Posted on 10/08/2022 1:05:38 PM PDT by nuconvert
Iranian Regime national tv Channel One hacked about an hour ago. During a broadcast of Khamenie speech, a red crosshair appeared over his face and chanting of Women. Life. Freedom. There was writing to the side saying "Rise up. Join us". Also 4 photos at the bottom of the screen of young people killed and additional writing: "The blood of our youth is dropping from your paws".
Also, there was a huge banner in the middle of Tehran highway today that read: We are no longer afraid of you. We will fight.
Also, attempted attack on IRI ambassador in Denmark. Her bodyguard was stabbed. Diplomatic Security intervened before the attacker could stab the ambassador.
Q: How not to be wrong on which day Hezbolla &/or Iran will launch an attack on Israel?
A: Post everyday that “sources” have confirmed that the attack is today.
https://x.com/Jessica_Obeid/status/1823005436997480714
Iran Update, August 13, 2024
Russian President Vladimir Putin met with Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas in Moscow on August 13.[13] Putin reaffirmed Russian support for Palestinian statehood and said that an independent Palestinian state is essential to peace in the Middle East.[14] Putin also pledged to continue to support Palestine amid the humanitarian crisis in the Gaza Strip.[15] Abbas welcomed Russian support and called on the UN Security Council to ”stop the actions that Israel is taking” in the Gaza Strip.[16]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-13-2024
Iran Update, August 14, 2024
Israeli Foreign Minister Israel Katz said on August 12 that Iran is cooperating with Hamas in Lebanon to smuggle weapons and funds into Jordan to destabilize the Jordanian government.[31] Jordanian Foreign Minister Ayman Safadi denied Katz’s statement.[32] CTP-ISW has observed previous Iranian attempts to undermine security in Jordan.[33] Jordanian police located two separate caches of explosives in Amman in June 2024 and linked these incidents to Iranian efforts to recruit agents in Jordan to destabilize the country.[34] Iranian-backed groups in Iraq have also shown an interest in developing networks in Jordan, including by threatening to equip thousands of “Islamic Resistance in Jordan” fighters with weapons in April 2024.[35] A destabilized Jordan could provide Iran with more opportunities to transport weapons to Palestinian fighters in the West Bank.
Iran’s smuggling attempts through Jordan are part of a likely Iranian effort to increase its influence in the West Bank. Katz said that the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps is working with Hamas to transport weapons and funds through Jordan to Palestinian fighters in the West Bank.[36] Jordan’s western border with the West Bank offers multiple routes through which Iran can move weapons into the West Bank.
Katz also said that Iran effectively controls Palestinian refugee camps in the West Bank and that the Palestinian Authority is “powerless to act.”[37] Katz highlighted the Jenin refugee camp as a hub of Palestinian militia activity and said that Israel must take action to dismantle militia networks in the camp. Katz‘s comments come amid an uptick in Palestinian militia attacks in Jenin in August.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-14-2024
Iran is likely trying to build operational surprise ahead of its expected attack on Israel. Iranian officials and state media have suggested repeatedly in recent weeks that an attack is imminent.[1] They have likewise suggested that they are imminently delaying the attack to create uncertainty about the timing of the attack and thus stoke anxiety and fear among Israelis.[2] An IRGC-affiliated outlet published a graphic on August 15, for instance, boasting that the ambiguity surrounding the timing of the attack is just as harmful as the strike itself will be.[3] Iran has tried to build this operational surprise while forgoing having any strategic surprise. Iranian officials have been clear in their plans to attack likely in order to reduce the risk of miscalculation, keep the escalation relatively contained, and to avoid an all-out war.
The operational surprise that Iran is trying to build is meant to increase the likelihood that an Iranian drone and missile attack on Israel would inflict serious damage. John Kirby—the US White House National Security communications advisor—warned on August 15 that Iran could launch a strike with “little or no warning.”[4] US officials speaking to Western media have indicated that there is no consensus about when exactly an Iranian attack will occur.[5] Iran likely seeks to exploit this lack of warning to help its drones and missiles penetrate Israeli air defenses and strike some of their intended targets within Israel. Iran has taken similar approaches in previous attacks, such as the large-scale Iranian drone and missile attack on Israel in April 2024 and the Iranian missile attack on US forces in Iraq in January 2020.[6] Iran in both instances had forgone strategic surprise but cultivated operational surprise by threatening to attack and sending conflicting messages and statements about when exactly it would occur.
