Iran Update April 10, 2025
A Senior Iranian official threatened to reduce cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) if external threats against Iran continue. Iranian Supreme Leader Adviser Ali Shamkhani stated on April 10 that Iran could expel IAEA inspectors, halt cooperation with the agency, or move enriched uranium to “safe and unknown locations” if external threats and military pressure continue.[1] Iran has already restricted IAEA oversight, including withdrawing the designation of several inspectors in September 2023 and barring other top inspectors in November 2024.[2] Shamkhani’s remarks may possibly aim to deter a potential US or Israeli strike on Iranian nuclear facilities and may also seek to instill urgency among Western officials for renewed negotiations.
China increased its Iranian oil imports by at least 80 percent in March compared to February.[3] This undermines the US “maximum pressure” campaign, which seeks to drive Iranian oil exports to zero, and illustrates cooperation between two major US adversaries. Reuters reported on April 10 that China’s imports of Iranian oil increased significantly in March amid concerns that new US sanctions could further restrict the Iranian oil supply, citing unspecified traders and analysts.[4] Estimates show that Iran shipped between 1.3 to 1.8 million barrels per day to China in March. Most of these exports are transferred off the coast of Malaysia and Singapore and reflagged as Malaysian. China remains the largest importer of Iranian oil, buying 90 percent of Iran’s total oil exports. China’s Iranian oil imports help Iran circumvent US sanctions. Iran, China, and Russia issued a joint statement in mid-March condemning the US “maximum pressure” strategy vis-a-vis Iran.[5] Chinese officials have echoed this statement since.[6]
Iran and Belarus continued to develop their strategic relationship. Iran and Belarus signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) on April 10 to expand bilateral trade along the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC).[57] This MOU comes after Iran and Belarus signed a defense MOU in early March to expand defense industrial cooperation.[58]
The Iranian rial depreciated from 999,000 rials to one US dollar on April 9 to 1,009,500 rials to one US dollar on April 10.[56]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-10-2025
Iran Update, April 11, 2025
Iran will likely attempt to use nuclear negotiations with the United States to delay a potential strike on its nuclear facilities and the imposition of snapback sanctions. Axios reported on April 11 that Iran may propose that Iran and the United States first negotiate an “interim deal” prior to beginning negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear agreement.[1] Iran and the P5+1 (the United States, the United Kingdom, China, France, Russia, and Germany) reached an interim deal in 2013 that froze elements of Iran’s nuclear program in exchange for temporary sanctions relief prior to further negotiations that led to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2015.[2] US President Donald Trump reportedly set a 60-day deadline to reach a new nuclear agreement, which will begin on April 12.[3] Trump previously warned on March 30 that ‘there will be a bombing’ if Iran does not agree to a new nuclear deal.[4]
Iran may calculate that an interim deal with the United States could delay or prevent the imposition of snapback sanctions by European JCPOA signatories. The E3 (France, Germany, and the United Kingdom) threatened to impose snapback sanctions on Iran in June 2025 if a new nuclear deal was not reached.[5] The June snapback deadline coincides with Trump’s reported 60-day deadline for reaching a new nuclear deal.[6] Snapback sanctions are a mechanism established by the JCPOA that allows current signatories to reimpose sanctions on Iran within thirty days in the event of “significant non-performance by Iran of JCPOA commitments.”[7] The United States cannot unilaterally trigger snapback sanctions as it withdrew from the JCPOA in 2018.[8] The snapback sanction mechanism is set to expire in October 2025.[9]
Senior Iranian officials persuaded Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei to approve negotiations with the United States in March 2025 to avoid being forced to fight a “two-front war” against the United States and the Iranian people.[10] The New York Times reported on April 11 that Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, Judiciary Chief Gholam Hossein Mohseni Ejei, and Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf met with Khamenei in March to convince Khamenei to change his position on negotiations, citing two unspecified senior Iranian officials familiar with the meeting.[11] Khamenei repeatedly and explicitly rejected negotiations with the United States in February and March 2025.[12] Pezeshkian, Ejei, and Ghalibaf reportedly warned Khamenei that rejecting negotiations may trigger a strike on Iranian nuclear facilities that could escalate into a ”two-front war,” which reportedly convinced Khamenei to approve indirect negotiations with the United States in late March.[13] The three stressed that a two-front war could worsen Iran’s economy and stoke internal unrest, which may pose a threat to regime stability. The Iranian rial hit a record low—at that time—after Khamenei categorically rejected negotiations with the United States for the first time on February 7.[14] Khamenei reportedly ultimately agreed to a two-step process that starts with indirect talks and potentially moves to direct talks.[15] Khamenei laid out conditions for negotiations, stating that Iran was willing to negotiate on its nuclear program, including its uranium enrichment, but Iran’s missile program was off-limits. Khamenei also appointed his close advisors, Kamal Kharazi, Ali Larijani, and Mohammad Forouzandeh, to manage negotiations with the United States along with the Iranian foreign ministry, according to four unspecified Iranian officials speaking to The New York Times.
Iran and Armenia conducted a joint border exercise in Norduz, East Azerbaijan Province, northwestern Iran, on April 9 and 10 to enhance border security and counter-terrorism coordination.[83] The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Ground Forces’ 31st Ashura Operational Division and the Armenian Armed Forces conducted the exercise.[84] Iran and Armenia have a history of economic cooperation, but this is the first time both states have conducted a joint military exercise.[85] Iran has previously conducted joint military exercises with its other South Caucasus neighbor, Azerbaijan, Armenia’s regional rival.[86] Northwestern Iran borders the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict zone between Armenia and Azerbaijan.[87] Azerbaijan seeks to build the Zangezur Corridor through Armenia, linking Azerbaijan proper to its enclave in Nakhchivan.[88] Iran has opposed the Zangezur corridor because the corridor would impede Iran’s access to trade routes to Europe via Armenia and potentially reignite the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict.[89] Iran’s policy aims to balance its relationship with both Armenia and Azerbaijan to avoid another conflict in the South Caucasus, which has the potential to spill over or flare up ethnic Armenian and Azeri-Iranian tensions in Iran.[90]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-11-2025