Posted on 10/08/2022 1:05:38 PM PDT by nuconvert
Iranian Regime national tv Channel One hacked about an hour ago. During a broadcast of Khamenie speech, a red crosshair appeared over his face and chanting of Women. Life. Freedom. There was writing to the side saying "Rise up. Join us". Also 4 photos at the bottom of the screen of young people killed and additional writing: "The blood of our youth is dropping from your paws".
Also, there was a huge banner in the middle of Tehran highway today that read: We are no longer afraid of you. We will fight.
Also, attempted attack on IRI ambassador in Denmark. Her bodyguard was stabbed. Diplomatic Security intervened before the attacker could stab the ambassador.
Videos obtained by @IranIntl show long lines of cars outside gas stations in various parts of Iran, amid reports that Russia has stopped gasoline exports to Iran and has even asked Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan to do the same. “Look at the ‘most powerful country of the region,” the Iranian citizen filming the video in Karaj is heard saying.
https://twitter.com/IranIntl_En/status/1691166511472226305
video
If this is true, we will know the reason within a few days.
Iran Update, August 15, 2023
Iran and the Syrian regime shifted their state-run information operation from the false claim that US forces will imminently attack Syrian-regime controlled territory and are instead alleging that United States supported recent ISIS attacks. Axis of Resistance media, however, continue to falsely accuse the United States of preparing to attack Syrian-regime controlled territory.
IRGC Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani met with Shia Coordination Framework leadership in Baghdad on August 15. Ghaani’s stop in Baghdad was the latest in a series of meetings with members of Iran’s Axis of Resistance in Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria.
Iranian state media signaled the regime’s frustration with the Taliban on the two-year anniversary of the group’s takeover of Afghanistan. This is a change from the conciliatory tone Iranian officials have recently adopted toward the Taliban.
Iranian Interior Minister Ahmad Vahidi appointed Qom Provincial Governor Mohammad Taghi Shah Cheraghi as Interior Ministry Political Deputy and head of Iran’s Election Headquarters on August 15. Shah Cheraghi could play a role in formulating the regime’s responses to anticipated security threats in the coming months.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-15-2023
The Russian government intends to introduce a ban on the free sale of gasoline abroad. This should cool down the domestic fuel market, where prices have already risen by 60% since the beginning of 2023 and hit new all-time highs. Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak, who is in charge of energy , instructed the Ministry of Energy to consider the possibility of introducing licenses for the export of petroleum products, Interfax writes.
The ministry previously planned to allow the export of fuel from Russia only to a narrow circle of companies and the official list of “special exporters”. The Ministry of Economic Development opposed. The agency indicated that it would be dangerous to publish such a list due to sanctions risks for companies and their agents. The ministry believes that licensing should be introduced. This idea was approved by Novak, says an Interfax source. According to him, the vice-premier supports limiting the number of exporters of oil products. At the same time, it is still unclear to whom and on what grounds licenses will be issued.
Analysts cited the cut in subsidies to oil companies as the reason for the deficit. Since September 1, amid problems with the budget, the authorities have been reducing payments by 30 billion rubles a month under the damper mechanism, which was introduced in 2018 to stabilize gasoline prices. In the regions, oil refiners have either “restricted the supply” of gasoline in small wholesale, or “do not provide” it at all.
Russia has ceased its gasoline exports to Iran for the past few months, an informed Iranian oil ministry official told Iran International on Monday.
The source said the Ministry had intended to import up to 10 million liters of gasoline daily from Russia to compensate for the gap in gasoline production and consumption. However, the Russian authorities, aware of Iran's needs, have halted the sale of gasoline to Iran, disrupting the planned efforts to address the fuel deficit. The expected volume from Russia would constitute roughly 10 percent of Iran's daily consumption in 2022.
The shortage has led to reductions in gasoline shipments to gas stations and long lines forming with cars rushing to fill their tanks.
