Iran Update Special Report, July 16, 2026
Iran is trying to deter the United States from striking Iranian energy infrastructure by threatening Houthi attacks on shipping in the Bab al Mandeb. Two senior Iranian sources and a regional source familiar with the matter told Reuters on July 16 that Iran requested that the Houthis prepare to attack Red Sea shipping if the United States expands its airstrikes to Iranian energy infrastructure.[1] An unspecified source close to the Houthis said that the Houthis have deployed missile and drone assets near the Bab al Mandeb and are awaiting orders.[2] Iranian officials, including IRGC Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani, have previously threatened that the Houthis could launch another campaign against shipping in the Bab el Mandeb Strait.[3] The comments to Reuters are part of an Iranian effort to signal that the Axis of Resistance could create another crisis for international shipping — this time around the Bab al Mandeb. This report comes as Western media has reported on the possibility that the United States could intensify operations against Iran.[4] US President Donald Trump recently threatened to expand US strikes to include ”power plants and bridges.”[5]
It is unclear whether the Houthis would follow through on Iran's threats. The Houthis have not yet closed the Bab al Mandeb to shipping despite numerous threats throughout the war to do so. Houthis Supreme Leader Abdul Malik al Houthi noted on July 16 that the Houthis are continuing to prevent Israeli vessels from transiting the Bab el Mandeb Strait and Gulf of Aden but made no reference to expanding this campaign to close the strait to all commercial shipping.[6] The risk that the Houthis escalate against maritime traffic around the Bab al Mandeb remains high, however.
Iranian efforts to stoke global concerns about Houthi attacks in the Red Sea coincide with rising tensions between the Houthis and Saudi Arabia. Abdul Malik asserted in his speech that Saudi Arabia had “embroiled itself” in conflict against the Houthis, referring to recent exchange in fire with Saudi Arabia over Iran's attempt to land a flight at Sanaa Airport earlier on July 14.[7] Abdul Malik threatened to launch drone and missile attacks targeting “all Saudi oil installations and highly vital facilities“ if it attacks the Houthis again.[8] The Houthis previously attacked Saudi energy infrastructure in 2022.[9] Abdul Malik’s statement follows the Houthis’ warning commercial airlines against using Saudi airspace.[10] Two regional sources close to Saudi leadership told Reuters on July 16 that Saudi Arabia is seriously concerned about Iran and the Houthis’ threat and is aware of Iran-Houthi coordination regarding the Red Sea.[11] Saudi Arabia has diverted 70 percent of its energy exports to its Red Sea port of Yanbu to circumvent Iranian attacks through the Strait of Hormuz.[12]
The United States is striking Iranian targets further inland in southeastern and southwestern Iran. The purpose of these strikes is not immediately clear. US forces struck a hangar at Semnan Airport in Semnan Province, according to a local official.[13] Semnan Province hosts several missile test and space launch sites.[14] Iranian media reported that US forces struck more targets in Sistan and Baluchistan Province, including an IRGC base near Rask, which is approximately 130 kilometers from Iran's southern coastline.[15] The United States has struck at least three inland targets in Sistan and Baluchistan Province since July 14.[16] Iranian media also reported that the United States struck unspecified sites near Kabudarahang in Hamedan Province, Khorramabad in Lorestan Province, Khondab City in Markazi Province, and Ahvaz in Khuzestan Province.[17] A US official told Reuters on July 15 that recent US airstrikes could be seen as “shaping operations” to degrade Iranian defenses in case the US military was ordered to conduct more intensive operations.[18]
The United States continued to strike Iranian naval and coastal installations that Iran uses to threaten maritime traffic in the Strait of Hormuz on July 15 and 16. US Central Command (CENTCOM) announced on July 15 that US forces struck Iranian command centers, air defense sites, missile and drone capabilities, and coastal surveillance facilities, including near Bandar Abbas and Greater Tunb Island.[19] Iranian media and open-source intelligence accounts on X recorded US airstrikes targeting Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Navy and Aerospace Force sites in Hormozgan, Bushehr, Khuzestan, Sistan and Baluchistan provinces near its southern coastline.[20]
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Iran is continuing to retaliate against the United States by firing at US bases in the region. The IRGC and Artesh launched several drone and missile attacks at US bases in Bahrain, Kuwait, and Jordan on July 15 and 16.[21] All three countries appeared to have intercepted the Iranian attacks. Kuwait reported that it intercepted 21 drones and four cruise missiles.[22]
