Iran Update, April 11, 2025
Iran will likely attempt to use nuclear negotiations with the United States to delay a potential strike on its nuclear facilities and the imposition of snapback sanctions. Axios reported on April 11 that Iran may propose that Iran and the United States first negotiate an “interim deal” prior to beginning negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear agreement.[1] Iran and the P5+1 (the United States, the United Kingdom, China, France, Russia, and Germany) reached an interim deal in 2013 that froze elements of Iran’s nuclear program in exchange for temporary sanctions relief prior to further negotiations that led to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2015.[2] US President Donald Trump reportedly set a 60-day deadline to reach a new nuclear agreement, which will begin on April 12.[3] Trump previously warned on March 30 that ‘there will be a bombing’ if Iran does not agree to a new nuclear deal.[4]
Iran may calculate that an interim deal with the United States could delay or prevent the imposition of snapback sanctions by European JCPOA signatories. The E3 (France, Germany, and the United Kingdom) threatened to impose snapback sanctions on Iran in June 2025 if a new nuclear deal was not reached.[5] The June snapback deadline coincides with Trump’s reported 60-day deadline for reaching a new nuclear deal.[6] Snapback sanctions are a mechanism established by the JCPOA that allows current signatories to reimpose sanctions on Iran within thirty days in the event of “significant non-performance by Iran of JCPOA commitments.”[7] The United States cannot unilaterally trigger snapback sanctions as it withdrew from the JCPOA in 2018.[8] The snapback sanction mechanism is set to expire in October 2025.[9]
Senior Iranian officials persuaded Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei to approve negotiations with the United States in March 2025 to avoid being forced to fight a “two-front war” against the United States and the Iranian people.[10] The New York Times reported on April 11 that Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, Judiciary Chief Gholam Hossein Mohseni Ejei, and Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf met with Khamenei in March to convince Khamenei to change his position on negotiations, citing two unspecified senior Iranian officials familiar with the meeting.[11] Khamenei repeatedly and explicitly rejected negotiations with the United States in February and March 2025.[12] Pezeshkian, Ejei, and Ghalibaf reportedly warned Khamenei that rejecting negotiations may trigger a strike on Iranian nuclear facilities that could escalate into a ”two-front war,” which reportedly convinced Khamenei to approve indirect negotiations with the United States in late March.[13] The three stressed that a two-front war could worsen Iran’s economy and stoke internal unrest, which may pose a threat to regime stability. The Iranian rial hit a record low—at that time—after Khamenei categorically rejected negotiations with the United States for the first time on February 7.[14] Khamenei reportedly ultimately agreed to a two-step process that starts with indirect talks and potentially moves to direct talks.[15] Khamenei laid out conditions for negotiations, stating that Iran was willing to negotiate on its nuclear program, including its uranium enrichment, but Iran’s missile program was off-limits. Khamenei also appointed his close advisors, Kamal Kharazi, Ali Larijani, and Mohammad Forouzandeh, to manage negotiations with the United States along with the Iranian foreign ministry, according to four unspecified Iranian officials speaking to The New York Times.
Iran and Armenia conducted a joint border exercise in Norduz, East Azerbaijan Province, northwestern Iran, on April 9 and 10 to enhance border security and counter-terrorism coordination.[83] The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Ground Forces’ 31st Ashura Operational Division and the Armenian Armed Forces conducted the exercise.[84] Iran and Armenia have a history of economic cooperation, but this is the first time both states have conducted a joint military exercise.[85] Iran has previously conducted joint military exercises with its other South Caucasus neighbor, Azerbaijan, Armenia’s regional rival.[86] Northwestern Iran borders the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict zone between Armenia and Azerbaijan.[87] Azerbaijan seeks to build the Zangezur Corridor through Armenia, linking Azerbaijan proper to its enclave in Nakhchivan.[88] Iran has opposed the Zangezur corridor because the corridor would impede Iran’s access to trade routes to Europe via Armenia and potentially reignite the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict.[89] Iran’s policy aims to balance its relationship with both Armenia and Azerbaijan to avoid another conflict in the South Caucasus, which has the potential to spill over or flare up ethnic Armenian and Azeri-Iranian tensions in Iran.[90]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-11-2025
Iran Update, April 14, 2025
Iran is increasing its diplomatic activity with third parties ahead of the April 19 nuclear talks. Iranian Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister for Legal and International Affairs Kazem Gharibabadi announced on April 14 that International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Rafael Grossi will visit Tehran on April 16.[18] Gharibabadi traveled to Moscow on April 14 and met with Russian Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs Sergei Vershinin.[19] Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi will also travel to Moscow in the coming days.[20] Iran has consistently engaged with Russia on the nuclear issue in recent weeks.
Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei called on the Iranian armed forces to maintain maximum “hardware and software readiness” during a meeting with senior military officials and commanders on April 13.[21] Khamenei described the Iranian armed forces as Iran's “shield” and praised the diverse and unified command structure of the Iranian armed forces. Khamenei criticized the West's double standards, claiming that Western countries possess “the most catastrophic weapons” but try to prevent Iranian “defense growth.” Armed Forces General Staff Chief Major General Mohammad Bagheri presented a report during the meeting about regional developments and Iran‘s response to the October 7 War. Bagheri highlighted Iranian deterrence efforts, weapons development, and joint exercises.
Senior Iranian officials continue to be concerned about a potential US or Israeli strike on Iran. Khatam ol Anbia Air Defense Headquarters Commander Brigadier General Alireza Sabahi Fard visited the Shahid Bordbar Air Defense Group in Chabahar, Sistan and Baluchistan Province, on April 12 to assess the unit's combat capability and defense readiness.[22] Sabahi Fard emphasized that expanding missile and defense systems is essential for protecting Iranian airspace against potential threats. The visit is part of a series of inspections that Sabahi Fard has conducted to Iranian air defense sites in recent days. Sabahi Fard visited air defense zones in Bandar Abbas, Hormozgan Province, on April 4 and Bushehr Province on April 6.[23]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-14-2025