Posted on 10/08/2022 1:05:38 PM PDT by nuconvert
Iranian Regime national tv Channel One hacked about an hour ago. During a broadcast of Khamenie speech, a red crosshair appeared over his face and chanting of Women. Life. Freedom. There was writing to the side saying "Rise up. Join us". Also 4 photos at the bottom of the screen of young people killed and additional writing: "The blood of our youth is dropping from your paws".
Also, there was a huge banner in the middle of Tehran highway today that read: We are no longer afraid of you. We will fight.
Also, attempted attack on IRI ambassador in Denmark. Her bodyguard was stabbed. Diplomatic Security intervened before the attacker could stab the ambassador.
Iran Update, June 29, 2023
The Syrian Arab Army (SAA) and Russian forces conducted airstrikes on rebel positions in Idlib Province between June 25 and 27. CTP is considering the hypothesis that Iran will commit forces to Idlib Province to support the SAA and Russian forces.
The Iranian regime is seeking harsher enforcement of mandatory veiling and may block banking and IT services for unveiled women, as well as imprison those who do not comply with the veiling laws.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-june-29-2023
Iran Update, June 30, 2023
The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force (IRGC QF) and Lebanese Hezbollah (LH) established a headquarters in eastern Syria, probably to coordinate arms transfers, intelligence collection, and training for Iranian-backed militants in Syria.
The Syrian Arab Army (SAA) and Russian forces conducted air strikes on rebel groups in Idlib Province shortly after the failure of the latest normalization and Astana Talks, and Iran may send Iranian-backed militants to in northwestern Syria to support the pro-regime operations.
Iran’s worsening water crisis is increasing food insecurity and internal migration, which will likely fuel greater popular unrest in the coming years.
The drying up of wetlands and rivers will limit Iranians’ access to clean drinking water and decrease food production, which will in turn harm many Iranians’ livelihoods. Esfahan Province residents—including many farmers—previously protested the drying up of the Zayandeh Roud River in November 2021.[30] Increased internal migration will additionally place an immense burden on large cities such as Tehran and change Iran’s social landscape. Large parts of Tehran experienced water cuts for several days in mid-June, which suggests that large cities sometimes have difficulty providing basic services to their citizens.[31] Increased internal migration would further strain cities’ capacities to meet citizens’ needs. Internal migration has historically caused unrest, moreover. Many protesters who participated in the December 2017-January 2018 Dey Protests had emigrated to the outskirts and suburbs of Iranian cities after facing economic hardships in their hometowns, for example.[32] Water scarcity is an issue that impacts all Iranians. This issue therefore poses a graver risk to the regime because, unlike previous protest movements which were largely limited to certain parts of the population, water protests could encompass numerous demographics.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-june-30-2023
Iran Update, July 5, 2023
Palestinian militants thanked Iran and the broader Axis of Resistance for their help during the recent Israel Defense Forces (IDF) raid in Jenin and likely will receive Iranian assistance to rebuild the military capabilities the IDF degraded.
Iranian officials inflated the amount of Iranian funds that a recent US sanctions waiver for Iraq will provide, possibly to inspire confidence in Iran’s economy and currency. News of similar waivers for Iraq has coincided with short-term improvements for the Iranian economy.
Iran became a member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization on July 4, which may enable it to circumvent sanctions through non-US dollar financial transactions with other SCO countries. Iran could benefit militarily from its membership in the SCO through participation in counterterrorism and naval exercises.
Iran attempted to seize two US oil tankers in the Strait on July 5, likely to assert its control over the Strait of Hormuz given the recent US naval deployments to the Persian Gulf. Iran also likely sought to pressure the US to accede to Iran’s demands in the nuclear negotiations.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-5-2023
Iran bolstered Lebanese Hezbollah's (LH’s) air defense capabilities likely to establish a deterrent in Lebanon against Israel.
Palestinian militant groups called for a cohesive strategy to counter Israel and may expand their joint military operation against Israel.
Iranian diaspora media, citing Russian investigative sources, claimed on July 6 that Russia has paid Iran nearly 900 million US dollars for Iranian drone technology.