CTP-ISW continues to assess that the most likely course of action is that Iran and its Axis of Resistance will conduct a coordinated drone and missile attack on Israel. Senior Iranian officials have been consistent in their statements saying that they will respond “forcefully” to Israel killing Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran.[7] Western intelligence services have moreover observed Iranian preparations for an attack.[8]
CTP-ISW continues to evaluate the likelihood of other courses of action in which Iran does not launch a major, coordinated strike on Israel. Three anonymous Iranian officials speaking to Reuters on August 13 claimed that Iran and Lebanese Hezbollah would refrain from attacking Israel if it reached a ceasefire-hostage agreement with Hamas.[9] US President Joe Biden similarly said that he “expects” that a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip achieved in the next few days would lead Iran to refrain from attacking.[10] CTP-ISW assesses that this course of action is unlikely at the moment in part because the Iranian regime has not suggested this possibility publicly and has instead maintained that it will attack. Hamas also refused to participate in the latest round of negotiations in Qatar on August 15, making this course of action even less likely.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-15-2024
The Iranian regime is continuing to signal that it will conduct a serious retaliation against Israel in response to Israel killing several senior Axis of Resistance leaders, including Ismail Haniyeh, in recent days. Numerous Friday prayer leaders vowed on August 16 that Iran will give a “harsh” and “tooth-breaking” response to Israel for killing Haniyeh.[11] The Shiraz Friday prayer leader claimed that Israel will become more “insolent” if Iran does not respond to Haniyeh’s death.[12] The Karaj Friday prayer leader separately claimed that failing to respond to Israel would signal to Israel that Iran has “surrendered and accepted humiliation.”[13] This rhetoric is consistent with Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s remarks on August 14, which emphasized that Iran cannot execute a “non-tactical” retreat.[14] Khamenei directly appoints Friday prayer leaders, and the prayer leaders receive guidance for their weekly Friday sermons from the Office of the Supreme Leader.[15] The consistent rhetoric among various Friday prayer leaders therefore suggests that the rhetoric is part of a coordinated regime messaging effort.
Iran is reportedly seeking security partnerships with two Chinese satellite companies specializing in low-cost satellites capable of capturing high-resolution imagery.[40] This capability could enable Iran to enhance its intelligence-gathering capabilities to improve the effectiveness of its strikes. The Washington Post, citing unspecified Western security officials, reported on August 16 that Iran is seeking a partnership with two Chinese satellite companies specializing in manufacturing and operating small, low-cost satellites with optical equipment capable of producing high-resolution images. The Washington Post reported that the optical equipment of the Chinese satellites is “at least twice as sensitive” as the most advanced satellites currently operated by Iran. Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and the Chinese companies have exchanged multiple delegations over the past few months in an attempt to secure these partnerships.
Higher resolution satellite imagery could allow Iranian military services to improve their targeting practices for future operations targeting US, Israeli, and Arab military bases. Iran would also almost certainly share this targeting information with its proxies and partners to enable their attacks. Iranian state media previously reported in July 2020 that the IRGC used its satellites to collect intelligence on US military positions in the region.[41] The United States previously sanctioned one of the companies Iran is pursuing a partnership with, Chang Guang Satellite Technology Co., due to its support for Russia's Wagner Group.[42]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-16-2024
The highly edited video shows missiles inside the underground facility and launching positions for the projectiles. The voice of Hezbollah chief Hassan Nasrallah, boasting about the terror group's missile capabilities, can also be heard in the video.
What a waste of money, first the damage in Beirut because Hezbollah allowed storage of ammonium nitrate and now this. Lebanon suffers from food and electricity shortages.
https://www.facebook.com/people/Pakistan-Markazi-Muslim-league-Sawabi/100091924380568/
Saeed, the founder of Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), has been in jail since 2019 after being convicted for several years in multiple terror finance cases along with some other leaders of the banned Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD).
This means that the Pakistan Markazi Muslim League (PMML) party— set up by Hafiz Saeed, the founder of Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) is working with Hamasas as was noted earlier:
On January 16, 2024, Hamas leader Khaled Mash'al's special representative to Pakistan Dr. Naji Zaheer, who has been in Pakistan in recent months appearing publicly alongside U.S.-designated global terrorists, visited the Karachi Press Club where he spoke with Pakistani journalists and called for more anti-Israel protests, according to Pakistani media reports.
https://www.memri.org/reports/dr-naji-zaheer-special-representative-hamas-leader-khaled-mashal-shares-stage-pakistan-us
LeT was funded by Osama bin Laben https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lashkar-e-Taiba
Sunni and Shia terrorists are working together and planning something.