According to the source, several other Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries have also been pushed by Moscow not to sell gasoline to Iran, further compounding the challenges faced by Iran.
One possible explanations could be Moscow's desire to raise the price of its gasoline, amid serious financial and economic challenges it faces following its invasion of Ukraine. Russia's currency the ruble fell again on Monday against the US dollar, breaking the psychological barrier of 100 rubles per dollar.
After Western countries slashed energy imports from Russia, Moscow started exporting gasoline and diesel to Iran by rail this year for the first time since it lost its traditional customers. In February and March, Russia supplied up to 30,000 tons of gasoline and diesel to Iran, Reuters reported. Subsequently, Ahmad Maroufkhani, the head of Iranian Oil, Gas and Petrochemical Products Exporters’ Union, disclosed that Iran was procuring each ton of petroleum products from Russia at a price $150 higher than global market rates. He told Tajaarat News that in addition to Russia Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan had also supplied fuel this year. According to Reuters, the shipments were made by rail from Russia via Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan.
Iran has been struggling with gasoline shortages since at least the beginning of the summer of 2022 and was forced to release one-third of its strategic gasoline reserves by the end of the same year. A source at the oil ministry told Iran International Sunday that the National Iranian Oil Refining and Distribution Company (NIORDC), a department within the ministry, has released around 900 million liters of strategic gasoline reserves into the market in an effort to make up the deficit. Iran has also scaled back its distribution, announced as a needed step to curb smuggling, limiting each refueling session to only 30 to 40 liters.
Earlier in the month, NIORDC deputy manager Ali Ziyar said that the average daily consumption of gasoline has hit 124 million liters, indicating a 20-percent increase compared with the previous year. “In recent years, the maximum annual growth in gasoline consumption has been seven percent, but this year we have suddenly experienced a 20 percent increase in consumption,” he said, tacitly acknowledging that a large amount of fuel is being smuggled out of the country because it is much cheaper than Iran's neighboring countries. He also stated that the daily gap between production and consumption is 17 million liters.
In recent days, rumors of an impending gasoline price increase have once again ignited, prompting a rush to gas stations. One of the main reasons that the Islamic Republic has not increased prices is because a fuel price hike would risk another wave of protests and strikes across Iran, especially with the first anniversary of Mahsa Amini’s death in police custody — the starting point of the ‘Women, Life, Liberty’ movement on the horizon.
Reza Ghorashi, a professor of Economics at Stockton University in the US, told Iran International that a large strike by the fuel truck drivers amid tensions over prices can cripple the regime's economy. He said in addition to economic repercussions, such an action is also a bold political statement in support of the popular street protests. Truckers, who do the heavy lifting of transporting goods mainly to and from Iran's border areas and ports across the country, have already held several rounds of weeks-long strikes that brought the flow of goods and the supply chain to a grinding halt.
An military ally of Russia providing drones and missiles, the Iranian regime is also involved in a bitter confrontation with the West. Iran and Russia's alliance may prove to be very flimsy as both countries are grappling with Western sanctions that and further economic woes for their people.
https://www.iranintl.com/en/202308144285
With many "middlemen" both in Russia and Iran, the cost to the consumer increases.