ISW-CTP has not observed Iranian attacks on vessels in the vicinity of the Strait of Hormuz since July 13.[23] Western media reported on July 15 that crews in the strait remain concerned about transiting the strait through the ”southern route” in Omani waters due to the ongoing threat of Iranian attacks.[24]
The IRGC is trying to supply Lebanese Hezbollah with first-person view (FPV), fiber-optic drones and other weapons that the group has used to attack Israeli forces in Lebanon and Israeli towns since March 2026. Syrian Interior Ministry forces thwarted an IRGC attempt to smuggle advanced weapons, including FPV drones, from Iraq through Syria to Hezbollah in Lebanon on July 7.[25] Syrian forces seized the shipment in a vehicle near al Tanf around the Iraq-Syria border.[26] The shipment included hundreds of 13-inch FPV drones and FPV drone components, including Chinese-made fiber-optic spools, Iranian-made PG-7V anti-tank warheads converted for FPV use, and FPV drone batteries.[27] Syrian forces also seized dozens of Iranian Almas anti-tank guided missiles (ATGM) manufactured in 2026 and Iranian Paveh-351 cruise missile components.[28] Hezbollah deployed FPV fiber-optic drones to attack Israeli forces in southern Lebanon and northern Israel for the first time in March 2026 and has deployed them at an increasing scale in the subsequent months.[29] Hezbollah has used fiber-optics systems, including drones equipped with thermal cameras, to impose physical and psychological costs on Israeli ground forces and attempt to compel the IDF to withdraw from Lebanese territory.[30] Unspecified Israeli officials told Western media in May 2026 that the IRGC had sent fiber-optic drones to Hezbollah.[31] A Syrian source reported that the IRGC smuggled the weapons on Iraqi oil tanker trucks traveling in daily convoys to export Iraqi oil through Syrian ports after Iran closed the Strait of Hormuz.[32]
Russia may have supplied Iran with some of the seized fiber-optic drones or drone components. Russia reportedly offered to provide Iran with 5,000 short-range, fiber-optic drones in May 2026, though it is unclear if this transfer ever occurred.[33] Russia would be the most likely actor to have provided Iran with fiber-optic drone capabilities.[34] Some of the equipment seized by Syrian forces contains commercially available Russian- or Chinese-manufactured components. The FPV drones that Syrian forces seized appear to have originated from a Russian company that sells standard and thermal camera-equipped FPV drones for 1,000 to 2,000 US dollars.[35] The seized Chinese fiber-optic spools were reportedly produced in Guangdong and are advertised on Alibaba.[36] These spools range from three to 30 kilometers, though it is unclear which variant and length Syrian authorities seized.[37]
Iran has also likely provided Hezbollah with technical support and knowledge on drone development. Syria- and Iraq-focused analysts have reported that Hezbollah has praised “Dr. Zain” for his role in developing Hezbollah's FPV drone program. Zain reportedly “regularly” visited Iran and worked with the IRGC Quds Force.[38] Israeli media reported that Iran supplies Hezbollah with the technical expertise and funding to develop its drones.[39]
Iran's Judiciary-run outlet, Mizan News Agency, denied reports that Iran released or exchanged a US prisoner.[40] US President Donald Trump stated on July 15 that Iran allowed an American citizen ”wrongfully detained” in December 2024 to leave Iran.[41] Iranian authorities detained an Iranian-American dual national who worked for a US technology company and operated a children's charity in December 2024, according to Western media.[42] Iranian authorities later released the woman from prison but confiscated her passports, prevented her from leaving Iran, and charged her with espionage.[43] Mizan News Agency reported that Iranian prisons had not released or exchanged any convicted US prisoner or “American spy” matching Trump's description or any other description.[44]
Iran is seeking to maintain its oil exports through the Persian Gulf despite the reinstated US naval blockade on Iranian ports. US naval forces disabled a Curacao-flagged oil tanker, M/T Belma, on July 15 as the vessel sailed for Kharg Island.[45] US aircraft struck the smokestack after the ship ignored multiple warnings to stop its course.[46] Tanker Trackers reported on July 16 that M/T Belma has transported at least 38 million barrels of Iranian crude oil over an unspecified number of years in service.[47]