Iran Update, August 17, 2024
Hamas has rejected optimism from US and international mediators that a ceasefire-hostage agreement is close to being reached.[1] Hamas stated that there has been no progress on ceasefire-hostage talks and accused the United States of selling a “false positive atmosphere.”[2] Hamas restated its demand on August 16 that negotiations return to the Hamas’ July 2024 proposal after talks in Doha concluded. Hamas listed its demands for a full Israel Defense Forces (IDF) withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, a “real [hostage-prisoner exchange] deal,” and humanitarian aid for the Gaza Strip. Unspecified sources “familiar with the matter” claimed that Hamas suggested that it is willing to speak with mediators if “significant progress” was made during the talks in Doha on August 15 and 16.[3] It is unclear whether the ceasefire talks met this threshold. Israeli mediators are “cautiously optimistic” that ceasefire negotiations will advance.[4] Israel, however, insists that Israeli forces retain control over the Philadelphi Corridor, which is incompatible with Hamas’ demand for a full Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip.[5] Lower-level talks will continue into next week to resolve outstanding demands between Israel and Hamas ahead of a second round of talks in Cairo, Egypt.[6]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-17-2024
Iran Update, August 18, 2024
Iran has engaged with international mediators throughout this latest of ceasefire-hostage negotiations. Acting Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Ali Bagheri Kani held two phone calls with Qatari Prime Minister and Foreign Affairs Minister Mohammed bin Abdulrahman al Thani on August 15 and 16.[13] An unspecified US official told Axios that Iran claimed that it wanted a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip and to deescalate regional tensions.[14] Bagheri Kani separately held a phone call with Egyptian Foreign Affairs Minister Badr Abdelatty on August 17.[15] Bagheri Kani reiterated that Iran has the ”inherent and legitimate right” to retaliate for the Israeli killing of Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran on July 31.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-18-2024
Iran Update, August 19, 2024
Hamas’ threat of further suicide attacks may indicate a shift in tactics as IDF operations destroy Hamas rocket supplies and limit Hamas’ ability to conduct rocket attacks.[26] Hamas uses rocket attacks in part as a way to impose costs on the Israeli civilian population, and it may begin to use other tactics to impose costs on Israeli civilians. Hamas has not claimed a suicide bombing in Israel since 2008 and has not been affiliated with a suicide bombing attack since 2016.[27] Hamas has relied on mortars, rockets, and other systems to conduct regular attacks targeting the Israeli population after it stopped conducting suicide bombings.[28] Current IDF operations are limiting Hamas’ ability to conduct long-range rocket attacks. The IDF has assessed that Hamas’ long-range rocket and launcher supply is dwindling, and its forces frequently destroy rocket stockpiles on the ground.[29] The IDF Air Force also responds rapidly to rocket launches, quickly destroying relatively rudimentary launch sites from which Hamas has launched rockets into Israel.[30] Hamas retains a very limited ability to continue rocket attacks targeting major Israeli population centers such as Tel Aviv. The group attempted to fire two rockets at Tel Aviv on August 13, but the last Hamas rocket attack targeting Tel Aviv prior to August 13 came on May 26.[31] This demonstrates that Hamas may attempt to revert to suicide attacks to target Israeli civilian centers, though its ability to do so successfully will be hampered by far more effective Israeli preventative measures that did not exist in the 1990s and 2000s.[32]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-19-2024
Iran Update, August 20, 2024
Senior Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) officials have continued signaling that Iran will attack Israel directly in response to Israel killing several senior Axis of Resistance leaders, including Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh, in recent weeks. IRGC Deputy Commander Brigadier General Ali Fadavi warned on August 20 that Iran will “definitely” retaliate against Israel “at the suitable time and place.”[1] Fadavi also warned that Israel “will be punished more severely than before,” likely referring to the large-scale Iranian drone and missile attack on Israel in April 2024.[2] CTP-ISW previously assessed that Iran likely seeks to cause greater damage to Israel than it did in its April 2024 attack in order to restore deterrence with Israel.[3] The United States, Israel, and their allies intercepted most of the projectiles that Iran and its allies fired at Israel in April 2024, so that the Iranian attack inflicted significantly less damage than Tehran intended.[4] IRGC spokesperson Brigadier General Ali Mohammad Naeini separately stated on August 20 that Iran is not rushing to retaliate against Israel.[5] Naeini, as the IRGC spokesperson, is the IRGC’s chief media officer and responsible for external messaging. Naeini claimed that Iran’s “right” to respond to Haniyeh’s death is unrelated to current ceasefire-hostage negotiations between Israel and Hamas, which mirrors similar statements from senior Iranian political officials in recent days.