran conducted three ballistic missile strikes against Muwaffaq al Salti Air Base in Jordan on July 17 and 18.[14] The first two Iranian missiles reportedly struck a gym and an empty aircraft hangar, while the third struck housing units and killed two US service members.[15] These strikes demonstrate that Iran can still penetrate US air defenses and inflict casualties despite repeated US strikes on Iranian drone and missile launch sites, storage facilities, and command and control centers. Satellite imagery also shows that Iran attacked King Faisal Air Base and another Jordanian airfield, where Iranian strikes reportedly damaged several US Army UH-60 Blackhawk helicopters.[16] Iran continued to claim attacks on US bases and military assets in Bahrain, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, and Qatar on July 20 and 21.[17]

Iran is broadening the costs of the war beyond military facilities by targeting infrastructure that supports essential civilian services. Iran likely calculates that sustained disruptions to electricity and water supplies will increase domestic pressure on Kuwait to restrict US operations from Kuwaiti territory. The Kuwaiti government stated on July 21 that Iran attacked several power-generation and water-desalination facilities for the fourth consecutive day on July 20, which disabled several generators.[18] Islamic Development Organization-affiliated Mehr News Agency separately reported on July 21 that an Iranian drone strike targeted the al Zour power plant in southeastern Kuwait.[19] Iran is likely trying to demonstrate to Kuwait and other Gulf states that they will bear direct civilian and economic costs for hosting US forces and supporting US operations against Iran. Iran likely also conducted these attacks to portray the United States as an unreliable security guarantor and drive a wedge between the United States and its Gulf partners. Iranian Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei stated on March 12 that Iran would strike bases used to attack Iran but avoid attacking host countries and urged neighboring states to close US bases.[20] Iran's attacks on Kuwaiti civilian infrastructure expand beyond this distinction, however.

Iran has reportedly temporarily restored communications between the mainland and Kharg and Qeshm islands after US strikes disrupted key communications and supply networks along the southern coast of Iran. Iranian Communications and Information Technology Minister Sattar Hashemi told Iranian media on July 21 that US strikes have repeatedly disrupted communications between mainland Iran and the islands, including Kharg and Qeshm.[21] Iran has reportedly replaced damaged fiber-optic links with radio and satellite communications, but Hashemi emphasized that these measures are only temporary and that Iran must restore fiber-optic networks to reestablish reliable communications.[22] The reported repairs follow recent US strikes along Iran's southern coast that sought to disrupt communications and sever supply networks linking key locations in southern Iran to the mainland to degrade Iran's ability to coordinate operations to threaten international shipping.[23] Iran's illegal traffic separation scheme runs along Qeshm Island.[24]

Iran reportedly moved critical nuclear infrastructure and material to the Mount Kolang Gaz site in Esfahan Province after the June 2025 Israel-Iran War. Unspecified US and Israeli officials, citing Israeli intelligence, told the Wall Street Journal July 21 that Iran moved “thousands” of uranium-enrichment centrifuges to Mount Kolang after the war.[25] An Israeli source told CNN on July 21 that Iran also moved part of its highly enriched uranium (HEU) stockpile to the site.[26] US and Israeli strikes during the June 2025 war damaged or destroyed thousands of centrifuges at Iran's principal underground enrichment facilities, including Fordow, Natanz, and the Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center.[27] The Institute for Science and International Security assessed following the June 2025 war that the Israeli campaign rendered most, if not all, of Iran's operational centrifuges inoperable and effectively destroyed Iran's enrichment capacity.[28] The strikes also buried at least a majority of Iran's HEU stockpile, according to International Atomic Energy Agency Director Rafael Grossi.[29] Commercially available satellite imagery suggests that Iran has not accessed the damaged underground facilities since the June 2025 war to recover buried centrifuges or HEU.[30] Iran may nevertheless retain additional centrifuges or portions of its HEU stockpile at undisclosed facilities that the US-Israeli strikes did not target. Commercially available satellite imagery indicates that Iran has conducted activity at the Mount Kolang site since the war, including efforts to harden the facility against future strikes.[31]

The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) deployed to Zawtar el Gharbiyeh in Nabatieh District on July 21 after the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) withdrew from the town.[32] This marks the first Israeli withdrawal in southern Lebanon in accordance with the June 26 Trilateral Framework Agreement.[33] The IDF reported on July 21 that its forces fired into the air to repel Lebanese forces who “breached” the IDF’s security zone in Zawtar el Charqiyeh, a town immediately east of Zawtar el Gharbiyeh.[34] The IDF added that Zawtar el Charqiyeh is not part of the “pilot zones” plan and that the IDF did not permit Lebanese forces to enter the town.[35] The LAF told Lebanese media on July 21 that its forces did not enter Zawtar el Charqiyeh and stated that this engagement “will hinder the implementation” of the “pilot zones.”[36] Lebanese media also reported on July 21 that vehicles in a Red Cross convoy struck an Israeli mine in Zawtar el Charqiyeh, which injured two paramedics.[37] The IDF established operational control over Zawtar el Charqiyeh in May 2026 to use the village as a bridgehead for ground operations north of the Litani River.[38]

