Posted on 10/08/2022 1:05:38 PM PDT by nuconvert
Iranian Regime national tv Channel One hacked about an hour ago. During a broadcast of Khamenie speech, a red crosshair appeared over his face and chanting of Women. Life. Freedom. There was writing to the side saying "Rise up. Join us". Also 4 photos at the bottom of the screen of young people killed and additional writing: "The blood of our youth is dropping from your paws".
Also, there was a huge banner in the middle of Tehran highway today that read: We are no longer afraid of you. We will fight.
Also, attempted attack on IRI ambassador in Denmark. Her bodyguard was stabbed. Diplomatic Security intervened before the attacker could stab the ambassador.
Hamas has begun transporting unspecified equipment to Baghdad International Airport in preparation for relocating its political leadership to Iraq, according to an unspecified senior Shia Coordination Framework member.[5] The politician claimed that Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Asaib Ahl al Haq Leader Qais al Khazali and Iranian-backed Badr Organization Secretary General Hadi al Ameri met on July 8 to discuss Hamas’ potential relocation to Baghdad. The politician noted that unspecified Shia factions are divided over whether the Iraqi federal government should allow Hamas to move to Iraq. Emirati media reported on June 24 that Hamas plans to relocate its political leadership to Iraq due to growing pressure from the United States and Qatar on Hamas to show greater flexibility in ceasefire negotiations with Israel.[6] Emirati media noted that Iran would be responsible for protecting Hamas personnel and offices in Iraq. The Emirati report followed the opening of a Hamas political office in Baghdad in early June 2024.[7]
Israel likely conducted an airstrike targeting an Iranian weapons shipment near Baniyas, Tartous, on July 9. The Syrian Ministry of Defense stated that Israel conducted an airstrike targeting an unspecified site near Baniyas city.[36] Syrian media reported Israel targeted a weapons shipment near Jableh, a town located near the port of Latakia and the Russian-controlled Hmeimim Military Airport.[37] Syrian media noted that the attack followed the arrival of Iranian shipments to the port of Latakia.[38] CTP-ISW has previously assessed that Iran and Russia are likely coordinating to transport Iranian materiel to Lebanon and Syria through Hmeimim Military Airport.[39] Syrian and Israeli officials recently noted that the objective of Israel's air campaign in Syria is to halt Iranian-backed efforts to transfer military materiel to Hezbollah before a potential full-scale conflict.[40]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-9-2024
Iran Update, July 10, 2024
Iranian President-elect Masoud Pezeshkian is apparently considering nominating Abbas Araghchi as his foreign affairs minister, underscoring Pezeshkian’s intent to seriously pursue nuclear negotiations with the West. IRGC-affiliated media reported on July 10 that Pezeshkian’s advisers “have almost reached the final conclusion” to nominate Araghchi, citing an unspecified source.[14] The source claimed that Araghchi has advised Pezeshkian on his conversations with unspecified Axis of Resistance and regional officials in recent days. Araghchi played a prominent role in the nuclear negotiations with the West under the Hassan Rouhani administration and served as Rouhani’s deputy foreign affairs minister for policy between 2017 and 2021.[15] It is unclear whether the Iranian Parliament, which is currently dominated by hardliners, would approve Araghchi as foreign affairs minister. It is furthermore unclear whether Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei would permit Araghchi to pursue nuclear negotiations with the West in a manner meaningful different from the Ebrahim Raisi administration if the Iranian Parliament does approve him as foreign affairs minister. Khamenei implicitly criticized Pezeshkian’s support for increasing Iranian engagement with the West in a speech on June 25.[16]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-10-2024
Jalili refused to allow the more pragmatic Mohammad-Bagher Ghalibaf to represent the ‘revolutionary front’ in the recent elections against the reform-leaning Masoud Pezeshkian. Ghalibaf’s supporters have taken to social media to accuse Jalili and his political allies of looking up to Mohammad-Mahdi Mirbagheri, a mid-ranking cleric, as their true religious and political leader. They allege that Jalili’s camp only “pretends” to emulate and respect Khamenei.
