Iran Update, January 7, 2026
CTP-ISW has recorded 89 protests across 21 provinces in Iran since its last data cutoff on January 6. CTP has adjusted its data cutoff for protests in Iran to 3:30 PM ET to correspond with 12 AM Tehran time.[1] CTP-ISW recorded eight protests across seven provinces in Iran between 2:00 and 3:30 PM ET on January 6.[2] Protests have continued to primarily take place in western Iran and in smaller, less populated areas. CTP-ISW has recorded 19 protests in Tehran City since its last data cutoff, however.[3] CTP-ISW has also recorded 14 medium-sized protests since its last data cutoff, which CTP-ISW defines as protests with more than 100 participants.[4]
The regime continues to use violence and lethal force to suppress the protests. CTP-ISW has recorded 15 instances of security forces firing at protesters across eight provinces since its last data cutoff, most of which were concentrated in Tehran, Fars, Kermanshah, and Chaharmahal and Bakhtiari provinces.[5] The regime reportedly disrupted internet access in Lordegan, Chaharmahal and Bakhtiari Province, and Malekshahi and Abdanan cities, Ilam Province, where security forces have clashed with protesters, according to an internet access researcher on January 7.[6] The regime has arrested at least 2,078 citizens and killed at least 24 protesters since December 28, according to a US-based human rights organization focused on Iran on January 6.[7]
Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-affiliated media reported on January 7 that protesters killed two Law Enforcement Command (LEC) officers during protests in Lordegan, Chaharmahal and Bakhtiari Province, as well as an unspecified security force member in Malekshahi, Ilam Province.[8] These reports mark the first time that the regime has publicly announced the death of security forces members since the start of the protests on December 28. The regime previously claimed on January 1 that protesters had killed a member of the Basij, but this claim turned out to be false.[9] The Iranian regime could use the deaths of security personnel as justification to intensify its suppression of Iranian protesters.
An Iranian media outlet affiliated with one of Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s representatives to the Defense Council, Ali Shamkhani, implicitly criticized security forces’ recent raid on a hospital in Ilam Province.[10] Security forces raided a hospital in Malekshahi County, Ilam Province, on January 5, where injured protesters were being treated.[11] The outlet argued that the incident represents “a serious test of how the government engages society during crises” and that “issuing conciliatory statements, declaring responsibility, and accepting the possibility of error” do not diminish the regime’s authority but rather strengthen it.[12] The outlet’s implicit criticism of the raid is notable, given that other parts of the regime have justified the raid.[13]
A group of seven Kurdish organizations, including anti-regime groups, called for a general strike across Iran on January 8.[14] The Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI), Komala Party of Iranian Kurdistan, and Kurdistan Free Life Party (PJAK), among others, called for a nationwide “general strike” on January 8 in response to the regime’s violent crackdown on protests in Kermanshah, Ilam, and Lorestan provinces.[15] CTP-ISW has recorded 67 protests in Kermanshah, Ilam, and Lorestan provinces since December 28.[16] The organizations’ call for a general strike is notable, given that the regime previously accused Kurdish opposition groups of inciting protests in Kurdish areas during the Mahsa Amini movement.[17] The IRGC previously struck anti-regime Kurdish militant positions in Iraqi Kurdistan in October 2022.[18] Significant protest activity took place in Kurdistan and West Azerbaijan provinces, which have large Kurdish populations, during the Mahsa Amini movement.[19] CTP-ISW has not observed any protests in Kurdistan Province nor significant protest activity in West Azerbaijan Province thus far in the current wave of protests, however.