Israeli and Lebanese efforts to implement the “pilot zones” coincided with US President Donald Trump's meeting with Lebanese President Joseph Aoun in Washington, DC, on July 21.[39] Trump pledged political and military support to help the Lebanese government disarm Hezbollah.[40] An unspecified US official told Axios on July 21 that the LAF will be responsible for disarming Hezbollah in the first “pilot zones.”[41] The official's statement is consistent with the June 26 Trilateral Framework Agreement, which stipulates that the LAF will be responsible for disarming Hezbollah in the “pilot zones.”[42] Aoun and other LAF officials recently said that the Lebanese government is reluctant to use force to disarm Hezbollah due to the risk of civil war and fractures within the LAF, however.[43]

Hezbollah Political Council Deputy Chairman Mahmoud Qamati threatened on July 21 that Hezbollah may shut down Rafic Hariri International Airport in Beirut in response to Lebanese government restrictions on Iranian influence in Lebanon.[44] Qamati warned during an interview with Hezbollah media that “no more planes will land in Beirut” and demanded that the government repeal its February 2025 ban on Iranian aircraft in Lebanese airspace and its visa requirements for visiting Iranian civilians, which it instituted in March 2026.[45] Qamati said that Hezbollah will employ strictly “peaceful means” to compel the government to reverse its restrictions on Iranian travel to Lebanon.[46] It is unclear how Hezbollah would shut down Hariri International Airport or what Qamati meant by “peaceful” means, however. Unspecified Lebanese Foreign Ministry officials told Saudi media on July 21 that Hezbollah's threats will not compel the government to reverse its decisions regarding Iran.[47] The Lebanese Foreign Ministry expelled the newly appointed Iranian Ambassador to Lebanon on March 24 because of Iran's support for Hezbollah.[48]

The Iraqi National Intelligence Service arrested three unidentified individuals who operated a first-person view (FPV) drone factory in Baghdad on July 21.[49] Iraqi authorities seized 25 drone frames, carbon fiber panels, and assembly and production equipment.[50] The factory is likely located in an area of eastern Baghdad in which Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah maintains a presence, according to footage from July 21 that ISW-CTP geolocated.[51] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, likely including Kataib Hezbollah, conducted multiple FPV drone attacks on US targets in Iraq during the war, as well as targets in the Gulf, in March and April.[52] The drones the Iraqi authorities seized, according to Iraqi media, appear to be made locally and differ from the types of drones that the IRGC has attempted to transfer to Lebanese Hezbollah. Syrian Interior Ministry forces thwarted an IRGC attempt to smuggle advanced weapons, including FPV and fiber-optic drones, from Iraq through Syria to Hezbollah on July 7.[53]

Multiple Iranian-backed Iraqi militias within the Islamic Resistance of Iraq, which is a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, reiterated their refusal to disarm until after a complete US withdrawal from Iraq.[54] Unidentified sources told Iraqi media on July 21 that 10 militias within the Islamic Resistance of Iraq informally told the Iraqi federal government that they would retain their weapons until this withdrawal occurs.[55] The sources said that the militias do not believe the United States will withdraw from Iraq by the end of September, as planned by the Iraqi government.[56] Kataib Hezbollah, Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada, Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba, and Harakat Allah al Awfiya are known to comprise the militia coalition, but the identity of the other six militias the sources are referring to is unknown.[57] The six other militias could include smaller Iraqi militias, front groups affiliated with the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, or members of the Islamic Resistance Coordination Committee.

Multiple Iraqi militias have repeatedly rejected disarmament in recent months and will likely continue to use the US presence in Iraq to justify their existence amid the Iraqi federal government's disarmament initiative.[58] The United States has increasingly pressured the Iraqi federal government to disarm the militias due to militia activity in March and April.[59] The militias’ opposition to US presence in Iraq is integral to their identity as “resistance” organizations, hence their recent efforts to cast doubt on US plans to leave Iraq in September. The militias have also used a variety of justifications for their existence, such as sectarian violence in coastal Syria in 2025, and thus they are likely to use new justifications once the United States withdraws. [60] Iraqi media reported on July 20 that Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al Zaydi will ask the Iranian government to pressure the militias to surrender Iranian-provided missiles to the Iraqi federal government during his upcoming visit to Tehran on July 23.[61]

The Iraqi Security Forces reported on July 21 that an explosive-laden drone crashed near the US al Harir Air Base in Iraqi Kurdistan.[62] It is not clear at the time of this writing which actor conducted the attack or if the base was the intended target. Iranian-backed Iraqi militias conducted numerous attacks targeting US positions in Iraqi Kurdistan, such as al Harir Air Base, in March and April.[63] US air defenses at the US Consulate in Erbil also reportedly intercepted at least three drones on March 21.[64] The consulate's air defenses have intercepted multiple drone swarms in recent days.[65] No actor has yet claimed these attacks.

https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-july-21-2026/