Iranian Regime tv Channel One hacked while it was airing Khamenie speech

Iranian Regime national tv Channel One hacked about an hour ago. During a broadcast of Khamenie speech, a red crosshair appeared over his face and chanting of Women. Life. Freedom. There was writing to the side saying "Rise up. Join us". Also 4 photos at the bottom of the screen of young people killed and additional writing: "The blood of our youth is dropping from your paws".

Also, there was a huge banner in the middle of Tehran highway today that read: We are no longer afraid of you. We will fight.

Also, attempted attack on IRI ambassador in Denmark. Her bodyguard was stabbed. Diplomatic Security intervened before the attacker could stab the ambassador.

Iran Update, April 29, 2024

Iran is hosting an international trade exhibition between April 27 and May 1 as part of its effort to undermine Western sanctions by increasing Iranian exports and economic cooperation with other countries. Delegations from at least 26 countries, including Burkina Faso, North Korea, Russia, and Zimbabwe, attended the exhibition.[20] The exhibition has showcased Iranian agricultural, electrical, medical, and petrochemical products.[21] Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry spokesperson Nasser Kanani emphasized on April 29 that the Iranian Industry, Mining, and Trade Ministry invited North Korea to participate in the exhibition.[22] A North Korean economic and political delegation traveled to Tehran on April 23, marking the first North Korean visit to Iran since 2019.[23] Kanani dismissed allegations that the North Korean delegation is visiting Iran to expand military cooperation with Tehran, describing these allegations as “biased speculation” and “baseless.”[24] Iranian First Vice President Mohammad Mokhber separately called for expanding economic ties and conducting trade in local currencies during meetings with the vice president of Zimbabwe and the prime minister of Burkina Faso on the sidelines of the exhibition on April 27.[25] Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi previously traveled to Zimbabwe in July 2023 and signed 12 cooperation agreements, including an energy agreement, with Zimbabwean officials.[26]

Iran appears especially focused on possible arms deals with regional and extra-regional actors. Iranian Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Minister Brig. Gen. Mohammad Reza Gharaei Ashtiani discussed military cooperation in separate meetings with his Indian and Kazakh counterparts on the sidelines of a Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) meeting in Astana on April 26 and 27.[27] Ashtiani separately expressed readiness to increase cooperation with Zimbabwe while meeting Zimbabwean Vice President Constantino Chiwenga in Tehran on April 29.[28] Ashtiani, in his role as defense minister, is primarily responsible for managing arms procurement and sales and the Iranian defense industrial base. Iranian leaders have intensified their efforts in recent years to export military assets in order to generate revenue for the ill-fairing Iranian economy and increasing Iranian influence abroad.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-29-2024

Iran Update, April 30, 2024

A BBC report published on April 29 detailed the uncoordinated and brutal way in which Iranian security personnel killed a 16-year-old girl participating in the 2022 protest wave, citing a “highly confidential” IRGC document.[27] The BBC identified the document as a report summarizing a five-hour, IRGC-held hearing on the killing of Nika Shakarami, a 16-year-old girl. The document confirmed that three members of Ansar-e Hezbollah — a semi-official, regime vigilante group — molested and killed Shakarami for participating in the Woman, Life, Freedom movement in September 2022. The report claimed that the personnel detained, abused, and killed Shakarami in their vehicle after spotting her at an anti-regime protest. IRGC Capt. Mohammad Zamani instructed the team to dump Shakarami’s deceased body on a Tehran street to avoid mounting casualties recorded at security stations. Zamani said that he had “already had deaths in [his] station, and [he did not] want the number to rise to 20.” This statement illustrates the culpability of this IRGC officer and his entire chain of command in Shakarami’s death. The regime later claimed that Shakarami killed herself.[28] The regime frequently disposed of dead protestors or delayed family access to the bodies of dead protesters during the Mahsa Amini movement.[29]

A senior former Iranian intelligence officer helped the BBC verify the authenticity of the report. The BBC offered details about how this official corroborated the document such as checking an IRGC archive by using a daily code issued to senior intelligence officers. The individual also called an Iranian government official within Iran's military apparatus to authenticate the report.[30]