Qatar-based Al Araby reported that IRGC Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani ordered Iranian-backed militias in Iraq to suspend attacks against US targets. He specifically called for an end to an IED campaign that an Iranian-backed militia has waged against Iraqi-operated convoys supporting the US military presence in Iraq. .[1] The article cited an unidentified source in the Shia Coordination Framework—the umbrella organization for Iranian-backed political parties in Iraq. This report comes after Ghaani traveled to Baghdad on August 15 to resolve differences between Iranian-backed parties and discuss the recent US-Iraq Joint Security Dialogue.[2] CTP cannot verify this report, but it is consistent with CTP’s previous assessment that Ghaani may have ordered Iranian-backed militias to refrain from attacking US targets in Iraq during his last visit to Baghdad in June 2023.[3] It is also consistent with the reports that the US-Iran prisoner swap agreement is part of a broader understanding to reduce tensions between the United States and Iran and prevent Iranian-backed attacks against US positions.[4]
Ghaani specifically called for an end to an IED campaign that Ashab al Kahf—an Iranian-backed militia—has waged against Iraqi-operated convoys supporting the US military presence in Iraq. Ashab al Kahf has claimed responsibility for four IED attacks against such convoys since July 2023. Ashab al Kahf has consistently been the most publicly aggressive of the Iranian-backed militias toward the United States. The group has also called for two separate protests at the US embassy in Baghdad.[5] The Iranian-backed proxies that have gained political influence under Iraq Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani have rejected Ashab al Kahf’s calls to protest and have instead emphasized diplomatic and political pressure against the United States
Iranian oil exports to China have increased by over 60 percent in August 2023. This growing energy cooperation is part of a broader deepening of Sino-Iranian ties, especially regarding economic relations and infrastructure development.
Iranian state media blamed the Afghan branch of the Islamic State—named Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP)—for a recent terror attack in central Iran. This reporting from Iranian state media is the most explicit connection it has drawn yet between the attack and ISKP.
Armed Forces General Staff spokesperson Brigadier General Abol Fazl Shekarchi described the purpose of a recent Iranian military exercise in the Persian Gulf, affirming CTP’s previous assessment of its intent.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-16-2023
Iran Update, August 17, 2023
Syrians demonstrated against worsening economic conditions and the Syrian regime’s mismanagement of the economy across the country.
Iran’s supreme leader emphasized internal security threats to the IRGC on August 17. He urged the IRGC combat enemy attempts to stoke unrest stemming from popular frustration over mandatory veiling and during the upcoming 2024 parliamentary elections.
Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian traveled to Riyadh, Saudi Arabia on August 17, marking the first official visit of an Iranian foreign affairs minister to Saudi Arabia in more than eight years.
Russian efforts to ramp up the domestic production of Iranian Shahed-136/-131 drones indicate that Russia aims to develop the long-term capability to conduct large strikes series in Ukraine. The Washington Post report indicates that Russia is struggling to produce its own variants of the Shahed drones at the pace and quality it desires. Russia is likely dissatisfied with the quality of Shahed 131 and 136 drones it sources from Iran but likely seeks to retain Iran as a long-term strategic defense partner.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-17-2023
Iran Update, August 18, 2023
Protests against the Syrian regime expanded across three southern Syrian provinces. This expansion is unsurprising given that it is a Friday—the first day of the weekend in Syria.
Iranian-backed political actors in Iraq are spreading disinformation framing the United States as dangerous and hostile. This disinformation is similar to the narrative that Iran, Russia, and the Syrian regime have amplified in eastern Syria since June 2023.
The Iranian regime is trying to deter and preempt protests ahead of the anniversary of Mahsa Amini’s death on September 16. These actions highlight the regime’s enduring commitment to repression.
The Iranian regime officially connected a recent terror attack in central Iran to the Afghan branch of the Islamic State. The attack will likely exacerbate mounting tensions between Iran and the Afghan Taliban.
The Ebrahim Raisi administration is continuing its diplomatic campaign to convince BRICS countries to admit Iran ahead of the 15th annual BRICS summit in South Africa on August 22-24. Iran faces significant diplomatic hurdles to joining BRICS, however.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-18-2023
Iran Update, August 21, 2023
Anti-regime protests have continued to expand in southern Syria, despite the beginning of the work week. The Syrian regime is trying to redirect frustrations toward external actors and local elements.
The United States reportedly unloaded Iranian oil off a tanker after seizing it in April 2023. Iran may further seize commercial vessels and/or threaten US ships in response.
The Artesh Ground Forces commander traveled to Moscow to discuss military cooperation. This visit is part of the evolving military and security partnership between Iran and Russia.