Jalili was backed by the ultra-hardliner Paydari (Steadfastness) Party led by Sadegh Mahsouli, a business tycoon and interior minister under populist Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, as well as the recently established Jebhe-ye Sobh-e Iran. The latter, often called MASAF, is a political group led by the controversial politician and theorist Ali-Akbar Raefipour. The two political groups have spread their influence to many government and state organizations in the past few years. The views expressed by Paydari and MASAF members often mirror Mirbagheri’s apocalyptic religious and anti-western political views that are sometimes even more extreme than Khamenei’s.
“First hit the United States in the face and break its wrist and then have fair negotiations with it if it is still inclined to talk,” Mirbagheri says about talks to revive the 2015 nuclear deal (JCPOA). Jalili’s rivals say his supporters even stopped the government of the late President Ebrahim from reaching a nuclear deal to remove US sanctions. Mirbagheri who heads the Islamic Science Academy of Qom is already one of the 81 members of the Assembly of Experts whose members are to appoint Khamenei’s successor. His followers are often collectively referred to as the “Academy current” by other hardliners.
The 63-year-old cleric who has never held any government office is little known outside seminaries, hardliner political circles, and networks of religious mourning groups (heya’at azadari) run by fundamentalist Shia eulogists. These groups and their leaders (maddahs) have gained huge political influence in the past two decades. The Paydari Party and MASAF have taken over many top and sensitive positions in state organizations and the parliament where they are a sizeable but very influential minority since 2020.
Mirbagheri’s interpretation of Islam and Velayat-e Faqih (rule of Islamic jurists) is very similar to the views of the late Ayatollah Mohammad-Taqi Mesbah-Yazdi, whom he is now considered a successor. Mesbah-Yazdi who was held in very high esteem by Khamenei insisted that God appoints the Islamic jurist who becomes the supreme leader of the country and the role of the members of the Assembly of Experts is only to “discover” God's appointee.
The role of the rest of the Islamic Shia society, in their view, is preparing itself for the emergence of Mahdi, the 12th imam who the Shia believe has been in occultation by divine will since 941 CE. The loudest and clearest call to suppress the Paydari Party and MASAF in the past few days has come from hardliner politician Abdolreza Davari who campaigned for Ghalibaf but said he would vote for Masoud Pezeshkian in the runoff elections to ward off the “danger of Jalili”.
“The fundamentalist sedition cannot be overcome through political and logical methods. The eye of the sedition must be removed to rid the society of their evil … The eye of the fundamentalists’ sedition cannot be removed without setting up a few gallows,” Davari declared in a tweet Tuesday. In his tweet, he compared the Paydari Party and MASAF to the Khawarij who turned their backs on the first Shiite Imam, Ali ibn-e Abi Talib and eventually assassinated him as well as Forqan, an anti-clerical Islamist militant group, that assassinated several senior officials of the Islamic Republic. His post was accompanied by an image of the announcement of the execution of seven members of Forqan on the front page of Kayhan newspaper in March 1980.
https://www.iranintl.com/en/202407104008
This is a battle between different mafia groups for power and money in Iran.