This report corroborates some of CTP’s assessments made during its coverage of the Mahsa Amini movement, including that the protests caused security bandwidth constraints, exhaustion, and low morale.[31] The report cited by the BBC suggests an extraordinary level of incompetence from security personnel, including that Iranian security forces feared Shakarami and 14 other female protesters’ potential to “cause a [prison] riot.”[32] Ansar-e Hezbollah's participation in protest suppression also suggests that the regime was facing bandwidth constraints due to the protests. The IRGC uses and works with Ansar-e Hezbollah members, although the group sometimes operates outside of the IRGC’s jurisdiction in an extra-legal capacity.[33] Ansar-e Hezbollah has previously threatened, kidnapped, and killed regime dissidents but has not played a prominent role in quashing anti-regime protests in recent years.[34] The group's participation in suppressing the Mahsa Amini protest movement is particularly noteworthy within this context.

The BBC's April 29 report further highlights CTP’s long-standing observation that the regime enables and empowers the killing of its citizens.[35] The IRGC document stated that Shakarami’s killing did not result in disciplinary action because the incident involved the participation of Ansar-e Hezbollah members instead of IRGC officers. The IRGC officer who oversaw the Ansar-e Hezbollah members and instructed them to dump Shakarami’s body received only a “written reprimand.”[36]

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-30-2024

Secret document says Iran security forces molested and killed teen protester

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-68840881

Yemen
Yemen's Presidential Leadership Council's head, Rashad Al-Alimi visited Marib.

https://twitter.com/alia_alyemen/status/1785613890279145505

the President praised the tribal reconciliation initiative in Al-Jawf, stressing the importance of reconciliation as a nucleus for unity and coexistence among the tribes in the Sheba region.

At the conclusion of the visit, Al-Alimi stressed the commitment of the Presidential Council to provide all capabilities to support security, military and development efforts in Marib, noting that the successes achieved in the governorate represent a model to be emulated in the rest of the regions. He expressed his confidence in the ability of the Yemeni people to overcome challenges and build a prosperous future for future generations.

This inspection visit embodies the spirit of determination and optimism, and reflects the strong will of the Yemeni government and people to strive towards achieving security, stability and progress, while preserving the national identity and rich cultural heritage of Yemen.

https://twitter.com/alsahilnet/status/1785431032399020349

i.e. perhaps we will get rid of the Iranian supported Houthies this time.

Iran Update, May 1, 2024

Several Iranian military leaders boasted on May 1 that they could strike Israel with a drone and missile attack much larger than what they launched on April 13 and thus inflict greater damage on Israel.[1] IRGC Commander Maj. Gen. Hossein Salami suggested that Iran could have launched two or three additional waves of drones and missiles against Israel and that each successive wave would have reduced the efficacy of US and partner air defenses.[2] IRGC Aerospace Force Commander Brig. Gen. Amir Ali Hajji Zadeh similarly asserted that his service used “only 20 percent of [its] strength” in the April 13 drone and missile attack.[3] CTP-ISW has previously assessed that Iran modeled its April 13 attack on recent Russian attacks in Ukraine and that Iran designed its strike package to defeat Israeli air defenses, even though the United States and its partners intercepted around 99 percent of the projectiles. Iranian leaders are almost certainly studying the April 13 attack to learn lessons and understand how to defeat US and partner air defenses in the future.[4]

Several senior Iranian military officers, including Salami, separately framed the April 13 drone and missile attack as successful in that it demonstrated Iranian willingness to now attack Israel directly.[5] These statements echo similar remarks from Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei on April 22, during which he praised senior military commanders for their role in the attack and said that “the willpower of the Iranian nation and armed forces” matters more than how many munitions Iran launched or how many munitions hit their target.[6] These statements are also consistent with Salami and other regime officials saying in recent weeks that Iran has adopted a new policy of targeting Israel directly in retaliation for Israeli attacks on Iranian interests.[7]

