Senior Iranian military officials called on students at Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-controlled universities to help the Iranian armed forces improve their technological and “preemptive” capabilities. Iranian Armed Forces General Staff Chief Major General Abdol Rahim Mousavi and Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Commander Major General Mohammad Pakpour gave speeches to students at the IRGC-controlled Command and Staff University and Imam Hossein University, respectively, on December 7.[67] Both officials called on the Iranian armed forces to develop and utilize advanced technologies, such as artificial intelligence.[68] Mousavi emphasized the need for Iran to keep up with technological developments and strengthen the armed forces’ “preemptive capabilities.”[69] Iranian media noted that developing “preemptive capabilities” is consistent with Iran's “active deterrence” strategy, which is an offensive strategy that Iran has employed since at least 2014.[70] “Active deterrence” emphasizes the need for Iran to intervene in situations abroad in order to expand Iranian influence and confront threats before they endanger Iran.[71] Pakpour highlighted applications for artificial intelligence in surveillance and targeting and stated that “stealth technology” could improve Iranian missiles’ ability to penetrate Israeli air defenses.[72] Pakpour emphasized that “more work should be done at Imam Hossein University in areas such as air defense and stealth technology.”[73] Mousavi and Pakpour’s emphasis on technological developments comes after Israel reportedly used artificial intelligence to identify Iranian targets during the war.[74]
Unspecified European diplomats told Al Monitor on December 6 that Israel would likely strike Iran in the next year if Iran resumes enriching uranium at high levels.[75] The diplomats stated that Israel would likely attack Iran if Iran takes “serious steps” to enrich uranium and advance its ballistic missile capabilities, and if the United States and Iran do not reach a nuclear deal. The European diplomats did not provide any evidence for these assertions, however. Iran has made minimal progress in repairing its three main nuclear sites that Israel and the United States damaged during the June 2025 Israel-Iran War but has conducted “extensive” clean-up efforts at several nuclear weaponization sites, according to satellite imagery analyzed by the Institute for Science and International Security.[76] The Institute assessed on November 21 that Iran's clean-up efforts at three nuclear weaponization sites “may be the prelude to rebuilding or related to sanitization activities.”[77] There are no indications that Iran has resumed enriching uranium or retrieved its highly-enriched uranium stockpile after the war. Iran possessed 440.9 kilograms of uranium enriched up to 60 percent before the start of the war, which is enough uranium, if enriched further, to produce at least 10 nuclear weapons.[78] A political analyst with ties to the Iranian regime assessed on December 7 that the probability of a “limited” and ”targeted” Israeli attack on Iran is high and that President Donald Trump's newly released National Security Strategy aims to uphold “the status quo” by containing Iran rather than pursuing strategic reconciliation or full-scale war.[79] The analyst claimed that the United States aims to keep Iran in a permanent state of “defense and effort to preserve survival” and prevent Iran from rebuilding its deterrence and influence.[80] The analyst suggested that Iran can impose costs on Israel and Arab states to reduce their willingness to contain Iran in line with the US National Security Strategy.[81]
Iran is pragmatically pursuing closer diplomatic and trade ties with Azerbaijan amid Iranian concerns about Azerbaijan's relationships with the United States and Israel, which Iran perceives as a threat to its security. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi met with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev in Baku on December 8 to discuss strengthening Iranian-Azerbaijani relations.[82] Araghchi reaffirmed Iran's support for the 3+3 format, which is a diplomatic initiative involving Iran, Turkey, Russia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan to ensure security in the Caucasus through trade “without any foreign interference.”[83] Araghchi and his Azerbaijani counterpart, Jeyhun Bayramov, also discussed how Iran and Azerbaijan are expanding bilateral trade through border infrastructure projects, such as the Rasht-Astara Railway and the Aghband-Kalalah highway bridge.[84] An Iranian expert on the Caucasus told Iranian media on December 8 that Iran wants Azerbaijan to join the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) to remove trade barriers between the two countries.[85] Iran is not an EAEU member but has had an “observer status” in the union since 2024 and signed a free trade agreement with the EAEU in May 2025. Member or observer status in the union reduces tariffs by 90 percent.[86] The Iranian expert noted that increased trade between Iran and Azerbaijan would activate Iran‘s land trade routes with Russia and support Iran's regional trade network.[87] Iran's efforts to increase trade with Azerbaijan come amid Iranian officials’ concerns about US and Israeli interference in the Caucasus. The United States proposed in August 2025 to oversee the development of the Zangezur Corridor in southern Armenia to connect Azerbaijan to the Nakhchivan Autonomous Region.[88] The corridor would run along Iran's only shared border with Armenia and sever Iran's land access to Russia and Europe via Armenia, which could hinder Iranian efforts to become a major transit hub. Some Iranian media outlets separately accused Azerbaijan of allowing Israel to launch attacks against Iran from Azerbaijani territory during the June 2025 Israel-Iran War, which Azerbaijan has denied.[89] Iran remains concerned about Israeli infiltration into Iranian territory from Azerbaijan, as well as Azerbaijan's deepening relationship with Israel.[90]