The Mobarizoun Popular Front (MPF), which is a coalition of Baloch anti-regime groups, killed an Iranian Law Enforcement Command (LEC) officer in Iranshahr, Sistan and Baluchistan Province, on January 7 in response to the regime’s violent crackdown on protesters across Iran.[20] The MPF claimed that it killed the Shahr-e Deraz LEC commander in response to “the killing and suppression of protesters in various parts of our country.”[21] The MPF claimed that the commander previously served as the Iranshahr LEC Information Protection Organization commander and had killed “Baloch fuel workers” in recent months.[22] The MPF previously warned on January 1 that it would respond to “every bullet” fired by Iranian security forces at protesters.[23] CTP-ISW has not recorded any protests in Iranshahr at the time of this writing. The MPF’s January 7 attack marks the first time that the MPF has conducted an attack in Iranshahr. The MPF previously conducted its first attack in Zahedan, Sistan and Baluchistan Province, in early December 2025.[24]
Anti-regime media and some social media users claimed that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have deployed to Iran to support the Iranian regime’s crackdown on protests.[25] CTP-ISW is unable to verify these reports, and anti-regime media have circulated similar reports during previous waves of protests. Anti-regime outlet Iran International reported on January 6 that around 800 Iranian-backed Iraqi militia fighters have deployed to Iran since January 2 through border crossings in Diyala, Maysan, and Basra provinces, citing unsourced “information.”[26] The Iraqi fighters are reportedly members of Kataib Hezbollah, Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba, Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada, and the Badr Organization, among other militias.[27] Iran International added that unspecified Iraqi government officials are aware of the fighters’ deployments, which have occurred under the guise of pilgrimage trips to the Imam Reza Shrine in Mashhad, Iran.[28] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias frequently use their control of many Iran-Iraq border crossings to smuggle items, such as weapons, in and out of Iraq.[29] Several social media users have also claimed in recent days that members of the Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) are suppressing protests in Iran, including in Hamedan City, Hamedan Province.[30] The PMF is an Iraqi state security service that includes many Iranian-backed Iraqi militias that tend to report to Iran instead of the Iraqi prime minister.[31] The militias’ deployments, if true, could bolster the regime’s efforts to contain the protests. Iraqi militias may also be more willing than Iranian security forces to use violence and lethal force against protesters, given that they lack personal connections to the Iranian communities that are protesting. Anti-regime media often circulate reports about the deployment of Iranian proxy forces to Iran to suppress protests during periods of unrest. Iran International, citing Israeli media, reported in 2022 that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias under the PMF deployed to Iran during the Masha Amini protest movement to help the Iranian regime contain the protests, for example.[32] The former head of Tehran’s Revolutionary Court, Musa Ghazanfarabadi, also implied in 2019 to Iranian religious students in Qom that Axis of Resistance groups, including Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, could support the regime’s suppression of future protest movements in Iran.[33] Iranian security forces notably helped the PMF violently suppress protests in Iraq in 2019.[34]
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-january-7-2026/
Iran Update, January 8, 2026
Protest activity in Iran has expanded dramatically in both rate and magnitude since January 7, including in major cities like Tehran and in northwestern Iran. Protesters demonstrated in at least 156 instances across 27 provinces on January 8, which almost doubles the number of protests recorded on January 7.[1] The individual protests are also much larger than those prior to January 8 and include 60 medium-sized protests (over 100 participants) throughout the country.[2]
Protests and strikes have expanded to the Kurdish-populated Kurdistan Province in northwestern Iran. CTP-ISW has recorded six protests in Kurdistan Province.[3] The Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI), Komala Party of Iranian Kurdistan, and Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)-linked Kurdistan Free Life Party (PJAK), among others, called for a nationwide “general strike” on January 8 in response to the regime’s violent crackdown on protests in Kermanshah, Ilam, and Lorestan provinces.[4] Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-affiliated Tasnim News denounced the Kurdish groups’ call for a general strike, accusing them of attempting to incite riots.[5] The regime previously accused Kurdish opposition groups of inciting protests in Kurdish areas during the Mahsa Amini movement.[6]
Iranian leaders have long-standing concerns about Kurdish separatism and militancy in the western and northwestern provinces.[7] Iranian leaders have historically accused Kurdish militias in Iraq of operating in the border provinces and inciting social unrest. Those concerns grew particularly acute during the 2022-23 Mahsa Amini protests, which were partly concentrated among Kurdish communities that the regime worried the Kurdish militias could try to co-opt.[8] The regime appeared especially prepared to use extreme force to suppress protests in the western and northwestern provinces during the Mahsa Amini protests, at one point deploying the IRGC Ground Forces to conduct what the regime described as clearing operations across several towns and villages.[9] The expansion of the ongoing protests to northwestern Iran will reignite regime anxieties about Kurdish separatism and militancy there. That could in turn drive the regime to adopt an especially brutal crackdown in those areas, which may already happening in Kermanshah and Ilam provinces.
The regime has likely determined that these protests represent an extremely dire security threat and has intensified its crackdown accordingly, including by taking the rare step of using the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Ground Forces to suppress protests in at least one province.[10] The regime used the IRGC Ground Forces to suppress protests in at least Kermanshah Province and possibly other provinces on January 8.[11] This is a rare step; the regime only deployed the IRGC Ground Forces once during the Mahsa Amini protests, but it did so in Kurdish-populated areas. Kermanshah Province, where there are reports of IRGC Ground Forces activity, has a large Kurdish population.[12] The regime tends to rely most heavily on the LEC and paramilitary Basij to manage social unrest and suppress protests.[13] The regime maintains elite Basij units that specialize in crowd control and repression and activates them when protests escalate meaningfully. The regime relies on the IRGC Ground Forces in the most extreme circumstances, during which the regime tends to approach protests as an insurgency rather than gatherings of aggrieved citizens. The IRGC Ground Forces is the final regime defense against civil upheaval and thus uses extreme levels of force to quell demonstrations.[14]
The use of the IRGC Ground Forces in Kermanshah and the reports of casualties there suggest that the regime is approaching the protests there as an insurgency rather than riots or protests. Norway-based human rights organization Hengaw claimed that two IRGC Ground Forces members were killed during the protests in Kermanshah City on January 8, citing Iranian state media outlets.[15] The deaths of the IRGC soldiers are notable because these individuals are from a military force, not the police, and should be more capable of protecting themselves. It is unclear what caused their deaths, though the deaths of two soldiers during protests indicate that the clashes between protesters and security forces have become particularly intense in Kermanshah City. Hengaw also claimed that forces from the Nabi Akram Operational Division fired live rounds at protesters in Kermanshah City, where the unit is based, on January 8.[16]
The use of the IRGC Ground Forces could indicate bandwidth constraints among security forces in addition to a shift in how the regime perceives the protests, however. The rapid expansion of the protests in space and magnitude may have outstripped the ability of the LEC and Basij to cover every protest. The lack of LEC and Basij manpower would require the regime to use the IRGC Ground Forces to continue to suppress ongoing protests.[17]
The regime arrested several security forces members on January 8 who reportedly refused orders to fire at protesters, according to a Norway-based human rights organization.[18] This is the only instance CTP-ISW has observed of security forces refusing orders at this time. Should this trend expand, however, it could cause major bandwidth constraints that would further limit the regime’s ability to suppress protests.