Iran Update, July 11, 2024
Some senior IRGC commanders have emphasized in recent days the need for the Iranian political establishment, particularly hardliners, to accept and support Iranian President-elect Masoud Pezeshkian in order to preserve political stability. Former IRGC Commander Major General Mohsen Rezaei said on July 10 that Pezeshkian should be considered part of “the revolution front,” which is a reference to parts of the hardline camp.[3] Rezaei further stated that those who support the regime and Islamic Revolution must also support Pezeshkian. IRGC Aerospace Force Commander Brigadier General Amir Ali Hajji Zadeh similarly on July 11 called on supporters of runner-up presidential candidate Saeed Jalili to respect Pezeshkian’s victory and avoid criticizing the electoral process.[4] Hajji Zadeh described Pezeshkian as “the president of the entire nation and of every Iranian.” Hajji Zadeh also noted that former President Ebrahim Raisi’s death could have triggered a “major crisis” but that the regime averted such a crisis and conducted two rounds of voting within a week “without the smallest problem.” Rezaei’s and Hajji Zadeh’s statements are consistent with CTP-ISW’s previous assessment that Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei prioritized regime legitimacy and stability over installing his preferred candidate in the election.[5]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-11-2024
Iran Update, July 12, 2024
Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf conducted bilateral meetings with his counterparts from Russia, Ethiopia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Armenia, and Tajikistan on the sidelines of the BRICS parliamentary forum in St. Petersburg, Russia, on July 11 and July 12.[49] Ghalibaf emphasized Iran’s interest in increasing economic relations during his meeting with Armenian deputy speaker Rubin Rubinian.[50]
Ghalibaf also met with Russian President Vladimir Putin and Russian State Duma President Viacheslav Valodin separately on July 11.[51] Ghalibaf invited the Russian Duma Chairman Vyacheslav Valodin to the President-elect Masoud Pezeshkian’s inauguration next month.[52] Iranian Ambassador to Russia Kazem Jalali announced at the forum that Russia and Iran have finalized the comprehensive cooperation agreement after two and half years of negotiations.[53]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-12-2024
Iran Update, July 13, 2024
Nothing specific
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-13-2024
but
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 13, 2024
Russia and Iran continue to signal their commitment to deepening bilateral relations and multilateral cooperation. Iranian President-elect Masoud Pezeshkian published an article in the Tehran Times on July 12 in which Pezeshkian praised the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Russia for standing by Iran during “challenging times.”[4] Pezeshkian stated that Russia is a “valued strategic ally and neighbor” to Iran and that his government will remain committed to expanding and prioritizing bilateral and multilateral cooperation with Russia, including through BRICS, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). Pezeshkian claimed that Iran “strives for peace” between Russia and Ukraine and is prepared to support initiatives aimed at peace. Russian Ambassador to Iran Alexei Dedov stated during an interview with Russian state news agency RIA Novosti published on July 13 that Russia will pursue the same strategic course with Iran under Pezeshkian as Russia pursued under deceased Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi.[5] Dedov claimed that Russia is prepared to consider peace mediation proposals from Iran, although Russian President Vladimir Putin recently rejected the possibility of any third-party mediation efforts between Russia and Ukraine.[6] Dedov stated that Russia and Iran will sign a comprehensive strategic partnership agreement in the “foreseeable future,” but did not provide a concrete timeline for this agreement.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-13-2024
Iran Update, July 14, 2024
The Houthis claimed two attacks targeting the Liberian-flagged Chrysalis crude oil tanker in the Red Sea and Bab al Mandab on July 12.[32] The Houthis claimed that they used drones and ballistic and “naval” missiles to conduct the attacks.
Houthi media claimed on July 14 that the United States and United Kingdom conducted airstrikes targeting Buhais, Midi District, Hajjah Governorate, Yemen.[33]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-14-2024
The Axis of Resistance is continuing to try to coerce Gulf states into reducing their economic cooperation with Israel. Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah warned Saudi Arabia on July 13 that it will “pay the price” for allowing Israel to conduct trade through Saudi territory.[1] Kataib Hezbollah accused Saudi Arabia of allowing Israel to use overland trade routes through Saudi territory “as an alternative to sea lanes.”[2] Kataib Hezbollah was likely referring to the trade corridor that connects Israel to the Persian Gulf via the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia, and Jordan.[3] Israel has increasingly relied on this land route to mitigate the impact of Houthi attacks on international shipping around the Gulf of Aden and Red Sea.[4] The Houthis conducted around 190 attacks targeting commercial vessels in the Red Sea between November 2023 and mid-June 2024, causing trade activity at the Port of Eilat to decrease by approximately 85 percent.[5] Kataib Hezbollah previously vowed in April 2024 to sever the Israeli “land bridge” that passes through Jordan.[6]