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-1-2024

Iran Update, May 2, 2024

Iran is trying to use its military exports as a vehicle for expanding its influence in Africa. A French investigative outlet reported on April 30 that Iran and Niger have been negotiating a deal since late 2023 for Iran to provide military drones and surface-to-air missiles in exchange for 300 tons of uranium yellowcake.[23] This quantity is especially significant given that Iran announced in 2019 its intent to produce that much yellowcake—300 tons—per year by 2024.[24] A Nigerien delegation notably traveled to Tehran in January 2024 and signed unspecified agreements with Iranian officials, including Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Minister Brig. Gen. Mohammad Reza Gharaei Ashtiani.[25] Ashtiani is responsible for managing the Iranian defense industry as well as arms procurement and sales. Niger ended its counterterrorism partnership with the United States in March 2024 after US officials accused Niger of secretly exploring a deal to allow Iran access to Nigerien uranium reserves.[26] Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian met with the new Iranian ambassador to Niger, Ali Tiztak, the same day that Niger suspended its counterterrorism cooperation with the United States.[27]

The Iranian negotiations with Niger come after Tehran similarly tried to use its defense exports to expand its influence in Sudan. Iran has supplied the Sudanese Armed Forces with drones, such as the Mohajer-6, to use against the Emirati-backed Rapid Support Forces.[28] Western media reported in March 2024 that Iran requested Sudanese permission to establish a permanent naval base on the Red Sea in return for a helicopter-carrying warship.[29] CTP-ISW assessed at the time that Iran would use a naval base in Sudan to support out-of-area naval operations and attacks on international shipping in the Red Sea.[30]

The Iranian effort to expand its influence in Africa is especially noteworthy given that Iran recently hosted representatives from over 40 African countries during its second annual Iran-Africa Trade Summit from April 26-29.[31] Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi, among other Iranian officials, met with the prime minister of Burkina Faso and vice president of Zimbabwe on the sidelines of the summit.[32] The Zimbabwean vice president also discussed expanding military cooperation during a meeting with the Iranian defense minister, Ashtiani, on April 29.[33]

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-2-2024

Iran Update, May 3, 2024

The Houthi movement said it will expand targeting of maritime shipping into the Mediterranean Sea, which is probably part of an Iranian-led effort to impose an unofficial economic blockade on Israel. The Houthi movement announced on May 3 that it will begin targeting ships in the eastern Mediterranean that are bound for Israel.[1] The Houthi military spokesperson called this the “fourth phase of escalation.” The Houthis’ Shahed-136 can reach the eastern Mediterranean.[2] Iran and its so-called “Axis of Resistance” have repeatedly called for an unofficial blockade on Israel in recent months.[3] Tehran and its allies appear to be operating on the theory that severe economic disruption would compel Israel to accept defeat in the Gaza Strip and that such economic pressure could ultimately collapse the Israeli state. Iranian leaders have repeatedly said in recent months that part of their theory on how to destroy Israel revolves around stoking instability and terror in Israel to catalyze reverse migration away from Israel.[4]

The Houthis will likely fail to disrupt trade around Israel's Mediterranean ports in the same way that the Houthis did around the Red Sea. The Houthis have been somewhat successful in decreasing the number of imports entering Israel from the port of Eliat. Eilat saw an 80 to 85% drop in revenue between November and December 2023.[5] The Houthis can achieve this effect because the movement can launch dozens of short-range drones and missiles into the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. The distances involved in targeting the Mediterranean Sea means that the Houthis have a much more limited suite of munitions to choose from and thus a more limited stockpile of individual systems to use. The Houthis also presumably lack a robust targeting regime in the Mediterranean Sea, whereas the Iranian Behshad supports Houthi targeting in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden.[6]

The same capabilities that enable the Houthis to target the Mediterranean to impose costs on Israel can be used in future conflicts—including or excluding Israel—to threaten maritime shipping and impose costs on the West. Both the Houthis and Iran have expressed aspirations to improve their capabilities to enable attacks into the Indian Ocean and Straits of Gibraltar, thus preventing shipping from entering the Mediterranean Sea or traveling around the Cape of Good Hope.[7] Attacks targeting these shipping lanes could severely impact global shipping prices. The Houthis or Iran could improve upon the capabilities they are currently employing in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden to impose economic costs on the West in the future. The Houthis and Iran could impose these costs at times and for reasons of their own choosing.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-3-2024