CTP cannot independently verify this claim nor determine the credibility of the Russian sources. The report of Russian monetary payments for Iranian drones differs from other sources that asserted Iran would receive Russian military equipment, including Su-35 fighter jets, in return for supplying Russia with drones.[21] Iranian Defense Minister Mohammad Reza Ashtiani, for example, expressed optimism about obtaining Su-35s on March 6.[22] Iranian rhetoric regarding the acquisition of Su-35 jets has shifted in recent months, however. Ashtiani later stated on May 28 that reports of Iran receiving Su-35s from Russia were “mostly speculation.” Artesh Air Force Commander Brigadier General Hamid Vahedi stressed Iran needs the aircraft on June 2, but also added that “we don't know when it will enter our squadron.”[23] This indicates that Iran is skeptical about receiving the Su-35 in return for supporting Russia's war in Ukraine.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-6-2023
Iran instructed the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Quds Force (IRGC QF) to achieve total hegemony in Deir ez Zor Province, Syria in May 2023.
Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al Sudani appointed six individuals to senior Iraqi security service positions between July 5 and July 7. Three of the six individuals appointed are affiliated with the Iraqi Popular Mobilization Force (PMF).
The IRGC Navy seized the Emirati-owned, Tanzanian-flagged oil tanker Nada II in the Persian Gulf on July 6.
Iran is negotiating a barter agreement with China wherein Iran provides oil in exchange for Chinese infrastructure support, which is unlikely to result in immediate Chinese assistance.
Iranian UN Ambassador Saeed Ervani objected to the UK's decision to invite the Ukrainian UN ambassador to the biannual UNSCR 2231 implementation review meeting on July 6.
Zahedan, Sistan and Baluchistan residents participated in anti-regime protests for the 40th consecutive week on July 7. [30] Zahedan residents have consistently used weekly Friday protests to commemorate an incident on September 30, 2022 wherein Iranian security forces killed at least 80 anti-regime protesters.[31] Senior Iranian clerics separately stressed the need to enforce mandatory veiling in sermons on July 7, which demonstrates the extent to which the regime is reinforcing grievances that drove the Masha Amini protest movement.[32]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-7-2023
Iran Update, July 10, 2023
Iranian-backed militias and Syrian regime forces deployed to Deir ez Zor in response to rumors of an imminent International Coalition attack to liberate cities there which began in late June.
Lebanese Hezbollah and Syrian-regime media outlets claimed the United Arab Emirates (UAE) will pressure Turkey to withdraw its forces from Syria in exchange for direct investment. Iran and Syria may aim to use the media outlets to shape negotiations ahead of talks between Turkey and the Gulf States about Syrian-Turkish normalization.
Four Jaish al Adl militants attacked a police station in Zahedan, Sistan and Baluchistan Province on July 8 in retaliation for the September 2022 “Blood Friday” massacre, indicating that Jaish al Adl is trying to portray itself as the bastion of Iranian Baloch citizens. The Iranian regime limited its response to condemning the attack, likely to maintain stability in this restive border region.
IRGC-affiliated media is touting the successes of Iran-sponsored armed resistance in the West Bank against the recent Israeli raids into the area.
President Ebrahim Raisi will visit Kenya, Uganda, and Zimbabwe on July 11 to expand Iran’s economic influence in Africa, marking the first Iranian presidential visit to Africa in 11 years. Greater economic cooperation with African countries will not enable the Iranian regime to fix the structural flaws in Iran’s economy, however.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-10-2023
Iranian-backed militias and Syrian regime forces are continuing to reinforce their positions in Deir ez Zor Province in response to rumors of an imminent International Coalition attack to liberate cities.
The Shia Coordination Framework – a loosely aligned coalition of pro-Iranian political parties – blamed US sanctions on Iranian accounts in Iraq for failures in energy supply to Iraq from Iran, likely to place additional political pressure on the Iraqi government to remove the US from Iraq.
Social media accounts affiliated with the Popular Mobilization Force (PMF) circulated a call on July 11 for supporters to storm the US Embassy in Baghdad.
Iran is attempting to reestablish diplomatic relations with Egypt to portray itself as a member of the global community. Normalizing ties with Egypt would likely improve Iran's economy.
Iranian security personnel violently suppressed injured Iraq-Iran war veterans protesting livelihood conditions in front of the Martyr Affairs Foundation Headquarters in Tehran on July 8. [33] Social media users circulated footage of tear-gassed pepper-sprayed veterans and claimed that security personnel had also arrested and beaten an unspecified number of protesters. Iran-Iraq war veterans have previously protested poor economic conditions, but the regime did not meet these protests with force.[34]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-11-2023
Iranian-backed militias are continuing to reinforce their positions in Deir ez Zor Province, possibly to bolster defensive positions against a rumored International Coalition attack.
Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al Sudani announced the Iraqi government will evade US sanctions on Iran by trading Iraqi crude oil for Iranian gas during a televised statement on July 11.
Social media accounts affiliated with the Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces called for supporters to siege the US Embassy in Baghdad, which could elevate the risk of an attack on US personnel in Iraq.
Iranian officials and media responded negatively to the July 10 Russia-Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) joint statement, highlighting preexisting tensions in the Russo-Iranian relationship. The Russia-GCC joint statement expressed support for the Emirati claim to three Iranian-controlled Islands in the Persian Gulf.[13] Iran seized the Greater and Lesser Tunbs and Abu Musa islands in 1971 shortly after the British withdrawal from the Gulf. Iran's Foreign Affairs Ministry summoned Russian Ambassador Alexey Dedov on July 12 to object to the statement.[14] Iran similarly summoned Chinese Ambassador Li Tieh-tseng in December 2022 over Chinese support for a negotiated settlement of the disputed islands.[15] Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian emphasized the importance of preserving Iran‘s territorial integrity on July 12 and Foreign Affairs Ministry spokesperson Nasser Kanani stated on July 11 that the Russia-GCC statement upset Iran's improving relations with its neighbors while reaffirming Iran's ownership over the islands.[16] Other officials similarly criticized Russia for acting against Iran's national interests and attempting to create tensions between Iran and the Gulf Arab states.[17] Reformist-affiliated media also published critical articles narrating what they perceived to be a history of repeated ”anti-Iranian” Russian actions in the recent and distant past.[18]
Chinese and Russian support for the Emirati claim to the three islands is part of their strategy to simultaneously balance their relationships with Iran and the Gulf Arab states.[19] The Sino-Russian-led Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) has admitted four of the six GCC member states into the organization as dialogue partners. Both China and Russia have separately initiated strategic dialogue forums with the entire GCC.[20] The July 10 Russia-GCC joint statement was published at the conclusion of the most recent Russia-GCC strategic dialogue summit in Moscow, which started in 2016.[21] Chinese President Xi Jingping traveled to Riyadh in December 2022 to participate in the China-GCC summit.[22] Both Russia and China have simultaneously advanced their relationship with Iran, the most recent example of which was admitting Iran into the SCO as a full member on July 4.[23]
The Raisi administration is attempting to override parliamentary adjustments to its mandatory veiling bill. Regime enforcement of mandatory veiling—in any capacity—will likely exacerbate intra-regime tensions. It will also likely reignite anti-regime sentiments.
Iran Update, July 13, 2023
Iran instructed the IRGC QF to achieve total hegemony in Deir ez Zor Province, Syria in May 2023 and the recent surge of Iranian and Iranian-backed militia deployments to the province may support this objective.
Some official Iraqi proxy channels rejected calls to storm the US Embassy in Baghdad on July 14, possibly to diminish the risk of being drawn into a conflict with the United States.
UK-based, economic think tank Bourse and Bazaar reported that Iran completed payments for 50 Su-35 fighter jets during the second term of reformist President Hassan Rouhani’s administration between August 2017 to 2021.
Two security and foreign policy officials from the Supreme Leader’s office expressed concern over expanding Western and NATO influence in the Caucasus between July 12 and 13.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-13-2023-0
Iranian-backed militias raised salaries for standard militia members in Mayadin and Albu Kamal Cities, Deir ez Zor Province by 13 percent on July 13, likely enabling Iran to maintain a competitive advantage in recruitment amid increasing troop deployments to the province. [1] Iran and Iranian-backed militias increased local militia salaries by over 100,000 Syrian pounds (SYP), bringing the maximum militant salary to around 1,000,000 SYP.[2] Local news source Deir Ezzor 24 cited recent rumors of an attack by the International Coalition and SDF forces as the reason for the increase.[3] The Syrian National Defense Militia salaries for militants typically are around 300,000 SYP.[4]
The salaries for militants vary by role. The average Iranian-backed militant in Deir ez Zor received 600,000 SYP in February 2023.[5] The Iranian-backed Al-Bashir militia recruited volunteers to patrol the T2 station, Muayzila, and Al Salihiya, Albu Kamal City for 750,000 SYP.[6] Iranian-backed militias pay militants in less risky positions, such as guards, around 250,000 SYP.[7] This indicates that higher-risk jobs usually entail danger pay. Iran's decision to raise salaries in such an uncharacteristic manner demonstrates its concern of International Coalition and SDF attacks.