Elements of the Iranian regime continue to debate how much effort Iran should commit to controlling the Strait of Hormuz. An Iranian outlet, Asr Iran, published an op-ed on July 15 that argued that Iran successfully diverted US attention to the Strait of Hormuz and away from the US war aims, such as collapsing the regime and ending Iran's nuclear program. Asr Iran previously had ties to Parliament Speaker and chief negotiator Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, who is currently leading the regime's pro-negotiations camp.[48] It is unclear if the outlet is still affiliated with Ghalibaf. The op-ed implied that it is unnecessary for Iran to allocate excessive resources to controlling the strait, particularly if doing so requires Iran to sacrifice other objectives, such as preserving its nuclear program or ensuring regime stability.[49] It remains unclear how widely the author's proposal to shift Iran's priorities away from the strait resonates within mainstream circles in the Iranian regime. Iranian hardliners continue to extol the value of maintaining control over the strait at all costs. Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters spokesperson Ebrahim Zolfghari described the strait as Iran's “unbreakable red line” on June 16 and noted that Iran will not allow the United States to interfere in the strait's affairs, for example.[50]
The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) began to deploy forces to and near one of the “pilot zones” defined by the June 26 Trilateral Framework Agreement.[51] The LAF announced that its forces began to conduct patrols and establish checkpoints and observation posts in the towns of Ghandouriyeh, Froun, Qalaouiyeh, and Kfar Dounine in Bint Jbeil District, Qaaqaaiyet al Jisr in Nabatieh District, and Srifa in Tyre District on July 16.[52] The Agreement stipulates that Israeli forces will eventually withdraw from areas in southern Lebanon, after which the LAF would secure the pilot zones and disarm and dismantle local armed groups.[53] One of these pilot zones is expected to be centered around Ghandouriyeh and Froun, according to an Israeli government press conference on June 27.[54] An unspecified security source told Lebanese media on July 16 that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) is not currently deployed in Ghandouriyeh and Froun.[55] ISW-CTP has not observed any LAF deployments to Zawtar el Gharbiyeh yet, which is expected to be the second pilot zone.[56] The LAF deployments follow recent US-mediated talks between Israel and Lebanon in Rome on July 14 and 15, in which the parties discussed the implementation of the pilot zone plan.[57] US, Israeli, and Lebanese military delegations will reportedly meet virtually on July 17 to discuss further implementation of the pilot zones.[58]
Iran likely launched two drones that struck Iraqi energy infrastructure in Basra Province, Iraq, on July 15 and 16 and briefly halted Iraqi oil exports.[59] Iraqi sources told Reuters that a likely Iranian drone struck an oil tanker vessel at Basra's oil terminal on July 16, forcing the terminal to briefly suspend oil loading.[60] There were no casualties. The sources said that the origin of the drone was unclear.[61] The director general of Iraq's state oil company SOMO asserted that the drone did mistakenly strike the Basra Oil Terminal and had a different target.[62] Iraqi media separately reported on July 15 that an “unidentified” drone struck al Faw Port, Basra Province, and ed caused damage but no casualties.[63] Iraqi media published an image of drone wreckage at the port, with Persian writing on the drone commemorating Iranian officials killed in the war, which indicates the drone may have originated from Iran.[64] An Iraqi source claimed that Iran was targeting Kuwait but accidentally struck al Faw port instead.[65] These likely Iranian strikes on Iraqi energy infrastructure coincide with Iraqi efforts to develop oil export routes that bypass the Strait of Hormuz.[66]
An Iranian-backed Iraqi militia denied responsibility for a July 15 drone attack that targeted the US consulate in Erbil and Erbil Airport.[67] Multiple Iraqi sources reported that an unknown actor launched at least eight drones at the US Consulate in Erbil and a US base at Erbil International Airport on July 15.[68] Iraqi air defenses intercepted the drones.[69] Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada spokesperson Kazem al Fartousi told Iraqi media on July 16 that neither the group nor any other militia launched any operations ”toward Erbil.” The spokesperson added that the attacks on US bases and interests in Iraq are part of the ongoing confrontation between Iran and the United States.[70] Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada has conducted numerous attacks on US bases in Iraq during this conflict through its front group, Saraya Awliya al Dam.[71] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias use front groups to conduct attacks and obfuscate responsibility.[72]
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-july-16-2026/
Iran Update Special Report, July 17, 2026
