Iran Update, December 9, 2025
Iran is reportedly prioritizing the rapid restoration of its ballistic missile production capacity over other aims, such as the reconstruction of its nuclear program. This prioritization signals that Iran views the restoration of its missile capabilities as an immediate strategic priority, likely because it is more readily achievable in the short term. A senior Israel Defense Forces (IDF) official told the Israeli Knesset on December 8 that Iran has resumed large-scale production of ballistic missiles.[1] Western diplomats also told Israeli media that Iran’s “top priority” is to restore the ballistic missile project, even if Iran does not appear to be advancing its nuclear program.[2] The diplomats also told Israeli media on December 8 that Iran is using older manufacturing methods to continue producing ballistic missiles.[3] Older manufacturing methods could refer to “trough-type mixers,” which are less efficient than the planetary mixers that Israel destroyed in October 2024, although CTP-ISW is unable to verify the type of mixers that Iran is currently using at the time of this writing.[4] Iran has begun rebuilding the Parchin and Shahroud missile production facilities, which Israel destroyed during the Israel-Iran War, since August 28 and September 5, respectively, according to satellite imagery analyzed by the Associated Press.[5] Iranian officials have long considered the ballistic missile program to be a crucial deterrent to Israel and the United States.
The Iranian assumption that Israel will resume the Israel-Iran War in the short term is likely animating the decision to prioritize the Iranian missile program over other defense priorities. Iranian officials have repeatedly publicly stated that they expect the war between Iran and Israel to resume imminently since the war ended in June 2025.[6] Iranian officials continue to say that they view ballistic missiles as a key deterrent to Israeli strikes, despite the ineffectiveness of Iranian ballistic missiles in the Israel-Iran War. Former Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Commander Mohammad Ali Jafari argued in October 2025 that Iran’s missile program is its main form of deterrence and that Iran deliberately prioritized developing its missile and drone capabilities over its air and ground forces to counter the superior capabilities of the United States and Israel.[7] Another former IRGC commander emphasized the role that Iran’s ballistic missile capabilities played in its “success” during the war.[8] Iranian officials are likely calculating that rapidly increasing their ballistic missile stockpile will deter the Israelis from resuming the war despite the missiles’ failures in June 2025. Some Iranian officials appear to want to improve the technical capabilities of these missiles over time, but could calculate that the perceived immediacy of future Israeli strikes requires an expansion of the stockpile of current systems.[9]
Iran is seeking to deepen its economic relations with Belarus in an attempt to circumvent the impact of international sanctions. Iran and Belarus held the eighteenth session of the Iran-Belarus Joint Economic Committee in Tehran on December 8.[43] Iranian Mining and Trade Minister Mohammad Atabak and Belarusian Industry Minister Andrei Kuznetsov discussed establishing a special economic zone and facilitating bilateral free trade.[44] Belarus National Agency of Investment and Privatization head Alena Perminova previously met with Iranian Free and Special Economic Zones High Council Secretary Reza Masrour on August 20 and proposed that Belarus could utilize Iranian ports to bypass its landlocked geography and sanctions.[45] Masrour said that, in exchange, Belarus could assist Iran with joining the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) as a full member.[46] Iran has had an “observer status” in the EAEU since 2024 and signed a free trade agreement with the EAEU in May 2025 that reduced tariffs by 90 percent.[47]
An Iranian delegation led by a senior Iranian military-diplomatic official responsible for managing defense relations, international coordination, and arms-related policy visited Belarus on December 8. This visit was the third Iran-Belarus interagency military cooperation commission meeting.[48] Belarusian First Deputy Defense Minister and Chief of the General Staff Major General Pavel Muraveiko emphasized Belarus’ readiness to cooperate with Iran in all areas during the meeting.[49] The two sides also approved a joint activity plan for 2026.[50] Iranian Artesh Air Force Commander Brigadier General Hamid Vahedi recently held a meeting with Belarusian Air Force and Air Defense Forces Commander Major General Andrei Lukyanovich during a four-day visit to Belarus between November 2 and 5.[51] CTP-ISW assessed that Iran may seek to exchange technical information with Belarus related to air defense systems and electronic warfare (EW) equipment to enhance its ability to produce these systems.[52] Belarus is unlikely to offer any low-density, high-demand air defense or electronic warfare equipment to Iran without Russia’s approval.[53] Air Defense and electronic warfare systems are in high demand for Russia’s war in Ukraine, and the available supply does not match Russia’s needs.[54]
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-december-9-2025/
Iran Update, December 10, 2025
Iran is seeking to develop and acquire electronic warfare (EW) systems, probably to attempt to remedy deficiencies that Israel exploited during the June 2025 war. The Iranian Defense Ministry unveiled the new “Sayyad-4” EW system on December 10 that can reportedly disrupt enemy positioning and navigation capabilities, according to Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps-affiliated media.[23] This description suggests that this system is a GPS jamming system that can disrupt enemy precision targeting and target identification. Iran‘s unveiling of the Sayyad-4 system reflects continued Iranian investment in reconstituting its integrated air defense systems (IADS) in the wake of the Israel-Iran War. Iran has previously relied on Russia for EW systems such as the Krasukha-4, which were built to neutralize low earth orbit (LEO) spy satellites, ground-based radars, airborne surveillance radars, and radar-guided ordinance at ranges between 150 to 300 kilometers.[24] Israel possesses systems that can circumvent or suppress EW systems like the Krasukha.[25]
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-december-10-2025/