Iran Update, May 6, 2024

A senior Iranian military officer described how Iran and its so-called “Axis of Resistance” could destroy Israel with a multi-front ground attack. Maj. Gen. Gholam Ali Rashid, who is the commander of the Iranian Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters, discussed the Iranian theory on how to destroy Israel in an interview with English-language, Tehran-based Iran Daily on May 5.[24] Rashid asserted that the Hamas attack into Israel in October 2023 highlighted Israeli vulnerability and the weakness of the IDF. Rashid argued that Hamas’ attack affirmed that the Axis of Resistance could destroy Israel by launching surprise attacks from Lebanon, the Gaza Strip, and the West Bank simultaneously. He added that such an attack would involve 10,000 fighters from Lebanon, 10,000 fighters from the Gaza Strip, and 2,000–3,000 from the West Bank. Rashid likened such an attack to the Beit ol Moghaddas operation that Iran conducted to liberate Khorramshahr during the Iran-Iraq War. This interview with Rashid is especially noteworthy given his role in commanding the Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters, which is the highest Iranian operational headquarters and is responsible for joint and wartime operations.[25]

Rashid’s comments echo a similar strategic concept that IRGC Commander Maj. Gen. Hossein Salami articulated in August 2022.[26] Salami described his idea of how to destroy Israel during an interview with the official website of the Office of the Supreme Leader. Salami stated that the Axis of Resistance should conduct ground attacks into Israel from multiple fronts and with increasing frequency. Salami argued that such attacks would generate internal displacement and instability and ultimately collapse the Israeli state. Rashid’s interview suggests that Iranian military leadership is continuing to develop this idea and refining it based on lessons from the Israel-Hamas war.

Rashid’s comments also signaled confidence that the Axis of Resistance has the advantage against Israel and will ultimately defeat it in the current war.[27] This message was likely part of an information operation meant for Western consumption given that Rashid gave these comments to an English-language outlet.

Rashid separately repeated the Iranian regime argument that it could have inflicted greater damage on Israel during its drone and missile attack on April 13, 2024.[28] Rashid argued that Israel would collapse without Western support and that 80 percent of the Iranian projectiles would have struck Israel if the United States and its partners did not intercept any. Rashid also repeated the regime assertion that the IRGC Aerospace Force used only “20 percent of its offensive capabilities” in the attack.[29] Other senior IRGC officials have made similar arguments in recent days, emphasizing that Iran could have launched a larger drone and missile attack than it did against Israel.[30]

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-6-2024

Russia may be switching sides in the Sudanese civil war to support the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) in pursuit of a Red Sea naval base for Russia, which would align Iranian and Russian Sudanese policy and create opportunities for increased Iranian-Russian cooperation in Sudan and the broader Red Sea area. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister and Special Representative for the Russian President in Africa and the Middle East Mikhail Bogdanov met with SAF head Abdel Fattah al Burhan and several other Sudanese officials during a two-day visit to Sudan on April 28 and 29.[32] Bogdanov stated that his visit could lead to increased cooperation and expressed support for “the existing legitimacy in the country represented by the [SAF-backed] Sovereign Council.”[33] France-based Sudanese news outlet Sudan Tribune reported that Russia offered “unrestricted qualitative military aid” during the meetings and also enquired about its longstanding but unimplemented agreement to establish a naval base in Port Sudan.[34]

Bogdanov’s discussions indicate that the Kremlin is willing to risk the gold it had been getting from supporting the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), which are fighting a civil war against the SAF, to advance its longstanding Red Sea basing ambitions. The Wagner Group had been arming and training the RSF since the outbreak of the civil war in April 2023 due to preexisting ties owing to the RSF’s control of Sudan's gold mines.[35] However, the civil war has halted some Wagner-linked gold operations, and it is unclear if this support has continued to the same extent after the death of Wagner Group leader Yevgeny Prigozhin in August 2023.[36] US officials and an independent report from non-profit groups claimed that Wagner smuggled out an estimated 32.7 tons of gold worth $1.9 billion during the first year of Russia's invasion of Ukraine.[37]