The United States has struck several bridges and railroads in southern Iran since ISW-CTP’s last data cutoff in order to disrupt supply routes to Bandar Abbas, Hormozgan Province, according to a senior US official speaking to the Wall Street Journal.[1] Bandar Abbas is a port city that hosts the IRGC Navy First Naval District and numerous other naval facilities.[2] Iranian state media reported strikes on bridges in and around the city and the closure of highways connecting Bandar Abbas to nearby provinces.[3] The United States also struck the Radio and Communications Regulatory Authority's office in Bandar Abbas on July 16.[4] The office is responsible for regulating telecommunications networks, licensing operators, and managing Iran's radio-frequency spectrum.[5] Iranian media also reported on July 17 that US forces struck Bandar Abbas's railway junction station, which is located approximately 10 kilometers west of Bandar Abbas.[6] Bandar Abbas is Iran's principal military and commercial hub on the strait, as the city hosts key facilities belonging to both the IRGC Navy and the Artesh Navy. The Shahid Rajaei Port in Bandar Abbas handles roughly 85 percent of Iran's container traffic and connects directly to Iran's national rail and highway networks, making Bandar Abbas a critical hub for moving military supplies, fuel, personnel, and commercial cargo between Iran's interior and its southern coast.[7] US Central Command (CENTCOM) acknowledged on July 17 that US forces struck “military logistics infrastructure.”[8]
The Kuwaiti Electricity, Water, and Renewable Energy Ministry announced that an attack, which it attributed to “Iranian aggression,” damaged several power generation units at an unspecified power and water desalination plant on July 17.[9] Kuwait intercepted 32 Iranian drones on July 16.[10] Interceptor shrapnel from an Iranian drone previously struck and damaged a Kuwaiti desalination plant in April 2026.[11] About 90 percent of Kuwait's drinking water comes from desalination.[12]
Iran may have struck the Kuwaiti plant in response to recent US strikes on bridges in Iran and to deter the United States from attacking Iranian energy infrastructure. US forces struck several bridges in Iran on July 17 (see above).[13] Regime officials have repeatedly warned that Iran would attack “regional infrastructure” in response to any US attacks on Iranian critical infrastructure.[14] The Iranian regime has also attributed recent power outages in southern Iran to US strikes, although there is no available evidence at this time that the United States has targeted Iranian energy infrastructure.[15] US President Donald Trump recently threatened on July 14 to expand US strikes to include power plants, and the Iranian strike on the Kuwaiti plant may have been intended to deter the United States from intentionally targeting Iranian energy infrastructure by signaling that Iran could retaliate by attacking critical infrastructure in the region.[16]
Iran attacked US targets in Bahrain, Jordan, Qatar, and Oman on July 16 and 17 as part of Iran's ongoing effort to impose costs on US allies and partners in the region and discourage them from supporting US efforts to undermine Iranian control of the strait.[17] Iran targeted US assets in Oman that support US operations in the Strait of Hormuz, likely to try to degrade the United States’ capability to operate in the strait. The IRGC Navy claimed on July 17 that it destroyed a naval surveillance radar on the Salamah Archipelago and a US air surveillance radar near Ghanem Island in the Persian Gulf.[18] Iran also likely aims to deter Oman from supporting international efforts to undermine Iranian control over the strait. Iran has recently adopted a more hostile tone toward Oman and accused Oman of giving in to “US pressure” to oppose Iranian management of the strait.[19] Iranian officials have explicitly stated that Oman and other Gulf states cannot prevent Iran from asserting control over the strait in recent weeks.[20] Iran also likely seeks to punish US regional allies and make their continued cooperation with the United States increasingly costly. IRGC Aerospace Force Commander Brigadier General Majid Mousavi warned on July 17 that the IRGC will continue to launch “effective and targeted” strikes until the United States ceases its attacks in southern Iran.[21]