The Iranian regime is working behind closed doors to pass an oppressive law that would expand the mandatory hijab requirement. These measures could further aggravate frustrations throughout Iran.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-21-2023
Iran Update, August 22, 2023
At least 21 anti-regime protests occurred in southern Syria. The Syrian regime is trying to prevent protests from spreading further.
The Iranian regime used its annual National Defense Industry Day holiday to highlight new military capabilities. The regime directed this messaging at foreign enemies and potential international buyers of Iranian defense products.
Iranian oil exports continue to surge, nearing pre-sanctions levels. Growing Iranian oil exports are part of Tehran’s ongoing effort to circumvent and undermine US sanctions.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-22-2023
Iran Update, August 23, 2023
At least 16 anti-regime protests occurred in the southern Syrian provinces of Suwayda and Daraa on August 23. The protests have gained popular support and activists are circulating calls for protests in Deir ez Zor Province on Thursday, August 24, and in all Syrian provinces on Friday, August 25.
Armed groups assassinated four pro-regime personnel, two of whom were from Iranian-backed groups, in eastern Syria between August 10 and August 22. Syrian regime forces refused to complete patrols in Mayadin City on August 23 following the assassinations.
The Supreme Leader’s office showcased the Iranian regime’s sponsorship of Palestinian resistance groups on August 22 after Israeli officials blamed Iran for kinetic activity in the West Bank.
Artesh Ground Forces Commander Brigadier General Kiomars Heydari traveled to Moscow between August 20-23. Heydari’s visit to the border surveillance equipment center and comment about “terrorism” indicate that Iran seeks Russian assistance in enhancing its border security.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-23-2023
Iran Update, August 24, 2023
Anti-regime protests continued and expanded to additional provinces in Syria. The expansion of protests to Deir ez Zor Province, albeit limited, suggests that Syrian protest groups may have successfully planned and organized the demonstrations.
BRICS invited Iran to become a full member state. Iranian state media boasted that membership will help the regime undermine Western sanctions and support major infrastructure projects.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-24-2023
Iran Update, August 25, 2023
Syrian opposition media reported that the Bashar al Assad regime ordered all Syrian Arab Army officers and troops to refrain from taking leave until further notice.
The Iranian regime is continuing to take preemptive measures to deter and prevent protests ahead of the one-year anniversary of Mahsa Amini’s killing on September 16.
Anti-regime protests occurred in at least three cities in Sistan and Baluchistan Province—a slight uptick from the usual protest activity that occurs each Friday in the province.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-25-2023
Iran Update, August 28, 2023
Iranian-backed militants deployed to Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)-controlled territory to conduct sabotage attacks amidst clashes between two US-backed groups in eastern Syria. The deployment of Iranian-backed militants likely supports pro-regime campaign objectives to expel the United States from Syria.
Iran threatened to take action against Kurdish anti-regime groups in Iraq and may conduct attacks in Iraq in the next month.
Iran finalized a barter agreement with China wherein Iran provides oil in exchange for Chinese development of the Imam Khomeini Airport in Tehran. This is consistent with the overall trend of Sino-Iranian oil-for-infrastructure agreements.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-28-2023
Iran Update, August 29, 2023
Lebanese Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah blamed the United States for the ongoing protests in Syria and called on demonstrators to show leniency toward the Bashar al Assad regime. Nasrallah is the first Axis of Resistance leader to publicly acknowledge the protests.
Iranian-backed militants raised their readiness levels around Deir ez Zor City amid ongoing clashes between the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces and the Deir ez Zor Military Council in eastern Syria.
IRGC Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani suggested that Iran would take unspecified military action if the Iraqi central government does not disarm and relocate anti-Iranian regime Kurdish militias in Iraqi Kurdistan.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-29-2023
The Iranian foreign minister traveled to Damascus, where he discussed economic cooperation and political stability with Syrian officials. The trip comes two weeks after the start of daily anti-regime demonstrations that protest the Assad regime raising fuel prices.