Russia has pursued a Red Sea port since 2008 to protect its economic interests in the area and improve its military posture by increasing its ability to challenge the West in the broader region, including in the Mediterranean Sea and Indian Ocean.[38] Russian President Vladimir Putin had previously made an agreement with Sudan's longtime dictator Omar al Bashir in 2017 for a Red Sea base capable of stationing 300 Russian servicemembers and four ships in exchange for various kinds of military and regime security support.[39] The Kremlin subsequently supported both the RSF and SAF after Bashir’s ouster in 2019 to pursue an implementation of the deal.[40] RSF Commander General Hemedti led these negotiations after the RSF and SAF overthrew Sudan's civilian-led transitional government in 2021, but the civil war that broke out between the RSF and the SAF once again put the deal on hold.[41] The SAF controls Sudan's coast, making it the key gatekeeper for any naval base.[42]

Russia backing the SAF would greatly benefit Iran by aligning Iranian and Russian policy and strategy in the region, which would advance Iran's own aims of securing a Red Sea base in Sudan. Iran strengthened its bilateral relations with the SAF throughout 2023 and started sending drones to the SAF in late 2023 and early 2024.[43] The Wall Street Journal reported in March 2024 that Iran unsuccessfully attempted to use these ties and promises of a helicopter-carrier ship to secure a permanent naval base in Port Sudan.[44] Iran seeks a Red Sea naval base for reasons similar to Russia's–to project power further westward. Iran would use a Red Sea base to support out-of-area naval operations and attacks on international shipping. This power projection includes threatening Red Sea shipping traffic and creating opportunities to launch attacks into Israel with systems fired from surface combatants.

The Kremlin may also align its Sudan policy with Iran to lighten its own military commitments. Russian insider sources reported in mid-April that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MOD) was redeploying Russian soldiers from unspecified MOD-affiliated Africa Corps units to the Ukrainian border.[45] These demands from the Ukraine war compound ongoing capacity issues stemming from Africa Corps’ recruitment struggles.[46] Russia aligning with Iran would enable the Kremlin to coordinate aid with Iran and potentially free the resources and soldiers that it had devoted to supporting the RSF.[47] Bogdanov met with Iranian Deputy PM Ali Bagheri Kani two days before leaving for Sudan when they discussed “the importance of bilateral ties and regional issues,” indicating they are already coordinating on the issue.[48]

The Kremlin is additionally pursuing secondary objectives, including sidelining Ukrainian and US influence in Sudan, through its outreach to the SAF. The Sudan Tribune reported that Bogdanov enquired about Sudanese military cooperation with Ukraine during his visit.[49] Ukraine has provided military support to the SAF as one of its many initiatives to boost support in Africa as many African countries have been ambivalent about or supportive of Russia's invasion of Ukraine.[50] The Wall Street Journal reported that Ukraine sent nearly 100 Ukrainian special forces soldiers to Sudan at Burhan’s request in August 2023 that have supported the SAF through occasional combat, drone support, training, and supplies provision.[51] Ukraine‘s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) claimed on April 17 that the Kremlin planned to launch an information operation accusing Ukrainian forces of illegally using Western weapons in Sudan to discredit Ukraine and undermine Western support for Ukraine.[52]

Russia's backing of the SAF also risks undermining impending US-backed peace talks.[53] The US has been urging a resumption of peace talks after US-Saudi efforts failed throughout 2023.[54] Other foreign intervention contributed to these failures by emboldening actors to take hardline negotiating stances.[55]

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-6-2024

Iran Update, May 7, 2024

Iranian officials appear increasingly confident in their view that the Axis of Resistance has the advantage against Israel and will ultimately destroy Israel. Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) commander Maj. Gen. Hossein Salami said during a speech commemorating the April 1 death of senior IRGC commander Mohammad Reza Zahedi in an Israeli airstrike that Israel is “approaching the end of its political life” despite the West's support for Israel.[21] Salami added that Hamas’ October 7 attack on Israel represented a complete intelligence failure by Israel that showed how “vulnerable some countries are to a limited invasion.” Salami added that the October 7 attack pushed Israel to the “brink of death.” Salami's statement follows an interview from Maj. Gen. Gholam Ali Rashid, who is the commander of the Iranian Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters, in which Rashid described a multi-front ground attack into Israel that could destroy the Israeli state.[22] Salami, in an earlier interview in August 2022, described a very similar concept that included successive ground attacks into Israel on multiple fronts with increasing frequency.[23]