Kataib Hezbollah's desire to disrupt the Israeli economic cooperation with the Gulf states is part of a larger Axis of Resistance effort to economically isolate Israel. Iranian leaders, including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, have repeatedly called on Muslim countries to impose an embargo on Israel.[7] Iranian officials and media have also criticized Gulf states for allowing Israel to conduct trade through their territory and argued that the “land bridge” connecting Israel to the Persian Gulf renders Houthi attacks in the Red Sea “ineffective.”[8] An Iranian-backed Bahraini militia began conducting attacks targeting Israel in April 2024 as part of the Axis of Resistance effort to impose an unofficial blockade on Israel.[9] Iran and its allies appear to be operating on the theory that severe economic disruption would compel Israel to accept defeat in the Gaza Strip and that such economic pressure could ultimately collapse the Israeli state. Iranian leaders have repeatedly said in recent months that part of their theory on how to destroy Israel revolves around stoking instability and terror in Israel to catalyze reverse migration away from Israel.[10]
Iranian officials are continuing to promote greater cooperation with Russia. Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry spokesperson Nasser Kanani traveled to Moscow on July 12 to attend a BRICS conference.[68] Kanani called for increasing media and public diplomacy cooperation during a meeting with Russian Foreign Affairs Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova on the sidelines of the conference on July 13.[69] Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf separately conducted an interview with Russia Today (RT) on July 13 in which he called for greater political, security, financial, and defense cooperation between Iran and Russia.[70] Ghalibaf recently attended a BRICS parliamentary forum in St. Petersburg on July 11 and 12.[71]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-15-2024
Iranian President-elect Masoud Pezeshkian is articulating a foreign policy that is a continuation of the policies of his hardline predecessor even as Pezeshkian attempts to present himself to the West as a “reformist.” Pezeshkian penned an op-ed entitled “My Message to the World” in English-language, Foreign Ministry-affiliated outlet the Tehran Times on July 12.[1] Pezeshkian framed himself as a reformist and reiterated that he ran his presidential campaign “on a platform of reform.” Pezeshkian contradicted his initial statement by reaffirming his commitment to many of the policies of his hardline predecessor, most notably signaling support for continuing former President Ebrahim Raisi’s “neighborhood” policy. The “neighborhood” policy seeks to build relations with regional states.[2] The policy is part of a broader Iranian effort to build a new regional order in which Iran is a central player and the United States has little influence.[3] Pezeshkian emphasized the importance of cooperation with regional partners including Iraq, Oman, Bahrain and Turkey emphasized the importance of working with neighboring Arab countries in an op-ed in UK-based, Qatari-owned Arabic-lanage outlet al Araby al Jadeed on July 10.[4] Pezeshkian added that one of his administration's first measures will be to work with neighboring Arab countries to ”utilize all political and diplomatic leverages” to secure a ceasefire and prevent the widening of the Israel-Hamas war. Pezeshkian stressed the ”devalue” of Iran's relations with Russia and China.[5] Pezeshkian separately reaffirmed his commitment to the Axis of Resistance through letters and phone calls following the election.[6]
Pezeshkian’s only articulated policy that aligned with his “reformist” agenda is his desire to pursue a nuclear deal with the West. Pezeshkian restated his intention to engage in “constructive dialogue” with Western countries in his op-ed. Pezeshkian repeatedly emphasized his desire to pursue nuclear negotiations with the West throughout his campaign.[7] It is unclear whether Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei would permit Pezeshkian to pursue nuclear negotiations with the West in a manner that is meaningfully different from the Ebrahim Raisi administration. The Raisi administration attempted to pursue nuclear negotiations with the West, albeit Raisi sought to gain broad sanctions relief in exchange for small concessions on the Iranian nuclear program.[8] Khamenei implicitly criticized Pezeshkian’s support for increasing Iranian engagement with the West in a speech on June 25.[9]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-16-2024
US authorities have intensified security measures around former President Donald Trump after receiving intelligence reports of an Iranian plot to assassinate him, a CNN report said, although no links have been established between the plot and a recent shooting at a Trump rally.
Iran has repeatedly threatened to avenge the death of Qassem Soleimani, the commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), who was killed in January 2020 on orders from then-President Trump.
CNN reported on Tuesday that recent intelligence from a human source reveals Iran was planning to assassinate Trump, leading to enhanced security measures by the Secret Service.