The IRGC said that it targeted a US special operations command center at al Tanf Garrison in the Syrian Badia in retaliation for the killing of Iranian soldiers in Iranshahr, Sistan and Baluchistan Province.[22] US forces struck the Artesh Ground Forces 388th Brigade in Iranshahr on July 15, reportedly killing seven Artesh soldiers. US forces withdrew from al Tanf in February 2026, and Syrian government forces assumed control of the position.[23] An unspecified Syrian military source told Reuters that Iran conducted an attack near al Tanf but did not hit the base itself.[24] CENTCOM denied Iranian claims that the attack killed US troops at al Tanf.[25] The Iranian attack on al Tanf comes amid repeated Iranian threats to Syria and was likely intended to deter the Syrian government from taking action against Hezbollah by demonstrating Iran's ability and willingness to attack Syrian territory. An expert close to the Iranian regime warned on July 16 that the Iranian regime would respond to any Syrian action against Hezbollah with Iranian missile and drone attacks on Syria.[26] US President Donald Trump has repeatedly suggested in recent weeks that the Syrian transitional government could play a role in operations against Hezbollah in Lebanon.[27] The location of the al Tanf Garrison attack on July 17 is also notable given that Syrian forces announced that they interdicted an IRGC shipment of drones, missiles, and weapons components intended for Hezbollah near al Tanf on July 16.[28]
Iran is continuing to use force and the threat of further attacks to impose its control over the Strait of Hormuz. Iran targeted a Thai-flagged vessel in the strait on July 17.[29] Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-affiliated Tasnim News Agency, citing an informed source, claimed that the IRGC Navy struck the vessel after it ignored warnings from the IRGC Navy and attempted to transit through the strait without Iranian authorization.[30] United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) reported on July 17 that an unidentified projectile struck a vessel 19 nautical miles east of Khasab, Oman.[31] The location of the vessel suggests that it was attempting to pass through the southern transit route along Oman's coast. Iran has repeatedly attacked vessels using this route because the route is an alternative to Iran's illegal traffic separation scheme and therefore undermines Iranian efforts to assert authority over the strait. Kpler data on July 17 shows that only eight vessels transited through the strait on July 16.[32] The low traffic volume on July 16 demonstrates how Iranian attacks on shipping are deterring shipping companies and ship captains from transiting the strait. Seven maritime security and shipping industry sources recently told Reuters on July 15 that shipping companies are avoiding using the southern route despite US military escorts.[33] Iran does not need to routinely attack vessels to disrupt shipping in the strait; a single successful attack, or even the persistent threat of one, can deter vessels from using routes outside Iran's control.
US naval forces are redirecting and disabling vessels around the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman to enforce the naval blockade. The US Navy has redirected three vessels and disabled one vessel since the United States reimposed the US blockade on Iranian ports on July 14.[34] The 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit boarded the Curacao-flagged M/T Wen Yao about 100 nautical miles east of Duqm, Oman, on July 16 to ensure the vessel's compliance with the blockade.[35] Maritime intelligence company Tanker Trackers reported that M/T Wen Yaowas carrying Iranian oil.[36]
The United States conducted a sixth consecutive night of strikes on Iran on July 16 in order to degrade Iran's ability to attack commercial shipping. CENTCOM stated on July 17 that the United States struck dozens of Iranian coastal surveillance and air defense sites, military logistics infrastructure, and maritime capabilities.[37] The United States destroyed the Chahbahar Shahid Kalantari Port surveillance tower on July 17, which CENTCOM said Iran used to track and target commercial vessels in the strait.[38] The United States previously struck the tower on July 8.[39] Iranian media reported that US aircraft also struck the IRGC Navy Imam Ali Naval Base in Chabahar, Sistan and Baluchistan Province, on July 16.[40] The US-Israeli combined force repeatedly struck the Imam Ali base in February and March 2026.[41] Commercially available satellite imagery captured between July 8 and 13 also showed damage to a boathouse and pier in Jask, Hormozgan Province.[42]
An Israeli geospatial analyst reported that commercially available satellite imagery shows that the United States struck the Oghab 44 underground aviation base in northern Hormozgan Province between July 14 and 16.[43] Israeli media reported that this facility probably houses Iranian aircraft and drones in underground facilities.[44] Iranian media separately reported that the United States struck unspecified targets at Iranshahr Airport in Sistan and Baluchistan Province on July 16.[45] The United States previously struck Iranshahr Airport on July 8.[46]