Popular Mobilization Force (PMF)-affiliated social media accounts that circulated calls to storm the US Embassy on July 14 prompted two small demonstrations of Ashab al Kahf protesters in the Jadiriyah District and al Kahdra neighborhood of Baghdad.
President Ebrahim Raisi traveled to Kenya, Uganda, and Zimbabwe between July 12-14 as part of his administration's intensifying economic diplomacy efforts.
Senior security and foreign policy officials are articulating the regime's comprehensive perspective on threats emanating from the Caucasus.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-14-2023
Maximum salary 1,000,000 SYP = $398 according to https://www.forbes.com/advisor/money-transfer/currency-converter/syp-usd/
Iran Update, July 17, 2023
A US senior defense official said Iran, Russia, and Syria are cooperating to pressure the US to withdraw forces from Syria. This is consistent with CTP’s assessment that Iran’s military buildup in eastern Syria may be to achieve hegemony.
Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia’ al Sudani met with Syrian President Bashar al Assad in Damascus on July 16 to discuss economic, security, and normalization issues. The improvement of Iraqi-Syrian relations through joint economic integration projects very likely would enable Iran to exploit regional trade to improve its economy and bolster Iranian regional influence.
Senior Iranian and Pakistani military officials met in Tehran between July 15 and 17. The meetings likely regard the volatile security situation in southeastern Iran, where Jaish al Adl conducted an attack on July 8.
Israel-based i24News claimed on July 16 that Armenia has used Iranian Shahed drones in several recent clashes with Azerbaijan. Iran may expand its military support to Armenia in response to Russian “negligence” toward the Caucasus.
The Iranian Law Enforcement Command (LEC) resumed the country-wide deployment of its morality patrol officers to enforce mandatory veiling on July 16.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-17-2023
Iran Update, July 18, 2023
Russia accused the United States of preparing false flag chemical weapons attacks against Syria, possibly supporting the joint Russian-Syrian-Iranian pressure campaign to expel US forces from the country.
Hamas’ militant wing in Jenin ambushed an Israeli military vehicle with a Shawath-1 explosively formed penetrator (EFP) during the Jenin raid on July 3, leading to the injury of seven Israeli soldiers. The Axis of Resistance likely aims to raise the costs of Israeli ground operations in the West Bank through the proliferation of EFPs.
Iran is pursuing a tit-for-tat policy with respect to seizing commercial tankers in the Persian Gulf.
Iranian Economic and Financial Affairs Minister Ehsan Khandouzi traveled to Beijing, China to attend the first Iran-China Joint Cooperation Commission meeting on July 16.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-18-2023
Iran Update, July 19, 2023
Iran and Russia are amplifying rumors of International Coalition attacks into Syrian regime territory likely as part of a campaign to expel US forces from Syria.
The British Secret Intelligence Service revealed on July 19 that Iran seeks to acquire cash from Russia in return for Iranian drones.
The IRGC Ground Forces conducted a military exercise near Iran’s border with Azerbaijan on July 19. Iranian officials have articulated a series of demands against Azerbaijan, which largely focus on Baku halting its anti-Iran cooperation with Israel and Turkey.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-19-2023
Iran Update, July 20, 2023
Iran, Russia, and the Syrian regime are coordinating military operations in eastern Syria likely as part of a coercive campaign to expel the United States from Syria.
Iranian Minister of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Ashtiani signed a defense and security memorandum of understanding (MoU) with his Bolivian counterpart Edmundo Novillo Aguilar in Tehran on July 20. Iran may seek to sell drones to Bolivia as part of this MOU.
IRGC Navy Commander Rear Admiral Ali Reza Tangsiri threatened that Iran will hold the United States and US companies responsible for confiscating and unloading Iranian oil, possibly signaling Iran will harass or seize US commercial and military vessels in the Gulf.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-20-2023
Iranian-backed militias transferred air defense weapons to eastern Syria, which likely will jeopardize the US-led International Coalition mission to defeat ISIS.
Iran expanded judicial cooperation with Syria, likely as part of a policy of building institutional links with regional allies.
CIA Director William Burns stated on July 20 that Russian technicians are assisting with the Iranian Space Launch Vehicle and missile program inside Iran. Russian assistance could advance Iran's development of inter-continental ballistic missiles and a military space program that would enhance Iran's intelligence gathering capabilities.