Iranian and Axis of Resistance officials are also placing increasing emphasis on operations in the Mediterranean Sea. Salami stated that Iran and the Axis of Resistance are “closing the way for the enemy” in the eastern Mediterranean Sea.[24] Other Iranian and Axis of Resistance officials have made similar claims recently. The Houthi movement announced on May 3 that it commenced the “fourth phase” of escalation against Israel by targeting ships in the Mediterranean Sea.[25] A top Iranian military adviser to the supreme leader said in March that the Mediterranean Sea is part of Iran's strategic depth and that Tehran must accordingly “increase [its] strategic depth [by] 5,000 kilometers.”[26] Five thousand kilometers from Iran would extend to the Strait of Gibraltar. These statements suggest that Iran and its regional partners are putting an increased emphasis on the Mediterranean as an arena in which it could pressure Israel and others as needed.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-7-2024

Iran Update, May 9, 2024

Iranian hardliners are continuing to normalize discussions about Iran's ability to procure a nuclear weapon. Strategic Foreign Relations Council Chairman Kamal Kharrazi stated during an interview with al Jazeera on May 9 that Iran will have “no choice” but to change its nuclear doctrine if Israel threatens Iran's existence[60] Kharrazi emphasized that Iran has not decided to pursue a nuclear weapon but warned that Iran's “level [61] Kharrazi is a top foreign policy adviser to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Kharrazi’s decision to conduct the interview with al Jazeera suggests that he meant to send this message especially to the Arab states, such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Kharrazi previously stated that Iran has the “technical means” to make a nuclear weapon but had not decided whether to pursue such a weapon during an interview with al Jazeera in July 2022.[62]

Other senior Iranian officials have similarly discussed openly Iran's ability to produce a nuclear weapon in recent weeks. The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Nuclear Security and Protection Corps Commander Brig. Gen. Ahmad Haghtalab announced on April 18 that Iran will change its “nuclear doctrine and policies” if Israel strikes Iran's nuclear facilities.[63] Haghtalab’s statement preceded the Israeli airstrike on April 18 that targeted an Artesh Air Force base in Esfahan City, Esfahan Province, approximately 112 kilometers south of the Natanz Nuclear Complex.[64]

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-9-2024

MbS needs new game plan as Houthis, Iran flex naval power

Given that Saudi Arabia in Mar. 2023 struck a normalization deal with Iran, and is in parallel engaged in peace talks with the Houthis, neither Sana’a nor Tehran are likely to strike the Kingdom. However, these conditions can change fast, to Riyadh's detriment.

In 2019 attacks on oil facilities in Abqaiq and Khurais slashed nearly half of Saudi production and about 5% of global supply. While the Houthis claimed the operation, Iran was blamed for the precision strikes, which were said to have been conducted with cruise missiles and drones. In a shock to the Kingdom, the Donald Trump administration did not come to the rescue. This was extremely damaging to Riyadh's confidence in Washington's commitment to its security.

Those turbulent years, coupled with Saudi Arabia's newfound perception that the US was not committed to its security, served as a wake-up call to the Kingdom. Even as Riyadh is now pursuing security guarantees from Washington as part of any normalization deal with Israel, Saudi decision makers understand that they cannot rely on the US to protect their vital oil infrastructure.

Ultimately, it is against this backdrop that Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman Al Saud (MbS) went from referring to Iran's supreme leader as “Hitler” in 2017 to agreeing to hold diplomatic talks with Iranian officials in 2021—ultimately resulting in the 2023 normalization deal with Tehran.

While Saudi Arabia previously was primarily concerned about avoiding becoming a casualty of a Iran-US confrontation, it is now also laboring to stay clear of a wider conflagration between Iran and Israel.