The United States also struck facilities that Iran may be using to strike Gulf states. Commercially available satellite imagery captured between July 15 and 17 showed damage to several buildings at the IRGC Aerospace Force Shahid Assi Zadeh Base in Ahvaz, Khuzestan Province.[47] This base's location in western Iran and distance from the Persian Gulf suggests that this base may be involved in Iranian retaliatory attacks against Gulf countries as opposed to Iranian attacks on commercial shipping. An Israeli geospatial analyst assessed that the United States struck Khorgu Missile Base in Hormozgan Province between July 8 and 16.[48] The United States repeatedly struck the Khorgu Missile Base in March 2026.[49] The geospatial analyst also assessed on July 17 that the United States struck Khormoj Missile Base in Bushehr Province on an unspecified recent date.[50] The analyst said that Iran has launched ballistic missiles from the Khormoj base at Gulf states.[51]
The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) continued to deploy forces to one of the “pilot zones” in southern Lebanon on July 17.[52] Lebanese and Israeli media reported that the LAF deployed additional forces to Froun and Kfar Dounine in the Bint Jbeil District on July 17.[53] French media reported that the LAF also deployed additional forces to Qalaouiyeh in Bint Jbeil District on July 17.[54] The LAF began deploying forces to Froun, Kfar Dounine, Qalaouiyeh, and additional areas in and around the “pilot zones” as part of the June 26 Trilateral Framework Agreement on July 16.[55] An Israeli military correspondent close to the Israeli government reported on July 17 that Kfar Dounine is within one of the pilot zones.[56] Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu did not include Kfar Dounine in the two pilot zones that he announced on June 27, however.[57] Netanyahu originally stated that one pilot zone would include territory surrounding Zawtar el Gharbiyeh in Nabatieh District, and the other pilot zone would include territory surrounding Ghandouriyeh and Froun in Bint Jbeil District.[58] Israeli media reported on July 17 that Zawtar al Charqiyeh in Nabatieh District is expected to be the next pilot zone.[59]
Unidentified actors conducted multiple drone attacks targeting several sites in Iraqi Kurdistan, including the US Consulate in Erbil, on July 17.[60] Kurdish counter-terrorism authorities stated on July 17 that US-led international coalition forces intercepted eight booby-trapped drones but provided no further details.[61] Iraqi media separately reported on July 17 that air defenses at Erbil International Airport shot down four drones attempting to target the US Consulate in Erbil.[62] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias launched numerous attacks against US positions in Iraqi Kurdistan during the war.[63] Unidentified actors also launched at least eight drones at the US Consulate in Erbil and a US base at Erbil International Airport on July 15.[64] No actor claimed the attack, and Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada denied responsibility for it.[65]
Iraqi Shia Coordination Framework sources revealed to regional media on July 17 additional information about how Iranian-backed Iraqi militias are attempting to circumvent the Iraqi federal government's disarmament initiative.[66] The sources reported that some militias are surrendering “older and lower-quality” weapons, such as heavy mortars, Katyusha rockets, armored vehicles, and mines, to the Iraqi state.[67] The framework sources added that the militias have not handed over drones or missiles with a range longer than 50 kilometers.[68] Iraqi media similarly reported on July 10 that unidentified militias are surrendering “scrap” missiles or inoperable drones but keeping functional heavy weapons.[69] Militia attacks during the war demonstrated that the militias have access to a large number of missiles and drones, including first-person view (FPV) drones.[70] The militias have acquired many of these weapons from Iran and via smuggling routes in Syria. The Iraqi federal government lacks accurate information about the number and types of militia weapons due to the covert nature of the militias, including those within the Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF).[71]
Kuwait is reportedly negotiating an expanded defense pact with Pakistan that would build upon a limited 2023 bilateral defense agreement between the two countries.[72] Unspecified Pakistani officials told Reuters on July 17 that Kuwait wants Islamabad to deploy aircraft, drones, an air defense system, and thousands of troops to Kuwait as part of the agreement.[73] Kuwait and Pakistan's limited 2023 agreement includes joint training and capacity-building programs.[74] Kuwait would help boost Pakistan's oil and fuel reserves under the new agreement.[75] A source familiar with Kuwaiti security planning told Reuters that Kuwait views Pakistan as a safe alternative for defense cooperation given Pakistan's long history of defense procurement and its positive relationships with Saudi Arabia and the United States.[76] Saudi Arabia signed a mutual defense pact with Pakistan in September 2025.[77] Unspecified sources with knowledge of Kuwait-Pakistan talks told Reuters that the negotiations are in an “early stage.”[78]
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-july-17-2026/