Iran is developing its SLVs with lift capacity and boosters that could be capable of reaching ICBM ranges, potentially reaching the United States, if they were reconfigured, according to the DIA.[12] Advancing Iran's space program would contribute to its development of ICBMs because SLVs use similar technologies.[13] Iran can use SLVs to launch satellites capable of collecting imagery and maintain an updated target bank for attacks abroad.[14] Iranian state media has reported that the IRGC used launched satellites to collect intelligence on US military positions in the region.[15] The IRGC Aerospace Force Space Command launched its first Iranian military satellite in April 2020 and a second in March 2022.[16] Russia, furthermore, launched a Kanopus-V satellite—alternatively referred to as the “Khayyam” in Iran—into orbit on behalf of Iran in August 2022.[17]
Russia's assistance to Iran's SLV program highlights another form of Russian payment for Iranian support in the Ukraine war and the expansion of Russian-Iranian relations.[18] Iranian Deputy Minister of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Brigadier General Hojatollah Qureishi separately discussed unspecified military cooperation with his Russian counterpart Alexander Fomin on July 21 in Moscow.[19] Iran's Ambassador to Russia Kazem Jalali also stated that Iran and Russia are cooperating on civilian passenger plane development.[20] Russian assistance with Iranian civil aviation could reinforce its proxies in Syria.[21] Iranian civil aviation has been in a state of decay for decades due to international sanctions.[22]
The above developments in Russo-Iranian cooperation follow reports that Iran is no longer expecting Russian delivery of Su-35 fighter jets.[23] Western media previously speculated that Iran could receive Russian military equipment, including Su-35 fighter jets, in return for supplying Russia with drones in the Ukraine war.[24]
BRICS has invited Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi to attend its 15th summit in Johannesburg, South Africa in late August.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-21-2023
Iran Update, July 24, 2023
The buildup of Iranian-backed forces in eastern Syria is possibly causing local anti-Iran and anti-Shia discontent.
The Iranian state-run Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA) launched an Azeri language section on July 21, likely to shape domestic Azerbaijani public opinion as Iran grapples with its concerns about the Caucasus becoming an arena for foreign interference.
Supreme National Security Council Secretary Rear Admiral Ali Akbar Ahmadian called for greater cyber security cooperation among BRICS countries during a Friends of BRICS National Security Advisors meeting in Johannesburg, South Africa on July 24. Iran may seek to bolster cyber security cooperation with BRICS countries to confront cyber-attacks and negative Western media narratives about Iran more effectively.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-24-2023
Iran Tries To Quell Scandal Over Official’s Same-Sex Video
A video that has gone viral on social media since Wednesday allegedly shows Reza Seqati (Seghati), a married man and the director general of the Islamic Culture and Guidance ministry in the northern Gilan Province who has close ties with the hardliner Paydari Front, engaging in sex with a young man, apparently at a ministry guesthouse.
A few days after the publication of the video, the Islamic culture and guidance department announced that it had suspended Seqati and referred his case to the judiciary for further investigation.
more info:
https://www.iranintl.com/en/202307240223
Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Nasser Kanaanisaid Monday, “We want governments of countries in which such shameful insults occur to prevent the repetition of such disgraceful actions and to strongly deal with the perpetrators.”
Following the incident, Hassan Nasrallah, the leader of the Lebanese Hezbollah militant group, called on all Arab and Muslim countries to expel the Swedish ambassadors from their respective nations and recall their own ambassadors from Sweden, echoing the actions taken by the Iraqi government.
The tensions escalated further when hundreds of supporters of Moqtada al-Sadr, a radical Iraqi Shia cleric, attacked the Swedish embassy in Baghdad, setting it on fire. A few days later, Baghdad expelled the Swedish envoy from the country.
Iran's Revolutionary Guard Commander Hossein Salami has also threatened attacks against those responsible for the incident in their own country, saying that those who burn or desecrate the Quran will not enjoy security.
Ali Khamenei, demanded harsh punishment for the perpetrators, saying that Sweden should hand over the individuals involved to a Muslim country. In the case of some Muslim states, the punishment would be execution.
https://www.iranintl.com/en/202307245983
Who is the biggest fighter against burning the Quran: Sunni or Shia and how do they deal with the destruction of Iranian Qurans smuggled to Saudi and Saudi Qurans smuggled to Iran?
I oppose burning Korans on the basis that it's a waste of toilet paper.
I guess the quality of Q is not even sufficient for this.
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