While the Islamic Republic does not intend to target the Kingdom, it can easily blame Israel and the US for forcing it to respond in a way that compromises global trade. Already, Tehran is once again threatening to close the Strait of Hormuz. Meanwhile, the Houthis have expanded the scope of their maritime operations to the Indian Ocean, which vessels carrying Saudi energy exports must traverse. Indeed, while Yanbu and the east-to-west pipeline provide easy passage to European clients, the Kingdom's prime customers remain in Asia. This means that a step such as the closure of the Strait of Hormuz would be catastrophic.

read full paper https://amwaj.media/article/mbs-needs-new-game-plan-as-houthis-iran-flex-naval-power

Iran Update, May 10, 2024

Iranian hardliners are continuing to discuss Iran's ability to procure a nuclear weapon. A hardline Iranian member of parliament speculated that Iran had developed nuclear weapons in an interview on May 10.[9] Newly-elected Ahmad Bakhshayesh Ardestani told the moderate-aligned Rouydad 24 outlet that Iran had obtained nuclear weapons but had not and would not announce that it had nuclear weapons. Ardestani’s comments were speculative in nature, and he is likely unable to such information in his current role. Ardestani’s comments follow Strategic Foreign Relations Council Chairman Kamal Kharrazi‘s comment in an al Jazeera interview on May 9 that Iran will have “no choice” but to change its nuclear doctrine if Israel threatens Iran's existence.[10] These statements align with International Atomic Energy Agency Chief Rafael Grossi’s May 8 comments that the agency was working ”very hard with [Iran] to prevent [nuclear weaponization] from happening,” suggesting that Iran has already obtained or is close to obtaining the ability to procure nuclear weapons.[11]

These discussions coincide with an April 2024 report that claimed that Iran is attempting to obtain 300 tons of uranium yellowcake from Niger.[12] A French investigative outlet reported on April 30 that Iran and Niger have been negotiating a deal since late 2023 for Iran to provide military drones and surface-to-air missiles in exchange for 300 tons of uranium yellowcake. This quantity is significant given that Iran announced in 2019 that it intended to produce 300 tons of yellowcake per year by 2024. A Nigerien delegation notably traveled to Tehran in January 2024 and signed unspecified agreements with Iranian officials, including Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Minister Brig. Gen. Mohammad Reza Gharaei Ashtiani. Ashtiani is responsible for managing the Iranian defense industry, including arms procurement and sales. Niger ended its counterterrorism partnership with the United States in March 2024 after US officials accused Niger of secretly exploring a deal to allow Iran access to Nigerien uranium reserves. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian met with the new Iranian ambassador to Niger on the same day that Niger suspended its counterterrorism cooperation with the United States.

Iranian-Zimbabwean cooperation has also increased in recent weeks amid Iranian hardliner comments about the Iranian nuclear program, as CTP previously reported.[13] Zimbabwe participated in the inaugural Iranian Nuclear Science and Technology Conference, for example, in Esfahan City between May 6-8.[14] The Times claimed in 2013 that Zimbabwe had signed an agreement with Iran to sell materials for Iran's nuclear weapons program, which Zimbabwe has since denied.[15] No further reporting has corroborated The Times’ 2013 report.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-10-2024

Iran Update, May 13, 2024

Iran is continuing to signal publicly that it could pursue a nuclear weapon. Strategic Foreign Relations Council Chairman Kamal Kharrazi stated during an annual Arab-Iranian dialogue conference on May 13 that Iran would need to change its nuclear doctrine if it faced threats from nuclear-armed countries.[7] This threat is particularly noteworthy given that Kharrazi is a senior adviser to Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Kharrazi similarly stated during an interview with al Jazeera on May 9 that Iran will have “no choice” but to change its nuclear doctrine if Israel threatened Iran existentially.[8] That Kharrazi made both comments to Arabic-speaking audiences suggests that he meant to signal to Arab states, such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, in particular. CTP-ISW has observed that Iranian officials have normalized public discussion about pursuing a nuclear weapon in recent months.[9]

Anti-Iranian regime outlet Iran International and an Israeli social media account published a joint investigation on May 13 detailing senior Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) officer Mohammad Reza Zahedi’s last movements in Iran and Syria before Israel killed him in Damascus on April 1.[58] The article claimed that Zahedi flew on an IRGC-affiliated aircraft from Tehran to the Russian-controlled Hmeimim Military Airport in Latakia on April 1. Zahedi traveled later that day from Latakia to Damascus and arrived approximately fifteen minutes before Israel conducted the airstrike that killed him. CTP-ISW cannot corroborate or verify these claims. Hmeimim Military Airport is Russia's largest military base in Syria.[59] CTP-ISW previously reported that Iran and Russia are likely coordinating to transport Iranian materiel to Syria through Hmeimim Military Airport.[60]

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-13-2024

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