Iranian officials are signaling that the regime will pursue nuclear negotiations, probably with the aim to achieve a comprehensive agreement.
Russia has begun transporting consumer goods to Saudi Arabia via Iran. The transit of Russian goods to Saudi Arabia via Iran is consistent with Iran's efforts to become a regional and international “transit hub.” A Russian cargo train en route to Saudi Arabia entered Iran from Turkmenistan on August 26 and arrived in Bandar Abbas, Hormozgan Province on the Persian Gulf on August 30.[13] Hormozgan Province Railway Administration head Ali Reza Nasiri Barazandeh stated on August 30 that the International North South Transit Corridor (INSTC)—the land route connecting Russia to the Persian Gulf via Iran—has “economic and strategic benefits.”[14] He added that Iran can increase customs revenues by facilitating trade between Russia and Saudi Arabia. A Russian cargo train en route to India similarly passed through Iran for the first time in July 2022.[15]
Iran and Russia have pursued the completion of the INSTC to undermine and mitigate the impact of Western sanctions. Russia agreed in May 2023 to finance the Iranian construction of the Rasht-Astara railway in Gilan Province, Iran—the missing link in the INSTC.[16] The completion of this corridor will grant Iran and Russia access to new markets and enable Iran to charge foreign countries transit fees. Iranian media previously reported that the INSTC will generate $20 billion in annual revenue for Iran once it is completed.[17]
The transit of Russian goods to Saudi Arabia via Iran is consistent with Iran's efforts to become a regional and international “transit hub.”[18] Ebrahim Raisi administration officials have repeatedly framed Iran's centrality in Eurasia as an important asset to regional organizations such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and BRICS. President Raisi emphasized Iran's ability to connect land-locked Central Asian countries to open waters following Iran's accession into the SCO in July 2023.[19] Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian separately emphasized Iran's ability to connect China to Brazil and South Africa during the Raisi administration's diplomatic campaign to convince BRICS members to admit Iran in August 2023.[20]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-30-2023
Iran Update, August 31, 2023
Iranian-backed militias have continued to deploy into territory held by the US-backed SDF in northeastern Syria to conduct assassinations and fuel tribal disputes. These efforts support the Iranian campaign to expel the United States from Syria.
Iranian-backed militias have reportedly deployed from Iraq to Damascus for protest suppression. These deployments highlight the capacity of the IRGC to manage multiple efforts in Syria simultaneously.
The Iranian foreign affairs minister affirmed Tehran’s intent to maintain a long-term military presence in Syria.
A senior Iranian nuclear official downplayed the threat of the Iranian nuclear program during an Arabic-language interview with Al Jazeera, possibly to assuage Saudi concerns about Iranian nuclear activities and discourage Saudi leaders from building their own program.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-31-2023
Iran and the Syrian regime are exploiting instability in eastern Syria to pose a greater threat to US forces there.
The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps and Lebanese Hezbollah (LH) trained Russian forces in Syria to operate Iranian-made drones on August 31. The Russian forces trained on the Ababil-3 multirole and Qasef-1 combat drones at the Palmyra Military Airport in Central Syria, where Iranian-backed militias and Russian forces are stationed.[13] Local Syrian opposition media reported that the Russian forces have a special site for LH Unit 127—a drone production and intelligence collection unit—to assemble, test, and train forces on drones.[14] The IRGC could have used this opportunity to showcase Iranian drones to Russian officers, as the Kremlin continues to seek Iranian-made drones for use in Ukraine. ISW previously assessed that Russia seeks to retain Iran as a long-term strategic defense partner.[15]
Russian forces could use the drones to offset their force reduction in Syria since the invasion of Ukraine. Russia is periodically engaged in conflict with rebels in northwestern Syria, such as Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the jihadist group that controls the territory.[16]
Russia employs Iranian-made drones, notably the Shahed-131- and 136 drones for striking rear areas in Ukraine.[17] The Qasef-1 has a range of 150 kilometers, and Russian forces could use it to strike areas along the front line, given their frequent use of ZALA Lancet and FPV drones.[18]
Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian discussed anti-Israel operations with leaders from the Axis of Resistance in Beirut.
