Iranian President-elect Masoud Pezeshkian is articulating a foreign policy that is a continuation of the policies of his hardline predecessor even as Pezeshkian attempts to present himself to the West as a “reformist.” Pezeshkian penned an op-ed entitled “My Message to the World” in English-language, Foreign Ministry-affiliated outlet the Tehran Times on July 12.[1] Pezeshkian framed himself as a reformist and reiterated that he ran his presidential campaign “on a platform of reform.” Pezeshkian contradicted his initial statement by reaffirming his commitment to many of the policies of his hardline predecessor, most notably signaling support for continuing former President Ebrahim Raisi’s “neighborhood” policy. The “neighborhood” policy seeks to build relations with regional states.[2] The policy is part of a broader Iranian effort to build a new regional order in which Iran is a central player and the United States has little influence.[3] Pezeshkian emphasized the importance of cooperation with regional partners including Iraq, Oman, Bahrain and Turkey emphasized the importance of working with neighboring Arab countries in an op-ed in UK-based, Qatari-owned Arabic-lanage outlet al Araby al Jadeed on July 10.[4] Pezeshkian added that one of his administration's first measures will be to work with neighboring Arab countries to ”utilize all political and diplomatic leverages” to secure a ceasefire and prevent the widening of the Israel-Hamas war. Pezeshkian stressed the ”devalue” of Iran's relations with Russia and China.[5] Pezeshkian separately reaffirmed his commitment to the Axis of Resistance through letters and phone calls following the election.[6]
Pezeshkian’s only articulated policy that aligned with his “reformist” agenda is his desire to pursue a nuclear deal with the West. Pezeshkian restated his intention to engage in “constructive dialogue” with Western countries in his op-ed. Pezeshkian repeatedly emphasized his desire to pursue nuclear negotiations with the West throughout his campaign.[7] It is unclear whether Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei would permit Pezeshkian to pursue nuclear negotiations with the West in a manner that is meaningfully different from the Ebrahim Raisi administration. The Raisi administration attempted to pursue nuclear negotiations with the West, albeit Raisi sought to gain broad sanctions relief in exchange for small concessions on the Iranian nuclear program.[8] Khamenei implicitly criticized Pezeshkian’s support for increasing Iranian engagement with the West in a speech on June 25.[9]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-16-2024
US authorities have intensified security measures around former President Donald Trump after receiving intelligence reports of an Iranian plot to assassinate him, a CNN report said, although no links have been established between the plot and a recent shooting at a Trump rally.
Iran has repeatedly threatened to avenge the death of Qassem Soleimani, the commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), who was killed in January 2020 on orders from then-President Trump.
CNN reported on Tuesday that recent intelligence from a human source reveals Iran was planning to assassinate Trump, leading to enhanced security measures by the Secret Service.
In August 2022, the US Justice Department charged an IRGC member for allegedly planning to assassinate John Bolton, the Trump administration’s national security adviser, in retaliation for Soleimani’s assassination. Bolton has been enjoying Secret Service detail since then.
Robert O’Brien, another national security adviser in the Trump administration, previously had a US government security detail due to threats from Iran, similar to Pompeo and other former Trump officials. However, that protection was withdrawn last summer, sources revealed to CNN. O’Brien is now funding his own private security, according to sources.
Iran’s assassination threat against the two former national security advisers has been countered by a $12m-a-year Secret Service operation, official papers showed in February.
“Make no mistake, lapses in security can and will permit Iran-backed plots to succeed,” Ben Taleblu told Iran International. “While fortunately many have been discovered or thwarted over the years, the rise in Iran-backed terror and kidnapping attempts usings proxies and trans-national criminal syndicates means that Tehran believes quantity has a quality of its own and is waiting for a mistake.”
US law enforcement also protects Iranian dissidents and journalists in America due to credible threats from Iran.
https://www.iranintl.com/en/202407161942
Iran is still attempting to establish a permanent naval base on Sudan's Red Sea coast following unsuccessful bilateral talks in March 2024. The Wall Street Journal initially reported in March 2024 that Iran unsuccessfully tried to persuade Sudan to allow Iran to build a permanent naval base in Port Sudan on the Red Sea.[11] France-based, Sudanese outlet the Sudan Tribune reported on July 16 that the Sudanese Armed Forces rejected an Iranian proposal to permanently station an Iranian military vessel in Port Sudan in exchange for continued Iranian military aid to the Sudanese Armed Forces.[12] The July 16 report stated that Iran modified its initial proposal to instead request to establish a dual-use commercial and military port at Port Sudan. Iran's initial proposal was to establish a solely military-use port, according to the Wall Street Journal.[13] The most recent proposal was also rejected by Sudanese officials, according to the Sudan Tribune report. The July 16 report likely indicates that Iran continued talks with Sudan after its initial talks as reported by the Wall Street Journal in March 2024.
Sudanese Armed Forces officials reportedly rejected these Iranian proposals due to concerns about potential backlash from Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Western countries. Port Sudan is located approximately 200 miles west of Saudi Arabia—separated by the Red Sea. A senior Sudanese intelligence adviser to the Sudanese Armed Forces stated in March 2024 that Sudan rejected the initial proposal to ”avoid alienating the US and Israel.”[14] Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Israel all have direct access to the Red Sea, and an Iranian presence on the Red Sea would enable Iran to support longer-range naval operations to disrupt international shipping to any of these states, should Iran choose to do so.[15] Sudan's rejection of these proposals has not visibly affected Iran's decision to supply drones to the Sudanese Armed Forces. Iran has supplied the Sudanese Armed Forces with drones, such as the Mohajer-6, to use against the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces in the ongoing Sudanese Civil War.[16] CTP-ISW previously assessed in March 2024 that Iran would use a naval base in Sudan to support out-of-area naval operations and attacks on international shipping in the Red Sea.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-17-2024