In August 2022, the US Justice Department charged an IRGC member for allegedly planning to assassinate John Bolton, the Trump administration’s national security adviser, in retaliation for Soleimani’s assassination. Bolton has been enjoying Secret Service detail since then.
Robert O’Brien, another national security adviser in the Trump administration, previously had a US government security detail due to threats from Iran, similar to Pompeo and other former Trump officials. However, that protection was withdrawn last summer, sources revealed to CNN. O’Brien is now funding his own private security, according to sources.
Iran’s assassination threat against the two former national security advisers has been countered by a $12m-a-year Secret Service operation, official papers showed in February.
“Make no mistake, lapses in security can and will permit Iran-backed plots to succeed,” Ben Taleblu told Iran International. “While fortunately many have been discovered or thwarted over the years, the rise in Iran-backed terror and kidnapping attempts usings proxies and trans-national criminal syndicates means that Tehran believes quantity has a quality of its own and is waiting for a mistake.”
US law enforcement also protects Iranian dissidents and journalists in America due to credible threats from Iran.
https://www.iranintl.com/en/202407161942
Iran is still attempting to establish a permanent naval base on Sudan's Red Sea coast following unsuccessful bilateral talks in March 2024. The Wall Street Journal initially reported in March 2024 that Iran unsuccessfully tried to persuade Sudan to allow Iran to build a permanent naval base in Port Sudan on the Red Sea.[11] France-based, Sudanese outlet the Sudan Tribune reported on July 16 that the Sudanese Armed Forces rejected an Iranian proposal to permanently station an Iranian military vessel in Port Sudan in exchange for continued Iranian military aid to the Sudanese Armed Forces.[12] The July 16 report stated that Iran modified its initial proposal to instead request to establish a dual-use commercial and military port at Port Sudan. Iran's initial proposal was to establish a solely military-use port, according to the Wall Street Journal.[13] The most recent proposal was also rejected by Sudanese officials, according to the Sudan Tribune report. The July 16 report likely indicates that Iran continued talks with Sudan after its initial talks as reported by the Wall Street Journal in March 2024.
Sudanese Armed Forces officials reportedly rejected these Iranian proposals due to concerns about potential backlash from Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Western countries. Port Sudan is located approximately 200 miles west of Saudi Arabia—separated by the Red Sea. A senior Sudanese intelligence adviser to the Sudanese Armed Forces stated in March 2024 that Sudan rejected the initial proposal to ”avoid alienating the US and Israel.”[14] Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Israel all have direct access to the Red Sea, and an Iranian presence on the Red Sea would enable Iran to support longer-range naval operations to disrupt international shipping to any of these states, should Iran choose to do so.[15] Sudan's rejection of these proposals has not visibly affected Iran's decision to supply drones to the Sudanese Armed Forces. Iran has supplied the Sudanese Armed Forces with drones, such as the Mohajer-6, to use against the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces in the ongoing Sudanese Civil War.[16] CTP-ISW previously assessed in March 2024 that Iran would use a naval base in Sudan to support out-of-area naval operations and attacks on international shipping in the Red Sea.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-17-2024
January 2020, Supreme Leader Khamenei
Following Khamenei’s proclamation of a “harsh revenge”, his official account on X (then Twitter) published an image of Trump on a golf course under the shadow of a drone, hinting at his targeting. That post has since been deleted. Khamenei’s official website also released an animation with the same theme, showing IRGC forces killing Trump using a robot.
December 2020, Qaani, Commander of IRGC Quds Force
On the anniversary of Soleimani’s assassination, his successor, Ismail Qaani, hinted at the intention to target Trump in an address to Iran's parliament. “American agents involved in the assassination of martyr Soleimani should learn the secretive life of Salman Rushdie because the Islamic Republic will avenge his unjustly-spilled blood.”
January 2021, Qaani, Commander of IRGC Quds Force
Qaani reiterated his threat in yet another occasion to commemorate his predecessor. This time more directly: “Trump and others who were with him are all known to us. From [Mike] Pompeo, who no one humiliated as much as martyr Soleimani, to the US president and all those involved in this crime, [they] are all under the microscope (not only of Muslims but) of all free people of the world.”