The Ebrahim Raisi administration is continuing to set conditions to resume nuclear negotiations with the West to achieve a comprehensive deal.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-september-1-2023
Syrian regime forces are financially exploiting the displacement of civilians amid clashes in Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)-controlled territory.
The deteriorating economic and security situation in eastern Syria may fuel anti-Syrian regime sentiment.
Russia provided at least two Yak-130 combat trainer aircraft to Iran, which could presage the delivery of more advanced, Russian-made Su-35s to Iran. The acquisition of Su-35s may enable Iran to more readily and independently project air power.
The Ebrahim Raisi administration closed a major reformist outlet, silencing a prominent critic of him and his foreign policy of expanding cooperation with Russia. This move will further reinforce the dominance of hardline voices over the Iranian information space. The Press Supervisory Board, which operates under the Culture and Islamic Guidance Ministry, shut down reformist-affiliated Entekhab News for publishing on August 22 a video criticizing Raisi’s “eastern- and Russia-oriented” foreign policy.[16] The Board accused Entekhab of publishing material “contrary to Iranian national interests.” CTP has extensively covered the Raisi administration's efforts to increase economic, energy, and security cooperation with China and Russia in recent months.[17]
Closing Entekhab will further reinforce the dominance of hardline voices over the Iranian information space. Entekhab served as a platform through which pro-regime moderates and reformists could criticize government economic and social policies.[18] This closure is especially noteworthy in the lead-up to the one-year anniversary of Mahsa Amini’s killing on September 16 and the parliamentary elections in March 2024. The closure is also part of a broader effort by Raisi to silence reformist media. The Press Supervisory Board previously shut down reformist-affiliated Sazandegi Newspaper in February 2023 for lamenting Iran's poor economic conditions.[19]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-september-5-2023
Russia directed local tribes to attack the US-led International Coalition and Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in eastern Syria likely part of a coordinated effort with Iran and the Syrian regime to expel the United States from Syria.
Iranian-backed militias relocated personnel and military equipment to southern Syria from Deir ez Zor on September 4, possibly to secure the Syrian regime as anti-regime protests continue.
Iranian protest organizations are planning demonstrations to commemorate the regime's killing of Mahsa Amini on September 16 and may generate protest turnout across Iran. The regime is taking steps to preempt protests that commemorate the death of Mahsa Amini and will likely crack down on demonstrations that occur.
Senior Iranian officials outlined the regime's policy perspective on Iran-Turkey bilateral relations during their meetings with Turkish Foreign Affairs Minister Hakan Fidan in Tehran on September 3.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-september-6-2023
Unsurprisingly #Iran’s decision to slow production of 60% enriched uranium & its failure to follow through on expanding IAEA monitoring is grabbing headlines.
The 60% news is a positive step with limited value. No progress on monitoring is a real concern.
But there is more: 1/
Thread
Given the limited nonproliferation value of the 60% slowdown future diplomacy should focus on enhancing transparency & actions that would have a meaningful impact on reducing short-term nuclear risk & preserving space for diplomacy. 20/20
https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1698814588085760153.html
Iran Update, September 7, 2023
The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps has sent over 60 Iranian-backed militants to Daraa Province to prevent the expansion of the ongoing, anti-Syrian regime protests in southern Syria.
Leaders from Lebanese Hezbollah, Hamas, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad met in Beirut and echoed Iranian leaders’ calls for greater cooperation among these groups against Israel.
Iranian authorities are continuing to take measures to deter and prevent anti-regime protests ahead of the anniversaries of Mahsa Amini’s death and the “Bloody Friday” incident on September 16 and 30, respectively.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-september-7-2023
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