IRGC-affiliated media reported on January 8 that a Law Enforcement Command (LEC) member died of a stabbing injury he sustained on duty while attempting to contain protesters in Malard.[19] Protesters killed two LEC officers during protests in Lordegan, Chaharmahal and Bakhtiari Provinces, as well as an unspecified security force member in Malekshahi, Ilam Province.[20] The Iranian regime could use the deaths of security personnel as justification to intensify its suppression of Iranian protesters and contribute to the regime’s perception that it is suppressing insurgents rather than protesters or rioters.
The regime has also responded with sweeping internet shutdowns.[21] The regime has spent years developing its ability to impose localized internet shutdowns.[22] The regime has elected for a countrywide shutdown is dramatic and reflects how dire Iranian leaders perceive the situation. Countrywide internet shutdowns precede bloody crackdowns, as was the case during the Aban protests in November 2019. Reuters reported that the regime killed around 1,500 protesters during this period.[23]
The internet shutdown across Iran could severely limit the open-source information available to CTP-ISW. Our updates during the shutdown will likely reflect only some of the protest activity on a given day. Nevertheless, the continuation of the internet shutdown is an indicator in itself that a meaningful amount of protest activity is still occurring.
IRGC Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani reportedly urged unity among unspecified Iranian-backed Iraqi militia leaders on the issue of disarmament during a visit to Baghdad between January 6 and 8. Ghaani’s visit and his urgings demonstrate the continued divisions among Iraqi militias over disarmament.[24] “Informed” Iraqi sources told Asharq al Awsat that Ghaani emphasized the prevention of “internal differences or escalation” regarding disarmament during a meeting with unspecified Iraqi militia leaders in Baghdad.[25] Multiple prominent Iranian-backed Iraqi militia members have expressed varying positions on disarmament in recent weeks, even as the militias’ official coordinating body has attempted to maintain a unified face.[26] Ghaani’s visit to Baghdad follows a statement by the Iraqi Resistance Coordination Committee on January 4 that rejected calls for Iranian-backed Iraqi militias to disarm due to the continued presence of US and Turkish forces in Iraqi Kurdistan.[27] The Iraqi Resistance Coordination Committee is a coordinating body for Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.[28] Kataib Hezbollah, Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada, Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba, Harakat Ansar Allah al Awfiya, and Asaib Ahl al Haq signed the statement.[29] CTP-ISW previously noted the inconsistencies between the committee’s statement and the positions that some of the militias that signed it have expressed about disarmament.[30] There may also be splits within as well as among the militias. A senior member of Asaib Ahl al Haq’s rejection of the statement on January 5 indicates that there may even be splinters within Asaib Ahl al Haq on the topic.[31] The United States has continuously pressured the Iraqi federal government to disarm Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, including throughout 2025.[32]
Ghaani may have attempted to increase militia support for disarmament in line with Iran’s reported efforts to push its larger partner militias in Iraq into politics. Iraqi political insiders told UK-based Amwaj media in November 2025 that Iran has encouraged unspecified Iranian-backed Iraqi militias to focus on political engagement instead of armed resistance, possibly to discourage US sanctions enforcement that would prevent Iran from using the Iraqi economy to evade sanctions.[33] Some prominent Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, including Kataib Hezbollah and Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba, have refused to disarm.[34] Other militias, such as Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada, have attempted to obfuscate the relationship between the militias and the Iraqi state.[35] Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada Spokesperson Kazem al Fartousi claimed on December 20 that weapons are already restricted to the Iraqi state, and the militias therefore do not need to disarm.[36] Fartousi’s comments ignore the reality that many Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, such as Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada, possess weapons and are neither integrated into the Iraqi security forces nor answer to the Iraqi prime minister.[37]
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-january-8-2026/