January 2022, President Raisi
“If Trump and (former Secretary of State Mike) Pompeo are not tried in a fair court for the criminal act of assassinating General Soleimani, Muslims will take our martyr's revenge.”
July 2022, Foreign Minister Amir-Abdollahian
Two years before dying in a helicopter crash, Iran's foreign minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian said what had happened to Soleimani would “never be forgotten.” He did explain Iran's legal and diplomatic efforts, including appeals to the International Law Commission. In an interview with Iran's state TV, he said: “One action we have taken has been to place the perpetrators and instigators of this crime on the terrorist blacklist, and those who have been listed do not sleep easily… They wanted to resolve this through intermediaries, but we rejected their offer.”
February 2023, Hajizadeh, Commander of IRGC Air Force
Amir Ali Hajizadeh, the IRGC Aerospace Commander, appeared on a TV program to explain Iran's actions to avenge Soleimani. He said, “We did not intend to kill [US soldiers]. God willing, we will kill Trump, Pompeo, [Frank] McKenzie, and the military commanders who ordered [Soleimani’s assassination].”
Iran Update, July 18, 2024
Members of Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s inner circle told Western Media that Khamenei sought to promote the candidacy of Masoud Pezeshkian due to Pezeshkian’s ability to “foster unity.”[1] Individuals close to the supreme leader told Western media that Khamenei received intelligence reports in May 2024 revealing that only 13 percent of Iranians would participate in the snap presidential election following former President Ebrahim Raisi’s death. Unnamed regime insiders stated that Khamenei subsequently “orchestrated” the election to result in the victory of moderate candidate Masoud Pezeshkian due to Khamenei’s fear that low voter turnout would “damage the clerical establishment’s credibility.” Regime insiders told Western media that Khamenei stated Iran needed a president who could “appeal to different layers of society” while “foster[ing] unity among those in power” and without challenging Iran’s ruling theocracy. This may be part of an effort to emphasize the regime’s stability and message to the West that attempts to undermine the regime will fail and that negotiations will prove the only successful way to curb Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Iranian officials believe that the United States and the West have used and are using media and other non-military means to fight a “soft war” against Iran to subvert the regime and eventually overthrow it. These Iranian officials, by presenting the facade of stability, appear to be attempting to discourage these efforts.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-18-2024
... or prevent the Paydari group and Mirbagheri from getting more power.
Khamenei man praises attack on Israel amid talk of ‘new foreign policy’
The top military advisor to Iran’s Supreme Leader praised him as the mastermind behind the April 13 air attack on Israel, while Tehran tries to convince the world that the president-elect will bring a new foreign policy approach. “The Supreme Leader decided on this operation that was unprecedented in the 78-year history of the Zionist regime. No leader or country had ever dared to do so; launching hundreds of missiles and drones at Israel is no joke,” General Yahya Rahim Safavi said on Thursday.
Described as “Operation True Promise” by Tehran, the air strike employing over 350 drones and missiles marked Iran’s first direct assault on Israeli territory. According to the Israeli military, 99% of the projectiles were intercepted with the assistance of a coalition led by the US. The raid was a response to what Iran said was an Israeli attack on its consulate in Damascus, which resulted in the death of seven officers of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, including a senior commander.
Observers noted that the successful interception of the missiles and drones represented a significant defensive victory for Israel, casting doubt on Iran’s aggressive tactics. Despite this, Iranian officials continue to depict the attack as a military success, leveraging state media and public statements to emphasize their military capabilities and project power against adversaries as the shadow war with Iran’s archenemy reached a historic climax.
