Qatar-based Al Araby reported that IRGC Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani ordered Iranian-backed militias in Iraq to suspend attacks against US targets. He specifically called for an end to an IED campaign that an Iranian-backed militia has waged against Iraqi-operated convoys supporting the US military presence in Iraq. .[1] The article cited an unidentified source in the Shia Coordination Framework—the umbrella organization for Iranian-backed political parties in Iraq. This report comes after Ghaani traveled to Baghdad on August 15 to resolve differences between Iranian-backed parties and discuss the recent US-Iraq Joint Security Dialogue.[2] CTP cannot verify this report, but it is consistent with CTP’s previous assessment that Ghaani may have ordered Iranian-backed militias to refrain from attacking US targets in Iraq during his last visit to Baghdad in June 2023.[3] It is also consistent with the reports that the US-Iran prisoner swap agreement is part of a broader understanding to reduce tensions between the United States and Iran and prevent Iranian-backed attacks against US positions.[4]
Ghaani specifically called for an end to an IED campaign that Ashab al Kahf—an Iranian-backed militia—has waged against Iraqi-operated convoys supporting the US military presence in Iraq. Ashab al Kahf has claimed responsibility for four IED attacks against such convoys since July 2023. Ashab al Kahf has consistently been the most publicly aggressive of the Iranian-backed militias toward the United States. The group has also called for two separate protests at the US embassy in Baghdad.[5] The Iranian-backed proxies that have gained political influence under Iraq Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani have rejected Ashab al Kahf’s calls to protest and have instead emphasized diplomatic and political pressure against the United States
Iranian oil exports to China have increased by over 60 percent in August 2023. This growing energy cooperation is part of a broader deepening of Sino-Iranian ties, especially regarding economic relations and infrastructure development.
Iranian state media blamed the Afghan branch of the Islamic State—named Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP)—for a recent terror attack in central Iran. This reporting from Iranian state media is the most explicit connection it has drawn yet between the attack and ISKP.
Armed Forces General Staff spokesperson Brigadier General Abol Fazl Shekarchi described the purpose of a recent Iranian military exercise in the Persian Gulf, affirming CTP’s previous assessment of its intent.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-16-2023
Iran Update, August 17, 2023
Syrians demonstrated against worsening economic conditions and the Syrian regime’s mismanagement of the economy across the country.
Iran’s supreme leader emphasized internal security threats to the IRGC on August 17. He urged the IRGC combat enemy attempts to stoke unrest stemming from popular frustration over mandatory veiling and during the upcoming 2024 parliamentary elections.
Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian traveled to Riyadh, Saudi Arabia on August 17, marking the first official visit of an Iranian foreign affairs minister to Saudi Arabia in more than eight years.
Russian efforts to ramp up the domestic production of Iranian Shahed-136/-131 drones indicate that Russia aims to develop the long-term capability to conduct large strikes series in Ukraine. The Washington Post report indicates that Russia is struggling to produce its own variants of the Shahed drones at the pace and quality it desires. Russia is likely dissatisfied with the quality of Shahed 131 and 136 drones it sources from Iran but likely seeks to retain Iran as a long-term strategic defense partner.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-17-2023