[6] This statement notably differs from recent Western reports that Iran would refrain from attacking Israel if Israel reached a ceasefire-hostage agreement with Hamas.[7] The Western reports may reflect the views of more moderate factions, such as President Masoud Pezeshkian and his allies, within the regime, while the IRGC and Iranian security establishment more broadly still seemingly seeks to conduct a direct strike on Israel regardless of whether Israel and Hamas conclude a ceasefire-hostage agreement.[8] Naeini’s remark that Iran is not rushing its retaliation is consistent with CTP-ISW’s assessment that Iran is likely delaying its attack in part to stoke psychological terror among Israelis.[9]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-20-2024
CTP-ISW is currently not prepared to change its assessment that Iran and its Axis of Resistance will most likely conduct a coordinated, large-scale attack targeting Israel. Some recent Iranian statements and Western media reports diverge from CTP-ISW’s ongoing assessment. Below are several of these statements and reports:
Unspecified Iranian officials told Western media that Iran will “delay” its attack on Israel if Israel and Hamas conclude a ceasefire-hostage agreement.[6] The Iranian UN mission similarly claimed in its August 20 statement that Iran seeks to “avoid any possible adverse impact” on the ongoing ceasefire-hostage negotiations.[7]
The Iranian president and his allies have advocated for attacking “secret Israeli bases” in Iraqi Kurdistan and Azerbaijan as a way to limit the risk of escalation.[8]
Some senior Iranian officials have called for killing senior Israeli political and military leaders instead of conducting a widescale attack on Israel.[9]
CTP-ISW does not dismiss the above statements and reports. These statements and reports, however, most likely do not reflect the views of the Iranian security establishment and members of the chain of command who are ultimately responsible for deciding and implementing Iran's response. The Iranian UN mission, for example, reports to the Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry, which is part of the Masoud Pezeshkian administration. The Iranian UN mission's statement that Iran seeks to avoid undermining ceasefire-hostage negotiations by conducting a strike therefore likely reflects Pezeshkian’s desire to avoid a direct strike on Israel rather than the views of the Iranian security establishment.[10] CTP-ISW continues to attach greater significance to statements from senior Iranian military officials and the Supreme Leader about how Iran will respond. These statements continue to indicate that Iran will most likely conduct a coordinated, large-scale attack targeting Israel:
Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei ordered a direct strike on Israel during a Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) meeting immediately following Haniyeh’s death.[11] Khamenei has publicly stated that Israel should face a “harsh punishment” for killing Haniyeh.[12]
Senior Iranian security officials, including Armed Forces General Staff Chief Major General Mohammad Bagheri and SNSC Secretary Ali Akbar Ahmadian, have suggested that both Iran and the Axis of Resistance will retaliate against Israel.[13]
Senior Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps officials, including IRGC Deputy Commander Ali Fadavi, continue to indicate that Iran will attack Israel directly.[14]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-21-2024
Iran Update, August 22, 2024
Iranian interest in the progress of Gaza Strip ceasefire-hostage negotiations suggests that elements of the Iranian regime are likely delaying a retaliatory strike on Israel until ceasefire talks conclude. Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps-affiliated Tasnim News Agency reported that newly appointed Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi is scheduled to meet Qatari Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman al Thani in Tehran “in the coming days.”[1] Thani kept Iranian officials apprised of negotiation progress during the August 15-16 ceasefire talks. The timing of Thani’s visit, combined with his role as a liaison between Iran and the other negotiators, suggests that Thani is likely to discuss the ceasefire with Iranian officials during his visit.[2] Talks between Israel and international mediators, including Qatar, restarted in Cairo on August 22 immediately before Thani’s visit to Iran.[3] Statements from Hamas and Israel suggest that disagreements over Israeli force presence in the Strip continue to be a barrier to a ceasefire agreement, however.[4] Unspecified Iranian officials told Western media on August 13 that Iran will “delay” its attack on Israel if Israel and Hamas conclude a ceasefire-hostage agreement.[5] The Iranian UN mission similarly claimed on August 20 that Iran seeks to “avoid any possible adverse impact” on the ongoing ceasefire-hostage negotiations.[6]