In fact, Safavi’s claim that Iran’s attack represented an unprecedented operation, armies of three Arab countries launched a massive land and air assault on Israel in October 1973, involving hundreds of thousands of troops and close to 1,000 warplanes.
https://www.iranintl.com/en/202407186709
The Houthis launched a one-way attack drone into Tel Aviv for the first time on July 18, killing one individual and injuring at least another 10.[1] The Houthis appear to have flown the drone from Yemen to the Mediterranean Sea before turning it eastward into Tel Aviv.[2] The drone then struck an apartment building about 100 meters from a US consulate.[3] The Houthis have claimed responsibility for the attack and vowed to continue attacking deep into Israel.[4] The Houthis said that the attack used their new “Yafa” drone, which appears to be a modified variant of the Iranian-designed Samad-3 drone.[5] The Yafa drone carried around 10 kilograms of explosives, according to an Israeli military correspondent.[6]
The Houthis have conducted reconnaissance in force against the Israeli air defense network in recent months, which may have enabled the attack into Tel Aviv. The US Army defines reconnaissance in force as “a deliberate combat operation designed to discover or test the enemy's strength, dispositions, and reactions or to obtain other information.”[7] The Houthis have conducted regular drone and missile attacks targeting Israel since October 2023 to this end.[8] These attacks could have provided the Houthis with the information needed to evade Israeli air defenses and strike targets in Tel Aviv. The almost daily Lebanese Hezbollah and Iraqi militia attacks targeting Israel could be meant to similarly gather information on Israeli air defenses and vulnerabilities.
The Houthi reconnaissance-in-force effort against Israeli air defenses reflects more broadly how Iran and its Axis of Resistance are learning from the Israel-Hamas war and accordingly developing new ways of fighting Israel. Senior Iranian military officials have discussed, for instance, how Hamas’ attack into Israel in October 2023 demonstrated how effective and valuable ground incursions into Israel could be.[9] Iran and the Axis of Resistance have similarly experimented throughout the war with how to disrupt the Israeli economy by attacking critical Israeli infrastructure and international shipping.[10]
US Secretary of State Antony Blinken stated on July 19 that Iran has reduced its nuclear breakout time to one to two weeks.[15] Senior US officials have previously estimated that the Iranian nuclear breakout time was between 12 days and several months. Blinken’s statement comes as Iran has in recent months expanded its nuclear program and run computer simulations that could support the production of a nuclear weapon.[16] Senior Iranian officials have threatened repeatedly in recent months to pursue a nuclear weapon.[17]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-19-2024
Iran Update, July 20, 2024
nothing specific
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-20-2024
Iran Update, July 21, 2024
Houthi supreme leader Abdulmalik al Houthi announced the start of the fifth phase of Houthi escalations against Israel known as “Operation Jaffa” in a speech on July 21.[15] Abdulmalik’s speech follows the IDF‘s retaliatory strike on the port of Hudaydah, Yemen on July 20. Abdulmalik claimed that Israelis are no longer safe in main population centers of Israel, including Tel Aviv. Abdulmalik added that Israel will not re-establish deterrence vis-a-vis the Houthis by launching attacks on Yemen. Abdulmalik denied that the “Jaffa” drone that the Houthis used in its July 18 attack on Tel Aviv was foreign-made and referred to it as “purely“ Yemeni made.[16] The Jaffa drone, however, appears to be a modified variant of the Iranian-designed Samad-3 drone.[17] The Houthis presumably modified the Samad-3 in order to extend its range. Abdulmalik denied that the Houthis are conducting operations to benefit Iran and reiterated that the Houthis are operating in support of the Palestinians.[18] Houthi spokesperson Brigadier General Yahya Sarea separately said in a televised statement on July 20 that the Houthis will respond to this “blatant Israeli aggression and will not hesitate to strike the enemy’s vital targets.”[19]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-21-2024
“These goods have the potential to bolster the national currency. Moreover, as per his [Zanjani’s] statement, should the Central Bank, due to certain considerations, choose not to use these goods as backing for the national currency, it has the option to sell them and utilize the proceeds,” Dehghan said on Friday.
Despite the secrecy surrounding the government's deal with the tycoon, gold seems to be the only commodity that could potentially back the currency. Many commentators and politicians over the years have hinted that Zanjani had accomplices in high places, otherwise he could not have embezzled large sums, or would have been executed by now.