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-december-8-2025/
Iran Update, December 9, 2025
Iran is reportedly prioritizing the rapid restoration of its ballistic missile production capacity over other aims, such as the reconstruction of its nuclear program. This prioritization signals that Iran views the restoration of its missile capabilities as an immediate strategic priority, likely because it is more readily achievable in the short term. A senior Israel Defense Forces (IDF) official told the Israeli Knesset on December 8 that Iran has resumed large-scale production of ballistic missiles.[1] Western diplomats also told Israeli media that Iran’s “top priority” is to restore the ballistic missile project, even if Iran does not appear to be advancing its nuclear program.[2] The diplomats also told Israeli media on December 8 that Iran is using older manufacturing methods to continue producing ballistic missiles.[3] Older manufacturing methods could refer to “trough-type mixers,” which are less efficient than the planetary mixers that Israel destroyed in October 2024, although CTP-ISW is unable to verify the type of mixers that Iran is currently using at the time of this writing.[4] Iran has begun rebuilding the Parchin and Shahroud missile production facilities, which Israel destroyed during the Israel-Iran War, since August 28 and September 5, respectively, according to satellite imagery analyzed by the Associated Press.[5] Iranian officials have long considered the ballistic missile program to be a crucial deterrent to Israel and the United States.
The Iranian assumption that Israel will resume the Israel-Iran War in the short term is likely animating the decision to prioritize the Iranian missile program over other defense priorities. Iranian officials have repeatedly publicly stated that they expect the war between Iran and Israel to resume imminently since the war ended in June 2025.[6] Iranian officials continue to say that they view ballistic missiles as a key deterrent to Israeli strikes, despite the ineffectiveness of Iranian ballistic missiles in the Israel-Iran War. Former Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Commander Mohammad Ali Jafari argued in October 2025 that Iran’s missile program is its main form of deterrence and that Iran deliberately prioritized developing its missile and drone capabilities over its air and ground forces to counter the superior capabilities of the United States and Israel.[7] Another former IRGC commander emphasized the role that Iran’s ballistic missile capabilities played in its “success” during the war.[8] Iranian officials are likely calculating that rapidly increasing their ballistic missile stockpile will deter the Israelis from resuming the war despite the missiles’ failures in June 2025. Some Iranian officials appear to want to improve the technical capabilities of these missiles over time, but could calculate that the perceived immediacy of future Israeli strikes requires an expansion of the stockpile of current systems.[9]
Iran is seeking to deepen its economic relations with Belarus in an attempt to circumvent the impact of international sanctions. Iran and Belarus held the eighteenth session of the Iran-Belarus Joint Economic Committee in Tehran on December 8.[43] Iranian Mining and Trade Minister Mohammad Atabak and Belarusian Industry Minister Andrei Kuznetsov discussed establishing a special economic zone and facilitating bilateral free trade.[44] Belarus National Agency of Investment and Privatization head Alena Perminova previously met with Iranian Free and Special Economic Zones High Council Secretary Reza Masrour on August 20 and proposed that Belarus could utilize Iranian ports to bypass its landlocked geography and sanctions.[45] Masrour said that, in exchange, Belarus could assist Iran with joining the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) as a full member.[46] Iran has had an “observer status” in the EAEU since 2024 and signed a free trade agreement with the EAEU in May 2025 that reduced tariffs by 90 percent.[47]
An Iranian delegation led by a senior Iranian military-diplomatic official responsible for managing defense relations, international coordination, and arms-related policy visited Belarus on December 8. This visit was the third Iran-Belarus interagency military cooperation commission meeting.[48] Belarusian First Deputy Defense Minister and Chief of the General Staff Major General Pavel Muraveiko emphasized Belarus’ readiness to cooperate with Iran in all areas during the meeting.[49] The two sides also approved a joint activity plan for 2026.[50] Iranian Artesh Air Force Commander Brigadier General Hamid Vahedi recently held a meeting with Belarusian Air Force and Air Defense Forces Commander Major General Andrei Lukyanovich during a four-day visit to Belarus between November 2 and 5.[51] CTP-ISW assessed that Iran may seek to exchange technical information with Belarus related to air defense systems and electronic warfare (EW) equipment to enhance its ability to produce these systems.[52] Belarus is unlikely to offer any low-density, high-demand air defense or electronic warfare equipment to Iran without Russia’s approval.[53] Air Defense and electronic warfare systems are in high demand for Russia’s war in Ukraine, and the available supply does not match Russia’s needs.[54]
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-december-9-2025/