The Iranian security establishment may calculate that a continued delay will generate operational surprise while forgoing strategic surprise, though the continued Iranian delay has also enabled the United States to move more assets into the theater to defend against an attack. Iran has likely not retaliated against Israel up to this point because Iran very likely seeks to ensure that its next attack restores deterrence with Israel while simultaneously avoiding a large-scale war.[7] Iranian leaders are therefore incentivized to carefully and slowly calculate their next attack to ensure that the attack inflicts serious damage on Israel but does not cause mass civilian casualties. Establishing deterrence would, however, require any retaliation to be successful. Iranian and Axis of Resistance officials have repeatedly emphasized that an attack targeting Israel will occur but have sought to counteract strategic clarity with operational ambiguity on the attack’s precise timing. US officials have warned, for example, that Iran could launch a strike with ”little or no warning.” The operational surprise that Iran is trying to build is meant to increase the likelihood that an Iranian retaliation on Israel would inflict serious damage, as CTP-ISW has previously noted.[8]
Iranian decisionmaker’s delay has also enabled Israel and its allies to ready defenses and move additional military assets to the region, however. The Nimitz-Class carrier USS Abraham Lincoln arrived in the Middle East on August 21, enabling US forces to operate two carrier strike groups in the event of an Iranian attack on Israel.[9]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-22-2024
Conflicting reports persist on cause of Raisi’s fatal chopper crash
Three months after the helicopter crash that killed Iran’s president and his foreign minister, the true cause of the incident remains shrouded in secrecy for the Iranian public, with conflicting reports continuing to emerge.
On Wednesday, the IRGC-affiliated Fars News reported that the crash was due to adverse weather conditions and the helicopter being overloaded. Citing an unnamed security source, the report claimed, “The investigation into Raisi’s helicopter crash has been completed... there is complete certainty that what happened was an accident.” The source identified unsuitable weather and excess weight as the causes, with the helicopter allegedly carrying two more people than allowed under security protocols.
However, the Armed Forces General Staff’s communications center, which oversees crash investigations, categorically denied the Fars report, labeling it “completely false.” The center urged media outlets to coordinate with them on defense and security reports to avoid “creating opportunities for enemies to exploit.”
https://www.iranintl.com/en/202408213110
Palestinian sources told Israeli media that Hamas has decided to begin targeting Israeli civilians abroad, possibly due to Hamas’ decreasing ability to conduct attacks into Israel.[10] Hamas has historically targeted Israeli civilians to impose costs on Israel for operations against Hamas. Unspecified Palestinian sources told Israeli Channel 12 that Hamas took a “strategic decision” to attack Israelis abroad to avenge the death of Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran. Hamas may made this decision because Israeli operations have destroyed the bulk of Hamas’ rocket supply.[11] The loss of this rocket supply and improved Israeli preventative measures over the last three decades that have made the use of suicide bombers within Israel impractical and less effective means that the two tactics Hamas has historically used are decreasingly viable.[12] Hamas could collaborate with Iran to threaten Israeli civilians abroad, given that Iran has invested tremendously in building covert attack networks abroad that could be used to target Israelis.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-23-2024
Iran Update, August 24, 2024
Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-affiliated outlet Tasnim News Agency claimed on August 24 that the April 2024 Iranian drone and missile attack on Israel demonstrated Israel’s inability to counter a multifront attack from Iran and its Axis of Resistance.[20] Tasnim News Agency claimed that a “massive” attack by Iran and its Axis of Resistance on Israel would “paralyze” Israeli and partner air defense systems. Tasnim News Agency further claimed that Israel lacks the manpower and military equipment to defend against such an attack. The article also described the April 2024 attack as a “warning operation.”
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-24-2024
Iran Update, August 25, 2024
Iran, Hezbollah, and the rest of the Axis of Resistance will likely learn lessons from the Hezbollah attack in order to improve the efficacy of future attacks on Israel, as CTP-ISW has previously warned.[21] The Hezbollah attack was likely in part a reconnaissance-in-force operation. The US Army defines reconnaissance-in-force as “a deliberate combat operation designed to discover or test the enemy’s strength, dispositions, and reactions or to obtain other information.”[22] Hezbollah could thus use the attack to better understand the capabilities and disposition of Israeli air defenses. Hezbollah could also better understand how to design more effective strike packages against Israel, which could include a larger volume of fire or the use of missiles—rather than just drones and rockets. The Axis of Resistance could apply this information in separate attacks in the coming days or weeks.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-25-2024
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