Dehghan further attempted to bolster Zanjani’s reputation, noting that he had already served over a decade of his sentence. Dehghan added, “According to our information, he has stated that if the assets he transferred to the country encounter issues being sold and converted into cash, he can sell them himself.”
Zanjani, once hailed as Iran's richest man, described himself as a soldier of the Islamic Revolution, working on the economic front to help the country evade crippling sanctions imposed by the United Nations over Iran's nuclear program in the early 2010s.
Once valued at approximately $13.5 billion, Zanjani’s wealth was extraordinary in a nation where the state controls most of the economy. Today, one-third of Iran's population lives below the poverty line.
By evading sanctions, Zanjani faced international penalties from the EU in December 2012 and the US in April 2013. Domestically, under President Hassan Rouhani, he was arrested and convicted, with the Ministry of Oil claiming he owed the government $1.9 billion in oil revenues.
https://www.iranintl.com/en/202407208659
https://www.rferl.org/a/iran-rise-and-fall-of-richest-man-zanjani/27594891.html
Iran Update, July 22, 2024
The modified Houthi drone that struck Tel Aviv flew at least 2,600 kilometers, demonstrating how Iran and its partners have expanded the geographic range of their weapon systems to target the eastern Mediterranean and other areas.[1] The modified Sammad-3 drone traveled east-to-west from Yemen, crossing into Eritrea before turning north and flying through Sudan and Egypt and then turning east to target Tel Aviv from the west. A standard Sammad-3 can travel 1,500 kilometers. Israeli air defense operations failed to identify the drone as a threat because it traveled in civilian flight corridors and dropped off and on the Israeli radar system. The Houthi attack approached Israeli air space at the same time as a second drone that came from Iraq. The IDF concluded that there was no operational coordination between the Houthis and the Iranian-backed Iraqi militia. The Iraqi drone arrived near Israel at the same time, but it was not launched simultaneously, given the much shorter flight time from Yemen.[2]
Iran and the Houthis have both said that they aim to develop the ability to attack targets in the Indian Ocean and Mediterranean Sea. The capability to strike a target over 2,500 kilometers from Yemen demonstrates that the Houthis can launch drones targeting areas as far north as Cyprus—ranging all of Israel—and as far south as the southeastern coast of Tanzania, ranging large portions of the Indian Ocean. The Houthis have expressed an intent to expand their targeting into both areas.[3]
This Houthi attack is part of a broader Axis of Resistance reconnaissance-in-force effort against Israeli air defenses, which aims to better understand the strengths and weakness of Israeli air defense, as CTP-ISW has previously assessed. These lessons can be shared across the access, given that the Houthis and Axis of Resistance almost certainly communicate about their attacks and lessons learned. The Houthi supreme leader, Abdulmalik al Houthi, noted that the Houthis and Iraqi groups continue to coordinate, for example.[4]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-22-2024
Hamas, Fatah and other unspecified Palestinian political factions agreed on a vision for post-war governance of the Gaza Strip on July 23 during “intra-Palestinian reconciliation” talks in Beijing.[1] The factions signed a joint declaration setting out their intention to form “a temporary national unity government” responsible for governing the Gaza Strip and the West Bank.[2] The agreement stipulates that a government partly influenced by Hamas would rule the Gaza Strip and West Bank until elections could be held at an unspecified future date.[3] The declaration reportedly does not address what party maintains security control over the Gaza Strip, and Hamas has been adamant it will keep its military wing.[4] Hamas, Fatah, and China have not disclosed the full text of the declaration at the time of this writing. Senior Hamas official Hossam Badran claimed that unity government would supervise the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip, manage the affairs of the Palestinian people, and provide a “formidable barrier” against regional and international intervention in the governance of the Gaza Strip.[5] Hamas and Fatah have previously signed a series of unimplemented reconciliation agreements.[6] The former Palestinian Authority prime minister and top Fatah official Mohammad Shtayyeh said that Hamas and Fatah must continue discussions to advance the declaration's framework.[7] CTP-ISW will publish more in-depth analysis and coverage of this development as more details of the agreement become available.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-23-2024
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